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THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

WOMEN KEEPING SILENCE IN CHURCHES.

BY REV. WILLIAM DELOSS LOVE, D.D., ANDOVER, MASS.

On Sunday, Oct. 13, 1845, died Mrs. Elizabeth Gurney Fry, in the sixty-sixth year of her age. Her excellent natural endowments were remarkably graced with culture and refinement. She became an earnest Christian in early womanhood, and soon entered upon a career of philanthropy unusual for that period, continuing in it thirty-five years, to the end of her life. She became a preacher of the Society of Friends, and as such had a lengthened experience in addressing public audiences. She travelled much on the British Isles and through continental Europe, and was often admitted to kings' palaces. Much interest centred about her prison-reforms, of which she often spoke in public; but her most effective discourses were upon the spiritual truths of the gospel. Often addressing women alone, she still did not scruple to speak in the presence of men when she thought herself constrained to do so by the Holy Spirit. Her larger audiences are reported as numbering fifteen hundred, and sometimes three thousand, persons. Kings, courtiers, and their families, with many of the most intelligent and refined men and women of cities and realms, assembled to hear her. Yet was she the mother of eleven children, whose training and development she by no means neglected; two of her

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daughters giving to the world the memoirs of their mother in a set of very interesting volumes.

These facts in the life of Elizabeth Fry suggest some inquiries concerning the Pauline direction that women keep silence in the churches. — Was that command binding on her? Was there anything indelicate in her appearing before men, as well as women, to speak and to teach? In so doing did she lack in proper subjection to her husband? Was hers a case of exception? If in these days we are not in all respects bound to the inspired letter of eighteen centuries ago, what relieves us, and how far does our wider privilege extend?

It is obvious that the leading questions on this subject are not yet settled. The two extreme views advocated are these: First, that silence at this day, and in all ages, is enjoined upon all women in all religious assemblies where men are present; second, that the command of silence was binding *only* upon Grecian women who had just been converted from idolatry, but not yet from all ignorance and its degradation. Is there not a golden mean between these two opinions which will reconcile all Scripture on this subject, and at the same time satisfy a conscientious regard for the divine word and all rational demands of the most active and also of the most cultivated modern society?

The two passages which enjoin the silence of women are from the inspired pen of the apostle Paul. As rendered by Alford, they stand thus:

"Let your women keep silence in the churches: for it is not permitted unto them to speak, but to be in subjection, as the law also saith. And if they wish to learn anything, let them ask their own husbands at home: for it is a shame for a woman to speak in the church. What! did the word of God come forth from you? Or came it unto you alone?" (1 Cor. xiv. 34–36).

"Let the women learn in silence in all subjection. But I suffer not the woman to teach, nor yet to rule over the man, but to be in silence. For Adam was first formed, then Eve.

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And Adam was not deceived, but the woman being taken by the deceit hath become a transgressor. Notwithstanding she shall be saved through her child-bearing, if they continue in faith and love and sanctification with sober-mindedness" (1 Tim. ii. 11–15).

The opinions advocated in this Article will be grouped under five different heads.

I. Some prominent views respecting woman's silence in the churches are inconsistent with Scripture facts.

1. Elaborate attempts have been made to show that the word translated *to speak* in 1 Cor. xiv. 34, 35 means, in that instance, simply *to babble;* and that the apostle did not intend to forbid woman's intelligent speech in promiscuous or mixed religious assemblies, but to forbid the disorderly and unprofitable speech of those Corinthian women, and of others like them, at that day.

We reply: (1) The usual meaning of the verb λαλεῖν is not *to babble*, but *to speak*. In this same epistle it is used when one speaks the "wisdom of God" (1 Cor. ii. 7) and the wisdom of the Spirit (ii. 13; xii. 3); while in another epistle it is used for the speaking of God (Heb. i. 1, 2; ii. 3), and for that of angels (ii. 2). In the classics this word is sometimes used to express the inarticulate sounds of human beings, the natural cries of animals, and also their attempts to imitate speech. But Archbishop Trench says that all those contemptuous uses of λαλεῖν, as to talk at random or to chatter, are foreign to the New Testament.[1] Neither do we find in the lexicographers Robinson, Bloomfield, Loch, Grimm, Harting, Schirlitz, Wahl, Wilke, any recognition of this bad sense of the word when it is used in the New Testament. Bretschneider, however, recognizes it in 1 Cor. xiii. 11 and 1 Tim. v. 13; yet in both those passages that shade of meaning lies not in the word, but in the context.

(2) If it were shown — which it is not — that the women at Corinth, and also those at Ephesus (where doubtless Timothy was when Paul addressed his first Epistle to him),

[1] New Test. Syn., p. 275.

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were incompetent or disinclined to say anything rational or of profit in religious assemblies, then this claim that they only babbled would have weight. On the contrary, Strabo speaks of the strong influence exerted by the women of Western Asia in forming the religious opinions of the men. In this same country was Ephesus, where Paul also enjoined "silence" upon women. Why should it be different across the Archipelago in Corinth? Aristotle credits the Spartan women with great influence over the men.[1] Such influence was not elsewhere unknown. The noted Phoebe, "succorer of many," lived in Cenchrea, the port of Corinth, and must have had a leading influence over her Christian sisters in that city. Priscilla for a time worshipped with the church in Corinth, and also must have exerted a social power over its women. "The good service which women contributed towards the early progress of Christianity is abundantly known, both from the Acts and the Epistles."[2] It must be that there were women in the Corinthian church who were far above *babbling*.

(3) The Pauline direction in some places is general, and not specific, applying to all women, and not to those only of Corinth and Ephesus. In Timothy (1 Tim. ii. 11, 12) it is not "your women," but "the woman," who is charged to learn in silence. In Corinthians (1 Cor. xiv. 35) the direction is first to "your women," but afterwards to "women," or, as the earlier manuscripts read, "a woman." This change from the definite to the indefinite shows that the command was binding on women in general at that time, and not merely on those of two or more particular cities.

(4) The *reason* assigned by the apostle for silence is applicable to *all* in Christian communities at that day, and not alone to the women of Corinth and Ephesus. That reason is, that there should be due honor to husbands and men. In First Corinthians the apostle writes, "As the law also saith." That law is, "Thy desire shall be to thy hus-

[1] Grote's Hist. of Greece, Vol. ii. p. 383.
[2] Conybeare and Howson, Vol. i. p. 181.

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band, and he shall rule over thee" (Gen. iii. 16). In First Timothy the apostle makes specific reference to Adam's being formed first, and not being first deceived, as the reason why authority was given to man. And from this he infers the duty of silence on the part of *woman*. Hence to limit the injunction of silence to the women of Corinth and Ephesus must be wrong.

(5) In 1 Cor. xiv. 27, 28 a *man* speaking in an unknown tongue is directed to "keep silence in the church," unless there be an interpreter present. Unintelligible address is forbidden in men, with the implication that they may speak in church if they have something to say that can be understood. But if *babbling* — senseless talk — were the only thing prohibited in women, why was there not the implication that they too might speak if they would utter sensible thoughts? Why was not exception made for such women as Priscilla, Phoebe, Lydia? They would have spoken better than some men. Such permission is not given, but silence is enjoined upon them, on account of their *sex*.

2. Professor Calvin E. Stowe has argued[1] that the apostle's injunction of silence was laid upon women in the churches of Greece and Asia Minor, because of peculiar customs there requiring reticence and retirement; and that in Rome and other parts westward from Greece, more freedom being allowed to woman, no such silence was enjoined. Such exception is not made or intimated in Scripture, and the inference is that it did not exist. At that time the condition of woman was nearly the same in all pagan nations. Earlier it was better, especially in Rome, and women still had a few more *legal* rights there than in Greece. They could give evidence in courts of law, and could accompany their husbands to public banquets. Professor Stowe cites Cornelius Nepos to show the superiority of the condition of Roman over that of Grecian women. But this author lived nearly a century earlier than the date of Paul's Epistles; and all he claims is that a Roman was not ashamed to take his wife to

[1] Hearth and Home, Vol. i. pp. 600, 601.

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a feast, and that he allowed her to occupy the better part of the house, even in the presence of company — *all* which was more than the Grecians did, and *a part* more than many Romans did when Paul gave his command. Becker shows that Roman women were in general restrained by custom from exercising even their legal rights.[1] And history shows that the silence made imperative on one side of the Adriatic was not changed to practical liberty of speech on the other. Besides, we have seen that Paul's direction to be silent was based on the difference between man and woman, and therefore must have been applicable in *all* churches, unless there were special reasons to the contrary, — which there were not, so similar were the manners, customs, and intelligence of all well-known nations of that period. Yet Professor Stowe recognizes the important fact that the apostle would not undertake to change *all* evil customs of his age, but would await the sure work of truth and time for some.

3. The theory that the meetings where Paul enjoined silence upon women were merely of a business character seems clearly untenable. The passages show that they were religious meetings. In the Corinthian instance, the "word of God," "psalm," "doctrine," "revelation," and "interpretation" are under consideration (1 Cor. xiv. 26, 36). In the case of the Ephesian church, "Faith and love and sanctification with sober-mindedness" are the theme (1 Tim. ii. 15). These are not business concerns, but religious topics.

4. There is no ground for the opinion that the silence enjoined was to be observed only in synagogues or other church buildings. For the "church," the *Ἐκκλησία*, means "assembly" of any religious kind in any place, and does not mean the building where the assembly meets.

5. Another view is, that the apostle required only so much silence of women in the churches as was needful for good order and womanly "subjection." The passages are interpreted to mean that women should keep quiet and orderly as "under obedience." But against this stand positive injunctions: "Let

[1] Gallus, p. 153.

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your women keep silence in the churches"; it is not permitted unto them to speak"; "Let them ask their own husbands at home"; "It is a shame for a woman to speak in the church." Silence itself was requisite to good order and womanly subjection, except in special circumstances.

6. The view most prevalent, which seems to us inconsistent with Scripture relative to our obligations, is this: Woman's silence in religious assemblies of the two sexes is as obligatory now as in the apostolic day. One of the ablest discussions in favor of this view is contained in the Bibliotheca Sacra for 1870. The writer, Rev. A. Hastings Ross, maintains: "A positive limitation of some sort is put by the Scriptures upon women."[1] He cites the limitation requiring 'woman's subordination to man,' which, as he rightly says, is as "permanent as the relation of the two sexes."[2] He cites, also, the limitation requiring woman's "silence," as though it were equally permanent; whereas the latter depends on the varying law of custom, and does not demand the same strict enforcement in modern civilization that it did in primitive times. Once "silence" was a synonyme of "subjection"; but it is not so now.

II. The same permanent principles are often embodied in changeable customs, quite unlike each other, in different countries and ages. As an idea may be expressed in various languages, so it may be by various customs. With the early Greek Christians men expressed reverence in places of worship by uncovering their heads (1 Cor. xi. 4, 7). So with us. But in the Orient, then and now, the same sentiment has always kept the head covered. In China gentlemen calling upon their friends express respect for them by keeping their hats on; we do the same by taking them off. Here we express cordiality by shaking each others' hands; the Chinese do it by shaking their own. English and American ladies wear white at weddings and black at funerals; Chinese ladies reverse that order. An American student, reciting a lesson, expresses respect for his teacher by turning

[1] Vol. xxvii. p. 337. [2] Ibid., p. 339.

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his face towards him; while a Chinese student does the same by turning his back. In China the left hand is the place of honor; here, the right. In Eastern Turkey a gentleman precedes a lady in entering a room; but in America the reverse is the order. In Europe a young lady may not go out at evening unattended by a gentleman or lady guardian or protector; in America she may go with any proper company. Standards of propriety and the language of manners change.

It has long been understood that some commands of Scripture pertaining to customs are not binding upon us, if other current customs involve the same sentiments and principles. There is the definite affirmation of the Saviour, "Ye also ought to wash one another's feet" (John xiii. 14). And the apostle Paul puts 'washing the saints' feet' (1 Tim. v. 10) along with other "good works" as an index of noble character in woman. It was a significant and symbolical act. Some have made foot-washing a sacrament, and a few still so observe it. But Christendom generally perceives that Christ did not institute it as a perpetual ordinance. Yet he himself exemplified it with his apostles, and enjoined it as at that time a proper and expressive symbolic custom. The Christian principles signified by it — humility and love for the brethren — are now manifested by other acts. Climatic change often changes foot-washing to foot-clothing or foot-warming. Luther recommended in place of it a bath for the poor. Christianity makes us willing to do even menial service for one another, when that subserves the higher temporal or spiritual good. The principle of humble love remains; the custom has passed away.

The apostle James enjoins prayer for the sick by the elders, "anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord" (James v. 14). The ancients used unguents for the promotion of health. Orientals now in warm countries do the same. Many Christians after the apostolic age continued the custom of anointing the sick. As a curative, in cool climates, its use now is generally displaced by other remedies. Though

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once a symbolic sacrament with some, with us it seems not to be binding as such. The duty of prayer for the sick and of the use of means for their recovery continues; the custom of anointing with oil is superseded.

III. The customs of the early Christian era which then required the silence of women in churches had changed since the more primitive and better Hebrew life, and have again changed since the apostolic period.

1. Customs among the Hebrews in the early Christian era. The condition of Hebrew women then was far better than in surrounding countries at that time,[1] or than in the Orient now. Hebrew law gave them some advantages denied even by the European or American law.[2] The former was founded on the Pentateuch, while the latter is partly based on Roman jurisprudence. But the general seclusion of woman from the other sex prevailed in all Eastern countries in the time of Christ and his apostles, and during hundreds of years before. 'It was the custom prevalent from the earliest period of the East to seclude women in apartments removed from those of the men.'[3] Among the Hebrews women had their own apartments, especially when in captivity among the Persians, as is evident from the case of Esther (Esther ii. 8, 11). Daughters seldom left those apartments for secular purposes, except among the humbler classes, and then chiefly or wholly for drawing and bringing water, or tending the flocks.[4] Daughters who by their wealth were elevated to high stations in life spent nearly their whole time within the walls of their palaces.[5] In Solomon's palace there was a woman's apartment separate from the rest (1 Kings vii. 8). In journeys women had their separate tent (Gen. xxxi. 33). At the eastern gate of Solomon's Temple virtuous men could take their wives with them as they entered; but women were excluded from the two inner

[1] Smith's Dict. of the Bible, p. 3552. [2] Smith and Barnum, p. 1194.
[3] Layard's Nineveh, Vol. ii. p. 193.
[4] Jahn's Archæology, p. 175; Kitto's Cyclopædia, Vol. ii. p. 966.
[5] Jahn's Arch., p. 176.

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courts.[1] In the same locality, in Herod's Temple, was the inclosure known as the "court of the women,"[2] though not exclusively devoted to them.[3] Worship in synagogues was practised at least five or six hundred years before Christ. In them each congregation was divided by a partition five or six feet high; the men being on one side and the women on the other. A speaker on either side of the partition could not be seen by the whole audience. To avoid confusion, he must go to the platform in full view of all, where for a woman to go, unless she were a prophetess, would have been very indecorous and immodest. These arrangements and customs of themselves nearly compelled the silence of ordinary women in the larger religious assemblies, especially in the synagogues, where the primitive Christians often met. But those buildings were ill constructed for their or our prayer-and-conference meeting. Such smaller meetings were held in private dwellings or rooms, where they partook of the nature of family gatherings.

The head-dress of women also nearly compelled their silence in the larger assemblies. In two particulars women were to be scrupulously different from men — they were to wear long hair, and not to be shorn as men were (1 Cor. xi. 6, 15), and they were to be veiled in the religious assembly (1 Cor. xi. 5, 10, 13). The word "uncovered" in 1 Cor. xi. 5, 13 is literally "unveiled." The word "covered," occurring twice in 1 Cor. xi. 6, is literally "veiled."[4] It is certain that the apostle enjoined upon the Corinthian Christian women the wearing of the veil in the churches. It is equally certain that in their conceptions of their new liberty some at times wished to throw off the veil (1 Cor. xi. 5, 6, 13). That act was doubtless necessary for unimpeded speech to an assembly of considerable size, and was probably prompted by the desire to speak. The Hebrews used several kinds of veils, but all chiefly for covering the face. They had, besides,

[1] Josephus's Antiq., Bk. xv., chap. 11, sect. 5.
[2] Smith's Dict. of the Bible, p. 3205.
[3] Kitto, Vol. ii. p. 839.
[4] Robinson's Lex., on Ἀκατακάλυπτος and Κατακαλύπτω.

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several kinds of mantles or shawls, which could be drawn over the face at pleasure. Both shawls and veils were doubtless of so thick material as to impede speech, except as addressed to those near at hand. Thin veils would have been as indecorous as no veils. Only a few months since, the authorities in Constantinople reprimanded certain Turkish women there for displacing thick veils with those of light gauze. The veil which Moses put on when he came down from the mount was probably a large garment, which could be drawn over the face at pleasure.[1] The common assumption and the English translation imply that Moses addressed the people with the veil drawn over his face. But the Hebrew and the LXX indicate that he did not put the veil over his face until after his discourse was finished. Alford and Murphy sustain this view.[2] One kind of veil covered the lower part of the face to the nose; another, called "mufflers" in the English version, hung down from the eyes over the face; another covered the head and nearly the whole person; still another hung from the top of the head over the face, and an equal distance down behind.[3] It was possible for a woman to be veiled, and still have one or both eyes exposed, but not and have her mouth uncovered. All veiling was a hinderance to speech addressed to more than a few persons.

Besides, the veil was especially emblematic of that "authority" (1 Tim. ii. 12) given the man over the woman, which he was to exercise not more as her leader than as her protector.[4] Without the veil she dishonored her head (1 Cor. xi. 5), and her head was the man (1 Cor. xi. 3). The love enjoined on husbands for their wives (Eph. v. 25; Col. iii. 19) would inspire them with the desire to "provide" for (1 Tim. v. 8) and protect their "own."

Though women in the synagogues were excluded by a partition from the sight of men in the audience, they were in full view of those that conducted the services,[5] who prob-

[1] Rev. W. L. Bevan, Smith's Dict. of the Bible, p. 3370.
[2] Alford, 2 Cor. iii. 7–13; Murphy, Ex. xxxiv. 33–35.
[3] Jahn's Arch., pp. 141, 142. [4] Thompson's Land and Book, Vol. i. p. 35.
[5] Smith's Dict. of the Bible, Art. "Philo," p. 3135; Kitto, Vol. ii. p. 806.

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ably were the messengers, the "angels," of the churches in the New Testament period. With their customs both modesty and "reverence" (Eph. v. 33) for men required the women to wear the veil in the presence of the synagogue officials. There was the public sentiment that they should have on their heads the token of "power" (1 Cor. xi. 10)—authority—which was doubtless the veil. The leaders of the services, unaccustomed to look upon the countenance of women beyond their own homes, would be in danger of embarrassment or diversion if a company of them sat unveiled in the assembly. The requirement of female modesty and "reverence" probably explains the text, "For this cause ought the woman to have power on her head, because of the angels."[1] Even now in Oriental lands, as Dr. Thompson says, the missionary is generally obliged, for the sake of the native preacher and of the people, to have women veiled and seated behind screens, separate from men.[2] Their immemorial custom cannot suddenly be set aside. Among the early Hebrew Christians, therefore, in their state of society, the silence of women in the larger assemblies naturally followed. But the churches of Corinth and Ephesus, though composed in part of Hebrew members, were in Grecian society. Did that make an essential difference?

2. Customs relative to woman's silence in assemblies among the Greeks. Virtuous Grecian women during the apostolic age, and long before, were seldom or never in public assemblies, except as converts to Judaism or Christianity. The condition of pagan Grecian women was far inferior to that of their Hebrew sisters.[3] When converted and introduced to Christian assemblies it materially exalted their concep-

[1] If the angels referred to were those of heaven, the good order of wearing the veil was needed for their sight. If as Tertullian (Ant. Nic. Lib., Vol. xviii. p. 165) supposed, they were evil angels, stirring up concupisence, the veil on the head would tend to defeat their purpose by shielding woman's face from man's sight. If Bengel's view be correct, that as angels are to God so in a far lower sense woman is to man, and as angels veil their faces before God so woman ought before man; still the good order of wearing the veil was imperative.

[2] Land and Book, Vol. i. p. 36.

[3] Rothschild, Littell's Living Age, Vol. cxxix. p. 132.

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tions and desires, and female vanity might easily creep in under the name of Christian freedom.[1] Pagan Grecian men had but little respect for the character of woman, and regarded her capacities as much inferior to their own.[2] Aristotle put her relation to man as that of subject to governor; and asserted that "if she have a will it is a will without rights, and if she have virtues they are kindred to those of slaves."[3] Though Plato's ideal education extended equally to both sexes,[4] his ideal community of wives[5] and ideal nudity of woman in the palestra[6] were degrading to the popular estimate of her character. The Grecian high poetical ideals of woman "had no counterpart in actual life. The Athenian woman was in no respect the equal of her husband; she was not the entertainer of his guests or the mistress of his house, but only his housekeeper and the mother of his children. She took no part in military or political matters."[7]

Virtuous Grecian women, previous to marriage, were chiefly kept confined at home. After marriage they were not allowed to leave their dwellings except on special permission of their husbands. At marriage-feasts, contrary to the custom on other public occasions, women as well as men were invited, though they sat with the bride at a table separate from those occupied by the men.[8] In Sparta, Olympia, and Crete married women did not attend gymnastic contests, though the unmarried did, and often engaged in them.[9] In Sparta some women appeared in public games and dances in a kind of undress or half-dress which shocked the refinement of Athenian society.[10]

"The life of a Greek woman of good repute was one of strict seclusion. She lived with her children and servants in what was called the *gynaeconitis*, always in the rear of

[1] Lange, 1 Cor. xi. 5, 6.
[2] Smith's Greek and Roman Antiq., p. 621.
[3] Barnas Sears, Bib. Sacra, Vol. xx. p. 233.
[4] Jowett's Plato, Vol. ii. pp. 146, 280.
[5] Ibid., pp. 130, 282.
[6] Ibid., p. 276.
[7] Ibid., 129.
[8] Smith's Greek and Roman Antiq., p. 620.
[9] Ibid., p. 622.
[10] Prof. Felton's Ancient and Modern Greece, Vol. i. p. 381.

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the dwelling; or, in Homer's time, in the upper story. The men occupied the *andronitis*, the front first story and chief part. Strangers were never admitted to the apartments for women. As a rule the virtuous women were not well educated, except in the duties of a housekeeper. The unvirtuous women were often well educated, like Aspasia, the famous mistress of Pericles."[1] The superior education of some of the hetaerae was owing to their unrestrained social intercourse with men. Virtuous wives were in general shut out from the thoughts and aspirations of intellectual society. They could not mingle with men, nor yet with educated courtesans — enemies of their peace — who associated with their husbands. No women but the hetaerae could listen to the philosophers in the arcades, or to the orators in the Areopagus. None but they could ride through the streets with uncovered face and in richness of apparel. With their society the men became familiar, and instead of loving their own wives often treated them as furniture and chattels.[2] "If retirement, restraint, ignorance of the world, and legalized respect were the portion of married women, freedom, education, and the homage of men, ending in contempt, fell to the lot of the hetaerae. Young women destined for this pursuit received a careful education, such as was denied daughters intended for the marriage state. Hence the hetaera was connected with the arts, the literature, and even the religion of her country; and this gave her a kind of historical importance."[3]

In such society it was of great moment that the apostle should guard the Christian women against all dress and behavior that would liken them to the vicious. Addressing religious assemblies would bring suspicion upon them and disgrace upon the church. Appearing in those assemblies at all was for them a marked degree of advancement. One class of Grecians, however, — the Dorians, — allowed com-

[1] Edward North, Professor of Greek Lang. and Lit., Hamilton College.
[2] Sanger's History of Prostitution, p. 54.
[3] Dollinger's Gentile and Jew, Vol. ii. p. 237.

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paratively free and unrestrained public intercourse between the sexes, and that actually led to the charge of licentiousness against them.[1]

Virtuous Greek women going from home customarily wore a veil or light shawl upon the head, with which they could cover their faces when in the presence of men.[2] Spartan married women never appeared in public unveiled; though the young unmarried did.[3] When, after the battle of Chaeronea, some women of Athens were daring enough to stand at the door of their dwellings, and inquire of those that passed after the fate of their husbands and sons, that exposure was deemed a reproach to both the women and their city. In Homer's Odyssey, Penelope comes down from her upper room, and appears before her suitors *veiled:*

"Before her cheek having placed a shining veil."[4]

In such society and circumstances the Christian Greek women must have felt constrained to wear their veils in the larger religious assemblies. Wearing the veil would of itself nearly compel silence, and throwing it off to speak would invite scandal. If some in their zeal were willing to incur all risks, and, besides appearing in church, to displace their veils and engage in asking and answering questions in public, the apostle thought it not becoming or wise. Especially so, because, unless they were actually inspired, and the Lord should not be hindered from speaking through them, they could as well put their questions to their husbands at home.

3. Customs relative to woman's "silence" among the Romans. With these we have not so much to do, for Paul's restrictions relative to "silence" were especially concerning Grecian women. The chief of what he wrote was to the church at Corinth, and that before he ever went to Rome; and all that he wrote was while he was in Grecian or Asiatic society. The restrictions of law and custom upon women among the Romans, however, were not so many or severe as among the Grecians. A Roman married woman had more

[1] Smith's Greek and Roman Antiq., p. 621.
[2] Ibid., p. 1037.
[3] Ibid., p. 622.
[4] Book i., line 334.

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control over her own household, and in the earlier centuries of the Republic lived in the better part of the house, instead of being confined to the poorer part. She shared also in the honors of her husband, and might be the educator of her own children, instead of yielding their instruction to the more trusty slaves, as among the Grecians.[1]

But Roman pagan women were far from the possession of rights and freedom afterwards enjoyed under the reign of Christianity. The few favors they received did not redeem them from oppression. Equality with men in culture and education was unknown. Profitable social intercourse with them was usually cut off. It was an index of their condition that while men could obtain divorces from women on slight grounds, women could not from men on any ground.[2] The Roman law affixing *infamia* to a woman for appearing on a public stage as an actress, was in accord with the general custom of excluding women from society, as well as with the sentiment of disgrace attached to that employment.[3]

Under the Emperors, which was the time of the apostles, woman's lot was far more miserable and degraded than during the Republic.[4] In early Rome the women were more like those of the ancient Celts, Scythians, and Thracians, who were remarkable for courage, and often accompanied the men in warfare.[5] But culture under pagan rule begat corruption. The change when it began in the latter part of the Republic, "was rapid and fearful."[6] Woman was more often taught by slaves and Greek chambermaids than by the Roman mother, or not taught at all. She was regarded as naturally more vicious than man. Even the elder Cato said, "All women are plaguy and proud," and "were men quit of women, their life would probably be less godless."[7] Metellus, the censor, said, "Nature has so arranged it that we cannot either live comfortably with wives or live at all without

[1] Smith's Greek and Roman Antiq., p. 625. [2] Ibid., Art. "Plutarch," p. 624.
[3] Ibid., p. 635. [4] Rothschild, Littell's Living Age, Vol. cxxix. p. 133.
[5] Strabo, Lib. 3. c. 4; Womankind in Western Europe, by T. Wright, p. 4.
[6] Ibid., p. 7. [7] Mommsen's Rome, Vol. ii. p. 405.

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them." "Marriage was long regarded as an oppressive public burden, necessary for the state."[1] "As soon as the old rigor of family life passed away, everything in morals fell, and marriage was poisoned at its foundation."[2] The union between husband and wife "on the side of the woman was rigorous and unequal. . . . . He exercised the jurisdiction of life and death; and it was allowed that in the cases of adultery or drunkenness, the sentence might be properly inflicted. She acquired and inherited for the sole profit of her lord; and so clearly was woman defined, not as a *person*, but as a *thing*, that, if the original title were deficient, she might be claimed, like other movables, by the *use* and possession of an entire year."[3]

Even the partial legal emancipation once secured for women was soon found to be inconvenient to men. They passed a law that only a limited amount of property should be left in inheritance to women, and took measures to deprive them of much of the property that fell to them without testament.[4] "The Romans knew nothing of the relations of modern society in which the sexes mutually encourage each other in the virtues appropriate to each. . . . . The women were never associated in their husband's occupations, knew little of their affairs, and were less closely attached to their interests than even their bondmen. They seldom partook of their recreations, which accordingly degenerated for the most part into debauches. Systematically deprived of instruction, the Roman matron was taught indeed to vaunt her ignorance as a virtue."[5] The Sabine housewives were not to be found in the decline of the Republic, or under the Empire. Education, and even pleasing conversational powers were, in the opinion of Sallust, such seductive fascinations as formed the charm and fixed the price of the courtesan. Virtue was under temptation to apostasy. Man's infidelity to the marriage state had long been nearly universal, and woman's at length

[1] Mommsen's Rome, Vol. iii. p. 419. [2] President Woolsey, Divorce, p. 60
[3] Gibbon's Rome, Vol. iv. p. 346.
[4] Mommsen, Vol. ii. p. 408; Liddell's Rome, Vol. ii. p. 62.
[5] Merivale's Fall of Roman Republic, p. 226.

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became so common as to alarm even corrupt emperors for their subjects. Virtuous women did not break through these chains and attempt a social equality with man; they rather pined in solitude. They could not have the companionship of even their brothers or other male relatives for their own improvement. Consequently, when woman was allowed any intercourse with the world, her ambition sought vain and gaudy show; her conduct was generally frivolous, often boisterous and vicious. She was unblushingly bought and sold for marriage; her capacities for even that relation were ridiculed; and marriage was at length avowedly and boastfully renounced by many citizens. She came practically to be without rights, without the ownership of property, and nearly without respect from her own or the other sex. Her status was that of a child. Her life of bondage was first controlled by her father, and then transferred at his option to her husband.[1] Though the law did not forbid her attendance at theatres, banquets, and courts, yet scruple and custom as a rule withheld her from such society, and even from walking abroad with the permission of her husband.[2]

Roman as well as Grecian and Hebrew women customarily wore the veil in the presence of men. The bride at marriage wore a veil called *flammeum*,[3] while the usual veil was named *velum*, or its derivative *velamen*.[4] "The fact that women covered their head with a veil always remained."[5] The married women more scrupulously wore it than the unmarried, because it was a symbol of their adherence to their own husbands. On the whole, then, Roman society, in the apostolic age, required woman's silence nearly or fully as much as Grecian. Virtuous women were too little esteemed to be allowed social freedom with men. That freedom was so much granted to vicious women as to drive the virtuous into seclusion. Silence became their protection; and there was no occasion for the apostle to except them

[1] Merivale's History of Rome, Vol. iv. p. 34.
[2] Becker's Gallus, pp. 153, 154.
[3] Smith's Greek and Roman Antiq., p. 625.
[4] Ibid., p. 1037.
[5] Becker's Gallus, p. 438.

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from the restrictions laid upon Christain women in the churches of Greece and Asia Minor.

4. The present Oriental customs relative to the silence and seclusion of women. They are more rigorous than in the primitive age. Women must be carefully excluded from all familiar association with men, except of their near relatives. If an Oriental woman's veil were to fall from her face in the presence of a strange man she would be overwhelmed with confusion.[1] Western Asiatic women are much confined to their own dwellings, and never see men who visit their husbands and fathers. In cities they never go abroad without having their faces completely shrouded; and even at home they generally take their meals apart from the male portion of the family. In rural districts they have somewhat more freedom.[2] Among the Druzes of Syria, a person visiting at an aristocratic house never sees the lady of it. If she ever goes abroad it is only at night, and with attendants on every side to keep off the profane gaze of strangers. Such a woman is often suffered to die rather than have her face seen by a physician. The birth of a daughter is considered a misfortune; and that is true among all sects and peoples of Syria.[3] In Egypt it is more requisite for women to conceal the face and head than other parts of the person. They refrain, if possible, from exposing their head and face to physicians in receiving medical treatment.[4] Among all Mohammedans the seclusion of women is a prevailing custom. They are never allowed to pray with men in public. It is thought that their presence inspires a different spirit from that of worship.[5]

When Oriental women are converted to Christianity, and are assigned a place in the religious assembly, the veil is still deemed necessary for their own modesty, as well as for the calmness, thoughtfulness, and devotion of the Oriental preacher. A whole half audience of female faces would dis-

[1] Land and Book, Vol. i. p. 37. [2] Kitto's Cyclopaedia, Vol. ii. p. 966.
[3] Women of the Arabs, Jessup, pp. 28, 29. [4] Smith's Dict. of the Bible, p. 3370.
[5] Women of the Arabs, pp. 11, 12.

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concert and distract him. Woman's veiling and silence in audiences could be neglected only at the risk of misapprehension and reproach.[1] Both observances are also requisite for symbolic acknowledgment of man's headship.

5. The influence of the ancient Persians in causing female seclusion and silence. The *modern* stringency of these customs among the Orientals took its rise about twelve hundred and fifty years ago, at the promulgation of the Koran, which forbade women appearing unveiled except in the presence of their nearest relatives.[2] Previous to that event, among the Assyrians women were often admitted to public banquets, and sometimes received strangers to their own apartments;[3] but not afterwards under Moslemism.

In like manner, the customs relative to female seclusion which prevailed in Jewish, Grecian, and Roman society during the primitive Christian era received their origin or special intensity from a new propulsive power in Cyrus's conquest of Babylon, five hundred and thirty-eight years before Christ. That Persian conqueror speedily obtained mastery over nearly all nations between the Aegaean on the west and the Indus on the east, and between the Amoo river on the north and the Red Sea on the south.[4] At Babylon he found the captive Jewish people, and a friendly interest at once sprang up between the Persians and the Hebrews, the latter especially coming under the influence of the former (Isa. xliv. 28; xiv. 1–4). The Persian woman's life had been one of much undue seclusion and restraint, and of oppression and corruption.[5] As is usually the case, the customs of the dominant began to be infused into the weaker people — the Hebrews copying from the Persians this greater seclusion of woman.[6] The latter kept their women in apartments separate from those of the men,[7] and did not allow them communication with persons outside (Esther ii. 3, 14, 15).

[1] Land and Book, Vol. i. pp. 35–37. [2] Smith's Dict. of the Bible, p. 3370.
[3] Layard's Nineveh, Vol. ii. p. 193. [4] American Cyc. (1st ed.), Vol. vi. p. 195.
[5] Rollin's Hist., Vol. ii. p. 220. [6] Lange on Gen. xii. 11.
[7] Rollin, Vol. ii. p. 220.

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Josephus says the laws of the Persians forbade their wives being seen by strangers,[1] and that Vashti, the Persian queen, refused to appear before king Ahasuerus's company because Persian decorum would not allow it. We see, further, that she made a separate feast for the women in the palace (Esth. i. 9–11). These facts indicate a greater degree of female isolation than up to that date had existed among the Jews.

The head-dress, including the veil for women when in the presence of men,[2] was an important article of apparel among the Persians.[3] Botta and Layard show that the head-dress received much attention among the Assyrians and Babylonians. But veiling among the Jews in the Mosaic age was not customary, though occasional.[4] Afterwards it became universal, undoubtedly through the influence of Persian custom and power.[5]

Lord Hervey quotes Plutarch and Herodotus, as he supposes, in opposition to Josephus, showing that Persian kings had their legitimate wives sit with them at their banquet tables.[6] But that testimony, at least in respect to Herodotus, pertained to affairs at a later date.[7] Besides, Josephus may have spoken of the general rule, and the others of exceptional cases. Hervey also says that Josephus is contradicted by the Book of Esther (v. 4, 8, 12; vii. 1). But the instances he cites pertain simply to Esther's receiving the king and Haman at her table, in which acts, as would be natural, she doubtless adhered to her Jewish instead of adopting the Persian custom. The Jews, though then in the Persian capital, were really in a Babylonian city, and retained many of their Hebrew manners and practices. Moreover, the Persian customs, in the third of a century that had nearly passed, had probably been modified by the manners of both Jews and Babylonians; and those of the latter are indicated by the fact, that when Baby-

[1] Antiq., Bk. xi. chap. 6. sect. 1.
[2] Kitto's Cyc., Vol. ii. p. 903; Herzog's Cyc., Vol. ii. p. 227.
[3] McClintock and Strong, Vol. i. p. 321. [4] Ibid., Vol. iv. p. 111.
[5] Hawks's Egypt and Remains, p. 146.
[6] Smith's Dict. of the Bible, p. 3369.
[7] Layard's Nineveh and Remains, Vol. ii. p. 312, note.

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lon was taken by Cyrus, Belshazzar was at a feast surrounded by his wives and concubines (Dan. v. 1, 2).[1] Other authorities agree with Josephus in attributing Vashti's refusal to go into the presence of the king's company to her unwillingness to violate Persian modesty by appearing in public unveiled.[2] Queens Esther and Vashti, by their dissimilar actions relative to eating with men, seem to indicate a difference of custom in the two nations they represent. It has been suggested that queen Vashti was summoned to the presence of only men of her acquaintance, belonging to the king's palace. Even then, why did she refuse to sit with them at the table, except because Persian decorum forbade it. But Layard supposes that all the people of the city of Susa were there in the gardens of the palace (Esth. i. 5),[3] and doubtless many strangers to the queen were at the king's feast. Further still, Rawlinson, referring to the supposed contradiction of Josephus by Herodotus, says that the latter in the passage quoted was not making his own statement, but that of certain Persians who wished it believed that wives in their nation had greater liberty than they really possessed. Rawlinson also says of the ancient Persians, "Wives lived in strict seclusion within the walls of the Gynaeceum, or went abroad in litters, seeing no males except their sons, their husbands, and their husbands' eunuchs. Concubines had somewhat more freedom, appearing at banquets, when they danced, sang, and played to amuse the guests of their master."[4]

The influence of Persian rule and custom over the Grecians while under their power, and through them over the Romans, and among the Egyptians and all Oriental nations, was natural and probable. Grecian morals retrograded under Persian subjection,[5] and particularly after the Peloponnesian war.[6] The social position of woman in Greece was lower during the Attic age than in the preceding Homeric or

[1] Layard's Nineveh, Vol. ii. pp. 312, 313.
[2] Dr. Cotton, in Smith's Dict. of the Bible, p. 47.
[3] Nineveh and Remains, Vol. ii. p. 312.
[4] Ancient Monarchies, Vol. iv. p. 196.
[5] Mahaffy's Social Life in Greece, p. 151.
[6] Dollinger's Gentile and Jew, Vol. ii. p. 247.

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Lyric;[1] and in Rome was lower during the decline of the Republic and the first of the Empire than in any former period.[2] The paintings and sculptures of the early Egyptians and Assyrians nowhere show the use of the veil.[3] Yet in both those nations it clearly came into use long before the reign of Moslemism, doubtless through Persian example.

6. The original freedom and power of woman in the Jewish nation. Early in their history there was far less use and significance of the veil than in later times. And its more frequent use certainly arose before Moslemism. Betrothed maidens put on the veil on coming into the presence of their future husbands; as Rebekah on meeting Isaac (Gen. xxiv. 65; xxix. 25). The veil was then probably used by fallen women for concealment (Gen. xxxviii. 14, 15). Yet, in the case of Tamar, she may have put it on merely to conceal herself from her father-in-law, Judah. In the apostolic age, however, being veilless produced suspicion of harlotry. But when Abram went into Egypt, the beauty of his wife Sarah was visible to all they passed (Gen. xii. 14). Rebekah was veilless when Abraham's servant first saw her in Mesopotamia (Gen. xxiv. 16), as also Rachel when Jacob first saw her at her father's well (Gen. xxix. 10). The pious Hannah wore no veil while praying in the temple, for Eli the priest saw the movement of her lips (1 Sam. i. 12, 13).[4] Women were wont also to go abroad through the fields unprotected (Deut. xxii. 25–27).

Note their freedom and importance in private and social life. The early Hebrew wife and mother held much control over her household (Prov. xiv. 1; xxxi. 10–31), and even invited guests to her dwelling and hospitalities; Jael invited Sisera to her tent (Judges iv. 18); the Shunammite woman, Elisha to her home. Later, when her son sickened and died, this Shunammite woman went to Mount Carmel to intercede with that man of God for his and the divine bless-

[1] Mahaffy's Greece, pp. 45, 100, 104, 174, 211, 293, 384.
[2] Religions before Christ, by De Pressensé, pp. 160, 161.
[3] Hawks's Egypt and Remains, p. 146.
[4] Smith's Dict. of the Bible, p. 3370.

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ing (2 Kings iv. 8); on another occasion a prophet's widow carried to him her own case of need (2 Kings iv. 1–7); and much earlier the troubled Abigail went with gifts to implore assistance from David (1 Sam. xxv. 18). In Job's day women attended feasts with their brothers (Job i. 4); in Christ's, they attended both as assistants (John xii. 2), and guests (John ii. 3). Undoubtedly it was always customary for Jewish women to take their meals with the men.[1] In the earlier history, at least, Hebrew damsels were not given in marriage without their own consent. To Rebekah the question was put, "Wilt thou go with this man?" (Gen. xxiv. 58). After marriage the husband was not to leave his wife for a year, but stay and cheer her (Deut. xxiv. 5). The scene of Ruth in the field of Boaz indicates the courtesy of men towards women in that early Hebrew life.

The polygamy of Solomon necessitated separate apartments or dwellings for his wives (1 Kings vii. 8), or subprincesses, — if many of them were only such, and not wives or concubines.[2] But, aside from this, no evidence appears that at any time there was among the Jews a customary separation in life between men and women in the same families.[3] Such separation did exist among the Greek, Roman, and many Oriental nations after the great Persian conquests. But the family and social life of the Jewish nation seems to have been more simple and natural in the earlier than in the later portion of its history.

Note again, the freedom and activity of Hebrew women in public affairs. Miriam led the women of Israel in public rejoicings over the nation's deliverance at the Red Sea (Ex. xv. 20, 21); Jephthah's daughter went out publicly to congratulate her father on his triumphal return from battle (Judges xi. 34); the daughters of Shiloh engaged by them-

[1] Smith's Dict. of the Bible, p. 3553.

[2] F. W. Newman suggests that the usages of the modern court of Persia indicate that numerous women called Solomon's wives were really only hostages for the good behavior of their fathers, who were chieftains of the surrounding heathen, and tributary to him. — Haley's Discrep. of the Bible, p. 296.

[3] Smith's Dict. of the Bible, p. 3553.

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selves, but in sight of others, in sacred dancing at a yearly religious feast (Judges xxi. 21); women of Israel came out of their cities with songs and triumphal marches to meet Saul and David as they returned from the defeat of the Philistines (1 Sam. xviii. 6,7); Deborah was a judge, prophetess, and sacred poetess in Israel, and of high distinction in public service (Judges iv. 6, 14; v. 7); Hannah offered a remarkable prophetic song in the house of the Lord (1 Sam. ii. 1–10); and the public office of inspired prophetess was held in the earlier day, at least, by the four, Miriam, Deborah, Huldah (2 Kings xxii. 14), and Noadiah (Neh. vi. 14). The career of Jezebel (1 Kings xviii. 13; xxi. 25; 2 Kings ix. 7), — Phoenician princess and wife of Ahab — in the government of Israel, and that of her daughter Athaliah (2 Kings xi. 3), as queen of Judah, illustrate the active part in public life which was sometimes allowed to women among the Hebrews.

This summary shows more prominence given to women in the former than in the latter part of Biblical Jewish history. No such array of heroines in public or conspicuous life appears in the later as in the earlier period. The prophetesses, Anna and the four daughters of Philip, do not bear so prominent a part as Miriam, Deborah, and Huldah long before. Priscilla privately assisted in expounding the word of God to Apollos, but Huldah had a more public position at Jerusalem, and taught king Josiah and Hilkiah the high-priest in important public concerns, in the presence of a small company of men (2 Kings xxii. 14; 2 Chron. xxxiv. 22). In the songs of the temple at Christ's coming Simeon bears a more public, and Anna a more private part. But Miriam in her time sings for the nation, and Deborah is high over all of her generation as prophetess, poetess, chieftainess. These facts are indices of the earlier prominence and superior freedom of woman among the Hebrews.

7. The freedom accorded to woman in modern civilized, Christian society. This has more resemblance to that of the earlier Hebrews than of the primitive Christians. In the

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age of the latter, customs, enjoining woman's silence and seclusion, were deemed binding which now in civilized society would be regarded as useless, tedious, and injurious. A woman now need not conceal her face at the approach of men, though female modesty yet reigns. In Christian congregations no close and high partitions between men and women are now necessary; and women in such assemblies need not keep their faces hidden from speaker or audience. No unjust suspicions are now excited if a woman walks abroad without a veil, nor need she wear one now to show due submission to her husband. She may occupy the best part of her own house, and not yield it to him, while she lives in the kitchen; she is not debarred the acquaintance of gentlemen that visit at her own home; she may teach her own children, and is often appointed the teacher of others'. Young women may pursue the same studies as young men, recite in the same classes, and a woman may teach them all. Women may now mingle, veilless, and with head uncovered, in the social circle with numbers of men, even if the assembly conclude with a religious service.

All these liberties are the opposites of certain inconvenient and evil practices which belong to Moslemism and heathenism rather than Christianity. The missionaries who promulgate Christianity where these practices exist, deem them an incumbrance, though not sinful, and patiently wait for better customs to supplant them.[1] The tendency of both Hebrew piety and the Christian faith has always been towards freedom from such ancient and Oriental manners. The Old Testament command, "Forsake not the law of thy MOTHER" (Prov. i. 8; vi. 20), was at once an index of the superiority of the Hebrew faith, and a lever of reformation for woman in all surrounding society. That faith labored for her just place and position. What was lost through Persian sway during the centuries between Solomon and Christ, Christianity early began to regain. Again, in the Middle Ages woman suffered loss; for example, Jewish Rabbis, after the temple

[1] Land and Book, Vol. i. p. 37.

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service had passed away, excluded her voice from public religious song,[1] though the ancient Hebrews, the apostles, and Christian fathers approved of her taking vocal part in that mode of worship (Ex. xv. 20, 21; 1 Sam. xviii. 6, 7; Eph. v. 19–22; Col. iii. 16–18). As religion retrograded woman and her services became less and less important. The great Reformation was a revival of her worth and freedom. Her liberty — including more use of speech and less of veil — has always been one of the fruits of the Christian religion;[2] and even the religion of nature, where but feebly developed, has shown tendencies to like results.

IV. The principle of man's headship and woman's helpmate relation to him are permanent and obligatory; while woman's veiling and her silence are but customs, binding only as showing loyalty to the principle. The principle is based on a changeless distinction between the two sexes. The customs the apostle enjoined as a token and conservator of woman's modesty, and of her fealty to man. Like other customs they have now lost much of their significance and binding authority.

1. The divinely appointed place for man in the marriage union is given thus: "The head of the woman is the man" (1 Cor. xi. 3). Equally ordained of heaven is the place of woman: "And the Lord God said, It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a help meet for him" (Gen. ii. 18). The marriage relation and the office of each party in it respectively, remain permanent; for the two correlated natures of man and woman never change.

In the English translation the relation and duties of the wife to her husband are indicated by the four following words, or by their derivatives, — to submit, subject, obey, and revere. The places where they are found are these: the first, in Eph. v. 22 and Col. iii. 18; the second, in 1 Tim. ii. 11 and 1 Pet. iii. 1; the third, in 1 Cor. xiv. 34 and Titus ii. 5; and the fourth, in Eph. v. 33. But the Greek reduces

[1] Rothschild, Littell's Living Age, Vol. cxxix. p. 138.
[2] Hawks's Egypt and Remains, p. 146.

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all these to two original words; ὑποτάσσω for the first three classes, and φόβεω for the last one. They are to be further reduced by dropping the first word, "submit," in Eph. v. 22. Alford says the oldest manuscripts reject it, and Jerome says the Greek rejected it in his day. But the same idea is substantially carried by the word "submitting" in the previous verse. And that happily defines the submitting of wives to their husbands: "Submitting yourselves one to another in the fear of God" (Eph. v. 21). It is not bondage, but the due observance of our obligations one to another according to the relations that we hold,—the wife observing her duties to her husband as his helpmate, and he his duties to her as head, leader, provider, protector. The same word and idea are in the following: "Likewise, ye younger, submit yourselves unto the elder, yea, all of you be subject one to another, and be clothed with humility" (1 Pet. v. 5).

The harshness or hardness in the words "submit," "subjection," "obedience," is in the sounding, and not in the meaning. The wife has no peculiar "subjection" to her husband to observe, except to answer to all her obligations to him with whom she is in marriage covenant, he the head, she the helpmeet. The "reverence" enjoined is, due honor to him in this relation. Another passage explains 'submission': "That ye submit yourselves unto such, and to every one that helpeth with us, and laboreth" (1 Cor. xvi. 16). This implies showing respect to such persons, following their advice, and acting in accordance with their wishes so far as right.[1] "Nothing is more natural than submission to the good."[2] If husbands love their wives as enjoined, and act accordingly, subjection is not servitude, but partnership. This helpmeet relation is fully and emphatically taught: "Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands" (Eph. v. 22); "Thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee" (Gen. iii. 16); "Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as it is fit in the Lord" (Col. iii. 18); "That they may teach the young women to be ..... obedient

[1] Lange, 1 Cor. p. 359. [2] Dr. Hodge.

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to their own husbands" (Titus ii. 4, 5); "Likewise ye wives, be in subjection to your own husbands" (1 Pet. iii. 1); "For after this manner in the old time the holy women also, who trusted in God, adorned themselves, being in subjection unto their own husbands: even as Sarah obeyed Abraham, calling him Lord" (1 Pet. iii. 5, 6). The Bible makes nothing clearer than the duty of the wife's proper submission or adherence to her own husband. And since a wife should be a wife everywhere we look for no change. The propriety of the "subjection" is inherent in the relation of the two natures to each other.

Their diversity of duties is partly expressed thus: "Let every one of you in particular so LOVE his wife even as himself; and the wife see that she REVERENCE her husband" (Eph. v. 33). Love from the husband; reverence from the wife. In such "love" is care, protection, reverence, headship; in such "reverence" is love, adherence, yielding for protection, "help" rendered to the "head." The obligation to such love and such reverence, based on *principle*, will last while the marriage relation lasts.

2. The apostle Paul taught the obligation of woman in his time to have her head veiled in the religious assembly (1Cor. xi. 5, 6). In the phrase, "With her head uncovered dishonoreth her head," the word "uncovered" means "unveiled"; and in "Let her be covered," the last word means "veiled."[1] Removed from Oriental life, it is now nearly universally believed, that woman is released from the duty of wearing the veil in churches. An occasional exception exists. One of the American Episcopal bishops has near lady relatives who regard the primitive direction as binding still, and scrupulously wear the veil in religious assemblies. But why the almost universal change from the practice that prevailed in the New Testament period? Because veiling the head is a changeable custom, not always needed. Why did the apostle require it? Because then and there woman's freedom from "shame" (1 Cor. xi. 6) — her reputation and

[1] Lange, 1 Cor. p. 224.

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modesty — demanded it; and because "woman is the glory of the man" (1 Cor. xi. 7), receiving her place and higher honor by her relation to him, and thus reflecting his honor. Man is unveiled; she should be different — veiled. If he is king, she is queen,[1] and her queenly radiance and modesty are fitly joined.

3. What was the divine design in that age of symbols, in requiring the *silence* of woman in the churches? Chiefly, to give token of her modest and retiring nature, and of her acceptance of her appointed relation to man. To the Corinthians the apostle says: "It is not permitted unto them to speak, but to be in subjection" (1 Cor. xiv. 34). "But" shows contrast: breaking silence by speaking was casting off the symbol of their relation to man. "It is a shame for a woman to speak in the church" (vs. 35), because there it was the violation of her symbolic profession of virtue, modesty, and faithfulness. "Did the word of God come forth from you" (vs. 36)? Are you the authority to change customs and symbols? To Timothy the apostle says: "Let the women learn in silence, in all subjection" (1 Tim. ii. 11). The implication is that "subjection" then required silence. "I suffer not the woman to teach, nor yet to rule over the man, but to be in silence" (1 Tim. ii. 12). A woman's public teaching was then an approach to ruling over the man, and belonged to the same category. "To be in silence," meant not attempting to rule, or to be the "head." "For Adam was first formed, then Eve" (vs. 13); hence Adam was to be the "head,"and Eve "a help meet for him" (Gen. ii. 18). At that time her silence was necessary to her acknowledgment of her relation. But what was the principle? "Subjection." What the custom? "Silence." The silence was enjoined for the subjection, and not subjection for the silence. To suppose that silence were the superior object, and subjection only tributary to it, were folly like assuming that man was made for the sabbath, and not the sabbath for man. The speaking "involved a sort of intercourse with men on

[1] Dr. Hodge.

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the part of women, and a renunciation of their dependence upon their husbands."[1]

Further, there is a close connection between the *silence* enjoined in the fourteenth chapter (vs. 34), and the *veiling* required in the eleventh (vs. 5, 6). The veiling nearly compelled silence in large assemblies. Miss Maria A. West gives ample testimony concerning the necessity of drawing aside the veil, among Turko-Armenian women of this day, for their distinctness of utterance in reading and speaking, and of the flush of shame that mantles their faces when first they do this in the presence of their teachers.[2] Mrs. Capt. R. Burton, long a resident in the Orient, speaks of the little respect or consideration that would be felt in Syria for a Christian woman with a "bare face."[3] Another author says, "A Persian on hearing of distant lands where all the women went unveiled would set them down as dead to all shame and virtue."[4] The Grecian and Roman classics show that, judged by our standard, an *excessive* silence was required of woman in those nations at the opening of the Christian era. Sophocles exclaims: "O woman, silence is an adornment to women";[5] Euripides says: "Silence and discretion are most beautiful in woman, and remaining quiet within the house";[6] Plautus: "A good woman is silent always rather than talking";[7] and Democritus: "Honor belongs to a woman who speaks little."[8] These authors refer to woman's silence at *home*, not in assemblies, for she was not in them. But the apostle enjoins it in churches and *not* in homes. He is more liberal than the poets and philosophers of his time; yet he requires enough silence of women to protect their character and reputation for virtue and modesty. The early fathers also guarded Christian women against such dress,

[1] Lange, 1 Cor. p. 296.
[2] Romance of Missions, pp. 654, 655.
[3] Inner Life of Syria, Vol. i. p. 223.
[4] Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria, by George Dennis, Vol. i. p. 287, note.
[5] Soph. Aj., 293.
[6] Eurip. Heracl, 476; Spiess's Log. Sper., pp. 282, 362.
[7] Plaut. Rud., iv. 4. 70.
[8] Democr. Ap. Stob., 441. 30; Wetstein's Nov. Test., Vol. ii. pp. 163, 164.

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coloring of the hair, and exposure of the face as would give them resemblance to the vicious of their sex.[1] Tertullian says: "To blush if he see a virgin is as much a mark of a chaste man as of a chaste virgin if seen by a man."[2]

4. But the veiling and silence requisite in the apostolic age to indicate woman's nature and virtue are not now necessary for those purposes, except in the Orient. Strict veiling among us is no longer insisted upon. Why insist on absolute silence? The apostle says, "I suffer not a woman to teach" (1 Tim. ii. 12). He spoke of public teaching. The private was allowed — Priscilla joined her husband in teaching Apollos (Acts xviii. 26). Public teaching broke the proper silence. But women may teach both sexes now, and cause no reproach, or violence of propriety. The basal *principle* of woman's office as helpmeet has in no wise changed. But two *customs*, veiling and silence, once expressive of the principle, have, as formerly observed, passed away. In some well-conducted institutions of learning female instructors of classes embracing both sexes of adults, turn often from language, science, and literature to teach Bible lessons and to conduct religious services with those same pupils. Not even Moslems would object to the teaching, if it could be done without exposing the female countenance. A company of men and women meet socially in a parlor; the women with bonnets and veils laid aside. Probably no such scene was ever witnessed in the apostolic age. Women in that circle may properly speak at times so as to be heard by all at once. Some of them may there give disquisitions on science, art, or manners. But turn that secular meeting into a prayer-circle, and why may they not as well be heard? Woman needs still to consult decorum, modesty, her own retiring nature, her place as helpmate and not head. Beyond that, why seal her lips? She need not sit now with face veiled and voice silent, and her own knowledge withheld, to show deference to either

[1] Tertullian, Ant. Nic. Lib., Vol. xi. pp. 304–322; Vol. xviii. pp. 176, 177; Clement of Alex., Ant. Nic. Lib., Vol. iv. p. 277.

[2] Ant. Nic. Lib., Vol. xviii. p. 157.

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men or women. Customs once required as signs and symbols would now be *bondage*. Laying upon woman now and here all the ancient or the modern Moslem habits of living in these respects, were equally preposterous and cruel with imposing on us under the new dispensation the ancient rites and ceremonials of Judaism. Truth, by developing symbol into substance, and type into antetype, makes us free.

5. But most biblical scholars have assured us that the command of "silence" is as imperative now as in olden time. They reason thus: The woman is to be in subjection (1 Cor. xiv. 34) to the man; the head of the woman is the man (1 Cor. xi. 3); the woman is not to rule over the man (1 Tim. ii. 12). This principle they claim to be fundamental, given for all time and for all men. In this they are perfectly correct. They claim, secondly, that divine instruction required in the apostolic age woman's silence in the churches as a part of her deference and subjection to her "head"—to man. In this they are also correct. The error, we think, is not in interpretation, but in logic. Yet, criticisms have generally been in respect to interpretation. Confident of the two preceding premises, authors and teachers have made the deduction that the silence of women is equally obligatory *now*. This conclusion is not necessitated, because not all things are binding now that were binding in the apostolic age. We have instanced three conspicuous Scripture cases of exception: The washing of feet, anointing the sick with oil, and the veiling of women in churches. None of these are now binding as they were in the days of Christ. So, woman's absolute silence in churches is not now binding. Change in society has given greater liberty in custom without infraction of principle. "The Bible lays down no exact and complete system of moral rules. What other religions partially undertake by their tedious codes it often sums up in the simple principles of love to God and our neighbor. And it sometimes devolves on us to decide what love prescribes."[1] In respect to the application of each Scripture

[1] Prof. J. Henry Thayer, Andover Theol. Sem.

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command we are unselfishly to inquire whether there is any just limitation by custom, class, circumstance, clime, or time. Christ gave the command, "Go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor" (Matt. xix. 21). Francis of Assisi, not regarding the limitation of class and circumstance, exemplified and taught the literal fulfilment. Origen and others failing to note the limitation of the letter by the spirit, are reputed to have rendered literal obedience to another verse of the same chapter (Matt. xix. 12). Paul's direction, "Seek not a wife" (1 Cor. vii. 27), unless limited by its time and circumstances of persecution and corruption would lead to undue celibacy. He, to some extent, discouraged marriage in his time, while the rule of life encourages it. The Saviour's command, "Swear not at all" (Matt. v. 34), must be limited by the kind of oaths — the private and profane, and not the civic, being forbidden. Paul's direction not to go to law except before saints (1 Cor. vi. 1) must have some limitation in time, class, or circumstance. He does not forbid all appeals to just and Christian tribunals though the judge be not a Christian. Jesus's command, "Resist not evil" (Matt. v. 39) has its limitation in revenge, and does not abrogate the administration of justice by the proper authorities. The direction of both Peter and Paul to the saints to salute each other with a kiss (1 Pet. v. 14; Rom. xvi. 16; 1 Cor. xvi. 20; 2 Cor. xiii. 12; 1 Thess. v. 26) is given to more churches, and as much without exception, as the direction to women to keep silence in the churches; yet its literal observance would be an offence in English or American society, and its substantial observance is fulfilled in any country by the customary cordial greetings that prevail there. The Saviour said, "In what place soever ye enter into an house, there abide till ye depart from that place" (Mark vi. 10). Christian ministers in modern civilized society do not consider that command binding now, because of the change of custom and propriety. In like manner, when Paul directed that women veil themselves, keep silence, and teach not, those requirements were limitable by the customs and proprieties

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of existing or similar society. The premise of principle relating to woman's "subjection," and that of fact relating to her "silence," do not logically demand her absolute silence now. If both premises were *permanent moral principles*, then would silence still be imperative. But the premise of fact has changed because custom has changed. The principle must be maintained, and such customs may be allowed as do not endanger the principle.

6. Practical exegesis tells us not to insist upon or expect a uniformity of manners and customs in all countries and ages alike. Bishop Whately has said, "Instead of precise *rules*, it (the gospel) furnishes sublime *principles* of conduct. Our Lord and his apostles .... laid down no *set of rules* for the conduct of a Christian. They laid down Christian *principles* instead; they sought to implant Christian *dispositions*."[1] It would only have extended his thought to have added, — The principles they did lay down were *permanent*, and the rules often *transient*. Miss West, long a resident of the East, in reasoning with a native Armenian Christian preacher, aptly puts it thus: "Many of the people confound principles with rules. Now, you know that rules should be made like leather, to bend to circumstances. But principles lie at the very foundation of things; and if you sacrifice them, you sacrifice everything."[2] Principle is involved in woman's acquiescence in her relation as helpmate. But veiling her face is a shifting rule, binding only so far as necessary to express acquiescence in the principle. Her silence in the presence of men and in churches is also, — is it not? — a variable rule, needing observance only so far as to sanction and sustain the principle.

7. There is in modern Christian society no special danger of woman's lack of fidelity in her office as helpmate. In Paul's day there was. But now she is in more danger of not laying hold of all her opportunities for usefulness which the manners of our age allow, and which her education — more

[1] Difficulties in the Writings of St. Paul, pp. 151, 152.
[2] Romance of Missions, p. 53.

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wide-spread than that of man, in that more of her sex are graduated from our schools — qualifies her to embrace. It was Saturday, the last day of the week of prayer in January, when four American missionary sisters and one brother were gathered for their daily noon season of united supplication in their native tongue for the outpouring of God's spirit upon the people of Harpoot. Two missionary brethren had gone out to labor among the villagers of the plain. The one brother left at the station while leading the meeting urged that the four sisters should take an active part. They hesitated; they had never done it in man's presence. They ventured now, and God apparently approved. That very day an Armenian sceptic, who had been accustomed to put Aristotle in the place of the Bible, a man of wealth and influence, while sitting in his office, was suddenly, as by a mighty rushing wind, overwhelmed with a conviction of his sinfulness before God, and he soon became a meek and laborious servant of Christ.[1] How preposterous to suppose that those women were immodest, or irreverent to their husbands in their act of prayer! How much greater the danger that other sisters like them, all over Christendom, will fail to embrace such golden opportunities for good! Miss West holds religious meetings with the Armenian women in destitute parts of Turkey and Syria. Often a number of men linger around the door to pick up a few spiritual crumbs that fall from the table. She denies them admittance, not because of Turkish scruples, but of the American interpretation that women are not to teach religion in the presence of men. A new missionary comes to the field, preaches to the natives, and Miss West translates to them his sermon. She does it so well that an Armenian delegation visit her, and beseech that she will come down and preach to them sermons of her own. She says, nay; because the Book says, "Let your women keep silence," though she evidently suspects there is some error in the interpretation or logic of the application.[2]

8. The perpetuity of a law depends upon its reason. If

[1] Romance of Missions, pp. 581, 582. [2] Ibid., pp. 25, 605, 606, 657.

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the reason remains the law continues. Hence the meaning or binding nature of a command may be ascertained, if doubtful, by consulting the reason for its existence. Blackstone says, "The most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the *reason* and *spirit* of it; or the cause which moved the legislator to enact it. For when this reason ceases, the law itself ought likewise to cease with it. An instance of this is given in a case put by Cicero."[1]

Professor Moses Stuart in giving biblical instruction often quoted the expressive phrase: Ratione manente manet ipsa lex. The reason for woman's office as helpmate, and not head, ceases not, nor ever will in the mortal state; hence the office, and requirement for acquiescence in it, continue. The reason why woman should closely veil her face in public has ceased in Christian countries, and the requirement has ceased. So the reason for her absolute silence has ceased, and the requirement also. She does not now bow to the restraint of a thick veil, she need not now maintain silence to maintain her modesty, or to symbolize her submission. Why, then, always be silent? The reason for humility and Christian affection among brethren has not been set aside, nor ever can be; and the requirement of these virtues is still in force. The reason for washing one another's feet, as expressing that humility and affection has been set aside, and also the obligation to perform that act. The command is satisfied with such other conduct as is expressive of fraternal fellowship and of "preferring one another" (Rom. xii. 10). So the requirement of woman's silence is satisfied with a modest behaviour and a cheerful adherence to her office as wife in the marriage state.[2]

[1] Commentaries, Vol. i. p. 61.

[2] More than five years since Rev. Dr. R. W. Patterson of Chicago applied to this subject the legal principle that the law continues while the reason continues, and ceases when the reason ceases. But his use of this axiom was to show the permanent obligation of woman's silence, in that she ever will be in subjection to man. The present writer, only a few days previous, in another publication, applied the same axiom to the same subject. Neither could have

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V. Man's headship and woman's partnership with him as wife, will always maintain distinctions in their callings and conduct while the two natures continue. Some principles are settled in the divine economy for mankind. Man and woman are fitted for different service in the main. The inherent laws of the two natures are not mutable like the customs of speech. Every true woman desires her husband to be her leader and protector, and in general he is fitted for that place. It is usually his calling that supports the family. If she is conscious of better education and talent than her husband has, still, it is her nature to recognize him as head, and herself as helpmate. Her help may often consist in being wiser than he. But her choice is to make him the hero, though herself be the heroine. In public affairs she wishes him to go forward, and without special reason will not herself go in advance. Yet, rational exceptions do legitimately occur. Elizabeth Fry, providentially, was more conspicuous than her husband. But he scripturally, and in the family really, was still head. A Florence Nightingale may come from Crimean battle-fields or American hospitals, and, telling a promiscuous audience of human sufferings and wants, and of woman's work to allay them, may infuse sympathetic interest and benevolent principle into thousands of human hearts. How in our state of society can woman's relation to man be thereby unfavorably affected? No *principle* of Scripture can by that act be weakened in its hold upon the mind. Only a *custom*, once important to the principle, now unimportant unless in the Orient, is violated. With us the violation, for such a cause, is better,— is it not? — than the observance. A missionary lady who has buried her husband on his field of toil on the other side of the globe, returns to us bringing her little children. She has golden

been indebted to the other for the suggestion. But the latter employed the principle to show that the duty of woman's "proper reverence and submission remains; for marriage remains"; 'that the reasons for her veiling and her strict silence do *not* remain, and therefore the duty to observe them ceases'; and that the rule demanding her silence is now satisfied with modest, helpful, and appropriate demeanor.

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words with which to tell the wonderful works of God wrought through her companion in that far-off land. She feels an incitement to do it, and multitudes of women and *men*, would gladly hear her. Does any real *principle* demand that the men be excluded? No! It is only an old, or Oriental *rule*, by which we need not be governed. In yielding to this apparently providential call, she may so do it that neither her spirit nor act shall violate the modest and retiring nature peculiar to her sex. She may do it in fulfilment of her office as helpmate of her husband; perfecting his mission by rehearsing the story of his toils and success for his Master.

There was an office for prophetess in the apostolic days. Daughters should prophesy as well as sons (Acts ii. 17). Both in their office spoke to "edification, and exhortation, and comfort" (1 Cor. xiv. 3). Prophetesses must have had hearers. When Paul's company came to the house of Philip, who had four daughters which did prophesy (Acts xxi. 9), it seems probable that in their small assemblies those daughters spoke. They could be heard there and remain veiled, if custom in so small a company required it. It may be that all women were at liberty to speak in churches assembled in *private* dwellings (Rom. xvi. 5). At the prayer-meeting held when Peter was miraculously released from prison, there were at least two, and doubtless more, women in the house (Acts xii. 12, 13). They could there speak and pray veiled, and yet be heard. The assemblies referred to in 1 Cor. xi. seem to have been of a more private character, such as those where the Lord's supper was observed, spoken of in the same chapter. Probably unbelievers were not present. But in the congregations named in the fourteenth chapter, where the silence of women is enjoined, unbelievers were often present (vs. 23, 24), and the congregations were doubtless larger.[1] There only two or three addressed the meeting (vs.

[1] The above view was adopted by the present writer without knowing that any other person had even considered it. When this Article was nearly all in type he learned that *Meyer*, the noted commentator, after holding other views through several editions of his work on First Corinthians, in his fifth and last

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27, 29),[1] not at their seats, but from a platform in front of all. In such circumstances women might well keep silence. But in the eleventh chapter where Christ is spoken of as "head" of the church and man as "head of the woman," man is taught to have his own head uncovered when praying or prophesying, and woman to have hers covered (vs. 4–7, 10, 13). The implication is that men did pray and prophesy. Why not also that women did? Even more is said requiring women to veil their heads when praying and prophesying, than requiring men not to cover theirs. The natural conclusion is that some women did pray and prophesy in the smaller and more private assemblies. We cannot think the apostle would take the pen of inspiration and write about the right method of doing a thing when it was not to be done by any method. He spoke not of services in secret. The covering of the head was for appearance before God among fellow-beings.

But these prophetesses may have been cases of exception among women. They were to pray and prophesy only under the influence of the Spirit. And the Holy Spirit now is never the author of confusion, immodesty, or impropriety. It was under his apparent call that Elizabeth Fry spoke in promiscuous audiences. She expressed her fear that some women would be too forward, and speak when not called by the Spirit. She resolved not to resist the Spirit, and not to go farther than the Lord evidently led her. She once wrote, "I am of opinion that nothing Paul said to discourage women's speaking in the churches, alluded to their speaking through the help of the Spirit, as he clearly gave directions how they should conduct themselves under such circumstances, when they prayed or prophesied."[2] With equal care and prayer woman now will not transcend the proprieties of

(German) states that he has changed his opinion, and now holds that the *permission* to pray and prophesy given in the eleventh chapter pertains to the smaller assemblies, and that the *prohibition* in the fourteenth chapter pertains to the larger ones. The smaller assemblies, he implies, do not mean the family circle. A woman would not veil her face in the presence of only her husband and children.

[1] See Alford.

[2] Memoirs Vol. ii. p. 336.

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her nature and office; nor will she forget to be man's helpmate in religion as well as in other things. None could so well as Mary break the alabaster-box of ointment and anoint her Lord for his burial. In the prayer-meeting woman can often break the box of spiritual aroma, whose odor shall fill the place. Her average of ability, piety, and experience sometimes transcends that of men. No custom or propriety forbids her voice in the social circle. Why should it in the prayer-circle? Yet, in that meeting she will appear as helpmate and not head. In the larger assembly nature will never put her so far forward as it does man. Her mind and heart would shrink from it more than his; her voice in general will be less fitted for it than his; her household cares will be adverse to the life of a public speaker. Cases like that of Mrs. Fry will be exceptions.

The views advocated in this Article being true, it follows:

1. Women should not take part or place in religious assemblies which would imply any claim of superiority or rule over men. It would violate the divine order of headship and helpmate, and would be repugnant to their own better feelings.

2. Woman's office as helpmate primarily applies to married women, yet proleptically, and by affinity of nature, to the unmarried.

3. Wearing the veil, once imperative on woman, has still its likeness in her long hair, and other slight covering of the head, symbolic of her modest and retiring nature.

4. The command to keep silence in the churches, once obligatory on woman, at least except in small private meetings, and in case of inspired prophetesses, has a modified obligation upon her still, beyond what it has on man, because of her office as wife and not husband. While her relation to man has not changed, the customs expressive of that relation and appropriate to it have partially altered, so that the same degree of silence and retirement requisite in the apostolic age is not now demanded.

5. Woman's peculiar relation to man is not now compromised or deteriorated, as it once was, by her act of teach-

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ing in public, when she is qualified for it and occasion calls upon her for that service.

6. Woman's modern rational freedom has its type in her condition among the early Hebrews rather than in that of the corrupt and debasing age of Rome's decline and Greece's decay.

7. The reasons for woman's former silence are still so far in force as to make silence her general rule now in the larger assemblies.

8. The women who assume the part or place of religious teacher are under equal obligation with men to walk circumspectly, lest they bring reproach upon that sacred office.

9. Woman can never put herself to the front, and assume all the prerogatives of men in society without suffering in her own nature and in human estimation.

10. Given to women the same knowledge and culture as to men, still they will not be equally active and prominent with them as public speakers. Modesty will always enjoin upon them more retirement than upon men. Whenever reason summons woman's speech in mixed assemblies, if she allow her modesty to be infringed upon, the weight of her words will be diminished. This is made so not by custom, but by the nature of mankind.

11. Woman has certain prerogatives and privileges which men are bound to respect, and not allow to be wrested from her by any custom; and which, exercised by her, are ennobling to her character and promotive of her usefulness.

12. A woman may not be ordained to the gospel ministry unless under very rare circumstances. She can serve as missionary or evangelist under approbation without ordination. No man even should be ordained to the ministry except for life; nor until after much preparation and due probation. A man can continue his ministry and marry; a woman properly could not. Yet the providential provision is that both marry. The constant tax on strength of a faithful ministry through scores of years or to the end of life, is ordinarily more than any but a strong man can bear.

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13. Both Scripture and nature attach so high importance to man's office as husband and head in the marriage relation, and to woman's as wife and helpmate, that it compels the inference of obligation upon all as a rule to assume or accept, if they may, the full responsibilities of that relation, though it involve burden and care. Paul's strictures upon seeking marriage were intended to call attention to its duties and trials, especially in the troublous times to the church then existing, and yet to come; and were incited, in part, by the fact of such corruption in society relative to the marriage relation, and in general, as to call for unembarrassed laborers in behalf of the living.

14. Notwithstanding all the restraints required by woman's modesty and her peculiar partnership with man, there remains in modern civilized life a propriety in her addressing promiscuous companies of men and women under certain circumstances, as in prayer and conference meetings, especially where she can be heard and remain sitting, — the more social the meeting the more unreserved being her participation; also in larger assemblies in exceptional cases of special fitness on her part, and special reason in the occasion. Some of these limitations apply to men, but woman's violation of them is more painful to beholders than man's like offence, because her normal nature is more refined and delicate than his. Though her exercise of this freedom may at first be repugnant to some, yet if she is wise and careful it will at length become agreeable, because it does not intrinsically violate her modesty or her relation to man.

15. Where in social religious meetings objections are known to exist against woman's taking part, it were better that she remain silent. Time and reflection will work a change sooner than her compulsion of unwilling ears.

16. It were well if such objections were withdrawn, and as much freedom given to woman in religious as in social life. In no other age of the world has she been denied more religiously than socially. This anomaly calls for attention, and for explanation by those who uphold it. Paul gave

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women more liberty in religion than many of them had in social relations. With most the question is not, "Shall womanhood be abolished?" but, do true womanhood and the Bible properly interpreted, require *now* as much seclusion and silence on the part of woman as Hebrew and pagan society did in the early Christian era and centuries before? If not now in social and educational life — as by custom seems to be granted — then why in the religious life?

17. Women as well as men need to remember that being qualified to address one kind of audience does not imply qualification to address all kinds. Respect is due to occasion and proprieties, to time and presence.

18. Notwithstanding woman's high privilege in this age, human nature in her, as in man, will incline more to be diffident or slothful than too forward in embracing opportunities for usefulness in prayer and conference meetings.

19. There is nothing in woman's relation to man to forbid her modest exercise of the right of suffrage in church-meetings. The judgment of some women on religious questions is often superior to that of some men.

20. To interpret the Pauline command of silence as applicable only to "babbling" women, or to those of Corinth and similar society at that day, is unwarranted and mischievous to woman's cause. Some will perceive that this command had a basis in the relation of the two sexes to each other. To interpret it as modified by change of custom, and as not so rigidly applicable now as it was eighteen centuries since, will, we think, be accordant with absolute reason and the better human judgment.

21. This subject so involves custom that the whole *practical* question now is, What conduct in woman is in harmony with her relation to man, with her modesty of nature, and with the habits of virtuous society where she dwells. Scripture warrants this rational consideration.

22. One distinctive feature in this discussion is its interpretation of Scripture in the light of history — a light absolutely requisite to a correct understanding of the inspired

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word, yet commonly neglected. It is hoped that many earnest and thoughtful minds hitherto in conflict on this subject may, in view of this new evidence, come into substantial agreement; though each class still hold some of its own most cherished opinions.

23. Though woman's education and ability in the future will excel those of the past, yet they will never remove her from domestic life as her chief calling. Nor in general will it be possible for her to have a higher or grander mission. Still, where in exceptional cases her greater usefulness turns her to other employments, she should be encouraged and cheered in that course. Early Christianity immensely exalted woman in ways of activity and usefulness, and that incomparable religion may be safely trusted to perfect its work with both man and his helpmate.

In the foregoing views it is believed there is perfect compatibility between the real teaching of the Scriptures, and the tendency of enlightened modern society to give woman a more prominent place in mixed assemblies, both social and religious. This we think is another instance of the wider adaptation of the Bible to human culture and development, than previously had in general been perceived. During the early stages of modern Foreign Missions, many of their founders refused a long time to ordain or even license a native ministry. At length experience suggested and then proved that the refusal was excessive caution, and a barrier to the greatest advancement.[1] Finally, it was perceived that the new method was according to the Scripture basis; for, the apostles ordained *native* teachers, pastors, presbyters, wherever they founded churches. Under the advancing sun of modern civilization woman is not to remain so silent as it became her to be in the twilight of Christianity under the shadows of paganism, and this predestined future will be fully accordant with the sacred word of God.

[1] Anderson's History of the Sandwich Islands Mission, pp. 23, 24; Anderson's Foreign Missions, pp. 326–330.

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ARTICLE II.

THE BEARING OF RECENT SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT UPON THEOLOGY.

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ALL truth is consistent with itself, and therefore all real progress in the knowledge of truth in any department must be a gain to every other department. All men honestly engaged in its pursuit should rejoice in the progress of those similarly engaged, especially in departments of truth which they cannot themselves occupy. History, however, shows that this state of things does not practically exist, and that misunderstandings and controversies are perpetually arising. Misunderstanding is peculiarly liable to arise between those whose pursuits are so different that they can but imperfectly appreciate the processes and results of each other's work; and the consequent controversy is apt to be proportioned in sharpness to the very earnestness of the parties in the pursuit of the common goal of truth. Such has been the case with considerable portions of the current literature of theology and of science. Criticisms upon science, put forth by some theologians, have been met by several eminent scientists with attacks upon theology. Able men have written and spoken not a little upon both sides, and true and important things have been said by the disputants on either part, so that the ultimate result of the controversy cannot be otherwise than useful. But in the excitement and confusion of the conflict there has naturally been less consideration of what points of truth are thus receiving a firmer establishment, and of what is the real bearing of recent scientific thought and utterance upon the most fundamental positions of theology. The question has been too little asked, What

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will be the net result of a comparison of the data now accepted by all? or rather, What would it be if the conclusions now generally concurred in by scientists were equally received by theologians? It is the aim of the present Article to direct attention to this question, in the conviction that the answer will be found favorable to theology in a degree hardly anticipated by those who have not watched the course of the discussion. The theologian may wish a hearty God-speed not only to the actual researches, but even to those well-considered speculations of the scientist which often prove prophetic of the course which science will take. He may do this not only because abstractly he desires, or ought to desire, the advance of truth in every direction, but also because every such advance must assist him in maintaining and elucidating that fundamental truth of all which it belongs to his province to uphold and defend.

The word "science" will here be taken generally of physical science, but not with such exactness as to exclude either the reasonings of those philosophers who take their starting-point from the conclusions of physical science, nor those more metaphysical speculations to which intelligent scientists themselves are prone when actual observation fails them, and the thread they have been pursuing in the known becomes lost in the impenetrable darkness of the unknown.

In every branch of science this point is reached sooner or later; it is an essential of progress that some assumptions should be made in regard to the things beyond. The assumption is legitimate, if it be held only as an assumption, that the general direction of the thread in the darkness will be the same that it has all along proved to be in the light. It is conceivable, indeed, that the direction of the thread may be changed just where we lose sight of it, or at any more distant point; but a pretty strong conviction will always exist in the human mind that the direction long followed without deviation is likely to continue unchanged, especially if there are several threads, and they all point in the same way. This general conviction is greatly strengthened

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by the experience of many instances in which it has been verified by the progress of observation. Certainly no man will give up such a conviction in consequence of the admonition that analogies and tendencies are very different from facts. He is aware of this; but in the impossibility of obtaining facts will still be likely to base his opinions and form his hypotheses of the unknown by the probabilities suggested by the known. In this he is to be commended, rather than blamed, provided he distinguishes these opinions and hypotheses from facts, and holds them only with the looseness of grasp appropriate to their character. The tendency of human nature, affecting the theologian and the scientist alike, is to go beyond this, and to verify Dean Swift's definition of orthodoxy as one's own, and heterodoxy as another man's, doxy. This inevitably leads to conflict, and this conflict is increased by the fact that science in its progress necessarily comes to embrace ground which had been previously occupied by theology; for before modern natural science arose there was much ground which had no proper owner, and which theology, therefore, as the *scientia scientiarum*, was compelled to occupy. Besides this, too, there is a vast realm of truth which has its scientific, as well as its theological, aspects. In this debatable region, common to both, scholars in either are often ready to speak quite oracularly. On the one hand, a certain class of scientists seem especially to enjoy disporting themselves in this region; and on the other, theologians are apt to resent this as a trespass on their peculiar premises. At the same time, there is often a want of appreciation, on either side, of the position really held by the other, and sometimes a most unfair insisting by the one that certain views which they entirely disclaim, if not actually held, at least ought to be, by the other. Hence, on the one side, men whose faith in God's word has been narrowed by their ignorance of his works, have had the folly to denounce science; and on the other, such as have received their faith without a sound foundation in their own deepest convictions and highest thought have found it overthrown. Both these

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effects result from the false supposition of the inconsistency of science and theology. It is perhaps natural that a man who knows much of the one and little of the other should be led to such a supposition by the annoyance of attacks upon his own position from the lesser lights of the opposite side. But no man has a right to pronounce upon, or even seriously to believe in, such opposition, until he has a good knowledge of both, particularly when it is well known that honest and conscientious men, who have been distinguished by a broader culture in both departments, have found in them no inconsistency. Entirely without excuse are they who, with imperfect knowledge of the real teachings on the other side, go out of their way to widen the supposed breach between these two departments of truth. On the other hand, there have happily not been wanting men in both classes who have taken more comprehensive views; but their voice too often has been only indistinctly heard in the widespread clamor.

Unquestionably both theology and science have been deeply indebted each to the other in the past. Modern physical science, notwithstanding the unnecessary efforts to trace it in the vague speculations of a hoar antiquity, really owes its origin to that mental activity which accompanied a great theological reformation; and long before this the way had been prepared for it by the teachings of theology. The doctrine of the unity of God has proved to be the only sure basis for the discovery of the harmony and unity in nature. It is true that some perceptions of the existence of such harmony had suggested of old to minds like those of Socrates and Plato the idea of the unity of God; but neither were these perceptions the result of any induction which science could now accept, nor was this idea more than a mere philosophical opinion. It had no hold upon the minds of any considerable number of men, and the prevailing polytheistic belief made the true unity of nature inconceivable. The strong and firm teaching of monotheism has alone made possible that modern science which aims ever more and more to trace the unity of the cosmos; and hence the tendency of scientists who

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refuse to acknowledge the one Creator must ever be not to any form of polytheism, but to pantheism. Theology, too, not only led men to seek for order and wisdom throughout all God's works, but it exalted the study of nature into a duty we owe to God. The men in the past who have been in the very front rank of the discoverers and the leaders of thought in the physical sciences — the Newtons, the Keplers, the Cuviers — have for the most part been men of faith, and have themselves been living examples that in this, as in all other departments of truth, "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge."

On the other hand, before the rise of modern physical science, theology was unable to complete its cycle of truth, except by speculation on a vast range of subjects not within its proper domain, and so speculating, without data, in many things necessarily went far astray. Such mistakes, although not distinctly on points of doctrine, yet had a distorting effect on the general theological scheme, and oftentimes caused no little misshaping of the higher truths which were thus forced to be bound up with errors into one consistent scheme. Modern physical science has stood forth as the deliverer of theology from the absurd systems of nature which it had begotten of itself. It has swept away a vast brood of errors, sometimes even fantastic, from the common acceptation of mankind; and thus, as far as it has gone, has enabled theology to fill out its circle of truth with reality, instead of error. The whole system of theology can consequently become a nearer approach to absolute truth, and so much light is cast upon the word of God by a knowledge of his operations in nature that a certain modification of statement has taken place, even of dogmas properly theological, but which had taken something of a false coloring from distorted views of physics. Pre-eminently has this aid been received from science in the right interpretation of Scripture. Theologians are sometimes sneered at by scientists for the readiness with which they modify received interpretations to meet the demands of advancing science; but interpretations thus

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modified are only such as rested on no solid support, and which one who seeks to follow truth should be ever ready to exchange when he has been supplied with better data. In many cases such modifications only restore interpretations held in Christian antiquity, and abandoned not on theological, but on what were falsely supposed to be scientific, grounds.

It is unnecessary to dwell longer on the past. The process which has been going on, often most opposed by those most to be benefited, is not yet complete, and our concern now is only with the present. Yet the past is both a pledge and a warning for the future — a pledge that physical and theological science will always be in reality mutually helpful to each other; a warning lest we become so absorbed in the passing scene in which we are called each one to bear our part that we cannot rise above the smoke and din of the action, and take comprehensive views of the whole field of truth and of the broad relations of its several parts.

1. The first point which may be singled out among the many in which the progress of science is now bringing important aid to theology is in the ever firmer and firmer establishment of the conviction that there exist certain unchangeable principles by which the whole cosmos is governed. There can be no question that such actually is the tendency of scientific investigation. A scientist, indeed, like Tyndall, may tell us "Nature is full of anomalies which no foresight can predict, and which experiment alone can reveal"[1] but he must mean that these are anomalies only of imperfect investigation, and that as they are subjected to the analysis of more perfect research they will be found to be in strict conformity to one general conception of order. It is characteristic of many of the so-called "laws of nature" that they are "ideal truths towards which nature tends," but which, instead of being "realized with mathematical exactness" are "more or less false in each particular case." "Even in regard to the law of gravitation there have always been residual phenomena unexplained by the law, and so probably there always will

[1] Heat as a Mode of Motion, p. 101.

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be, until, as we go on widening our generalizations, the last generalization of all brings us into that presence of which all natural phenomena are the direct manifestation." [1] Confidence in the fact that all things, notwithstanding their seeming anomalies, really belong to a universal and perfectly harmonious system is the very foundation of science. If the operations of nature are capricious, man can never analyze them. All his experiments, all his investigations, all his theories, rest absolutely upon the conviction of the uniformity and unchangeableness of the order of nature. In fact, the antagonism so often erroneously supposed to exist between science and theology rests upon the assumption of the incompatibility of the fixed and universal system of order taught by science with the personality of the Ruler of all so emphatically declared by theology. Of course, no such incompatibility really exists. It is only alluded to here to show how thoroughly science is committed to the doctrine of the universality and invariableness of what is called law in nature. The time when the winds and the rains, when health and sickness, when even the development of intellectual power and greatness, was supposed to be merely capricious has passed away, or, at least, has been relegated to the philosophy of the ignorant and superstitious. Science has fully satisfied the minds of those who have any appreciation of its facts and its reasonings that all things in nature are subject to invariable law — not only the inorganic crystal forming in the precise system and angles belonging to its species; not only the plant, throwing out its leaves and branches in the order required by the law of phytolaxis; and the animal, developing from the embryo according to the law of its kind, and governed in its food and its digestion, its life, its death, and its decay by the law of its being; but even man himself, in so far as he is an animal, being governed by the laws of his animal nature, and in so far as he is an intellectual and spiritual being governed by mental and spiritual laws of invariable action. For, in view of science, man also, in common with

[1] Cooke's Chemical Physics, p. 301.

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all other created or finite beings, is subject to law. From the highest point of the hierarchy of heaven down through all the endless ranks of animate and of inanimate nature, so far as knowledge can be pushed, no exception is anywhere found; and where knowledge fails, and the phenomena are beyond the classification of any laws or combination of laws as yet included in the range of our vision, we still rest, without a shadow of doubt, upon the ever growing basis of the vast induction of all knowledge. We believe — every intelligent investigator of nature believes, that there is still law, fixed and invariable, stretching out beyond the limits of knowledge and including all created things within its boundless grasp. This teaching of science is the more remarkable, because the disproportion between the known and the unknown is so vast. The things of which we know the law are but as the surface soil upon the crust of the earth. The actual induction is little more than the apex of a pyramid on which for the present its huge base must rest. Nevertheless, science is bold and firm in its assertion, and that assertion carries conviction to every well-regulated mind. It cannot at present be proved in the immense breadth of its generalization; but no one who has studied nature to any purpose doubts of its truth.

Now this doctrine of the universal prevalence of a fixed order and system in nature, which is thus one of the firmest positions of science, is also one of the fundamental data of a just theology. That this has always been recognized by the great masters of theology as alike the plain teaching of Scripture and the necessary conclusion of reason is shown by "the judicious" Hooker in his magnificent treatment of law in the second and third chapters of the first book of his Ecclesiastical Polity, with the abundant references there given. A single quotation may serve to recall the whole passage. "All things that are have some operation not violent or casual . . . . . That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the form and measure of working, the same we term a law. So

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that no certain end could ever be attained unless the actions whereby it is attained were regular, that is to say, made suitable, fit, and correspondent unto their end by some canon, rule, or law. . . . . All things, therefore, do work after a sort according to law; all other things according to a law whereof some superior, unto whom they are subject, is author."[1] Firmly, however, as this position in regard to the universal prevalence of law has been held by the masters of theology, it is nevertheless a position which it has been exceedingly difficult for them to establish in the convictions of mankind generally. It necessarily follows, indeed, from the abundant scriptural declarations of the unchangeableness of the Ruler of all; it necessarily follows from the reasoning of metaphysical theology. But for all this, revelation, in order to make itself intelligible to man, has so largely expressed itself in anthropomorphic language, and philosophy has so little succeeded in making clear, popularly, the distinction between what is intended by the term personality, and that other thing which is called arbitrariness, or capriciousness, that the powerful aid of natural science here becomes most welcome to the theologian. This truth is one chief weapon upon which true theology must rely in combatting those false and pernicious notions which would represent the Divine Being as a capricious Ruler, such as he was pictured to be by the heathen. It is the very foundation of our confidence that all things in heaven and on earth are concurring together to work out ultimately the definite purposes of his will. Or considered practically, it is the final ground on which must rest every obligation of duty and every hope of reward. Take, for an example, prayer; this truth constitutes the only basis on which we can cherish any rational trust in its efficacy. For, as the chemist could make no experiment in his laboratory, the farmer could plant no crop in his field, the physician could have no hope for his patient, man, in all his varied activity, could do nothing except under

[1] See the references given throughout this passage, especially to Augustine, Civit. Dei., xix. 12; Confess. i. 12. Thomas Aquinas, I. 1. 2. 9. 93, Art. 4, 5, 6. Bacon, Adv. of Learn., Bk. ii.

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the conviction that there are laws of nature which will work out his purposes if he can but rightly avail himself of their action; so the intelligent believer could offer no prayer except in the confidence that he is hereby introducing a factor which, under the divine law, — the ordinance of the Supreme Ruler, — must as certainly have its effect as any force in the natural world which man bends to do his bidding. He could not truly pray, nor could he truly believe in the reiterated gospel assurances of the absolute certainty of the answers to prayer, if he thought the Being to whom he addresses his prayer was simply capricious, and might or might not hear him. No! as when the physicist arrests the light of the sun upon his mirror and turns it aside to lighten the darkness of his chamber, or to be decomposed in his prism, or to be transformed into heat or into some other correlated force upon the blackened surface of his thermopile, so the Christian seizes that spiritual force which is ever flowing out from the Sun of Righteousness, and transforming it into prayer, knows that under the operation of invariable law that force must have its spiritual effect, whether it be manifested to him in an answer which shall be the exact thing he sought, or whether under the law of infinite love it shall be transformed into some correlated blessing of a higher spiritual value than he had dared to look for. The same principle is equally essential to every act of the Christian life and to every article of the Christian creed.

Such a view has sometimes been unthinkingly supposed to militate against the true personality of the Supreme, and to make him, too, the subject of law. But law itself in a higher view is simply a convenient word to express his will; it is unchangeable only because his infinite perfection is itself unchangeable. Could we suppose it otherwise, could we suppose his will subject to change, then either that which went before or that which followed after the change would not be the best that could be, and this is impossible. In speaking of the Infinite Being whose thoughts are not as our

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thoughts, nor his ways as our ways, it becomes us to speak most cautiously, and with the consciousness that our best reasonings must fall far short of the realities of his existence. Yet of this truth we may rest assured, for the supreme teaching of the Bible is his unchangeableness; and the operation of an unchangeable will is what we are accustomed to express by the term *invariable law*. Scripture, here as elsewhere, is found to correspond with the highest results of thought, and meets and satisfies the deepest intellectual requirements of the thinker.

Without such law nature would be chaos, and religion would be — as some scientists would seek to make it — simply emotional; a vague, subjective thing, having no real objective value, and only better than bald scepticism because the experience of all ages has abundantly proved that man with his high faculties is incapable of existing for any long time and on any large scale without the support of some sort of religion. But, as already said, although the theologian might and did, many centuries ago, arrive at the conviction of the universality of law according to the plainest teaching of Scripture concerning the character of the Omnipotent, "with whom is no variableness neither shadow of turning"; yet to the popular apprehension of this great truth, to its firm hold upon the minds of all men, it is already, and it will be increasingly, indebted to the teachings of science. Here, then, is one great point in which the bearings of modern scientific thought are most favorable and most important to theology.

2. A corollary from this truth is the theological doctrine of the immanence of the Creator in his works. In primeval times everything that occurred was referred to the immediate action of God. It was He that scattered the hoarfrost like ashes and cast forth his ice like morsels, who also sent out his word and melted them, who caused his wind to blow, and the waters flowed. From the begetting of the drops of dew to the guiding of Arcturus, everything on earth and in the heaven above was referred by the inspired Hebrew

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seers to the immediate divine action. Among the heathen this idea became corrupted; and in the multiplicity of deities a separate god, at least in the popular belief, was assigned to each manifestation of the divine energy, — a god of the brooks and of the forests, of the sea and of the cloud, of birth and of death. Science, with a rude hand, has brushed away this beautiful dream of man's poetic youth, and has replaced it all with inexorable law; but when it refers for the source of that law to the Unknowable, to the inscrutable Power above and yet within all natural phenomena, it leads us back again to the Hebrew conception as the highest and truest of all. For when natural law has once been identified as the expession of the unchanging will of the Supreme, we find that there is nothing but him in nature. All is his action; He is present in all, and does all things according to his will; He is all in all.

"Cujus sensus, totum nosse;
Cujus virtus, totum posse."

3. Closely connected with this is another correlative truth: that however fixed and invariable may be the natural laws of the universe, their results, and consequently the course of nature, may be largely modified by the intervention of intelligence and skill. If ordinary theologians are wont to dwell less upon the former point, scientists are less earnest in drawing attention to the latter. Yet both facts must be admitted by both. On the one side, as already said, the fixedness of law is at once the firmest of all conclusions of scientific induction, and is also the necessary theological deduction from considering law as the manifestation of an unchangeable will; and, on the other, all processes of scientific investigation in which a knowledge of the special laws of nature is sought by the isolation of their effects, and all progress in the arts of life attained through the teachings of science, constitute a living and ever-multiplying proof that man may modify to a large extent the operation of natural laws to the advancement of his own purposes and the improvement of his own condition.

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This proposition is too obvious to require enlargement. Of course man can have no power over the effect of any natural law except by bringing other natural laws to bear upon it; but this he can do with stupendous results. The present state of the earth, in which marshes and lakes have been drained, rivers curbed or made to flow in other channels, waterfalls trained to do man's work, steam harnessed to his bidding, the fauna and flora of one land made to flourish in another, the very lightning itself forced to become the instantaneous bearer of his despatches across continents and oceans; in a word, the whole face of civilized society shows that natural laws do a very different work when left to themselves than when guided and controlled in their operation by human intelligence. Often the effect under such guidance is even the opposite of the result which would otherwise have been produced. The proverbial impossibility of making water run up hill is accomplished in every aqueduct, and scientific experiments make us familiar with lenses of ice, by means of which combustibles are set on fire, and with the freezing of mercury in red-hot crucibles. But setting aside these, and taking only the broader view, the greater part of the change produced in the face of the earth by the agency of man is attributable to the progress of science. Hence the fact of the modifiation of the course of nature under the uniform operation of the laws of nature by the intervention of intelligence may be classed among those truths which it has been the office of science to make familiar to the minds of men.

The gain to theology hereby has been very great. If human and finite intelligence can do so much to modify the course, without disturbing the laws, of nature, it must follow that the infinite Intelligence can modify that course to an inconceivably greater degree without being inconsistent with himself or changing those principles, which we call laws, because they are the expresssion of his own unchanging will. This covers the whole of the long and hard-fought ground of the possibility of miracles. In view of what science has

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done and is doing, it is no longer necessary to call these suspensions of the laws of nature, or, in other words, of the divine will. It is evident that without any change in that will, infinite Intelligence may yet modify the results of its action to an extent far beyond our power to limit or define. Christian apologists have invented many curious devices for bringing miracles into harmony with the operations of natural law. One of these, which, in various modifications, has obtained considerable currency, is that proposed by Babbage in his "Ninth Bridgewater Treatise." This would make miracles but a part of the natural laws themselves, laws of such vast generality that these particular effects are only manifested at intervals too remote for human observation to determine them to be the consequences of those laws. This explanation is true enough if by law we understand simply the will of the Ruler of the universe — that from the first it was his will that, at certain periods, miracles should be manifested. But then the explanation needs this explanation, and has not itself helped to remove the difficulty. Understood in any other sense, it ignores (without, however, necessarily denying) the personality of the Author of miracles, and it still leaves their cause, as deviations from the ordinary course of nature, totally unexplained, except by an hypothesis of which there is no proof. It has always been unsatisfactory both to the receivers and to the impugners of miracles. Certainly the reason for the occurrence of miracles constantly set forth in Scripture, and the only possible logical reason, is for the manifestation of the presence and power of God. How this could be accomplished consistently with the divine unchangeableness, how even the Infinite could thus modify and even reverse the ordinary course of nature without interfering with the laws of nature — the unchangeable expression of his own will — this science has helped theology to understand and explain by exhibiting as close an analogy as the finite can furnish to the infinite, in the inteference of human intelligence with the course of nature. The microcosm throws its light upon the macrocosm.

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In this explanation, moreover, we find something of the limitations of the universal reign of law giving room and scope also for the attributes of personality.

All this is based on the supposition that there is, beyond and above and distinct from nature, an unchangeable Being; and that this Being is not a blind force, not a mere abstract cause, but a living, intelligent, and infinite Being. This theology has always taught, and, from its very definition, must always continue to teach. It is upon this fundamental point that the bearing of modern scientific thought is most important.

4. It is not very long since the tendency of scientific thought was quite generally supposed to be in direct opposition to this conception. The positivist had taught that all our knowledge is confined to phenomena, and that we can affirm nothing beyond. Time was, and that within the memory of the present generation, when scientists who had cut themselves loose from revelation thought they might find nature complete within itself, and that it was unnecessary to seek for any cause or power beyond. Such a disposition may linger still; but in the advancing rank of scientists, even of that portion of them who most utterly refuse any regard to the Scriptures, we recognize everywhere the reference to "a Power inscrutable to the human intellect,"[1] to an "Unknowable"[2] beyond and above nature, whose existence must first be posited before there can be a nature at all. In the dim groping of even unbelieving scientists after this Being there may be much that is painfully astray, and Paul might say to them as he did to the worshippers of the "unknown God," "Whom ye ignorantly worship, him I declare unto you"; but yet we thankfully recognize that they have arrived at the conviction of the existence of something beyond the realm of nature. They may not recognize in him that character which, for want of a better term, we express by the word *personality;* they may shrink from the use of the personal pronoun, and maintain that for the finite to have any knowl-

[1] Tyndall's Belfast Address. [2] Herbert Spencer.

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edge whatever of this Infinite is impossible. Still, for all this, the main point is gained; the acknowledgement, the necessary assumption of a power outside of nature. Logically, such an assumption cannot remain a mere barren assumption. It has its corollaries and its consequences, and they, sooner or later, must be acknowledged also. In fact, some of them are apt to accompany, more or less unconsciously, the statement of the primary postulate. Herbert Spencer himself in the very act of declaring the ultimate cause of all things to be unknowable, One of whom nothing *can* be known, actually predicates of him omniscience, omnipotence, eternity, and, by necessary inference, intelligence. From these philosophy might deduce all his other attributes: but it is unnecessary. The description of the Supreme in Spencer's philosophy as "Unknowable," or in Tyndall's account of evolution as "a power inscrutable to the human intellect," is more just than the congeries of attributes sometimes bestowed upon him in metaphysics; more just because in more exact accordance with his own teachings in Scripture. There he presents himself to man as One whom no searching can find out; One who dwells in light which no man can approach; One whom not only no man hath seen, but whom no man can see. The absolute unknowableness of God in his own essence has been nowhere set forth more plainly or more powerfully than in the pages of Scripture. Here, then, are two most important points of accord between the thoughts of advancing science and theology. There is a Power above nature, and that power man can never find out — nay, even if he were revealed in his true essence, such is the difference between the finite and the Infinite, it would be impossible for man to receive the revelation. This accord is of peculiar value in its bearing upon the prevailing tendency of the unbelief of our time. Burnouf, himself carried away by it, has shown in his "*La Science des Religions*" that this tendency is towards Pantheism. Pantheism has been the outcome of Oriental philosophy in Buddhism and Brahminism, and Pantheism is undoubtedly the goal towards

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which unbelief is turning in Continental Europe. It commends itself to the intelligence of the Aryan races, because it is in some sort comprehensible; it makes of God something which can be understood. Therefore precisely here the present position of scientific thought is helpful to theology, because it not only represents the Primal Cause as above nature and apart from nature, but as himself unknowable.

And theology is not only thus aided by scientific speculation in establishing these truths in the minds of men, but it is also restrained in its natural tendency to make of God but an omnipotent man. Such a tendency is indeed abundantly rebuked in Scripture, but has ever remained a sore danger to theology. Man, indeed, is created in the image of God. He bears such God-like features as no creature below him can bear. Yet even for him there can be no approach to, and no communion with, God, except through a Mediator who can form a link between God and man by himself partaking of the nature of both.

5. Beyond these truths, and necessarily flowing from them, there is another, not considered by science, because science, as such, has nothing to do with it; but which, nevertheless, is a logical consequence of the position towards which scientific thought is tending. The Supreme Being may have revealed himself, not indeed in his own absolute essence, which Scripture and philosophy alike declare to be impossible to man's comprehension; but partially, as man is able to bear it, and in terms adapted to man's capacity. The very name "Unknowable," the very term "Inscrutable," necessarily admit the possiblity of this. If the Supreme be that which these adjectives imply, then it must be impossible to deny to him any possibility. He may have revealed himself; only if this revelation is to be of any value to man it must be only partial, and it must be anthropomorphic. Precisely such a revelation Scripture purports to be. Whether it be in fact a revelation at all will now remain simply a question of evidence. Certainly to theology in its battle with unbelief this is such an immense advance on the position of a bygone gener-

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ation that the victory almost seems already won. Let the question once be brought fairly to a question of evidence, apart from all assumption of *a priori* improbability, and there need be no doubt as to the decision of intelligent men generally. The analogies of science are helpful even further than this. If nature proceeds from a Supreme Being, then nature itself is in some sort and to some extent a revelation of him. It is a revelation which man can at least partially understand, although hedged about on every side with inscrutable mysteries. If such a revelation has certainly been given in nature, it becomes the more probable that it may also have been in Scripture. Moreover, nature, as Butler has so well shown, is a revelation containing difficulties of precisely the same sort as we encounter in the written word; and it is a revelation which becomes more and more plain precisely as we study its teachings in an honest and good heart, and give ourselves up without cavilling to its guidance.

6. The above considerations, too, remove from theology all the opprobrium once sought to be attached to it, from the fact that the revelation contained in the Scriptures is anthropomorphic; for it is seen that, to be a revelation at all, it must necessarily be so. It removes also the objection drawn from the dimness of the earlier as compared with the growing brightness of the later parts of revelation, because it shows that revelation of God to man can only be made according to man's capacity to bear it; and yet, that man might not thereby be misled, it declares distinctly and emphatically that the revelation is only partial and adapted to human weakness; that God himself cannot be known, that no man by searching can find him out. To man seeking to see his glory he ever, as to Moses in the mount, hides the face which man cannot look upon, and shows him only his uttermost parts. He has revealed himself through a Mediator, and apart from him can neither be seen nor known.

7. We pass now to what may be considered more doubtful ground — the doctrine of evolution. In speaking of this the subject must be separated into two very different ones:

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logical and material evolution. The first means simply that the universe is a κόσμος, that its several parts are connected together in an orderly way, most intimately related one to another, and result in a harmonious whole. In a word, that there is that in the universe which finds human expression in the phrase *unity of thought*. Theologians from the time of Augustine, and before, have always insisted upon this, and in modern times it has been shown by science to be much more than a mere speculative belief. It is the correlative truth to the universality of a fixed and orderly system of nature. It is quite in accordance with this that there should have been from the outset of material things a constant progress, which we have no reason to suppose is yet arrested. We may look back to an original nebula, to the *tohu* and *bohu* of Genesis, and to the first springing forth of light, and then on through all the stages of increasing condensation and growing heterogeneousness, until the earth has assumed its present varied surface, and vegetable and animal life in its ten thousand forms has appeared upon it, with man as the present — but, in his earthly state, not the ultimate — apex of its vast pyramid. All this was taught of old in the primeval revelation with as much distinctness as the receivers of that revelation were able to bear; and when men became fitted for more, they were also fitted to understand the indications of nature, and to gather from nature so much of additional information as was needed. This having been taken in, in the same way more, much more, will doubtless yet be learned. But all this implies only a logical evolution. It states only that in the order of the cosmos the homogeneous, to make use of Spencer's terminology, is ever succeeded by the heterogeneous, that the general is ever followed by the more special. To this great fact in the constitution of the world all evidence points. It is true of everything as far as it has been possible to ascertain the truth at all, and every new progress increases the breadth of the basis for the vast induction. Here again the "Unknowable" makes himself somewhat further known in the unity and the character

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of his operations. So far, then, as related to the past, science here comes forward as the direct and explicit upholder of the teachings of theology; and, so far as relates to the future, on which science refrains from speaking with assurance, all her analogies point in the direction of that higher and more perfect stage of existence which is the very hope and stay of the believer in revelation. If the question now be asked, how is this brought about? we are led at once to the other branch of the subject — material evolution.

At present the theologian must speak somewhat hesitatingly concerning this. It is a purely scientific question, with which he does not wish himself to intermeddle. When he turns to scientists for information, he receives, as yet, a somewhat uncertain answer. By a large and undoubtedly increasing majority of scientists, and emphatically of those whose specialities particularly lead them to the study of the question, he might be told that scientifically the matter was settled; that material evolution, or the actual development of one kind of being from another, was the accepted doctrine of scientific men; Huxley would even say that the hypothesis was already demonstrated, and rests upon as firm a basis as the Copernican system itself. From others he would receive a different answer. Not to speak of Agassiz, who, dying, left unfinished his argument against it, Dawson devoted a long and able address at the Detroit meeting (1875) of the American Association for the Advancement of Science to its overthrow. Some of the most eminent men of science, as Dana, consider it to be a true account of the ordinary progress of life, but failing at certain important epochs, and notably at the introduction of man upon the earth. Wallace, the simultaneous originator of Darwinism with Mr. Darwin himself, a few years ago very earnestly contended against the application of the hypothesis to man. He has now (1876) so far modified his position as to say, "Hardly anyone capable of judging of the evidence now doubts the derivative nature of man's bodily structure as a whole"; but he adds, "although many believe that his mind, and even some

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of his physical characteristics, may be due to the action of other forces than have acted in the case of the lower animals."[1] Few, if any, scientists now receive "natural selection" as a sufficient agent for its accomplishment. Some, as Cope, suggest some other agency; many, as Mivart and Dana, do not yet see any sufficient natural method, although some of these look forward to the possibility of the future discovery of such a method. This view is substantially what has been described above as logical evolution, except that it goes beyond it in the expectation of future discovery; but it demands, as the ultimate source of evolution, a force beyond nature. The theologian, therefore, looking at science from the outside, cannot tell whether or not, or how far, to accept material evolution as its teaching. He is uncertain whether the fullest statement of the doctrine, or whether only a part of it, and what part of it, is to be considered as belonging to the secured domain of scientific conclusion. This embarrassment is increased by the fact of the extreme newness of the prevalence of the hypothesis; for, as Wallace justly remarks at the conclusion of the address above referred to, "However great may have been the intellectual triumphs of the nineteenth century, we can hardly think so highly of its achievements as to imagine that, in somewhat less than twenty years, we have passed from complete ignorance to almost perfect knowledge on two such vast and complex subjects as the origin of species and the antiquity of man." The theologian, therefore, almost bewildered by the rapidity with which science has changed its position, naturally waits to see if this change is permanent and final. Nevertheless, as the hypothesis is so evidently growing in favor, and as its main features, at least, are already so generally accepted by scientists, we are called upon to inquire what bearing it has upon theology. Directly, absolutely none; except as it gives us higher and nobler views of the Creator, and establishes a closer analogy between his various

[1] Address as President of the Section of Biology at the Glasgow meeting of the British Association, 1876.

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works. For theology the question between evolution and anti-evolution is simply a question between mediate and immediate creation; and even this, in view of the immanence of the Creator, becomes little more than a question of the human mode of conception of his work. It is well known that the tendency of theological thought in ancient times, before there was any disturbing influence of science, was decidedly in favor of the mediate conception of creation. The idea of a self-evolution of the cosmos would indeed be destructive to theology; but this need not be feared as the result of scientific thought. Its tendencies are quite in another direction, and lead us, as already said, to the recognition of an inscrutable Power from whom and under whom evolution has been accomplished. The only form of self-evolution, if it can be called a form at all, which attempts to hide itself under the cloak of science, arises from the refusal to think at all as soon as the range of sensible phenomena is passed. The doctrine of evolution as proceeding from and guided by a Power above nature has nothing in it in anywise inimical to theology. On the contrary, nothing can bring us nearer to the old view of the Hebrew seers, that God is everywhere, and that all that is done on earth or in heaven or under the earth is done by him, than this latest stretch of scientific thought, that all is the effect of evolution, but that this evolution must take place under a Power "inscrutable to the intellect of man."

This remains true in the extremest possible view of that hypothesis. Bastian, partly by experiments, partly by reasoning, attempts to trace the molecules of matter from their more simple aggregations in the more stable forms of the crystalloids to the more complicated ones in those which are less stable, and then to those still more complicated and still less stable in the colloids, and thence, with still increasing complication and still lessening stability, to the simplest living forms, thinking that he had himself actually followed the changes of matter from the one to the other, and thence still onwards in the same direction to somewhat higher forms

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of life. These experiments and conclusions are understood to be generally rejected by scientific men, and especially negatived by the researches of Tyndall. But if they were generally accepted, and if Tyndall's confession that he "prolongs his vision backward across the boundary of the experimental evidence, and discovers in matter ..... the promise and potency of every quality of life," were not confessedly a speculation beyond the boundary of evidence, but were a reality of experience; and if Huxley's expectations of what may be hereafter, but has not yet been proved — if all these were assured realities, they would but show the necessity of a more comprehensive view of creation than was formerly received, and prove the theory of mediate, as opposed to immediate, creation. They would not militate against any theological tenet. The theory of evolution may be taken to include man, and that not merely as an animal, but as an intellectual and spiritual being, and, although some theologians stand aghast, nothing has been proposed to shake one iota of the faith. All men of the present and of the past generation have come into being through natural processes, but they remain, nevertheless, moral, accountable, and immortal beings. This is obviously true of the body, and it is shown by inherited gifts and idiosyncrasies to be also true of the intellectual faculties. If we would separate the soul or spirit from these, and confess entire ignorance of the mode of its origin, it yet remains true that each particular soul comes into being with each particular body, and never under any other circumstances. Whatever be, therefore, its origin, the invariable conditions of that origin, without which it never appears, and with which it always appears, are these same natural processes. The same thing is true of all past generations of man; why should we be shocked at the supposition that it may be true also of the first? Neither is such a view more antagonistic to the letter of Scripture than the teachings of geology or of the Copernican system — both of which were once thought utterly subversive of the words of revelation, but which have long since been accepted by all

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intelligent men, and have proved to be in perfect harmony with Scripture. But all this is said not with reference to anything which science has yet attained, but only of that to which some of the students of science look forward. All actual investigations into the origin of life have as yet been baffled. Every effort to elicit living from lifeless protoplasm has come to a generally acknowledged defeat. The mystery at the boundary of life is as yet impenetrable by actual experiment or by actual evidence. But if it were not so; if the theories and analogies which seek to strike across that boundary be admitted as satisfactory,— as to many minds they undoubtedly are,— still theology, except in the necessity of revising the expressions of some of its students, remains wholly unaffected.

The bearing of the doctrine of evolution upon theology may therefore be thus summed up: Logical evolution is thoroughly in accordance with theological teaching, and helpful in many ways in giving it firmness and strength in the convictions of men. Material evolution is as yet too recent and too little defined as an accepted truth of science to understand precisely what its bearings may be, except negatively, that they cannot be harmful. We can conceive that if the theologian dared accept the doctrine as absolutely true he might find in it a glorious realization of the teaching that the facts of nature are but the thoughts of nature's Lord; that the actual outer processes of nature are in harmony with the inner and formative thoughts thereby disclosed. Fresh strength might be gained for his view of the unity of the cosmos, and fresh power in teaching, therefore, the unity of the Author of the cosmos. But it is needless to speculate on what may be hereafter. Suffice it for the present that theology receives no harm from either aspect of evolution, but from the former great gain.

8. The position of theology has always been that no *vera causa* could be found in the realm of nature itself, but must be sought for above and beyond. Philosophical theologians, while insisting upon the existence of a true casuation, have

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come to teach that we know nothing of the real relations between the natural phenomena commonly described as causes and effects, except that they are invariable antecedents and consequents; while the only modifications of the course of nature giving evidence of the intervention of a true cause have come about by the intervention of beings possessed of life. To some small extent such true causation may be seen in the action of the lower animals; but this sinks into insignificance in comparison with the effects produced by man. Now, whatever theories may be held by either theologians or scientists as to still more remote causes by which the human will is itself predetermined, the fact remains that human consciousness testifies to its ultimate power of choice, and that all ages have recognized a moral responsibility in man which can only exist on the basis of his originating action. In such origination we recognize a true cause, and the only cause of which we have knowledge in earthly affairs. It is of no importance to consider the question here whether a true will may also be found in some embryonic stage of development in the lower animals. If so, the argument will remain the same; but it is enough that it exists in man. Effects have been and are now produced by it on a considerable scale upon the earth, upon its flora and its fauna, and upon man himself. But man is surrounded on all sides by effects, by trains of antecedents and consequents of far more stupendous magnitude. In the midst of the vast forces of the cosmos his power of physical causation is as nothingness, and his strength to produce spiritual effects is of permanent avail only as it coincides with the working of a higher Power. What causes, then, are at work beyond and above him? We know of no cause but will, and human will is manifestly and utterly insufficient for the solution of the problem. Analogy, therefore, points to the existence of a higher than human will. We are thus brought again to the same point with which we set out — the existence of a power beyond nature and distinct from nature, — but now with the attribute of will, the essential and distinctive mark

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of what we call personality. It may at first seem rash to speak of this conclusion as sustained by the recent progress of scientific thought; yet on reflection it will be seen that it is so sustained most emphatically, and in a way which has not been heretofore done. There are scientists, indeed, who would deny the existence of the human will in any true sense of that word. The essay "Are Animals Automata?" not only goes so far as to make of man "a conscious automaton," but has the marvellous effrontery to attribute this opinion to Augustine, Calvin, Jonathan Edwards, and other predestinarian theologians — a position which can only be excused from disingenuousness on the supposition of an ignorance of theological subjects which ought to debar its possessor from the expression of any opinion whatever upon them. But however any of us may differ from the peculiar ideas of that school of theology, we may safely trust to history for their vindication from such an absurd travesty of their opinions; and however subtile may be the reasoning which would deprive man of a will we may safely trust to human consciousness for its overthrow. But apart from this, it is clear that the most advanced school of scientists have come to recognize, expressly and emphatically, and in every variety of statement, that the ultimate causes of nature's action lie beyond all scientific ken. This was long ago recognized in the laws of motion. The argument has been admirably stated by Dr. Hill, in his "Geometry and Faith." The first law of motion is this: A body in motion, free from external influence, moves with uniform velocity in a straight line forever. And then comes its consequent: A body at rest, free from external influence, would remain at rest forever. From these laws follows by necessary logical consequence the proposition "that the cause of all motion in the universe is something else than matter." The argument is clear, the premises are admitted, and the conclusion is irrefragable; but it has exercised little influence over the minds of men. It is too abstract; and, moreover, the minds of most men are easily bewildered in the mazes of an ex-

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ternal force exerted by other matter upon the particular matter under consideration, and on that again by still other matter, and so on, endlessly, until the attention is wearied before it is seen that if the proposition is to be met in this way matter itself must be infinite — not indefinite merely, but absolutely infinite. It is therefore a great help to theology, to truth, that physical science on all sides should be declaring with one voice, through the mouths of many votaries, that there must be a causation outside of that nature with which it is their specialty to deal. For example, Huxley refuses to be ranked among atheists, because "the problem of the ultimate cause of existence is one which seems to me to be hopelessly out of reach of my poor powers"; Tyndall would make void the charge of his being a materialist, because evolution presupposes "a power inscrutable to the intellect of man"; Herbert Spencer (who, though not, strictly speaking, a physicist, must yet always be included in describing the opinions of the coterie of which he forms so prominent a leader) at every turn of his philosophy leads us for the ultimate cause of what we know to the "Unknowable." Indeed, so fundamental is the existence of the Supreme to Spencer's philosophy that one could almost wish that philosophy itself was not so vulnerable.[1] These names are selected

[1] The generalizations of Spencer's philosophy are so fascinating that one would be glad to refer to it for higher purposes than that of simply evidencing the drift of a certain class of thought. Many of its weak points have been often and ably pointed out; and it has one fallacy which is especially fundamental. It professes to be a philosophy of the whole cosmos, and makes the fundamental principle of that cosmos to be progress from the diffused, the homogeneous, and the general to the condensed, the heterogeneous, and the special. All this is attended with a constant dissipation of force. Yet he shows that this force cannot be annihilated. What then becomes of it when it is dissipated from the universe? Correspondingly he teaches that when this process has reached its ultimate stage and an absolute equilibrium been attained, it will be reversed, and the opposite process go on with a constant absorption of force. From whence is this force to be derived, seeing it is not in the universe? Clearly either the cosmos must be duplicated, and one process must be going on in one and the reverse in the other, like the two buckets in a well, in which case the philosophy of integration is not that of the universe but only of its half; or else there must be a Power above the universe, from whom all force proceeds and to whom all force returns. In other words, the powers and forces of nature are

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because they are those of men who have shown the greatest abhorrence and contempt of theology, as men often do of things of which their knowledge is limited; but it is well known that the list might be indefinitely enlarged. It is plain that science is day by day, in every branch of its widely extended pursuits, and wherever it is cultivated, pointing with more and more emphatic clearness to some causation beyond nature as the cause of nature, to a power above all natural forces as the source of force, to a *vera causa* not included within the range of nature's antecedents and consequents.

9. And the necessity of such a cause applies not only to the origin of nature but to every causation in its progress. The advance of science makes more and more evident not only that nature could not have come into existence, but that it could not continue to exist as it is, but for a cause beyond its boundaries. There is thus brought before us again, and from another point of view, the highest idea we can form of the divine connection with the universe; it is an instant and all-pervading connection presenting God to our thought as the cause of all that is. This was abundantly expressed in the imagery of the old Hebrew poets; it was fully set forth in the apostolic teaching, that "in him we live and move and have our being," and that "by him all things consist." But as we have grown in knowledge we have imagined that we have found secondary causes coming between us and God, and removing him far off from us. Now science in part shows, in part suggests, that these secondary causes are at once everything and nothing; everything in that they describe the apparently universal method of God's working, nothing in that they are nothing, and can accomplish nothing, except as they depend upon and are energized by his power.

Here, then, are several of the great points of the teaching

but the manifestation of the will of the Most High. Nothing is gained to his argument by the theory that the cosmos is finite and enclosed by nothingness, and that the force which is dissipated from any point in it is therefore reflected back from its limits. On this supposition again, his philosophy can relate only to that part of the cosmos from which force is being dissipated; it must be gathering again in the other parts.

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of recent scientific thought. In regard to one phase of one of them, material evolution, we hesitate yet how far to accept it as the certain conclusion of science; but it fully accords with the highest and best theological teaching, and opens to us ennobling views of the divine presence and activity in the world from which an earlier stage of scientific progress threatened to shut us out. If the hypothesis prove true, theology will be the immense gainer whenever it feels itself authorized to accept this doctrine from science. Aside from this the other points remain, taught with ever-increasing vigor of assertion by advancing science and scientific speculation; the universality of fixed order in nature, the modification of the course of nature, consistently with this fixed order, by the intervention of intelligence; the insufficiency of nature either to originate or to continue itself, and the unsearchableness of the Power above it, together with the impossibility of his being revealed to man otherwise than according to man's capacity — in other words, partially, and in an anthropomorphic fashion, except as man gains a higher and unutterable knowledge through a real union with a Mediator who is both God and man; the doctrine of evolution, logically considered, as showing the unity of the world and a *nexus* between its parts which bespeaks the unity of the Source from which it proceeded; and, finally, the necessity of seeking the *vera causa* of the things that are, beyond them, or of positing the existence of a Cause distinct from the cosmos, and eternal, intelligent, and omnipotent; together with the immanence of this cause in its causation — the perpetual, abiding presence of the Creator in his works, the ever active energy of God in all things.

These are all fundamental points for theology. They are, perhaps, nearly all the points which natural science, as such, could be asked to teach; or, at least, they lead on, by logical consequence, to all. Beyond these the theological argument must rest mainly on historic and on subjective evidence from which it has no serious dangers to encounter. The subjective evidence always has been, and probably will

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always continue to be, the most immediately satisfactory, and, to those who can properly appreciate it, is overwhelmingly convincing. But intellectual conviction must rest chiefly upon historic evidence. There is, indeed, a certain pseudo-historic and antiquarian learning, which dogs the progress of the true, in which the audacity of the falsifications of history and of discovery is only surpassed by the malignant ingenuity of its attacks upon revelation. But honest historic investigation and sound archaeological research are continually adding such fresh and powerful testimony to the faithfulness of the Scripture record as to replace in our day something of the value of the miraculous attestation of old. That destructive criticism which has made so many minds indisposed to receive the historic evidences of the faith, has reached its culmination, and is yielding before the results of excavation and deciphered inscription, and it may also be added, before the exposure of the illogical consequents to which it was leading. The "humanities," as they develop, continually broaden the foundation for our faith. Only the historic evidences, as well as the subjective, in many quarters, have had no chance of acceptance, because there was a foregone conclusion contradicting the truths to which they testify. Science is busily at work in removing those foregone conclusions, and the result must be that "wisdom shall be justified of all her children."

As true theology, the interpreter of the revealed word of God, should be honored by the student of his works, so science, the knowledge of the works of God, should be hailed as the natural and exceedingly important ally of the study of his word.

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ARTICLE III.

HORAE SAMARITANAE; OR, A COLLECTION OF VARIOUS READINGS OF THE SAMARITAN PENTATEUCH COMPARED WITH THE HEBREW AND OTHER ANCIENT VERSIONS.

BY REV. B. PICK, PH.D., ROCHESTER, N.Y.

NUMBERS.

CHAP. I.

2 of all the congregation — Sam. of the congregation.

42 the children — Sam. לבני of the children.

44 each one — Sam. איש אחד למטה אחד למטה each one for one tribe of the tribe; Sept. ἕις κατὰ φυλὴν μίαν κατὰ φυλήν.

for the house of his fathers — Sam. of the house of their fathers בית אבתם; Sept. οἴκων πατρῶν αὐτῶν.

45 לבית אבתם by the house of their fathers — Sam. לצבאתם throughout their hosts; Sept. σὺν δυνάμει αὐτῶν.

52 על דגלו by his own standard — Sam. על ידו by his side.

CHAP. II.

4 and their mustered ones — Sam. and its mustered ones ופקודיו (id. v. 13, 15, 19, 21, 23, 26, 28, 30).

7 the tribe — Sam. and the tribe.

14 Reuel — Sam. ריעיאל Deuel; Vulg. *Duel.* The Samaritan reading is found in more than seventy Hebrew MSS.

CHAP. III.

4 and Nadab and Abihu died before the Lord — Sam. and Nadab and Abihu died.

9 לו unto him — Sam. לי unto me; Sept. μοί.

12 מבני ישראל from the children of Israel — Sam. מבני ישראל מרוחם יחיו among the children of Israel they shall be redeemed; Sept. λύτρα αὐτῶν ἔσονται.

17 and Kohath — Sam. קהת Kohath.

25 its covering — Sam. ומכסהו and its covering.

31 and the hanging — Sam. ותמסך ותכיור וכנו and the hanging, and the laver, and its foot.

and all its service — Sam. וכל עבדתם and all their service.

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38 and Aaron — Sam. Aaron.
שמרים keeping — Sam. שמרי the keepers.
39 Moses and Aaron — Sam. Moses; Syr. Moses.
46 מבכור of the firstborn — Sam. מבכורי of the firstborn.
48 פדויי the redeemed ones — Sam. פדוי the redeemed one.

CHAP. IV.

6 and they shall spread — Sam. ופרשו עליו and they shall spread over it; Sept. *ἐπ' αὐτήν*.
8 בגד a cloth — Sam. כסוי בגד a cover, a cloth.
14 the flesh-hooks — Sam. and the flesh-hooks ואת.
At the end of the verse the Samaritan has the following words: ולקחו בגד ארגמן וכסו את הכיור ואת כנו ונתנו אתם אל מכסה עור תחש ונתנו אל המרם and they shall take a purple cloth and cover the laver and its foot, and put them upon the covering of badger's skins, and shall put them on the bar; Sept. *καὶ λήψονται ἱμάτιον πορφυροῦν καὶ συγκαλύψουσι τὸν λουτῆρα καὶ τὴν βάσιν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐμβαλοῦσιν αὐτὸ εἰς κάλυμμα δερμάτινον ὑακίνθινον καὶ ἐπιθήσουσιν ἐπὶ ἀναφορεῖς.*
15 and all the vessels — Sam. ואת כלי and the vessels.
the burden — Sam. משאי the burdens.
19 and thus — Sam. ואת thus; Sept. *τοῦτο*.
איש איש every one — Sam. איש a man.
ואל and to — Sam. ועל and over.
23 unto fifty — Sam. and unto fifty ועד.
25 his covering, and the — Sam. and his covering the.
32 the vessels — Sam. את כל כלי all the vessels; Sept. *πάντα τὰ σκεύη*.
34 and after the house — Sam. לבית after the house (vs. 38-46).
36 seven hundred — Sam. and seven hundred.
49 אשר as — Sam. כאשר according as; Sept. *ὃν τρόπον*.

CHAP. V.

3 unto — Sam. ועד and unto.
5 Israel — Sam. ישראל לאמר Israel, saying; Sept. *λέγων*.
9 יהיו they shall be — Sam. יהיה it shall be.
איש any man — Sam. ואיש and any man.
29 אשר which — Sam. ואשר and which.

CHAP. VI.

20 to the priest — Sam. לכהן יהיה to the priest it shall be.

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CHAP. VII.

16 one kid — Sam. ושעיר and one kid (vs. 22, 28, 34, 40, 46, 52, 58, 64, 70, 76, 82).

25 his offering — Sam. וקרבנו and his offering (vs. 31, 37, 43, 49, 55, 61, 67, 73, 79).

CHAP. VIII.

4 unto the flowers — Sam. ועד פרחיה and unto the flowers.

15 לעבד to do — Sam. לעבד את עבדת to do the service; Sept. ἐργάζεσθαι τὰ ἔργα.

16 instead of such as open every womb, even instead of the firstborn of all the children — Sam. תחת כל בכור פטר רחם בבני instead of the firstborn that openeth the womb among the children.

CHAP. IX.

3 תעשו ye shall do — Sam. יעשו they shall do.

13 ויתאיש and the man — Sam. ואיש and a man.

CHAP. X.

7 and when is gathered — Sam. בהקהל when is gathered.

10 before your God — Sam. before the Lord your God.

At the end of this verse the Samaritan text adds here the following words from Deut. i. 6–8, with slight alterations of the Hebrew text, which we put in brackets: And the Lord spake unto Moses [ויידבר יתיה אל משה], saying, Ye have dwelt long enough in this mountain; turn you, and take your journey, and go to the mount of the Amorites, and unto all the places nigh thereunto, in the plain, in the hills, and in the vale, in the south [בנגב], and by the sea-side, to the land of the Canaanites, and unto Lebanon, unto the great river, the river Euphrates. Behold ye [ראי], I have set the land before you, go in and possess the land which I have sworn [נשבעתי] unto your fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, to give unto their seed after them [לתת לזרעם].

18 camp of Reuben — Sam. camp of the children of Reuben בני; Vulg. *filii*.

CHAP. XI.

6 עינינו before our eyes — Sam. עיננו before our eye.

12 ילדתיה begotten them — Sam. ילדתיו begotten him.

15 אם if — Sam. ואם and if.

24 מזקני of the elders — Sam. זקני the elders.

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26 מידד Medad — Sam. מודד Modad; Sept. Μωδάδ (id. vs. 27).
32 all the next day — Sam. וכל היום המחרת all that next day.

CHAP. XII.

6 אתודע I will make myself known — Sam. יתודע he will make himself known.
in a dream. — Sam. יבחלום and in a dream.
8 ומראה through vision — Sam. במראה in a vision.
16 with this verse the Samaritan commences

CHAP. XIII.

and adds at the end of the verse (the first of the chapter) the following words from Deut i. 20–22, with some slight alterations of the Hebrew text, which we put in brackets: And Moses said unto the children of Israel [ויאמר משה לבני ישראל], Ye are come unto the mountain of the Amorites, which the Lord our God doth give unto us. Behold, the Lord thy God hath set the land before thee: go up and possess it, as the Lord God of thy fathers hath said unto thee; fear not, neither be discouraged. And they came near unto Moses, and said [ויקרבו אל משה ויאמרו], Let us send men before us, and they shall search us out the land, and bring us word again by what way we must go up, and into what cities we shall come; and the saying pleased Moses well [ויטב חדבר בעיני משה].
2 shall ye send — Sam. [3] תשלח shalt thou send; Sept. ἀποστελεῖς.
8 הושע Oshea — Sam. [9] יהושע Joshua (id. vs. 16 [17]).
15 מכי Machi — Sam. [16] מיכי Michi.
17 and Moses sent them — Sam. [18] וישלח אתם and he sent them.
21 and they went up and searched — Sam. [22] וילכו ויבאו ויתרו and they went up, and came and searched.
24 קרא was called — Sam. [25] קראו they called; Sept. ἐπωνόμασαν.
28 very great — Sam. [29] וגדלות מאד and very great; Sept. καὶ μεγάλαι σφόδρα.
29 and the Hittites — Sam. [30] and the Hittites and the Hivites והחוי; Sept. καὶ ὁ Εὐαῖος.
30 and said — Sam. [31] and said to him לו; Sept. αὐτῷ.
33 At the end of this verse the Samaritan [34] adds what is found in Deut. i. 27–33: And the children of Israel murmered in their tents, and said [וירגנו בני ישראל באהליהם ויאמרו], Because the Lord hated us, he hath brought us forth out of the land of

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Egypt, to deliver us into the hands of the Amorites, to destroy us. Whither shall we go up? since our brethren have discouraged [תמיסו] our heart, saying, The people is greater and taller than we; the cities are great, and walled up to heaven; and moreover we have seen the sons of the Anakim there. And Moses said unto the children of Israel, Dread not, neither be afraid of them. The Lord your God, which goeth before you, he shall fight for you, according to all that he did for you in Egypt before your eyes, and in the wilderness, where thou hast seen how that the Lord thy God bare thee, as a a man doth bear his son, in all the way that ye went, until ye came into this place. Yet in this thing ye did not believe the Lord your God, who went in the way before you, to search you out a place to pitch your tents in, in fire by night, to show you by what way ye should go, and in a cloud by day.

CHAP. XIV.

12 and I will make thee — Sam. ואעשה אתך ואת בית אביך and I will make thee and thy father's house; Sept. καὶ ποιήσω σε καὶ τὸ οἶκον τοῦ πατρός σου.

18 and of great mercy — Sam. ורב חסד ואמת and of great mercy and truth; Sept. καὶ πολυέλεος καὶ ἀληθινός; Chald. וקשום.

and transgression — Sam. ופשע וחטאה and transgression and sin; Sept. καὶ ἀδικίας καὶ ἁμαρτίας; Chald. ולמרוד ולחיבין.

unto the third — Sam. and unto the third ועל.

20 according to thy word — Sam. כדבריך according to thy words.

23 unto their fathers — Sam. unto their fathers, to give it to them לתת להם.

40 At the end of this verse the Samaritan adds what is read in Deut. i. 42: And the Lord said unto Moses, Say unto them, Go not up, neither fight, for I am not among you, lest ye be smitten before your enemies.

45 in that hill — Sam. בתר התוה לקראתם וירדפו אתם כאשר תעשינה חדבריים in that hill to meet them, and they persecuted them as bees do (comp. Deut i. 44).

unto Hormah — Sam. חרמה וישובו אל חמחנה unto Hormah, and they returned into the camp; Sept. καὶ ἀπεστράφησαν εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν.

CHAP. XV.

8 בנדבה in a free will — Sam. נדבה a free will.

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12 במספר according to the number — Sam. במספרם according to their number.

14 כן יעשה so he shall do — Sam. כן יעשה תקהל so the congregation shall do (making a pause after the first word of the following verse); Sept. καὶ ἡ συναγωγὴ κυρίῳ.

31 his commandment — Sam. מצותיו his commandments; Sept. τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ.

39 and it shall be — Sam. והיו and they shall be.
look upon it — Sam. וראיתם אותם look upon them; Sept. αὐτὰ; Vulg. *quas*.

CHAP. XVI.

1 sons of Reuben — Sam. son of Reuben בן; Sept. υἱοῦ Ῥουβήν.

5 והקריב and cause him to come near — Sam. יקריב he shall come near.

9 and to stand — לעמד to stand.

14 and a vineyard — Sam. או כרם or a vineyard.

15 חמור אחד one ass — Sam. חמוד אחד one precious thing; Sept. ἐπιθύμημα.

36 With this verse, according to Van der Hooght's Bible edition, the seventeenth chapter commences, while some Polyglots, as well as the Samaritan, close the sixteenth chapter with the fiftieth verse, as the English version also does.

39 Eleazar — Sam. [4] Eleazar the son of Aaron בן אהרן; Sept. υἱὸς Ἀαρών.

CHAP. XVII.

4 לכם with you — Sam. [19] לך with thee; Sept. σοί; Vulg. *ad te*.

CHAP. XVIII.

9 מקדש of the holy — Sam. מקדשי of the holies.
ישיבו לי bring unto me — Sam. יאשמי לי transgress against me.

17 לריח ניחוח for a sweet savor — Sam. ריח ניחוח a sweet savor.

27 heave offering — Sam. תרומתיכם heave offerings; Sept. ἀφαιρέματα.

31 and thy family — Sam. ובתיכם and thy families; Sept. ὑμεῖς καὶ οἱ υἱοὶ ὑμῶν; Vulg. *familiae vestrae*.

CHAP. XIX.

2 אשר upon which — Sam. ואשר and upon which.

12 יטהר he shall be clean — Sam. וטהר and he shall be clean; Sept. καὶ καθαρὸς ἔσται.

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14 this is — Sam. וזאת and this is.

15 פתיל עליו bound upon — Sam. ופתיל עליו and cord upon.

18 upon all the vessels — Sam. ועל הכלים upon the vessels; Sept. ἐπὶ τῷ σκεύῃ.

21 להם unto them — Sam. לכם unto you; Sept. ὑμῖν.

CHAP. XX.

5 ויתאנה or of figs — Sam. of figs.

13 מי מריבה water of Meribah — Sam. הם מריבה these are the strifes.

At the end of this verse the Samaritan text adds the following pieces from Deut. iii. 24–28: And Moses said, O Lord God, thou hast begun to show thy servant thy greatness, and thy mighty hand: for what God is there in heaven or in earth, that can do according to thy works, and according to thy might? I pray thee, let me go over, and see the good land that is beyond Jordan, that goodly mountain, and Lebanon. And the Lord said unto Moses, Let it suffice thee; speak no more of this matter unto me. Get thee up into the top of Pisgah, and lift up thine eyes westward, and northward, and southward, and behold it with thine eyes; for thou shalt not go over this Jordan. But charge Joshua, the son of Nun (בן נין), and encourage him, and strengthen him; for he shall go over before this people, and he shall cause them to inherit the land which thou shalt see. Deut. ii. 2–6: And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Ye have compassed this mountain long enough: turn you northward. And command thou the people saying, Ye are to pass through the coast of your brethren, the children of Esau, which dwell in Seir, and they shall be afraid of you: take ye good heed unto yourselves therefore: meddle not with them; for I will not give you of their land a possession (ירשה), no, not so much as a foot-breadth; because I have given Mount Seir unto Esau for a possession. Ye shall buy meat of them for money, that ye may eat; and ye shall also buy water of them for money, that ye may drink.

27 ויעלו and they went up — Sam. ויעלהו and he made him go up; Sept. ἀνεβίβασεν αὐτόν.

CHAP. XXI.

3 the Canaanites — Sam. את הכנעני בידו the Canaanites into his hand; Sept. ὑποχείριον αὐτῷ.

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5 לממ הוצאתנו have ye brought us — Sam. לממ הוציאתנו hast thou brought us; Sept. ἐξήγαγες ἡμᾶς; Syr. and Chald.

11 At the end of this verse the Samaritan adds what is said in Deut. ii. 9: And the Lord said unto Moses (וידבר יהוה אל משה), Distress not the Moabites, neither contend with them; for I will not give thee of their land a possession; because I have given Ar unto the children of Lot for a possession.

12 At the end of this verse the Samaritan adds these words, taken from Deut. ii. 17–19: And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Thou art to pass over through Ar, the coast of Moab, this day; and when thou comest nigh over against the children of Ammon distress them not, nor meddle with them; for I will not give thee of the land of the children of Ammon any possession, because I have given it unto the children of Lot for a possession.

13 from thence they removed — Sam. ויסעי מנחל זרד and they removed from the valley of Zared.

15 and at the stream of the brooks that goeth down to the dwelling of Ar — Sam. which taketh possession of them, and which goeth down to the dwelling of the city (the Sam. reads אשר for ויאשר, and עיר instead of ער).

16 gather the people together — Sam. gather the people together unto me אספה לי.

18 with their staves. And from the — Sam. ובמשענותם ממדבר and with their staves: from the.

20 At the end of this verse the Samaritan inserts the following, from Deut. ii, 24, 25: And the Lord said unto Moses, Rise ye up, take your journey, and pass over the river Arnon: behold, I have given into thine hand Sihon the Amorite, king of Heshbon, and his land: begin to possess it, and contend with him in battle. This day will I begin to put the dread of thee and the fear of thee upon the nations that are under the whole heaven, who shall hear report of thee, and shall tremble and be in anguish because of thee.

21 Amorites, saying, — Sam. מלך האמרי דברי שלים Amorites, with words of peace, saying; Sept. λόγοις εἰρηνικοῖς.

22 the land — Sam. בדרך המלך נלך לא אסיר ימין ושמאל לא אמח the land, by the king's highway will we go; I will neither turn unto the right hand nor to the left.

we will not turn into the fields or into the vineyards — Sam. I

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will not turn into the fields or into the vineyards. Thou shalt sell me meat for money, that I may eat.

22 we will not drink of the waters of the well, but will go along the king's highway — Sam. and give me water for money, that I may drink, only I will pass through on my feet, as the children of Esau which dwelt in Seir, and the Moabites which dwelt in Ar, did unto me. Comp. Deut. ii. 27–29.

עד שר נעבר גבלך until we be past thy borders — Sam. omitted.

23 Between ויאסף and בגבלו the Samaritan inserts: And the Lord said unto Moses, Behold I have begun to give Sihon and his land before thee: begin to possess, that thou mayest inherit his land (Deut. ii. 31).

24 smote him — Sam. ויכהו ישראל ואת בניו ואת כל עמו smote him and his sons and his whole people.

28 consumed Ar of Moab — Sam. אכלה עד מואב consumed unto Moab; Sept. ἕως; Syr. לעד.

30 which reacheth unto Medeba — Sam. אש על מידבא a fire upon Medeba; Sept. πῦρ ἐπὶ Μωάβ.

31 בארץ in the land — Sam. בערי in the cities; Sept. πόλεσι.

32 ויורש drove out — Sam. ויורישו and they drove out; Sept. καὶ ἐξέβαλον.

35 ואת בניו and his sons — Sam. omitted.

CHAP. XXII.

4 the company — Sam. הקהל הזה this company; Sept. ἡ συναγωγὴ αὕτη; Vulg. *hic populus*.

5 עמו of his people — Sam. עמין of Ammon; Syr. עמון.

והנה behold they — Sam. והנה and behold they.

7 וקסמים with the rewards — Sam. וקסמיהם with their rewards.

11 ועתה לכה come now — Sam. ועתה לכה and come now; Sept. καὶ νῦν δεῦρο.

12 לא תאר thou shalt not curse — Sam. ולא תאר and thou shalt not curse.

18 כסף וזהב silver and gold — Sam. כסף או זהב silver or gold.

20 ויבא אלהים and God came — Sam. ויבא מלאך אלהים and the angel of God came.

22 ויחר־אף אלהים and God's anger — Sam. ויחר־אף יהוה and the Lord's anger.

32 לשטן to withstand — Sam. לשטנך to withstand thee; Sept. εἰς διαβολήν σου; Vulg. *ut adversarer tibi*.

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32 כי ירס הדרך לנגדי for the journey ran against me — Sam. כי רע דרכך לנגדי for thy way is bad against me; Sept. ὅτι ρύπ; ἀστεία ἡ ὁδός σου ἐναντίον μου; Vulg. *quia perversa est via tua mihique contraria.*

33 לנגדי from me — Sam. שלנגדי from before me.

35 that thou shalt speak — Sam. אתו תשמר לדבר that shalt thou observe to speak; Sept. τοῦτο φυλάξῃ λαλῆσαι; Vulg. *quam praecepero tibi loquaris.*

38 that shall I speak — Sam. אתו אשמר לדבר that shall I observe to speak.

CHAP. XXIII.

1 build me — Sam. עשה לי make me.

3 burnt offering — Sam. עלותיך burnt offerings; Sept. θυσίας σου.

יהוה the Lord — Sam. אלהים God.

4 ויקר אלהים and God met — Sam. וימצא מלאך אלהים את and the angel of God found.

5 and the Lord put — Sam. and the angel of the Lord put.

6 burnt sacrifice — Sam. עלותיו burnt sacrifices; Sept. τῶν ὁλοκαυτωμάτων.

15 here by thy burnt offering — Sam. by thy burnt offerings (id. vs. 17).

16 and the Lord met — Sam. and the angel of the Lord met.

19 ודבר or hath he spoken — Sam. ידבר shall he speak; Sept. λαλήσει.

20 and he hath blessed — Sam. אברך I will bless; Sept. εὐλογήσω.

21 he hath not beheld — Sam. לא אביט I behold not.

26 all that the Lord — Sam. כל דבר אשר ידבר האלהים every word that God; Sept. τὸ ῥῆμα ὃ ἂν λαλήσῃ ὁ θεός.

30 אמר said — Sam. דבר spoke.

CHAP. XXIV.

4 נאם שמע אמרי אל — Sam. omitted.

עינים eyes — Sam. עין eye.

5 thy tabernacles — Sam. and thy tabernacles.

6 are they spread forth — Sam. נטעי planted. Some MSS. read נטוי spread forth (sing.); probably referring to Israel in the preceding verse.

8 מוציאו brought him forth — Sam. נוהגו led him forth; Sept. ὁδηγήσων; Vulg. *eduxit.*

13 *silver* and gold — Sam. כסף או זהב silver or gold.

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18 the Lord saith — Sam. the Lord saith to me אלי; Sept. μοί.

14 I will advertise — Sam. ואעיצך and I will advertise.

17 וקרקר and destroy — Sam. וקדקד and the crown. The reading of the Samaritan is also preferred by Fürst, who says in his Hebrew Lexicon, s.v. קור "but we should read with the Samaritan Cod. וקדקד instead of וקרקר."

18 Seir — Sam. עשו Esau; Sept. Ἡσαῦ.

20 that he perish for ever — Sam. עד יאבד until he perish.

22 until Assur shall carry thee away captive — Sam. עד מאשור תושבך until from Assur thou art carried away captive. The difficulty in the Samaritan is the word תושבך, which in the Latin translation by Walton is rendered *incola tuus*. One Samaritan MSS. reads as the Hebrew does, תשבך.

23 יחיה live — Sam. יהיה be.

24 וציים and ships — Sam. ויוציאם he shall bring them forth, or, going forth; Sept. ἐξελεύσεται; Vulg. *venient*.

ועני and they shall afflict — Sam. they shall afflict.

עדי אבד perish for ever — Sam. עד יאבד until he perish.

CHAP. XXV

3 and Israel joined — Sam. and the children of Israel joined מבני ישראל.

4 take all the heads of the people, and hang them up before the Lord against the sun — Sam. אמר וידברו את האנשים הנצמדים לבעל־פעור speak, and they shall slay all the persons who have joined themselves unto Baal-peor.

17 צרור vex — Sam. צררו vex ye; Sept. ἐχθραίνετε.

CHAP. XXVI.

5 the children — Sam. ובני and the children.

8 ובני and the sons — Sam. בני the sons.

9 ודתן and Dathan — Sam. דתן Dathan.

אשר רצו who strove — Sam. אשר ועדו who gathered themselves; Sept. οἱ ἐπισυστάντες.

בהצותם when they strove — Sam. בהועדתם when they gathered themselves; Sept. ἐν τῇ ἐπισυστάσει.

10 swallowed them up — Sam. ותבלע אתם הארץ the earth swallowed them up.

devoured two hundred — Sam. את קרח ואת חמשים devoured Korah and the two hundred.

12 למשפחתם after their families — Sam. למשפחת השמעוני after the families of the Simeonites.

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16 of Eri, the family of the Erites — Sam. לעדי משפחת העדי of Adi, the family of the Adites; Sept. Ἀδδί.

17 Arod — Sam. לארודי Aroḍi; Sept. Ἀροαδί.
Areli ... Arelites — Sam. לארולי ... האדולי Aruli ... Arulites.

18 families of the children of Gad — Sam. משפחות גד families of Gad.

21 Hamul ... Hamulites — Sam. לחמואל ... החמואלי Hamuel ... Hamuelites; Sept. Ἰεμουήλ.

23 החמי Punites — Sam. חפואי Puites; Sept. Φουαί.

24 Jashub ... Jashubites — Sam. ליושב ... היושבי Joshab ... Joshabites.

27 הזבולני Zebulunites — Sam. זבילן Zebulun.

29 לגלעד of Gilead — Sam. omitted.

31 Asriel ... Asrielites — Sam. ואשרואל ... האשרואלי Asruel ... Asruelites

34 ופקדיהם and those that were numbered — Sam. לפקדיהם according to their numbers (id. vs. 41).

35 אלה these are — Sam. ואלה and these are; Sept. καὶ οὗτοι.
לתחן ... התחני Tahan ... Tahanites — Sam. לתחם ... התחמי Taham ... Tahamites.

36 and these are the families — Sam. these are the families אלה.
לערן ... הערני Eran ... Eranites — Sam. לעדן ... העדני Edan ... Edanites; Sept. Ἐδάν.

40 and the sons of Bela were Ard and Naaman — Sam. omitted.
הנעמי Naamites — Sam. הנעמני Naamanites; Sept. Νοεμανί.

43 according to those that were numbered — Sam. ופקודיהם and they that were numbered.

44 לימנה of Jimna — Sam. לימני of Jamina; Sept. Ἰαμνί.

45 the sons of Beriah — Sam. omitted.

51 שבע מאית seven hundred — Sam. ושבע מאית and seven hundred.

55 ינחלו they shall inherit — Sam. יתנחלו shall they receive as possession.

58 families of the Levites — Sam. משפחות בני לוי families of the sons of Levi; Sept. υἱῶν Λευί.
the family of the Hebronites — Sam. and the family of the Hebronites וחשפחת.
the family of the Mahlites — Sam. and the family of the Mahlites וחשפחת.
the family of the Mushites — Sam. וחשפחת החקרחי and the family of the Korathites.

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58 the family of the Korathites — Sam. ומשפחת חמושי and the family of the Mushites.

CHAP. XXVII.

1 Noah and Hoglah and Milcah — Sam. Noah, Hoglah, Milcah.

3 and had no sons — Sam. our father had no sons אבינו.

4 give unto us therefore a possession — Sam. give ye unto us therefore a possession of an inheritance תנו לנו אחזת נחלת; Sept. δότε; Vulg. *date.*

8 וחעבירתם cause to pass over — Sam. ונחתם ye shall give.

12 and the Lord said unto Moses — Sam. and the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, וידבר ... לאמר.

20 למען that — Sam. ולמען and that.

21 shall they go out ... come in יבאו ... יצאו — Sam. shall he go out ... come in יבוא ... יצא.

23 At the end of this verse the Samaritan adds (from Deut. iii. 21, 22): And he said unto him, Thine eyes have seen all that the Lord hath done unto these two kings: so shall the Lord do unto all the kingdoms whither thou passest. Thou shalt not fear them, for the Lord your God he shall fight for you.

CHAP. XXVIII.

2 במועדו due season — Sam. במועדיו due seasons; Sept. ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς.

5 בשמן כתית of beaten oil — Sam. בשמן of oil; Sept. ἐλαίῳ.

10 ונסכו drink offering — Sam. ונסכיהם drink offerings.

14 לפר a bullock — Sam. לפר האחד one bullock.
לכבש a lamb — Sam. לכבש האחד one lamb.

15 יעשה shall be offered — Sam. יעשו shall they offer.
ונסכו drink offering — Sam. ונסכיהם drink offerings.

17 יאכל be eaten — Sam. תאכלו shall ye eat; Sept. ᾔσεσθε.

21 a several tenth deal shalt thou offer for every lamb — Sam. and a several tenth deal for every lamb (תעשה is omitted).

22 and one goat for a sin-offering — Sam. and one kid of the goats for a sin-offering ושעיר עזים אחד; Sept. καὶ χίμαρον ἐξ αἰγῶν ἕνα περὶ ἁμαρτίας.

24 after this manner ye shall offer daily — Sam. after this manner daily ye shall offer ליום תעשו.
ריח ניחוח of a sweet savor — Sam. לריח ניחוח as a sweet savor.
it shall be offered ... drink offering — Sam. יעשו ... ונסכיהם they shall be offered ... drink offerings.

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26 וביום and in the day — Sam. ביום in the day.
27 burnt offering for a sweet savor — Sam. burnt offering, a sacrifice made by fire, of a sweet savor עלה אשה ריח.
one ram, seven lambs of the first year — Sam. ואיל אחד כבשים בני שנה שבעה תמימם יהיו לכם and one ram, lambs of the first year, shall be to you seven without blemish.
28 two tenth deals — Sam. and two tenth deals ושני.
29 a several tenth deal — Sam. and a several tenth deal ועשרון.
30 one kid of the goats — Sam. ושעיר עזים אחד לחטאת and one kid of the goats for a sin-offering; Sept. περὶ ἁμαρτίας.

CHAP. XXIX.

3 two tenth deals — Sam. and two tenth deals ושני.
4 and one tenth deal — Sam. ועשרון עשרון and a several tenth deal; Sept. δέκατον δέκατον.
6 ונסכיהם their drink-offerings — Sam. ונסכיה their drink-offering (id. vs. 16, 19).
7 any work — Sam. וכל מלאכת and any work.
8 one ram — Sam. ואיל אחד and one ram.
9 two tenth — Sam. and two tenth ושני.
10 a several tenth — Sam. and a several tenth ועשרון.
11 one kid of the goats for a ... drink-offerings — Sam. ושעיר עזים אחד לחטאת ... ונסכיה and one kid of the goats for a ... drink-offering.
12 of the seventh month — Sam. לחדש השביעי חזה of this seventh month; Sept. τούτου, and Syr.
13 without blemish — Sam. תמימם יהיו לכם without blemish for you.
14 two tenth deals — Sam. and two tenth deals ושני.
15 fourteen lambs — Sam. הכבשים ונסכיהם fourteen lambs and their drink-offerings.
16 his meat-offering — Sam. ומנחתה and his meat-offering.
22 and one goat for a sin — Sam. ושעיר עזים אחד לחטאת and one kid of the goats for a sin; Sept. καὶ χίμαρον ἐξ αἰγῶν (id. vs. 28, 31, 34, 38).
24 their meat-offering — Sam. ומנחתם and their meat-offering (id. vs. 37).
31 his meat-offering — Sam. ומנחתה and his meat-offering.
35 on the eighth day — Sam. and on the eighth day וביום.

CHAP. XXX.

4 hear her vow and her bond — Sam. נדריה ואסריה hear her vows and her bonds; Sept. τὰς εὐχὰς αὐτῆς καὶ τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς αὐτῆς.

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4 and every bond — Sam. ואסריה and her bonds (id. vs. 5, 7, 11, 12).
יקים shall stand — Sam. יקימו shall stand; Sept. *μενοῦσιν*.

5 her father disallow her — Sam. her father disallowing, disallow her ואם חנא ינא; Sept. *ἀνανεύων ἀνανεύσῃ*.
ויהוה and the Lord — Sam. יהוה the Lord.

7 her vows — Sam. כל נדריה all her vows; Sept. *πᾶσαι*.

8 ואת and that which — Sam. or that which או.

11 וכל אסר every bond — Sam. כל אסריה all the bonds; Sept. *πάντες*.

16 between the father — Sam. ובין אב and between the father.

CHAP. XXXI.

2 afterward — Sam. ואחר and afterward.

12 and unto the congregation — Sam. ואל כל עדת and unto the whole congregation.

15 החייתם have ye saved — Sam. למה החייתם why have ye saved; Sept. *ἵνατί*; Syr. למנו.

16 behold these — Sam. הנה חנה these, these; Sept. *αὗται γάρ*.

19 and do ye abide — Sam. ואתם חטו לכם and ye, however, do ye abide; Sept. *ὑμεῖς*.

20 Between the twentieth and twenty-first verses of the Hebrew the Samaritan inserts what we read in the Hebrew from 21–24, so that the Hebrew verses from 21–24 would contain only a repetition, or rather a command, of something said before: And Moses said unto Eleazer the priest, say unto the men of war which went to the battle, This is the ordinance of the law which the Lord commanded: Only the gold, and the silver, and the brass, and the iron, and the tin, and the lead, everything that may abide the fire, ye shall make it go through the fire, and it shall be clean; nevertheless it shall be purified with the water of separation; and all that abideth not the fire ye shall make go through the water. And ye shall wash your clothes on the seventh day, and ye shall be clean, and afterward ye shall come into the camp.

22 the brass, the iron, the tin — Sam. and the brass, and the iron and the tin ואת ... ואת ... ואת.

28 and of the sheep — Sam. ומן הצאן מכל חבהמה and of the sheep, of every beast.

30 of the beeves, of the asses — Sam. and of the beeves, and of the asses ומן ... ומן.

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52 כל זהב and all the gold — זהב and the gold.
seven hundred — Sam. ושבע מאות and seven hundred.

CHAP. XXXII.

1 of Gad — Sam. ולבני גד ולחצי שבט המנשה of Gad, and of half the tribe of Manasseh.
2 of Reuben — Sam. וחצי שבט המנשה of Reuben and of half the tribe of Manasseh.
3 ושבם and Shebam — ושבמה and Shebmah; Sept. Σεβαμά.
5 let us — Sam. and let us ואל; Sept. καὶ μή.
6 Moses said unto the children of Gad, and to the children of Reuben — Sam. Moses said unto the children of Reuben, and to the children of Gad, and to half the tribe of Manasseh.
25 and the children of Gad and the children of Reuben spake — Sam. and the children of Reuben, and the children of Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh spake.
26 our wives, our flocks — Sam. ונשינו ומקנינו and our wives and our flocks.
29 the children of Gad and the children of Reuben — Sam. the children of Reuben, and the children of Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh.
31 of Gad and the children of Reuben answered — Sam. of Reuben, and the children of Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh answered.
33 of Gad and to the children of Reuben — Sam. of Reuben and to the children of Gad.
35 שופן Shophan — Sam. שפים Shaphim.
יעזר Jaazer — Sam. יעזיר Jaazir.

CHAP. XXXIII.

8 מפני from before — Sam. מפי from.
13 אלוש Alush — Sam. אלש Alish (id. vs. 14).
20 בלבנה Libnah — Sam. בלבונה Lebonah; Sept. Λεβῶνα (id. vs. 21).
28 במתקה Mithcah — Sam. במתיקה Methicah; Sept. Μαθεκκά (id. vs. 29).
30 במסרות Moseroth — Sam. במסירות Mesiroth (id. vs. 31).
42 בפינן Punon — Sam. בפינן Pinon; Sept. Φινών (id. vs. 43).
56 אעשה לכם I shall do unto you — Sam. כן אעשה לכם even so shall I do unto you.

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CHAP. XXXIV.

8 מהר from mount — Sam. ומהר and from mount.
צרדד Zedad — Sam. צרדה Zerad.
20 ולמטה and of the tribe — Sam. למטה of the tribe (id. vs. 22).
21 אלידד Elidad — Sam. אלדד Eldad.

CHAP. XXXV.

4 of the city and outward — Sam. חוצה העיר of the outward city.
5 לחם to them — Sam. לכם to you; Sept. ὑμῖν; Syr. and Chald.
12 ולא ימות die not — Sam. ולא יומת shall not be killed.
18 או or if — Sam. ואם and when; Sept. ἐὰν δέ.
32 הכהן of the priest — Sam. הכהן הגדול of the high priest; Sept. ὁ ἱερεὺς ὁ μέγας; Syr. רבא.
33 אשר אתם wherein ye are — Sam. אשר אתם ישבים wherein ye dwell; Sept. κατοικεῖτε; Syr. and Chald.
34 תטמא defile not — Sam. תטמאו defile ye not; Sept. μιανεῖτε; Chald. and Syr.

CHAP. XXXVI.

11 Tirzah and Hoglah, and Milcah and Noah — Sam. and Noah, Hoglah, Milcah, and Tirzah.

[זאת ספר הרביעי : קצין ר ויח this is the fourth book (with) two hundred and eighteen Kazzin.]

(To be continued.)

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ARTICLE IV.

A CENTURY OF WAR AND ITS LESSON.

BY REV. SAMUEL OSGOOD, D.D., LL.D., NEW YORK CITY.

GRATEFUL as was our last years' review of the first century of our national life, and hopeful as was our anticipation of the new century now opening upon us, it is plain that we do not yet belong to the happy family of nations that shall not learn war any more.

"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God," we are all ready to say; but these words of our Lord in his Sermon on the Mount come to us with the rising blessing of ages to deepen their rebuke of the present warfare of nations. Between men as individuals, and in social, literary, commercial, and religious relations there has been a constant and memorable progress in good neighborhood. The civilized world now has very much the same music which is the voice of sentiment, and the same arithmetic which is the tongue of trade; it employs the same engine to carry its freight and passengers, and the same lightning to carry its news; and it is getting to read the same books, to wear the same clothes, to like the same dishes, and to have very much the same code of polite manners; perhaps even to enjoy the same great moralists and preachers. Men, as mankind, have gained wonderfully in peace, and they who fight each other with fists or weapons are branded as ruffians and locked up as criminals. But the nations, what are they doing for peace? Alas, anything but peacemaking; and never was what they call their peace footing so warlike as now. It is best for us to treat the subject for ourselves, and from our own point of view, as we cannot be everybody, and look out for everything. We are American Christians, just at the close of the first century of our nation,

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and trying to make up our mind and purpose as to the new century now opening before us. Let us ask what we are to think of the war-making of the last hundred years, and what we are to do for the peace-making of the hundred years to come.

I. What a time among the nations that century has been — the hundred years from 1776 to 1876! The new life was stirring in the Old World and the New at the outset, and there was a vague and restless feeling abroad among the people that startling changes were at hand. Voltaire led the protest against the old despotism among scholars and nobles, whilst Rousseau was stirring among the plainer people the great crusade for nature and man against artifice and tryanny, — marvellous prophet as he was of the new literature and society. Kings caught the contagion; and Frederick the Great of Prussia was ambitious with his pen as his sword, the disciple and the rival of Voltaire, the admirer of Washington, and the helper of Franklin and Adams in international law; whilst Joseph II., then on the throne of Austria, made the simplicity of Marcus Aurelius his model, and had as little liking as that imperial sage could have had for the Jesuits and their ways; in fact, anticipating Bismarck in his raid upon Rome. With the new ideas and movements there went a great hopefulness; and if theologians spoke less than usual of their millennium, illuminists, full of the rising free-thinking, saw a new age of light and liberty at hand; and such enthusiasts as Rousseau and St. Pierre were revelling in their visions of universal peace.

What a strange and fearful awakening from those dreams! Three great groups of wars cover the ground of that century since 1776. Wars from the uprising of the people against arbitrary kings; the American Revolution beginning the fray in triumph, and the French Revolution closing it in defeat; then wars between the new military autocrat, whom his nephew, Louis Napoleon, called the testamentary executor of the French Revolution, and the old monarchies whom he defied, ending in the triumph of the old kings, and the reign

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of the Holy Alliance; then, last of all, the wars of the nations for their life, ending with the uprising of Italy, and the consolidation of Germany and of the United States of America. It is useless to try to present these gigantic conflicts rhetorically, even in the most general descriptions; and the picture, even if succesful, would more distract our nerves than edify our spirit. Such names as Washington and Lord Howe, Napoleon and Wellington, King William and MacMahon, Grant and Lee, suggest enough for our purpose, and may tempt us to love war itself for the splendor of its triumphs and the fascination of its heroes.

But, without any slur upon the men or the nations who have taken up arms against invasion, we ask for the moral of all this carnage, and we would bring the wisdom of history to urge the justice and mercy of God and humanity upon the nations. It has been, and is, taken for granted that war belongs to our civilization, and that no important progress can be made without the appeal to arms. For an act which is in itself an essential immorality, — the repudiation for the time being of moral principle, and the resort to physical force, — what possible justification for this act can there be, except the bare assertion that it cannot be helped, and because the war spirit exists it must continue to exist? The same argument can be used to justify all the brutal quarrels that have cursed our race; and all that is said in defence of war between nations has been said in behalf of encounters between individuals. All the arguments against the old fist and club law between persons hold good against the present sword and bayonet law between nations, and bear against it with manifold force. We have, to a great extent, the law of right to keep men from assailing each other; and we need the appeal to that same law to keep nations from assailing each other. The nations are, as belligerents, still to a great extent barbarians, and war, with all its recent reforms, is essentially barbarous. It is the sway of might over right, the domination of the strong and the oppression of the weak, organized destruction and wholesale murder.

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Look a little in detail at the war record of the last century — the chronicles of slaughter that followed the inauguration of the reign of humanity and the jubilee of equal rights. The memorable work of Süssmilch, the father of statistic science, upon "The Divine Order in the Changes of the Human Race," of which the fourth edition was published at Berlin, in 1775, opened the way for the searching and comprehensive method of moral statistics which is now interpreting history and life in a light so new and startling, and bringing war, with all other vices and crimes, to the bar of judgment. He thus spoke of war: "It is hurtful, not only because it robs the nation of many, but also of the best men who are in their best years, — yes, generally in the bloom of life, — from whom a numerous and strong posterity might be expected. Not only battles, but the consequences of camp life, destroy many men. Finally, war is also in the highest degree terrible and destructive, because it not seldom brings with it as companions those two other enemies of the human race, pestilence and famine." No man has brought together more facts bearing upon the enormities of war than Dr. Alexander von Oettingen, in his great work on Moral Statistics and Christian Ethics. He asks, "Upon whom are we to lay the responsibility, when we consider that in the wars of the French Republic and the Empire (1792–1815) more than five millions and a half of men, or about two hundred and forty thousand every year, were more or less sacrificed, and that in the Seven Years' War six hundred and forty-two thousand were devoted to death for their country? Are Napoleon and Frederick the Great the hangman and executioner whom we have to accuse? Is it not rather the case that the collective persons whom we call states and nations have waged those wars for the promotion of their own interests, as if to manure the field of their political life with blood?" So, also, he adds, "it is a collective guilt which images itself in the loss of life since 1815. They call this period of fifty years comparatively peaceful. But at least two millions of men have within that time, on

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European soil alone, been obliged to learn that the individual must expose his life and die for the passionate ends of the community. A more bloody proof for the truth of the social, ethical view can hardly be alleged. Every dying soldier is a document for the position maintained by us, that the death of the individual has at the same time a representative relation to the race." This was written in 1868, before the last war between Germany and France.

If we add to the number of the wounded, the disabled, and the slain by war, the destruction of useful commodities, the loss of productive labor, and the immense cost of armies in peace as well as in war, we have a fearful reckoning before us as the penalty of the fighting dispositions of men. Oettingen estimates the number of men absorbed by the military power of Europe as about five millions, at a cost in peace, apart from the expenses of war, of two and a half milliards of francs for standing armies (1863), while the yearly budget for popular education was only one hundred and fifty millions, or six per cent of that sum. In the work of Henry Merlin upon the Civil Budget, it is shown that France appropriated to the army and navy, not including Algiers and the colonies, from 1853 to 1866, not less than nine thousand three hundred and eleven milliards of francs; whilst for public instruction only three hundred and twenty-five millions, or three and four tenths per cent of that sum, were appropriated.

Add to the costs of war the disease, intemperance, and crime that go on its track, and haunt its marches and its halts, and the catalogue of its ills is more than it is wholesome for the imagination to contemplate. I will not go into the account of the costs of our recent war; for we know enough about them without such painful reckoning. It is enough to say that those of us who have not believed in war as the right adjustment of wrongs, who did all that we justly could for peace, and who reluctantly, but loyally accepted the war forced upon us by a demented sectionalism, have had all our scruples justified by the result. Such monstrous destruction of property and life, such waste of the best blood

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of the nation, such corruption of private and public morals, such bloated wealth and such widespread embarrassment, such frauds in private business and such rings of public corruption, such demoralization of trade and utter repudiation of the first principles of finance, such premature admission of ignorance and animalism to the functions of election, such inauguration of military force and such perversion of the courts of justice, such unsettling of the morals of trade and the principles of religion, as we have seen for the last fifteen years — who that studies these facts wisely will be the eulogist of war, however loyally he may have accepted the fatal necessity?

But no enumeration of particulars can duly present the enormity of the evil. As already hinted, the state of war is to a large extent the repeal of law, the abolition of justice, the resort to violence, and rule of force. The practice is essentially inhuman and ungodly. It sets man against man in mutual hatred and injury, and offends the justice and mercy of God. I know very well that war has its apologists, and even its eulogists; that Cousin regards it as the consequence of the necessary conflict of ideas and the condition of progress; that Dr. Leo calls it not only the necessary symptom of the unconquered egoism of nations, but an indispensable scourge for depraved times and corrupt masses; that Proudhon, who calls property theft, calls war the deepest and finest phenomenon of our moral life. "No other can be compared with it — neither the imposing festivals of worship, nor the acts of royalty, nor the gigantic creations of industry. It is war that makes the mightiest notes in the harmonies of nature and humanity; it acts on the soul like the clap of thunder, like the peal of the organ. A mingling of intellect and courage, of poetry and passion, of the highest justice and of bravest heroism, makes its majesty astonish us; and the more we reflect upon it the more it commands the enthusiasm of our heart. War — in which a false philosophy and a yet more false philanthropy show to us only a monstrous evil, an outbreak of inhora

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weakness, and the manifestation of divine wrath — war is the most incorrupt utterance of our conscience — an act which positively, and notwithstanding the impure influence mingling with it, honors us highly before creation and before eternity."

What stuff this is; and well worthy of the man who called property theft, and who understands ethics and political economy equally well. In both capacities we may say of him what a recent writer has said of the war doctrine: "We believe we are listening to a lunatic." More wisely writes Vacherot: "In the eyes of the philosopher war is wholly like the duel, an act of barbarism which tends therein to limit civilization, and finally to suppress it."

It is not true that no hatred remains after combat, and that public combatants easily forget their quarrels, and become personal friends. Our sectional animosities teach otherwise; and Germany and France, now at peace, are eyeing each other in a way that bodes no good for them or for the world. Whilst nominally at peace, with the exception of Russia and Turkey, Europe is paying the expenses of war and supporting at least three millions of men as her peace establishment. The figures from this last new year's court almanac of Gotha are not festive, as they gave us with Christmas the census of the standing armies of the world in round numbers, England 228,000, Italy 205,000, Austria 257,000, Germany 401,000, France 490,000, Russia in Europe, 540,000 combatants, besides 82,000 non-combatants, and the whole account foots not far from 4,000,000 of men as the present peace establishment of the civilized world.

According to Emile de Girardin, in his recent essay on "The Question of Money," it appears as if all existing governments, excepting those of England and America, were fast hastening to a bankrupt condition; a state of things which he ascribes to the mutual suspicion which compels all the powers of Europe to maintain fleets and armies to keep their neighbors in check. His figures are not precisely according to our estimates, but we give them as they are in his pam-

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phlet. The result according to him is that Europe is one vast camp; the soldiers of England, France, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Russia costing those governments about $500,000,000 annually. England's army of 106,000 men costs $53,250,160; France's 480,000 men, $112,913,298; Russia's 575,000 men, $137,034,925; Germany's 412,000 men, $92,764,603; Italy's 205,000 men, $37,176,086; and Austria's 273,000 men, $47,705,914. The support of the various navies also costs $135,000,000 a year; of which England expends $60,000,000, France, $35,000,000, Russia, $24,000,000, Germany and Italy, $7,500,000 each, and Austria, $5,000,000. M. de Girardin concludes from the estimate of naval expenses that the danger of universal insolvency will never be removed until rulers shall cease to prosecute their search for an armament which no projectile can pierce, and a projectile which no armament can withstand.

What perversion of wealth and men, what loss of production to a race as yet, on the whole, poorly fed, clothed, housed, schooled, and churched! What a comment on the passions and selfishness, which are quoted in justification of war establishments! What a proof that the race, that has learned so many things, has not yet learned to treat each other with justice and kindness in the most dignified of relations — that of nation with nation — under the providence of God! What virtual denial of the kingdom of God, this constant expectation of violence and glorification of force! The gospel of Christ is wholly against the usage of war, not only by expressly forbidding the resort to force in extending religion, but by calling the nations to live together within the kingdom of God, and to enlarge and consecrate the old Hebrew nationality by Christian comprehensiveness and humanity. "From whence come wars and fightings among you? Come they not hence, even of your lusts?" They who are God's children are not war-makers; and from the deeps of the eternal Godhead they draw that Holy Spirit, whose essence is the love that unites the Father with the Son, and calls all souls and all nations to the unity of all differences in the harmony of peace.

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It is said, indeed, that wars inspire devotion; and that the hymns and litanies of nations have been born in the anguish and conflict of battle. If so, not among the war makers, but among the war victims; not among the violent men who have tried to submit nations to their rule, but among the patriots who have stood up against aggression, or the martyrs who have died for the right. At present the war spirit is not religious, as it tends to strengthen the rising materialism that ascribes the universe to matter and force, and regards society as the resultant of material forces. The strife of the nations that begun a century ago with optimism, and dreamed of universal liberty and equality, threatens to end with pessimism and its nightmare of universal cursedness, that looks upon love as madness, marriage as treason, birth as damnation, and death as the only salvation from this life of strife and disappointment and this world of tyranny and despair. In triumphant Germany pessimism is the rising philosophy; and its wails of despair are heard in the pause of the trumpets of jubilee. Not only philosophy, but art catches the contagion, and a peerless composer like Richard Wagner makes music for the age, not to remove, but to solace the general gloom, as the nightingale sang of old in the grove of the furies. We surely are, in some respects, an accursed race, and we waste our blood and substance in riotous living. We drink ourselves into blindness and want, and we fight ourselves into wounds, disease, and death, in a sweep of folly and dominion of madness, that bring the innocent and the guilty into the same ruin. War and whiskey are the prime movers of the mischief; and they are opening ever the gates of hell against the kingdom of God and the prayers of his children.

II. This is our view of war-making and war-makers for the last hundred years. Now what are we to say and do for the hundred years now opening upon our nation and the world? Is the same old story to be told over again, and the history of civilization to be always written in blood? Many seem to think so, and probably some cool heads who

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now read these pages, and who do not like at all the war-spirit, are ready to ask what we can do to change it. Human nature, they say, is very much the same old Adam that it always has been, and men and nations will fight as they have ever done. War is not an opinion that depends upon argument, but a fact that goes with force. When forces of numbers or nations conflict, the issue is war, and conflict they must so long as rivalry exists, and wealth and power are in question. In modern society wars, moreover, continue among the most civilized people, and they who are too thoughtful to follow the madness of passion, cannot resist the policy that studies the balance of power. Professing to look at men and events, not as a sentimentalist, in mere feeling, or as a theorist, in mere abstractions, but as a calm student of history, and a friend of reason and conscience, I have a few words of a positive kind to say for peace-making as we face the new times.

1. Begin with the true principle, that there is justice between nations as between men, and that this justice ought to be embodied in a code of international law. We are not to wait for the powers of the world to balance their interest and passions by the old game of war, but to meet the question of the balance of power by the balance of principle. We do this in our personal relations under civil law. Why not do it between nations? When rival interests and ambition clash among us, as neighbors and citizens, we do not bring clubs and guns to bear upon each other, and fight until it is decided who is the strongest, and forces adjust themselves to their own equilibrium, but we start with certain principles of justice and law, and, as far as we can, we make them hold unruly violence in check, and keep the due balance of power. The human body is a good illustration of the normal state of the body politic in this respect, and the heavens illustrate the just order of the earth. We keep our standing on our feet, and we walk safely among trees and men, not by leaving our hands and feet and shoulders and head to struggle together for the mastery, but by acting from

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the royal brain and vision. Man is balanced on his feet and walks well when he sees well, and without his eyes he stumbles, and makes chaos of his limbs and movements. So society should have its vision, and the nations should be guided by leading principles that save them from chaos and collision. The order of the universe is from central law, and not from the resultant of lawless forces; so that every planet and star rebukes the jumble of conflicting nations.

Many, indeed, who allow that just laws should balance conflicting powers, say that it is a Utopian dream to think of bringing this about; and even if the law could be made it could not be carried out without a central authority, that cannot be established, and might be dangerous to liberty if it could be established. The sufficient reply is given alike by the course of civilization and the truth of our religion. Civilization has been constantly bringing law to bear upon the passions of individuals and the barbarism of tribes, and the idea of international justice is not a new thing, but simply an extension of the sober experience of history. A peaceful, organized nation is as much an advance upon the wild tribes that were assimilated by its laws as a fellowship of nations under law would be an advance upon the present belligerent state of nations. The logic of history needs only to go on with its work to lead the sober statesman to join in the blessing of the peacemaker, and to welcome the commonwealth of man. There has been a certain progress towards the result in our time; and from Franklin to Gladstone, from John Adams's great treaty to Professor Bluntschli's noble work on Universal Civil Right, we have seen cheering steps forward in the reform of wrong courses between nations. It was something that the Holy Alliance of 1815 rebuked the monstrous policy of papal Rome by taking the Greek and the Protestant church into its fellowship in Russia and Prussia; something, that in the Congress of 1856, at Paris, Turkey was allowed to represent herself, and a Mahometan nation was reckoned as having part in the rights of men and the hopes of civilization; something, that America and

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England have been willing to refer an exciting and delicate question to the arbitration of the Council of Jurists at Geneva, and repeated congresses have been held to deliberate upon a code of international law. Our country has no mean place in this movement, and Bluntschli gives to Dr. Francis Lieber the honorable name of being first among jurists to draw up a code for the conduct of armies within the country of enemies, and to do all in his power to take from war its horrors.

Let us not be afraid to accept international justice with the highest of all sanctions, and to urge it upon the nations with the power of conscience and the authority of religion. Why shrink from saying boldly in the pulpit that the nation is a divine institution, a historical life, a moral personality, and not merely a business partnership or a convenient economy. No nobler book upon this subject has been written than that on the Nation, by Rev. E. Mulford, an honored clergyman of the Episcopal church, and I think it a part of my duty to commend it to favor in this Essay. Make conscience of the nation, or we betray our trust; and if the ministers of religion ignore or disparage the national life, and fail to enlighten and strengthen the public conscience, they will find their place occupied by other friends, and in new America, as in old Rome, the wolf in sheep's clothing will take possession of the neglected fold. We need the wisdom of the children of God to keep peace among the nations by holding up the justice which brings the balance of principle to bear upon the conflict of powers. They surely are blessed as peacemakers who see the eternal right and interpret it into law.

2. With this balancing rule of principle we need moral and active force — the exalted force that belongs to the children of God. It is a great mistake, either in regard to the order of nature or the order of human life, to try to annihilate power. The true method is to transform and to exalt it. The soldier himself is not to be destroyed, but to be transformed, and the military spirit, or what is best in its composition, is to be carried up into a higher plane of life —

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a doctrine not hard for us to accept who read the word "soldier" in our baptismal office, and who as such are all enlisted in the militant church. In this respect many censors of warfare make a great mistake, and in condemning battle they forget the virtues that are often trained in its school. Even so wise and generous a thinker as Dr. Channing fails to appreciate the military character, and he does not fully recognize the intellectual and moral qualities that make the great soldier, and bring such comprehensiveness, combination, and spirit to bear upon the strategy and the tactics that raise and move armies and marshal them for battle. There is mind in the great soldier, and a rare force of will, which closet philosophers are slow to appreciate. Perhaps the kind of original force in a heroic will partakes as much of the character of genius as originality of reason and imagination. Surely, all manly virtue is an inspiration, and the great things that have been done in peace, as well as in war, have been done by its power. Add will to ideas, and they are forces, and they carry originality into action. Such original force dwelt in the primitive Christians, and as a militant church they carried all before them by their exalted force, and shaped the world anew according to the patterns seen by them in the mount of God.

This force we need in our modern life, to rob war of its fascination by transforming its strength and by making the carnage of war mean and odious by contrast with the valor and the victories of peace. We have neglected too much this view of the subject; and our schools and colleges, our professional, and especially our theological, training has lacked the muscular vigor and the nervous force that give military life its charm and strength. Our scholars are too much a lily-livered, pale-faced, timid class of men, and hosts of our theological students cannot stand the fire of a thousand eyes without hiding behind a manuscript. We need to change all this, and give tonic force to all the offices of peace, more chivalry to society, more vigor to enterprise, more daring to well-doing, more dash against evil, more

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originality in mission work; nay, more energy in prayer itself — the prayer that lifts the might of the filial will to the eternal throne, and brings the Eternal Spirit to bear upon the affairs of men. Criticise the Caesars and Napoleons as we may; but do not forget that from Paul to Wesley, from Latimer to Patteson, the militant children of God have had much of their material, and were not less, but more, brave than they.

We need the elevation of force, the ennobling of the will-power in our education and art, our business and pleasure, our politics and our society, as well as in our religion. We must make peace more manly, and even more martial, than war, and not even allow war to have the best use of the drum and trumpet and cymbal. In my native town, not long ago, when the horse malady prevailed, the men of a great furniture factory dragged the carts of furniture into the neighboring city, and were spurred on, not by whips or curses, but by a band of martial music that went before them; and this seemed a better prophecy of the future of labor than any of the wild visions of internationals. Bring out this idea of the elevation of force in every way, in schools and workshops and on our farms, but do not forget to base the movement upon the highest principle, and to maintain that the supreme force comes from God himself, and that his children, as such, are peace-makers, because they draw from the purest fountains of power, and by their faith and baptism they live from the Spirit, who is the Lord and Giver of life, and have the fulness of the Eternal Father and Son, and the might of the whole fellowship of blessed souls. In this very point of the suppression of war we need the help of exalted force; and until a regular international tribunal is established, moral strength must hold the umpireship, and keep the nations from madness and death. If the pope can do this, let him do it; but he needs better help than he has had heretofore, and better ideas of his duty as peace-maker. Let him repent of his crusades and his inquisitions, and, like a good Christian, which we hope he is, join with all the children of God in bringing about the reign of peace.

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3. Last of all we need not only the balance of principle and the elevation of force, but also the organization of peace, alike between classes and nations. Strange that there is often more order in war than in peace, and the chaos of society compels the fearful discipline of the field. Here the especial problem of our age opens upon us; the problem of social science and social art, the true philosophy of society, the adjustment of its ways, and the guidance of its walks. The problem will bring in its answer the practical settlement of the war question; for when men and nations live together in any sort of reasonable order and co-operation, war will be stigmatized as robbery and murder; and they who try to kindle its fires will be brought to judgment as enemies of the human race. The nations are made for each other, and are bound to bless each other by mutual trade, culture, and fellowship; and when this is seen, standing armies will vanish, and the gold that has been the sinew of war will be the strength and beauty of peace. I am not dreaming of any speedy regeneration of society, or sudden perfection of the institutions of the earth, but only waiting upon such moderate advance in social economy and good neighborhood as will keep nations from taking each other by the throat and spoiling each others goods. It must come; and why not within the opening century? A hundred years ago Priestley and Lavoisier began a new order in the science of nature by interpreting the chemical constitution of the material world and the principles of definite proportion. Why may not we begin or continue the true interpretation of the elements of society and its proportions and combinations of peace?

It is as unwise to deny the solidarity of society as to deny the solidity of nature; and if war, with its call to sacrifice, and its heritage of want and wretchedness and hatred, proves that truth of social liability which the church so urges, why not peace? Why should not peace call us to share its blessing together, and to leave its heritage of mercy to generations unborn?

Many and magnificent powers are at our command, and,

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with all the tremendous enginery of war, the armament of peace can laugh it to scorn; for peace creates, whilst war destroys. They that follow the divine order shall have the divine help; and the meek — they who submit will to justice, and have the gentle majesty of obedience — the meek shall inherit the earth.

Take this subject home to ourselves, and do what we can for peace between nations and in nations. We have some influence to give to the recent movement in favor of international arbitration, and some of us have done what we could in its behalf. Let us all try to help it, and especially try to keep and strengthen good feeling between America and England, the two great powers who have led the way in this peace policy, and who are likely to have so much to do with the future international history of the race. In our intercourse with men of other sections of our own country let us be kind and true, at once loyal to the national order, and strenuous for the rights of every community and every citizen as for our own, and as jealous of the aggressions of military power over them as over ourselves.

As citizens and as men we have something to do with guiding the thought of our people at this interesting season of our history; and we are to do our part to give a high tone, a wise aim, and a generous spirit to our centennial rejoicing and its historical record; to endeavor to make it a memorial of national brotherhood, as well as of patriotic pride. Perhaps every association of clergymen has its especial work to do, and its word to say. Those brethren have had an especial part to do who were in the Church Congress that lately met in Philadelphia and Boston, and was to meet in New York in October; and they will make a great mistake if they do not make that congress tell upon the mind and heart of the nation at large, and prove that they have not been so perverted by Latin superstitions and assumptions as to forget that George Washington and William White were members of the same church a century ago, and that their example calls the good Christian to be the true patriot. Clergy and

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laity are called to work together in all of our great Christian assemblies as never before, for humanity as well as piety, and for the living gospel which is both human and divine.

We are to do what we can for a sound statesmanship in all things, and a public rule that shall make our republic to be peace. We are to bring the wholesome freedom and solid conservatism of religion to the defence of law and the nurture of virtue. We are to strive for such charity among all Christians as shall make Christianity one with true humanity, and show that our church is the school of life and the home of love, not a debating society or a metaphysical club. We are to favor the more comprehensive and generous interchange of thought and feeling between all earnest minds, and do what we can towards a pure and powerful public opinion that shall make the people and the press of America a power among the nations. Sometimes we may properly be a little sanguine, and take bold and far-reaching views of things to come. Indeed, it is sober wisdom for us to give high importance to the attitude of our country now; and the century past, in its sober history, is a startling prophecy of the century now opening. Take the broadest generalization that presents itself to us now, and remember that we are on the threshold of the twentieth century of the Augustan age and the Christian era, and that the empire of the Caesars — which preceded by about thirty years the birth of Christ, as this time precedes the twentieth century — began what we may fitly call our own peculiar history, and still prosecutes its claims in connection with the gospel of Christ in the pontiff who asks to be recognized as head of the church and king of the nations. The state and the church! How those ideas and powers came together, and still work together or fight together, — the Augustan culture and the Christian church, — the temporal power and the papal crosier, — sometimes united, sometimes divided, how their contact and conflict run through the ages, and are before us still!

We acknowledge the justice that is often recognized in the Roman law, which Justinian solemnly dedicated, in his

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Institutes, to Almighty God; and we do not deny the right of the Roman bishop to minister to his people, nor do we wish to let down, in any respect, his spiritual functions; but we acknowledge powers which neither Caesar or Pope have ever recognized — even the great and free nations which have been raised up in the order of providence. They are positive facts that history cannot ignore, moral powers that conscience cannot neglect, and they present divine lessons that faith cannot reject. Dante, father of modern literature, and foremost of the new patriots, wrote in his essay on the rising Italian language that he heard the word of God breathing from the heavens in the new tongues of the nations; and he dared to put his great poem into Italian, although the papal Latin tried to laugh it to scorn. The Italian stands; so does the French, the German, the English; and the tongues, like the litanies of nations, came not only from the heart of nations, but from the Spirit of God. Let the nations live together, and love and serve each other to the end of time.

It is not easy, nor is it wise, to leave this subject without a closing word upon the aspect of the war question at the present time, when we as a nation are entering upon the second century of our history, and considering our political and moral relations with each other and with the people of the Old World. It is cheering to be able to say that peace prevails now throughout our land and our hemisphere. It is wonderful that our great army has disappeared, and that our standing army, which was rated last year at twenty-five thousand men, now falls even below that estimate. This fact is one of the most encouraging aspects of our situation as compared with that of European nations; and, monstrous as our present burden of taxation is in the nation, — the states and the municipal governments, according to the statement of the President of the New York Chamber of Commerce, burdened with seven hundred million dollars yearly, — we have no reason to despair of seeing prosperity return, if we introduce just economy into the public service and private

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life, and strive wisely and bravely to bring out all the resources of our soil and our industry. We must remember that peace, like war, and in some respects more than war, needs sagacity and generalship and combination. We are, in a certain sense, not merely a nation, but a family of states; and although we have no present fear of a new rupture between the states, we are not to forget that the war spirit may exist wherever hatred exists, and that it is the part of good citizens and good men to reconstruct the good temper and the good neighborhood of the states, as well as to keep the peace outwardly.

Perhaps we may call our own true peace policy a part of the international code that the world is looking for; and surely, if we are judicious in so adapting our laws, — as, for example, our laws of electing Presidents and distributing the civil service, and regulating the industry of the country in such a way as to secure the tranquillity and prosperity of our republic, — we can with a good face say our word of reconciliation to the belligerent nations of Europe. If we are one nation from many states, we may make our national motto a text for preaching to them the need of making less account of the old boundary lines, and carrying on the good work that has already been begun of constructing or reconstructing the United States of Europe. There probably has never been seen such an example of the spirit of conciliation in the victorious power as in this country within the last twelve years; and the heart of our people goes with the President in removing the last traces of the strife by recalling the national troops from the states most suspected of insubordination. There is good hope, certainly, of taking out the old roots of bitterness; and what we need more than anything else, to this end, is the bringing of the most judicious and patriotic men of all places and parties together to work for the common welfare. It will be well if positive Christian sentiment can be made to join in this service, especially that sentiment which feels that all men need to forgive as they need to be forgiven, and that our very frailty, self-conceit,

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and self-will should further the very unity which they at first threaten, by teaching us that we are all very much alike in our perversity, and we ought all to agree in our sense of sin and our prayer for God's grace before the mercy-seat of the Eternal Judge. It is not necessary to advocate the union of church with the state in order to maintain the idea of being Christian in all relations, and to rebuke the folly and the wrong of so separating religion from civil life as to leave the affairs of government and the relations of rulers and parties wholly to worldly policy and human passion and selfishness. May God keep us and our America in his Spirit.

The outlook towards Europe is not at present very auspicious of peace; yet it is not well to accept the darkest prophecy as the wisest. It is not wise to take it for granted that we are on the eve of a great religious war, whether the belligerent parties are held to be the champions of the Romish church and the Protestant nations, or the Greek-Russian church and the combined powers of Turkey and Islam. As to the imagined war in behalf of Ultramontanism, there is no nation that is willing to march under that banner; and France, which could not keep the pope's temporal crown on his head when it was there, can have no motive to fight to put it back in a war which would endanger the pope's spiritual authority — that power which no nation now ventures to assail by arms in this age of general toleration.

As to the Russian war with Turkey, there is no assurance that it will bring all Europe into the fray — little prospect of its being a war of all Christendom with Islam. Christendom is not inclined to elect Russia as her champion, or to make the Czar her commander of the faithful. The most civilized nations of Europe know too well the oppression of Poland and the genius of the Russian church and state to expect the millennium of peace and virtue from the conquest of Constantinople by Russia. It is probable, indeed, that the Turk must quit Europe before our century closes, and that his departure will come from other forces than bayonets and cannon, torpedoes and ironclads. If the *Ter Sanctus*,

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as we hope and pray, is to be heard again in the church of Santa Sophia which Justinian erected, it must be under the influence of laws not less mighty and sacred than those which Justinian dedicated to the Christian God in his Institutes. If the Christian is to take the place of the Turk, it must be by restoring the manhood which was lost by the superstition and monkery that opened the way of Mohammed the Second to the city of Constantine. We must wait and watch for the new civilization that is to restore the Byzantine empire to Christendom.

We may justly add in conclusion, that these views of the wrong and the madness of war and the wisdom and duty of peace have received new confirmation from the events of the past year in both hemispheres. What an opportunity the great powers of Europe lost in not compelling Turkey to stop her misrule by peaceful arbitration, and what a frightful tragedy is the war-record which chronicles wounds, death, and demoralization in both contending nations, with little prospect of relief.

Brighter is the promise of our America. God bless our wise and worthy President, and his principle and his policy of peace.

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ARTICLE V.

THEORIES OF ATONEMENT.

BY PROF. JOHN MORGAN, D.D., OBERLIN, OHIO.

No. II.

In order to a clearer insight into at least some parts of this great subject, Atonement, I propose to review some of the theories which have extensively prevailed in the church, or have been proposed by theologians. Whatever of error there may have been in these theories, the doctrine of the atonement effected by Christ has under them exerted a glorious and beneficent influence, has been the deliverance from sin and condemnation of innumerable souls; and the theories have, therefore, naturally been most precious and sacred in the view of the beneficiaries. It cannot be in the heart of any good man to treat such feelings with disrespect, or not to cherish a kindly interest in them. But these respectful and tender feelings should not stand in the way of an honest and thorough examination of the theories, and a frank expression of the views, favorable or unfavorable, to which such an examination may seem to lead us.

In the primitive church there was no formal theory of the atonement. There is no such theory exhibited in the Scriptures. In no theoretic way it is merely said that Christ is our propitiation; that God has set him forth as such; that he died for our sins; that he is our ransom; that the saints wash their robes and make them white in his blood as the Lamb of God. The Scriptures leave the facts to their own influence. So the primitive church received the atonement, and rejoiced in the Saviour "with joy unspeakable and full of glory."

Christ's Death a Ransom paid to the Devil.

The first theory that obtained extensive recognition was, that man having become through his sins the lawful captive

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of the devil, and he being unwilling to let him off without ransom, and a ransom most costly, Christ the Son of God consented to ransom man with his life; that the devil gladly accepted this, hoping to contrive to retain his influence over man's heart; but that Christ outwitted the devil, by his death gaining a preponderating influence over the race.

This, I think, is the substance of the theory; but though for ages the theory of minds of the first order, no one believes in it now. It lies in the rubbish-heap of ancient nonsense. It is interesting to inquire how men, believing in such a theory, could work their moral nature under it.

1. It represented the deep guilt of man. He could not be the lawful captive of Satan unless he deserved to be so.

2. It taught that man is practically incompetent to save himself without a Redeemer.

3. It represented that God so loved the world as to give his only begotten Son to save it; and it presented also the great love of Christ for the race of man.

4. There was something interesting to the human mind in the respect it represented God as showing to the supposed rights of the devil, giving him his due.

5. It mainly left the facts of the gospel history to their natural influence.

We can hardly imagine that there were not many minds to which this strange theory was a stumbling-block. Be that as it may, we have all come to see that Satan could not have obtained a rightful power over any creature of God, and especially by the perpetration of the most outrageous wickedness. We see that to pay him for the surrender of man such a ransom, or any ransom at all, would have been not divine wisdom, but consummate folly.

This theory has hardly anything in common with the natural import of sin-offerings, unless the scape-goat be considered as an offering to placate the devil; which, though accepted by some modern writers, is received by comparatively a very small number. And the theory does not repre-

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sent that any satisfaction was made for the penalty of the law, or that Christ in any sense bore this penalty. But yet it did make the impression that the sinner deserved what his Saviour suffered in his behalf, or worse. It contained this great element of power.

I think we can see that believers in the atonement of Christ, even under this theory, might find the power of God to salvation. They did not blunder in believing that God gave his Son for their souls, even to the death of the cross. That great truth was not lost under the mountain of nonsense. Bishop Thomson in his essay in the "Aids to Faith," says that other views were held along with the above-given defunct theory, somewhat similar to the more modern views. But certainly — and this the good Bishop does not deny — the above was the prevalent theory for centuries.

Anselm's Theory.

It could hardly have been that Anselm's theory was wholly different from all the views before entertained; but it probably was a great advance beyond the general thought of the age. With most others I had taken Anselm to be the father of what is called in this country the old school doctrine of the Atonement. I had accepted the interpretation of such men as Tholuck and Hagenbach. The interpretation of Neander, Baur, and Dr. Bushnell seemed to me quite improbable. But a recent perusal of the "Cur Deus Homo" has convinced me that Dr. Bushnell, in the introduction to his "Vicarious Sacrifice," has given, at least, for substance, the true exposition of the celebrated father. I give a brief view of his theory in words and illustrations of my own. Anselm held that as the sin of man had dishonored God and impaired the practical authority of his law, or the order of the world, God must seek a remedy, either by the punishment of the sinner, or through a satisfaction effected in some other way. The God-man appears on the stage; and by his obedience unto death, even the death of the cross, restores the honor of God and of his law, and makes the law stand in

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general regard higher than before, and higher than punishment could have made it stand. The God-man receives as his reward the forgiveness and salvation of all his brother men who are led by his satisfaction to repentance.

It is as if a king had suffered in his kingly honor and influence by the rebellion of a portion of his subjects, and there was danger that the disaffection would spread. It is in the king's power to crush the rebellion, to destroy the rebels, and thus restore his kingly influence. But at the king's call some of his nobles of highest rank and influence take occasion to manifest in an especial way their loyal devotion to his person and government, and do not hesitate to risk life and property and influence to sustain the honor of the king and the orderly loyalty of the subjects; and some of them do lay down their lives in the demonstration. The whole manifestation is more impressive from the fact that the loyal nobles are related by blood both to the king and the principal leaders of the rebellion. The result is, that the king in his realm at large, is more honored than ever before; and the loyalty of his subjects is warmer and more enthusiastic. The far larger part of the rebels are so affected that they repent with tears, and cast themselves unconditionally on the mercy of the king. He enjoys forgiving them; but out of regard for his devoted nobles he chooses to say that he forgives their penitent relatives in reward for their loyal love, and considers their self-sacrifice as a full satisfaction for all the demerits of the penitents. Persistent rebels he leaves to the judges and officers of the law. This I consider a faint outline of the theory of the famous Archbishop of Canterbury. A better exhibit of it may be found in Bushnell's introduction to the treatise before-mentioned.

In the "Cur Deus Homo," the theory is marred by needless scholastic subtilty and hair-splitting; while on the whole the wonderful brochure is written in a manner and spirit becoming to an Archbishop.

Dr. Bushnell says of Anselm's theory, that it "shocks no moral sentiment, and violates no principle of natural reason."

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I wish the eloquent Doctor had just adopted it, freeing it from its cumbrous scholasticism, and throwing around it the halo of his own beautiful manner of speech.

The power of this theory is found,

1. In presenting aright the guilt of sin, its desert of condign punishment.

2. In exhibiting the love of God, and of Jesus Christ his Son.

3. In impressing the holiness of God, his fixed determination to sustain the honor of his throne, and the full sympathy of Christ with his holy purpose.

4. In the full hope it gives to the believing and penitent, and the ruin it denounces against the incorrigible.

5. In the mighty moral influence it sends forth, or rather the gospel of the cross sends forth, throughout this world and all worlds.

The theory of Anselm needs a clearer and fuller exposition. This is all it needs to show its vast superiority over the mechanical supposed improvements of it. It will be seen that this theory does not represent our Lord as punished in the room of the sinner, or as occupying his law place. The sinner's sin is not legally imputed to him, nor his righteousness to the sinner, though the sinner is saved through his influence and for his sake. Anselm seems to have had no place in his fine mind for the dreary philosophy which has been imputed to him. But he doubtless felt as strongly as most of the saints that his Saviour "bore his sins in his own body on the tree;" that the Lord had "laid on him the iniquities of us all," and that "the chastisement of our peace was upon him"; that "he is the propitiation for our sins," and our high-priest who offers his blood in God's holy of holies. I thank God that the dear old father ever lived, that he might endeavor by lifting up the Saviour's cross in the true light of heaven, to honor him, and induce his fellowmen to look to the Saviour and live. His theory has had a wide influence and will have more influence as it is better understood.

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The Theory of Nicholas of Methone.

So far as I can judge from the little I have seen of his writings, Nicholas presents the view that the redemption of Christ consists in his victory over Satan in all the temptations that assailed him, whether in the wilderness or in the garden, or in his whole passion. It is apparently an example in the Eastern church of a line of free thought like Anselm's in the Western. The idea of Milton's "Paradise Regained" seems the same; and it has the support of the relation of the temptation and victory of our Lord to the temptation and defeat of Adam. The victor Redeemer must be sinless in the sense in which God only is sinless. But the conflict with Satan must be pushed to a mortal issue; therefore, the Redeemer must be capable of suffering even to death; therefore, the divine Saviour must become incarnate and die. This was the judgment of this world. Now is the prince of this world cast out; and by his cross the God-man draws all men to himself to be victorious through him.

This theory has the same elements of power with Anselm's, though not in an equal degree. There is nothing in the way of their amalgamation. Both present vicarious *suffering*, not vicarious *punishment;* but exhibit as clearly as any vicarious punishment could do the ill-desert of sin and the redeeming love of God, and furnish a basis for the forgiveness of repentant rebels.

The Juridical, or so-called Old School Theory.

This theory is very extensively held throughout Christendom by many branches of the church universal. It is a form under which millions of souls have received the grace of God. It has been that through which they have seen the guilt of sin, and the holiness and loving-kindness of God. In it they have felt the power which has shaped their Christian lives, and which has given their hearts joy and peace in sickness and death. It is the glory of the work of Christ that, construed in various ways, and in some that stray far from

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Scripture and scientific truth, it still retains its saving power, not always in perfection, but in a wonderful degree. It is quite certain that none of us understand it fully, and that as it is now the delightful and edifying study of angels, so it will be of human saints forever and ever. This all true Christians believe, and they rejoice that the time is hastening on, when, seeing the truth face to face, their differences will melt away in the pure white light of the heavenly state.

I cannot without occupying too much space present the details of this theory; neither is it necessary, as it is given in so many theological treatises accessible to all. In Symington and the younger Hodge may be found the Calvinistic view ably exhibited; and in the "Aids to Faith," Bishop Thomson gives a short and interesting presentation of the theory independent of Calvinistic peculiarities.

The chief and essential points of the system, as I apprehend it, are, that God being not only a God of love, but of justice also, gives to his law the sanction of reward for obedience, and the sanction of the denunciation of wrathful punishment of disobedience. It maintains that the promise must be performed and the threat executed without fail; that the threat just as sacredly binds the divine holiness and veracity as the promise. But it maintains also that this does not preclude the salvation of sinners, — that God, in order that he might save, sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh to the world, and that he bore the punishment of our sins, and that thus he became the substitute for sinners, being punished in their stead. Thus the difficulty of the threat is removed. The redeemed sinner becomes entitled to the reward of righteousness by the imputation to him of the perfect righteousness of Christ. The operation of the Holy Spirit changes the hearts of redeemed sinners; and this, with the moral influence flowing from the life and death of Christ, progressively sanctifies them till they are perfectly holy. Faith, produced in the soul by the agency of the Spirit, is a condition on which these results are suspended.

Believers in this remarkable theory have found in it,

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1. An impressive exhibition of the moral hatefulness and ill-desert of sin.

2. A glorious manifestation of the love of God for his sinful creatures, and of the love of the Redeemer, the Son of God.

3. Powerful motives for faith, for love, and for holy lives.

4. A foundation for assured hope that the God who had given them his Son would with him also freely give them all things.

These elements of saving power, every Christian will see, appear in the doctrine of the atonement as presented under this theory. It owes to them all the influence for good it has ever had; and that influence has been, and still is, very extensive. But the influence is not due to the form, but to the glorious truth under the form. And so, many an apologue, parable, or allegory, not a word of which was literal truth, but the whole narrative a fiction or a cluster of fictions, has taught the most wholesome doctrine; and sometimes interpreters have thought it incumbent on them to maintain the literal truth of the fictitious stories. I frankly confess, with all respect and fraternal love towards the great body of Christians who believe in this theory as a statement of literal facts, that I consider this their belief as signal an exemplification as the history of good, sensible, learned, and great men presents, of the practicability, from pious motives, of believing impossibilities and contradictions to reason and Scripture.

This theory finds it necessary to maintain that love is not the whole of virtue; and yet it would seem as if nothing had been more plainly taught in God's word. The apostle Paul says that love is the *pleroma* of the law, the *fulfilling*, as our version renders it, or *the full content*, as usage leads me to think it should be rendered. In the law itself, which divines have been wont to call a transcript of the character of God, love is the only thing commanded; and on the law of love, our Lord himself says, that all the law and the prophets hang.

Faith, too, is said to work by love, and he that loveth is born of God. Whatever there is in justice which deserves

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unswerving regard, must be comprehended in love. For why should justice be done? It would seem plain that if justice rewards a good man, or a good angel, it must be because the reward is a good to him, and an encouragement to others to go and do likewise. If justice is done in punishing a sinner, his punishment, if the sinner is excluded from mercy, is no good to *him;* and the object of the punishment must be, to do away sin, and promote virtue in others. If it does not promote, or tend to promote these ends, it is of no use at all. To do justice, or inflict on a sentient being terrible pain, for no end but the realization of an idea or feeling, does not seem worthy of God. The law is made for God's rational creatures, and not they for the law.

Punitive justice is only a form of benevolent action for their good, and can be modified or set aside if the good of the moral realm requires it. There never can be a reason for the non-performance of the promise; but when the ends of punishment can be secured in a better way it may be set aside. This has always been the idea and the practice of mankind in all governments, so far as I know, except that of the Medes and Persians. The inflexibility of the punitive sanction of law did not work very well with them. Punishment, it is true, is the first course to pursue with sinners; and had it not prevailed so much and so terribly in the divine administration, mercy could not be appreciated, could not be the blessed thing it is. And mercy can never be wisely or righteously exercised when its exercise would diminish the horror of sin in the universe of God.

Is justice, in the sense of retributive justice, in the sense of the threat of the law, done when a sinner is saved? The suffering deserved and denounced is not inflicted on the ill-deserving party, but on the most innocent and holy being on the earth substituted for him. Is that justice fit to satisfy the ethical hunger for justice in God or any moral being? Is that justice according to the threat of God's law? Neither God's law, nor any other righteous law, ever threatened any one excepting the transgressor. And how can it be pro-

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tended that legal justice is accomplished when the glorious Son of God is substituted for the sinful wretch, and crucified as a malefactor for him under God's authority? Calvin actually appears to have thought that the sanhedrim, and Pilate, and the Roman executioners were God's court and officers to condemn and execute the Son of God as a criminal and malefactor, standing in the place of sinners. It is astonishing how so great and good a man could ever have entertained such a thought, and imagined that such a transaction was the punishment of sin threatened in the law, instead of being simply the most atrocious and horrible murder ever perpetrated. To call the sufferings of our Lord the punishment of sin, using the word punishment in the literal sense, is one of the strangest attempts on the part of good and intelligent men to make things *what they are not*, and to do this, for themselves and others, by mere sleight of hand in the management of words. The practice, I have no doubt, has been honestly and piously pursued. The people of God have often loved masses of chaff on account of the wheat they are in, and have even piled it on to preserve the precious wheat, while the devil's cheats and dupes have gladly taken occasion from the chaff to throw overboard wheat and chaff together.

Another serious error in this theory, necessitated by its fundamental principles, is found in its doctrine respecting justification. It rightly rejects both the doctrine on this subject held by the Romanists, and that advocated by Drs. Bushnell and Young. Justification, according to this theory, is the pronouncing of the believing sinner righteous *according to law* at God's tribunal, as not liable to punishment on account of Christ's sufferings legally substituted for his punishment, and on account of the righteousness of Christ legally imputed to him. The justification is pronounced in God's court of law, not of equity. Occupying there Christ's law place, the believing sinner has as good a right to a legal justification as any angel in heaven. It seems to me as plain as day that the Bible teaches that the believing, penitent sin-

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ner is justified in an entirely different way. God has provided for him an atoning Saviour, a Saviour from sin and condemnation; and the gospel proclaims this, and has invited him to put himself under the operation of this provision; and when he does this he is justified under the gospel proclamation as a penitent rebel, who accepts thankfully God's conditions of mercy. It is just as simple a thing as it was for Queen Victoria's Canadian subjects, who had been in rebellion, to avail themselves of the Queen's proclamation of mercy, and receive justification as having done so at the hands of the Queen's representatives. Under the law against treason still on the statute book, they were liable to be hanged; but when the Queen's government thought it safe under certain conditions to pardon them, a proclamation, a gospel, to that effect was sent forth, and under it they were justified and saved.

If before God we were judged by law, not one of us could be saved. The law knows nothing of redemption, of atonement. The law knows nothing of a faith which is the condition of salvation to a sinner. It simply says, the man that doeth them — the commandments, that is — shall live by them. When a soul stands before the law-tribunal the only question the judge can ask is, Has this soul kept the commandments? Can that soul reply, Yes, I have, not in my own person, but in my substitute? Is there anything like that in the law? No, indeed. The law and the gospel are entirely distinct systems, not hostile, but the one supplementing the necessary impotence of the other to save any soul that has sinned. The justification of the gospel is a totally different thing from that of the law; but it is even more glorious, and does more to diffuse holiness and blessedness throughout the moral universe of God. And I am happy to think that my beloved old school brethren, if I may call them brethren, do in substance believe this as heartily as I do.

In endeavoring to obviate the objections to this theory, especially that part of it that represents Christ's sufferings as literally the punishment of our sins, one, at least, of the

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great champions of the theory, the elder Professor Hodge, brings forward a new definition of punishment. Punishment, according to him, is suffering inflicted (or borne, as I suppose) for "the support of law." The "support of law," I understand to mean here the promotion of obedience to it. This definition seems to me to be logically an abandonment of the theory, though designed to sustain it. The definition would spread a shield over every theory which regards the sufferings of Christ as essential to the redemption of men. It applies to Anselm's theory as interpreted by Neander and others, to the theory of Nicholas of Methone, to the theory of Barnes, Beman, etc., and to the ancient ransom-paid-to-Satan theory. But that is not what mankind understand by punishment when the word is literally understood. Figuratively the word has manifold applications. It is applied even to the bruising the poor fellow gets in the barbarous champion boxing. It might be applied to the battering a police-officer gets in arresting a criminal, as that would be received for the support of law. But would it be punishment in Dr. Hodge's sense, or in the sense of his theory? Yet to save his theory he must resort to some such device as this definition, which turns the theory into sense by destroying it.

Another device of the advocates of the theory is the supposition of such a divinely constituted unity between Christ and those he came to redeem, as rightfully transfers their responsibility to him. It is not irreverent to say of God that he cannot effect impossibilities or contradictions. He cannot make a thing be and not be at the same time; nor can he do that which is contrary to the nature of things as he has constituted that nature, unless he does away that nature. Moral responsibility is in its nature incapable of transfer. No will, no power can transfer it. One being may suffer for another, and often must fail in duty if he refuses to do it. Of course he might bear for another the full equivalent for the sufferings contained in any punishment; but punishment, literally taken, is a necessarily personal thing. There is a sense in which Satan is responsible for the sin of the world,

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because his malign temptations have occasioned them. But still his sin is one thing, and the sin of man is another; and each person is in strictness responsible for his own sin only. It is only an abbreviated mode of expression to say that Satan is responsible for man's sin, or will be punished for it. Christ's responsibility is that of the Redeemer, not that of the sinner. But he may and does save his people from sin and from punishment; not by being punished himself, but by his obedience unto death, even the death of the cross, by which he obtained for them sanctification, and forgiveness and eternal life.

Another objection to the juridical theory is, that it nullifies the Scripture doctrine of forgiveness; at least, this is one of its logical outcomes; because, to use the terms of Grotius, the juridical atonement is a *solutio*, not a *satisfactio*. Justification, as old schoolism regards it, is a legal process, by which one is discharged legally from all bad responsibility, and legally invested with a right to all blessings. It is as different from forgiveness as any one thing can be different from another. Forgiveness always contemplates the sinner as ill-deserving; but when he is penitent blots out his sin, dispensing with the punishment of it. We are all perfectly familiar with the word and the thing. That is what the sinner is invited in God's word to receive, in response to the hearty confession and forsaking of his sin. And where the gospel is preached this sin would include, as its worst element, all previous refusal to believe on the Only-begotten Son of God. But the theory does not, as I conceive it, exclude grace. Grace, however, is solely found in the spontaneous gift of the Saviour, to which God was not bound by justice. Mere justice would have left the sinner to perish; but grace provides the glorious Saviour, and saves a countless multitude through his marvellous doings and sufferings and the Spirit of God given to apply his work to the soul. But after the Saviour is provided there is no more grace, but all is law.

I do not suppose that old-school men in general admit that on their theory there is no room for forgiveness. They are

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perhaps as abundant in speaking of forgiveness as any class of Christians. I have had in view, in the preceding remarks, only the logical outcome of the system.

It is thought by the advocates of this theory that it best accords with the natural meaning of Scripture. The natural meaning, or the obvious meaning of terms to interpreters, depends much upon their antecedent views. We must employ our reason and our common sense in interpreting all books. To warn a man against the use of reason in interpretation is to exhort him to interpret like a fool. There is a perverse or foolish use of reason, and there is a perverse and foolish attempt to lay reason aside. What is the organ which we are to employ in interpreting God's word? We must use some intellectual organ, even if we embrace the infallibility of the pope; and so we must if we follow the interpretation of the church at large. And we must have some reason for accepting the infallibility in either case, or we must act unreasonably. No man ever had a deeper sense of human ignorance than the illustrious Bishop Butler; but he insisted upon the necessary use of reason. "This I say," he remarks, "lest I should be understood to vilify reason, which is the only faculty we have whereby to gain the knowledge of anything." I am not sure that I remember the bishop's exact words; but I am sure of his sense.

One of the most important rules of interpretation is to interpret according to the known nature of the subject. This rule applies to all books, and certainly not less to the Bible than to any other book. We must not by interpretation make any writer write nonsense without a decisive necessity of so interpreting. Men may write nonsense, and often do; and we have to interpret them accordingly. There is the strongest antecedent certainty that there is no nonsense in the Bible; but we may by our false interpretation put a great deal of nonsense into it, and perhaps we all do more or less of this deplorable mischief. We are to do the best we can to interpret right, with all the light from reason, science, philosophy, and the Spirit of the Father of lights.

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The Bible is one of the most figurative books in the world, and it is quite as likely as any other book to contradict in its language, taken literally, the known nature of things. This does not necessarily make the Bible obscure, or specially difficult of interpretation; but every sound interpreter knows that this figurative language of the Bible is often most absurdly taken, and even by learned men. Some have argued from the saying in Genesis that "it repented the Lord that he had made man," that the author of the Book of Genesis, or of that part of it, believed God to be changeable.

If the language of the Bible respecting sacrifice and atonement is capable of a figurative construction, and this construction is most conformable to the known nature of things, then this construction should be accepted as the true one, and, of course, *vice versa*. The sense attached by unintelligent readers often has nothing in its favor in the view of the really well-informed.

The word of God is given to be understood, but not without study, not without divine aid, not without due respect to the sense, conscientiousness, and possibly better knowledge of brethren of different views from our own. I have derived great advantage from the study of the old school commentators, among whom I account Dr. C. Hodge one of the best, and Calvin almost unrivalled; but, as I have frankly said, I regard their views of the atonement as erroneous; yet I cherish for them a respectful and affectionate regard, because I believe they have loved their theory for the sake of the glorious truth in their opinion best expressed by it. I believe that the truth is not well expressed by it, and I think their theory contains very dangerous and hurtful elements.

The Governmental, or so-called New-School Theory.

This theory is held by a host of New England divines, by many of the Presbyterian church, and by some of the English divines. It has found able expositors and defenders in Dr. Lyman Beecher, Dr. Beman, Albert Barnes, President Finney, Dr. Edward Hitchcock the geologist, and Professor Park of

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Andover. It has many other defenders; but it is enough to mention these.

Some of the most interesting of the earlier treatises have been collected into a large volume by Professor Park, who has furnished an able introduction and some notes. There are, of course, varieties of representation; but I consider the substance of the theory to be as follows:

1. The death of Christ is not the punishment of sin, but a symbolical representation of its ill-desert, analogous to the representation of the ill-desert of sin in the sacrifices of the law, which are a typical prophecy of the atonement of the Son of God.

2. The impressiveness and worth of the sacrifice are proportioned to the dignity of the victim, and proportioned also to his glorious moral character.

3. This sacrifice lays a foundation for the offer of pardon and justification to all the world, if believing and penitent.

4. This atonement is a moral influence to promote repentance, impressed on the soul by the operations of the Holy Spirit.

5. The saving result cannot be effected, except through a faith which places the heart under the influence of the atonement presented by the Holy Spirit.

6. The sufferings of Christ are vicarious, as they are borne for sinners, and answer the same purpose with their punishment in a higher degree.

This theory possesses all the elements of moral power exhibited in the juridical theory. It aims at sustaining the authority of the law and moral government of God. But it does not call the sufferings of Christ punishment; while they are as great as under the old school theory, and equally express the guilt of sin and love of God. It has the advantage over that theory in admitting the exercise of pardon, and making justification to consist in acquitting the sinner and admitting him to favor on his performance of the published conditions of mercy. If the sufferings of Christ are contemplated as directly laid on him by the authority of God, as

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death was dealt to the sacrificial animal, they represent the same thing — human ill-desert — on both the old school and the new school theory. But as the human mind cannot really believe that they are the very punishment threatened by the law, or an equivalent punishment, or any punishment at all in the literal sense of the word, the new school theory has the advantage over the old of not being cumbered with the fiction which logically turns the favor shown to a sinner into a legal justification, and promotes the utter mystification of human thought.

But both theories really, though not, I believe, intentionally, represent our Lord as sacrificed in a manner analogous to the sacrifice of a brute animal, or as put to death under God's authority in the manner of a felon, in order to represent the ill-desert of the sinner. The old school called this sacrifice or execution the vicarious punishment of sin. The new school say, as Dr. Griffin expresses it, that it answered the purpose of the threatened punishment. But both theories represent God as putting Christ to death as the real or symbolical substitute for sinners. I remember, however, that when Dr. Channing, in his sermon preached at Baltimore, represented the orthodox doctrine of atonement under the figure of a public execution of a criminal, the illustration was denounced as a caricature of the doctrine. But I do not see that it caricatures either the juridical or the governmental theory in its common form; and I used to hear from the lips of the eloquent President Griffin similar illustrations. But somehow there are few Christian men whose feelings are not shocked by such figures; and this must be because the figures do not truly exhibit the doctrine of atonement as it lies in their heads and hearts. But the theories, for aught I can see, really present the atonement as consisting in the great God-man's sacrifice laid upon an altar and slain, or the ignominious execution of the Son of God on a gibbet, as the representative of the guilty human race.

This commonly accepted form of the great doctrine of the atonement has made it repulsive to many honest men, and

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has stumbled others who were glad to have a stumbling-block. In the theory of Anselm, as Neander interprets it, and in the views presented in these pages, the sufferings of the Son of God were a necessary result of his glorious devotion to the restoration of the honor of his Heavenly Father, and his law, and the salvation of men; and they create a moral influence which tends to do away sin, and bring in everlasting righteousness, and make reconciliation or atonement for iniquity. In this world of sinners the Son of God could do no otherwise than meet his death in his conflict with God-dishonoring and man-ruining sin; and his death could not but demonstrate in various ways that sinners deserve a death unspeakably worse. It shows and means all and more than any direct effusion of his blood by divine authority, in the manner of the animal sacrifices, could express.

The death of Christ, indeed, on these theories, does not by itself express anything, but is an absolute dumb mystery, unless accompanied by explanatory words. It is so with the animal sacrifices so far as respects the mere slaying of the victims. But on Anselm's theory the whole life and death of the Son of God explain themselves. All the facts, severally and taken together, are naturally significant. Words, if needed at all, are employed to call attention to what the facts say with the voice of divine emphasis. No one can doubt that they honor God and magnify his law of love, and, done and suffered for man, are a wondrous manifestation of holy love. But it is very much doubted by many honest thinkers whether, as interpreted by the old school or new school theory, these sufferings are a fit expression at all of what they are held to express, or fit at all to be an atonement. But all theorists who have Christian hearts read alike the law-honoring obedience to death of the Redeemer, and expatiate on it with widely efficacious persuasion. All Christian schools harmonize in this — that, first or last, the moral influence going forth from this obedience is promotive of salvation; and that this must be brought to bear on the soul by the agency of the Holy Ghost.

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Theory of S. T. Coleridge.

The writings of Coleridge have exerted a fascinating influence on some of the best minds in our English-speaking world; but, except on the negative side, I know not whether his doctrine of redemption, as propounded in his "Aids to Reflection," has had much sway.

After having been in his early manhood a zealous preacher of Unitarianism, he was in his riper years, and to the end of his life, a most earnest advocate of Orthodoxy in most of its doctrines; but he differed from the great divines of his beloved church of England on the doctrine of redemption. I think that his difference was not so great as he imagined it to be. No great English divine believed, as he seems to represent, in a redemption that left the sinner enslaved to his sins. This misapprehension appears in the case supposed of Matthew as a vicarious son, discharging all filial duties, shamefully trampled on by James an only son of a most loving and self-sacrificing mother, and then proposing that this unworthy son should be treated by the abused mother, on account of this vicarious goodness of Matthew, as if he had done no wrong at all, when he gave not the least sign of repentance. I know of no orthodox sect or divine that represents God as so treating persistent sinners.

In his formal statement of his doctrine Coleridge seems to represent regeneration as redemption:

"The causative act [of Christ the Redeemer, who is the co-eternal Word, and Only-begotten Son of the living God, incarnate, tempted, agonizing, crucified, submitting to death, resurgent, ascendant, communicant of his Spirit] by which redemption is effected is a spiritual and transcendent mystery that passeth all understanding. The effect caused is the being born anew — as before in the flesh to the world, so now in the Spirit to Christ. The consequence from the effect are sanctification from sin and liberation from the inherent and penal consequences of sin in the world to come; these consequences being the same to the sinner, relatively

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to God and his own soul, as the satisfaction of a debt for a debtor relatively to his creditor; as the sacrificial atonements made by the priests for the transgressor of the Mosaic law; as the reconciliation to an alienated parent for a son who had estranged himself from his father's house and presence; and as a redemptive ransom for a slave or captive. Now, I complain that this metaphorical *naming* of a transcendent causative act, through the medium of its proper effects, from actions and causes of familiar occurrence, connected with the former by similarity of result, has been mistaken for an intended designation of the essential character of the causative act itself; and thus divines have interpreted *de omni* what was spoken of *de singulo*, and magnified a *partial equation* into a *total identity*."

That this illogical interpretation has prevailed a good deal must be conceded. The old school divines, who on this subject are perhaps the most literal interpreters, avoid this error with respect to the relation of debtor and creditor. In the process of redemption as to those who are really saved by it, the causative act which Coleridge speaks of, the regenerative operation of the Spirit of Christ, mysterious as Christ represents it, must occur; and the consequences are, in all cases of salvation, sanctification and liberation from the inherent and penal consequences of sin in the world to come.

Coleridge did not differ from his fellow-Christians essentially on this point; though he uses words of more learned and philosophic sound. In speaking of the *agens causator* — that is, active causer — in redemption, he goes over an outline of the great facts in Christ's person and career, but does not say what these facts have to do in redemption,— what Christ does by them, what we have to do with them, or whether they have any bearing on the forgiveness of sin or the rescue of the soul from its power. But inasmuch as he mentions these characteristics of the Redeemer it is fairly inferable that he thought them somehow necessary to redemption. A partial understanding of his view may be gained by considering a portion of his Matthew-and-James

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illustration, preceding his formal statement, but not included in it: "If, indeed, by the force of Matthew's example, by persuasion, or more mysterious influences, or by an inward co-agency compatible with the idea of a personal will, James should be led to repent, — if, through admiration and love of this great goodness, gradually assimilating his mind to the mind of his benefactor, he should in his own person become a grateful and dutiful child, — then, doubtless, the mother would be wholly satisfied."

There is nothing in this theory respecting the restoration of the parent's honor, as the moral and authoritative head of the family, as in Anselm's theory. On repentance the child is restored to full favor, and is, of course, grateful to his moral Saviour and to his forgiving parents. The theory, so far as it goes, contains elements of power, and not encased in an unworthy casket; but lacks that combination of kingly, rectoral majesty with grace, which satisfies fully the demands of the moral nature.

The Matthew-and-James illustration of Coleridge has a remarkable parallel in a paragraph from President Edwards, given by Professor Park in his elaborate introduction to his volume of treatises on the atonement. "The satisfaction of Christ by his death is certainly a very rational thing. If any person that was greatly obliged to me, that was dependent on me, and that I loved, should exceedingly abuse me, and should go on in an obstinate course of it from one year to another, notwithstanding all I could say to him, and all new obligations continually repeated; though at length he should leave it off, I should not forgive him unless upon gospel considerations. But if any person that was a much dearer friend, and was a very near relation of him that offended me, should intercede for him, and, out of the entire love he had for him, should put himself to very hard labors and difficulties, and undergo great pains and miseries to procure him forgiveness, and the person that had offended should, with a changed mind, fly to this mediator and should seek favor in his name, with the sense in his own mind how much his me-

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diator had done and suffered for him, I should be satisfied, and feel myself inclined, without any difficulty, to receive him into my entire friendship again; but not without the last-mentioned condition, that he should be sensible how much his mediator had done and suffered. But if he was ignorant of it, or thought he had done only some small matter, I should not be easy nor satisfied. So a sense of Christ's sufficiency seems necessary in faith."[1]

This remarkable passage contains some important elements not in the Coleridge theory; but, what is quite strange in Edwards, it says nothing of satisfaction to rectoral honor and influence, or the restoration of that. No doubt many a soul has been saved by a glimpse of one beam of the great Sun of Righteousness.

Theory of Dr. J. M. Campbell.

An interesting treatise on the atonement not very long since came from the pen of an able divine of Scotland, Dr. Campbell, whose theory cost him his ministerial standing, though it appears by the suffrages of all that he bore an excellent character. His book on every page gives evidence of his Christian spirit; and under his exclusion from the ministry of his church he manifested the utmost meekness and freedom from a schismatic heart, attending respectfully on ministrations from his brethren, and in every becoming way promoting Christian love and fraternal union. There is a great deal of edifying matter in his volume, of which I can take no notice. I can only briefly state what I understand his theory to be.

Dr. Campbell expatiates on a quotation from President Edwards, in which that illustrious divine says, that if man without any other atonement were to exercise an absolutely perfect repentance, he thinks that repentance might be accepted. But as such a repentance is never exercised by man, and the repentance he does exercise is derived from

[1] Discourses on the Atonement, by Edwards, Smalley, and others (Congregational Publishing Society), p. xxiii.

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Christ, Christ's atonement is neccssary. Dr. Campbell regards Christ as our vicarious confessor of sin, condemning it in our name perfectly, in our behalf testifying by word and deed against it. In like manner he vicariously acts in favor of holiness, and in favor of every precept of God's law. He recognizes our ill-desert, and the ill-desert of all sin. In his whole course he is on the side of God and of his government.

As the incarnate Word he demonstrates the falseness of the slanders of Satan against God. He is an actual manifestation of love for the poor human wretches who have fallen in with Satan's lie. In their behalf he takes away this consent to the base lie of Satan, and exhibits in full all the transcendent goodness of God.

If men, influenced by what he has done, believe, repent, and cast themselves on God's mercy, they are accepted; otherwise their condemnation is awfully increased. I think that it must be said of this theory, that all that is positive in it is true and wholesome, and that it is erroneous only by defect and omission. Perhaps it does not insist as much as it should on the bearings of the whole work and sufferings of the incarnate Word on the general interests of the government of God; or, as the new school men express it, on the interests protected by general justice. In a remarkable degree this theory recognizes the mediatorship of Christ, and gives it very interesting characteristics.

Theory of Dr. Horace Bushnell.

The only other theory of which I shall take notice is that of Dr. Horace Bushnell, more celebrated, and at least in our country, more influential than any other proposed in our days. That of Dr. John Young of Scotland, presented in his book, called "The Life and Light of Men," remarkably coincides with Dr. Bushnell's view. Dr. Bushnell's "Vicarious Sacrifice," and Dr. Young's book appeared the same year. Dr. Bushnell had in previous publications presented substantially the same theory. His views are set forth in that masterly style of original eloquence for which he is distinguished.

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Dr. Bushnell has, perhaps, made it plainer than any previous writer had done, that all the virtue there can be in any atonement must be found in its moral influence on God's moral creatures. Nothing can be extracted of good from any theory of atonement but moral power or influence for God's moral government. Even the juridical theory, which supposes that the great thing done in atonement is the realization of justice in vicarious punishment and righteousness, thus rendering man's salvation possible, holds that salvation is in part effected by the manifestation to souls of God's holy, gracious love.

The tenor of Dr. Bushnell's theory is, that Christ, appearing in our world with truly divine perfections and powers, in due season puts forth most earnest efforts for the good of man, body and soul, realizes and manifests in the most extraordinary and affecting way the ideal of moral excellency, intensifying this manifestation by his submission to the death on the cross. By the life he lived, and the death he died, and all the wonders he displayed, he acquired transcendent moral power to employ for the deliverance of mankind from sin, and for establishing in the heart everlasting righteousness. When the gospel that proclaims him, in the presence of the Holy Spirit, is believed with practical faith, deliverance from sin begins; and at the same time begins salvation from the misery that sin produces, and the enjoyment of the peace and blessedness effected by righteousness; and the salvation advances to perfection as the Saviour becomes more and more known. The punitive causes more and more cease to operate, because they more and more cease to exist; and the causes of good grow in volume and power more and more till salvation is completed in complete moral excellence attained through the saving power of Christ, the Holy Spirit co-operating by showing the things of Christ to the soul, working faith and all right willing and doing. This is a very feeble account of the theory as compared with the glowing picture which Dr. Bushnell draws; and to propose to substitue it for his picture would be like proposing to substi-

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tute for the Paradise Lost a meagre table of contents, or argument; or for the Transfiguration of Raphael a slip from a newspaper report of a chance traveller.

I understand both Dr. Bushnell and Dr. Young to hold that when deliverance from sin begins in the soul, and righteousness begins to take the place before occupied by the evil thing, this is a beginning of remission, forgiveness, justification; these words expressing salvation, as to inward experience, in its entire extent, so far as deliverance from punitive evil and enjoyment of gracious reward are concerned. Only, when the good work begins, time is needed for its consummation; but all that follows is of a piece with the commencement.

The great facts of the life and death of Christ, in their natural bearing on the soul of man for his rescue from sin and attainment of a true life of love, are set forth by competent advocates of this theory in an excellent manner, and with happy results. It is very edifying to read in this view much found in the writings of both these able men.

One of the most interesting things in Dr. Bushnell's "Vicarious Sacrifice," is the account he gives of the spirit and manner in which the Saviour takes our case on his heart and feeling, entering into the disordered state of our souls, our guilt, or deep misery, and the countless evils we have pulled down on our own heads. In his masterly way he turns this over and over, and makes it clear how this is adapted to give the Redeemer great power in our unhappy hearts. It is quite clear that this deep compassion, so holy and tender, must belong to the character of a divine Redeemer for man. As our Lord bore our sins in the sense that he felt intensely their odiousness and ill-desert, and groaned in solemn indignation when he had before him the infinite evils and horrors with which sin has filled the world, this Dr. Bushnell fully accepts, — and sets forth as scarce any other man has done so impressively. Such sin-bearing has a mighty curative power, manifested often in infinitely humbler spheres. To see his creature-man in the power of such

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a monster, stirred the heart of God to redeem the race, and his love culminated in the cross of Calvary.

The work of redemption logically, according to this theory, terminates with a moral and spiritual deliverance; and there is nothing for the Redeemer to do for man, saved from sin and its necessary natural consequences, more than for moral creatures of God who have never sinned. The atonement provides for no pardon or justification except in the sense of a moral deliverance. There is no *expiatory* power or force in any possible atonement — in the "Vicarious Sacrifice" Dr. Bushnell maintained that there is no *propitiatory* power. In his recent amendment of his previous works Dr. Bushnell maintains, not that the atonement when made propitiates God, but that God in making it propitiates himself; that is, in the work of saving he becomes more and more interested in lost sinners as he makes cost for them, and takes the burden of their sin and misery on his soul. In this he resembles a man, made in his image, who should, renewed in love, undertake to rescue from ruin loathsome wretches from whom at first he shrinks; but as he goes on in his work he is more and more interested in them, his saving love reacts on his own heart, and so propitiates him. If Dr. Bushnell only meant that God is *phenomenally* more and more in the work of redemption, this would not contradict his own doctrine of the perfection of God in love and pity, and the impossibility of any change in him making him more loving or merciful or propitious. As I understand this book I regard it as no amendment of his previously taught theory, but inharmonious with the whole spirit and tenor of it. It was magnanimous of this distinguished man to write it, and blot out so large a part of the "Vicarious Sacrifice"; but it might have been a nobler magnanimity to recall the whole of it. It is in disharmony, not only with Dr. Bushnell's theory, but with all theories which the church has seen.

To me the greatest errors in the theory of Dr. Bushnell appear to arise from his opinions on punishment and reward, and on remission and justification. I think that both he

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and Dr. Young are seriously astray on these several points. The Greek word rendered *remission* appears to be used in two senses. 1. It is used to express forbearance towards evil-doers, and granting them a space for repentance. This is the sense the word bears in the prayer of our Lord for his murderers. 2. The other sense is that of the complete setting aside of the punishment of the sinner, which is always represented as conditioned on his repentance. This is the sense the word has in the Lord's prayer. The sense given to the word by Dr. Bushnell I do not find in the Scriptures. A concordance, English, Greek, or Hebrew, will settle the question for most unsophisticated minds. It plainly seems to be taught in the Scriptures that when sinners have been brought by the grace of God to repentance, to a revolution in character, they need the remission of their sins — an act of mercy by which the punishment they deserve is set aside. This is not a mere natural effect of the change in the heart, but a procedure of divine authority. It was this that David prayed for when he repented of his heavy sins; and it is this for which, in the Lord's prayer, we all supplicate. We pray that we may be forgiven as we forgive our injurers; but we surely do not mean by our exercise of forgiveness effecting a moral change in our injurers' hearts.

To justify a sinner, in the view of Doctors Bushnell and Young, is to make him righteous in heart, to work a radical moral change in his character. There are two cases in the Old Testament in which some authorities, ancient and modern, suppose the original expression, usually rendered *justify*, to exhibit this meaning. The passage most favorable to Dr. Bushnell's interpretation is found in Daniel xii. 3. Here the hiphil participle of the verb is rendered in our version, "they that turn [many] to righteousness." The Vulgate translates "quia justitiam erudiunt multos," which is somewhat ambiguous, as "justitiam" may here have the so-called Pauline sense. The Greek translation given in the version of Daniel in Van Ess's Septuagint, would, Englished, read "Some of the righteous ones of the many"; which differs

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totally from our version, yet, strange to say, requires no change of the Hebrew text, but only a different vocalization. It thus appears that the most ancient authorities are not certainly favorable to the now common view of this passage.

The other passage occurs in Isaiah liii. 11, where the word in question is rendered in the common version *justify*, as also in the Vulgate, *justificabit*. The modern lexicographers, Gesenius and Fürst, interpret here as Dr. Bushnell does, and perhaps the majority of other authorities. But no one can carefully examine a Hebrew concordance without concluding that the prevailing forensic sense of the causative forms of the verb is to be held fast, as it is by most Hebrew scholars. The other sense is almost if not quite unknown to Hebrew usage, and doubtful in the two passages where some moderns think they find it. The Greek translation did not know that sense in either of them.

The case is, if anything, clearer still in regard to the *Greek* word rendered in the common version *justify*. Classic usage knows nothing of Dr. Bushnell's sense of the word, as any one may see for himself by looking carefully into Liddell and Scott's Lexicon. A Greek concordance, or even an English one, under the words "justify" and "justification," will set the matter at rest in most men's minds. Cremer, in his recent Lexicon, thought he had found one exception in the Septuagint usage; but it might be easily shown that he is mistaken. Let Psalm lxxiii. 13, Septuagint, be compared, in the Hebrew, with Psalm li. 6, and it will appear that the Hebrew verb used there has sometimes a forensic sense, as well as the more common verb in the parallel member of the verse. So the Vulgate took the word Psalm lxxiii 13, following the Septuagint in its translation: "Ergo sine causa *justificavi* cor meum"; where the meaning is, not I have actually made my heart righteous, but shown it to be so, *justified* it. The correct conclusion seems to be that there is no example of such a use of δικαιόω as Doctors Bushnell and Young need for their position. The common view of remission, forgiveness, pardon, and justification, accords with

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the Biblical use of the words rendered by these English terms.

It is not denied that the proffer of forgiveness and justification to men in their sins, is a powerful argument to induce men to repent. But the proffer of these blessings is not identical with the blessings themselves; nor is the repentance which is secured by the proffer. It is also the case that the experience of forgiveness deepens and confirms repentance, but is not the repentance which it promotes. It is also true that where the one is the other will and must be; but they are as distinct as if they were centuries apart; they are as distinct as cause and effect, occasion and consequent event, are distinct. For the sinner's great need of moral renovation the theory under consideration seeks to make provision; but it denies that there is any additional need of pardon and justification, and confounds these with the renovation of the heart. It maintains that sin is its own punishment, and that there is no other; and of course that prayer for mercy in any other sense than that of renovating or sanctifying grace, is an absurdity.

On the principles of this theory an atonement can make no provision for the legitimation of remission or justification, as distinct from the change in character, or salvation from sin itself. But the human soul, while it knows that sin, by its natural effect, produces misery, fears also punishment from the hand of an offended God. No philosophy can annihilate this fear. The soul needs, therefore, an atonement that provides a remedy for the object of this natural fear; and no atonement can satisfy its wants but one that provides salvation from sin, and salvation from punishment as well. An atonement that does not provide for this great want an accessible, legitimate pardon and justification in the sense commonly held, must lack one great element of power for the renovation of the heart. The heart knows its own bitterness; and that only makes the most effectual appeal to it which legitimately proffers deliverance from the whole, from sin, and, ultimately, all its natural and penal

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consequences in both worlds. The voice of man's moral nature is on the side of God, his holy law, and the moral order of his vast realm, and refuses to be at rest until the demands of all are met.

The great facts, public facts, of the life and death of our Lord, do provide for both needs. They show the ill-desert of sin as justly punishable, not merely while it lasts, but after it is put away. This is what the moral nature teaches, and this is the teaching of the atonement of the Son of God. And often, no doubt, when the facts of the gospel are told by Dr. Bushnell in his eloquent way, they speak forth, in spite of his theory, all the glorious truth that is needed to transform and give peace to the soul. I am persuaded that some read Dr. Bushnell's books with great spiritual profit, and never even suspect what the negative import of his theory is.

It is in providing for pardon and justification, as they are commonly understood, that Anselm's theory differs essentially from Dr. Bushnell's. This provision cannot be fairly thought to hinder, but seems greatly adapted to help, the influence of the whole atonement of Christ on character, both in the case of each sinner who is saved and in all the moral creatures of God who are not irredeemably obdurate. I see not why the idea of expiation for sin should be abhorent to any mind. The idea of expiation, in this circle of thought, is only that of putting the government of God into such a position with respect to sin, as that sin may be forgiven without harm to moral order, but even with advantage to it; and God is said to be propitiated, not when his love or mercy is excited or gained, but when, through satisfactory expiation, he can justly exercise his mercy, and there is no necessity for punishment remaining. Is there in this "anything to shock any moral sentiment, or violate any principle of natural reason?" The obedience of our Lord unto death, —the magnifying thus of the law and making it honorable,— may not that be such an expiation as can subdue the hearts of sinners and propitiate God, that is, justify him in mercy?

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That is, in Anselm's language, "a satisfaction," that is, a *doing enough* to meet the great objects to be accomplished. It is plainly true that when there is a general prevalence of high, zealous, and steadfast loyalty to good rules and good laws, this sends forth an influence rendering mercy more easy and wholesome than it could be in an opposite state of things. And shall not the transcendent self-sacrificing loyalty of the Son of God, his obedience to the death of the cross, honoring inexpressibly his Father and his authority, not only rescue men from sin, but render their pardon, when they repent, safe, wholesome, and glorious? There is ample power in that divine-human loyalty to act back on all the ages of the world, and to justify all the forbearance and mercy God ever exercised; so that, beyond controversy, it will remain most salutary and blessed in its influence forever. That Sun of Righteousness has filled all the lesser orbs with glorious light. But neither the rod nor sword of punishment is laid aside; but they are in the hands of him who died for the world, and thus we are assured that they will not be used without imperious necessity.

On Dr. Bushnell's theory, if a sinner becomes conscious of complete moral renovation through the moral power of Christ, he has suffered all the punishment he deserves. Logically he has no pardon to ask, has no occasion for mercy except to perpetuate his moral excellence; and a prayer like that of the prodigal son would be utterly unphilosophical. He is entitled, on the score of justice, to more than the penitent prodigal asked; and the penitent thief only asked justice from Christ in requital for his faith and love. The sense of unworthiness which the apostle Paul carried about with him through life, on account of his former persecutions of the church of God, was only a piece of voluntary humility, sincere indeed, but intellectually shallow. Dr. Young might have told him he had paid the last farthing of the debt.

In one thing I rejoice, that all who believe with Doctors Bushnell and Young will amply tell "the old, old story of Jesus and his love," and that will, of itself, speak of man's

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sin and guilt, and of salvation from sin and condemnation, through him. The poor philosophy will generally occupy a low seat, and have relatively little to say. It was this story, with very little aid from philosophy, which conquered the world, and cast the old dragon down from heaven. To the believing eye the cross may still be seen in the heavens, "In hoc signo vinces" written brightly over it. It is matter of gladness inexpressible that there is so much in this great theme on which Christian minds and hearts agree; and that in their prayers and hymns they naturally employ the same language to express the views and experiences of their hearts. And if they meet together in great concourse to manifest Christian alliance, they naturally talk in much the same way; and their talk is not unintelligent vagueness, but a nobly significant utterance of the warm, universal sentiments of Christian hearts, fervently loving each other, and the glorious One who loved them and gave himself for them, and whose reign over human souls they together ask their Heavenly Father to make universal.

No Christian man, in the exercise of his intelligence, will desire that theologians should cease to think or to endeavor to discover the genuine form of highest truth. But every Christian well knows that truth ought to be subservient to life — life in love. When great generals have been engaged in mortal combat for long years, settling great questions in controversy, they have cherished for each other deep respect, they have been at the farthest remove from rancor and animosity. It ought to be so in the case of theologians, and *odium theologicum* should cease to be a possible combination of words in reference to combatants recognized as belonging within the Christian lists. In determining who these are, the greatest charity possible to right reason should have sovereign sway. Charity that goes beyond that is a hateful thing, that has stolen a very beautiful and lovely name. But it is relatively of little account what we may think of one another. Our aim should be to enjoy the confidence of the Master, and so

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to hold up our little mirror to his glorious light as to reflect it around as we may.

When atonement as made by the Son of God is fitly interpreted it appears, as President Edwards says, a very rational thing, nay, we may add, the perfection of reason, the most consummate moral manifestation of himself and transcendent moral excellence that God ever made, or even can be conceived to have made. It is, as the apostle Paul calls it (1 Tim. ii. 6), *the* testimony — in word and deed, and in utmost suffering and in death — of the consummate flower of humanity and of the Word of God, in whom dwells the life that is the light of men incarnated in him, to the highest truth thought can reach or receive, truth whose legitimate seat and throne is the centre of the human heart. The Word had been uttering it, syllable by syllable, since the world began; for his goings forth did not begin when his incarnation was effected, but were from of old, from everlasting. The utterance became plainer and plainer as his spirit breathed progressively in the prophets. But at length the Sun of Righteousness arose, and mounted to mid heaven, and flooded the universe with his beams. Both before and since his star-heralded birth at Bethlehem, fitly sung by angelic hosts, he had been the inspiration of all the witnesses for God and truth in behalf of man's redemption that ever have trod our earth, and will be till the end, as it is the great function of the Spirit of God, in his most holy moral working, to take of the things of Christ and show them to the soul.

Atonement, when wise and good law has prepared the way for it, has a higher sphere of influence than law. It does not address fear as its primary appeal; it goes at once to the moral sentiments, and at once uncovers the character of sin and of obedience to holy law. Hence it has a more mighty, as well as a more natural, tendency to deter from sin and win to righteousness.

Both law and atonement are personally administered, and hence are the more powerful in their influence. To make

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either impersonal is to mar their wholesome efficacy. In the atonement God, as it were, through his Son, unbosoms himself completely, comes with all the charms of infinite loveliness and beauty, to bind the soul in golden chains.

We may safely conclude that, while the world stands, the church, as a body, will maintain and proclaim that the Son of God has made an atonement which does not make void the law, but establishes it in greater glory; that this atonement, naturally attracting all to Christ, effectually provides for the deliverance of all believing souls from the power of sin, securing in such souls the love and practice of righteousness; and that while it ultimately delivers believing penitents from the natural consequences of sin, it also provides for their legitimate complete pardon and justification, securing for them to all eternity the position and inheritance of children of God, through union with him who is the first born among many brethren.

ARTICLE VI.

THE STAR OF THE EAST.

BY REV THEODORE APPEL, D.D., FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF ASTRONOMY IN FRANKLIN AND MARSHALL COLLEGE, LANCASTER, PA.

PART FIRST.

IT is now generally conceded that the Saviour of the world was born at least four years before the beginning of the Christian era. The current chronology, introduced during the sixth century by the monk Dionysius, without much critical examination, and adopted by Archbishop Usher over two centuries ago, is therefore not less than four years in error. This has been satisfactorily demonstrated by the most careful investigation of the subject in more recent times. King Herod died in the year 749 of the founding of Rome according to one date of this event, or in 750 according to another; and of course Christ could not have been born

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in the year 753 or 754, the time usually fixed for his birth. If, then we add four years — the difference most generally adopted — to the present year of our Lord, we have eighteen hundred and eighty-two years as the period which has elapsed since the incarnation.

In regard to the particular day of the year, however, when that event took place, there has been a vast amount of discussion, but without any reliable results. The early Christians, who might have ascertained the precise date, made more account of the event itself than of the day, and they have therefore left no references in their writings which would give the scholar a clew to the solution of the question. One of the oldest and best established traditions handed down in the church at Rome assigns it to the twenty-fifth of December — the day now generally adopted in Christian countries to commemorate the advent of our Saviour on earth. In modern times an objection has been urged against this date, because it occurs in the winter, when shepherds could not be supposed to be out in their fields watching their flocks by night. But it must be remembered that Palestine lies in a southern latitude, and that its winters differ materially from ours or those of northern Europe. With occasional snow or frosts that do not last long, the cold is not so intense or continuous as in more northern climes. The winter is prevailingly the rainy season; and the earth, which had been left dry and parched by the heat of summer, with scarcely any sign of vegetation left, is now clothed with a green verdure, while the grain-fields everywhere present a cheerful and flourishing appearance. As a general thing, shepherds have come home with their flocks from distant mountains and vallies, whither they led them during the summer for pasture, and have them safely inclosed in sheepfolds on account of the unpleasant state of the weather. But travellers inform us, just as we might expect, that there are always some intervals of fair weather during this rainy season, when shepherds lead out their flocks to the neighboring hills; and it is not at all improbable that in

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some cases they may at times have kept them out in the field all night. Such periods occur, we are told, towards the end of December, after there has already been a considerable fall of rain, and when the flowers are all out in bloom.[1] The objection, therefore, to the twenty-fifth of December as the day on which Christ was born has in itself really no force. It is modern in origin, and was first urged only about a century ago by Dr. Lightfoot, and then under the influence of a theological bias. It was never thought of by the early Christian writers who lived near Palestine and were well acquainted with its climate. It would have doubtless occurred to them if it had had any good foundation in facts.

This, of course, does not establish the truth of the old Roman tradition; it simply leaves the question unsettled. We cannot, indeed, as it seems, prove that it was the identical day, nor, on the other hand, that it was not; and we are therefore simply left at liberty to regard the old tradition for what it is worth. It seems to be the oldest and the best accredited.

It is sometimes supposed that Christmas was an artificial arrangement, a kind of compromise entered into by the early church to get rid of certain heathen festivals which were celebrated at that season of the year in an uproarious and dissolute manner. Of this description were the Roman Saturnalia, when slaves enjoyed a brief respite from bondage, and society generally was very much demoralized. In order to correct these excesses, it is imagined that Christmas was instituted; so that heathen converts, who were accustomed from their youth upwards to such celebrations, might not be offended, but be better satisfied with Christianity, if they were allowed to have a feast of their own, freed from the gross sensuality of the heathen orgies. But the Saturnalia were celebrated at least a week prior to Christmas, and the whole temper of the early church showed no disposition to enter into any compromise with heathenism; on the contrary, it set itself in decided antagonism to everything of a

[1] See Lange's Commentary, in loco.

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heathenish character. It possessed within itself a principle and a life that abundantly qualified it to create for itself its own festivals.

So far as Christmas connected itself with the history of the times, its origin was Jewish, rather than pagan. It synchronized with the Jewish feast of the dedication — the feast that celebrated the purification of the Temple under Judas Maccabaeus, which had been celebrated by the Jews for centuries, and which is still observed by them on the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth of December. As many of the first Christians were of Jewish origin, and still continued in the practice of Jewish customs after they were converted to Christianity, it is easy to see how an originally Jewish feast should in the course of time change its character, and be transformed into one that was purely Christian. So it was with the passover and the feast of pentecost. The great German philologian, Jacob Grimm, in this way accounts for the origin of the German name for Christmas, *Weihnachten*, which comes from the days of the early Goths, meaning *dedication night*, and contains a manifest reference to the original Jewish character of this festival. If our Saviour was born during this same night, it would be a remarkable coincidence, which could not be without a deep significance in the divine mind; if not, the origin and appropriateness of the day would still be accounted for.

The precise day in the year, however, on which Christ was born is a matter of comparatively small account. It is the great event itself which interests us most of all; for it is the pivot upon which all history revolves — the turning-point of its grand departure for a higher destination and a nobler consummation. It was an event of world-wide significance — the greatest which had occurred since the creation, rising also above that — one that was to be followed by a series of other grand events in history, until it results in the final victory of light over darkness in the restitution of all things. Touching the very life of history, it has sent out undulations over the whole surface of human society.

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Now it was eminently proper that an event like this, so wide reaching in its scope, should in some way be heralded forth to the world, and be announced in some truly dramatic manner, in keeping with its remote, as well as its more immediate bearings. Appropriately it had to be announced first to the Jews, in a manner that was in harmony with their character and history. As a nation they were not distinguished for their progress in the arts, sciences, or in philosophy. It was only at a later day that they manifested anything like a high order of talent for speculation or human learning. In these respects they were excelled by other nations around them. But, on the other hand, they were distinguished above all other nations of antiquity for their sense of religion, of the supernatural, and (during their later history, especially) for their tenacity in holding to the idea of one Supreme Being in its purity. This was, indeed, their vocation, their mission, their high distinction in history; for which, however, they had to be trained and educated by a long series of the most wonderful and extraordinary events. To a people so peculiarly constituted revelations could be made, from time to time, directly and miraculously from a higher sphere, and they could also be intrusted with them for safe-keeping for the world at large. They believed in such manifestations, and were prepared not only to embrace them, but also to admit their true source in God. They also had a correct sense by means of which they were enabled to distinguish the true from the spurious in any professedly supernatural event. This, however, was not always true of the Scribes and Pharisees, nor of the mass generally, but of their prophets and of those among them who still retained the primitive piety of their forefathers.

To the Jews, therefore, the proclamation of the birth of a Saviour was made in a supernatural way. The veil that separates the natural from the supernatural was withdrawn for a moment, and through the open skies a choir of angels, looking down, made the great announcement in that never-dying song, "Peace on earth, good-will to men," whose grand

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refrain has been returning back to heaven from human lips through all the ages since. As a general thing, the Jews had deteriorated very much from that lofty theocratic faith which had once distinguished them; they were for the most part mere formalists; but a pure and simple piety still lingered among the humbler classes of society. The shepherds at Bethlehem were of this description, and for them it was reserved to see the opening heavens and to hear the good news from angelic voices. Those in authority at Jerusalem were not in a condition to receive such a communication from the other world.

As, however, Christ was born for the whole family of man, it was necessary that the heathen world, on the outside of the church as then established, should also in some becoming way be apprized of this wonderful event; and this was accordingly accomplished by means of an extraordinary star, whose meaning was made known to the wise men of the East. The heathen world had renounced the knowledge of the true God, and, as a matter of course, the supernatural method of revelation was withheld from them, and restricted to the single nation of the Jews. But they were not left in total darkness, without any witness of God; they retained the light of nature and of reason, through which He continued to communicate with them. They were thrown in a measure upon their own resources; and it became their mission to cultivate science, to search the hidden depths of philosophy, and to give audience to the inward promptings of reason, of conscience, or of whatever faith or light they still retained. Comparatively considered, this was at best mere starlight; but it served an important purpose in enabling them to steer their frail bark over the dark and tempestuous seas, until the true light should shine down upon the darkness of earth, for which the light that was still in the heathen mind helped to prepare the way.

In keeping, therefore, with the constitution of heathen society, it would appear that the birth of Christ had to be announced not by a miracle, but by an occurrence in the

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order of nature; not by a direct revelation, but by science; not by messengers from the spiritual world, but by a brilliant star.

In the first place, the illustrious personages to whom the star made the revelation demand attention. They were the elect from among the greatest and the best that could be found in the Gentile world. The magi, as we are told, hailed from the Orient, the land of the East and of the rising sun. As this language embraces a wide scope of country, they may have come from Arabia, as some suppose; from Chaldea, from Persia, Media, or from the still more distant regions of India, as some have maintained. The evidence that we have seems to preponderate in favor of the Parthian empire, embracing ancient Media and Persia, as the proper home of the wise men. The term "magi" (or "magus," in the singular) is of Medo-Persian origin, and was first employed in Media to designate its priests, philosophers, or wise men as a class, just as "philosopher" was the term used in Greece and Rome, "rabbi" among the Jews, or "brahmin" among the Hindoos. It was, however, in the course of time, transplanted into other languages, with a corresponding degeneracy of meaning. Among the Greeks, and especially the Romans, it was synonymous with astrologer, enchanter, sorcerer, or imposter, and from it we have derived the words "magic" and "magician," which are suggestive of anything but honesty and truth. But we must not confound the more ancient and honorable order of the magi with their degenerate and dishonorable successors in the western world, who, under the cover of their fair fame, imposed on the credulity of men for the sake of lucre. As their title signifies, they were noble and influential; they were the priests, the theologians, and philosophers of their nation; and they were also, in the true sense of the word, the statesmen of their age; for they were consulted on all points connected with the welfare of the nation, and in this way exerted a wide political influence. They were, accordingly, the highest authority in matters of religion; they embodied the wisdom and knowledge of their times; and they were especially distinguished for

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their knowledge of medicine and astronomy. If they were addicted to divination, astrology, or other superstitions, as the learned were very generally in their days, it is not difficult for us to suppose that some of them, at least, should rise above these errors, and gain some glimpses of divine truth itself. This, as we take it, was the good fortune of the wise men of the East, who, like Melchisedec, Job and his companions, Socrates, Plato, and others, were in the kingdom of heaven, or not far from it, although on the outside of the visible church. This will become the more apparent, if we consider for a moment the comparatively pure form of religion in which they were trained and grew up.

The old Zend religion, as reformed by Zoroaster, still held its sway over the region of country from which they came. In the history of the world it recognized two principles, or creators, in opposition to the Monism of India, the principle of light and of darkness, of good and of evil, which are in continual conflict, each seeking for the victory over the world, giving rise to wars and the most fearful commotions in history. In the end the principle of light will gain the triumph over the principle of darkness, when there will be a general resurrection, a judgment day, and a final separation between the kingdoms of truth and error; the righteous shall dwell forever in a region of unadulterated light, whilst the wicked shall be confined forever in a region of perpetual darkness. Before this final victory, however, the principle of darkness will at times seem to carry everything before it, and threaten the overthrow of the kingdom of light; but in order to prevent such a catastrophe, Ormazd, the good principle, or being, will send a prophet, a deliverer, a Saviour called Sosiosh, who will turn the tide of victory, heal the world of its disorders, and reign a thousand years. This Sosiosh or Saviour, further, according to the Zendavesta, the sacred book of the Persians, was to be born of a virgin, out of the water of a running brook, in a supernatural way. The followers of this system were not idolaters in the ordinary sense of the term. They rejected idols, and worshipped

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light, especially the light of the sun, as the symbol of their good Ormazd, in opposition to the wicked Ahriman, their Satan. These are some of the leading points of Parsism, the religion of the old Persians, as gathered from their sacred writings by the diligence of modern scholars. With much that is fanciful and purely speculative, it embodies some of the main doctrines of the Bible, and, as a system of heathen religion, approaches probably nearer to that of divine revelation than any other. It was no doubt a part of the primitive revelation obscured by its passage through earthen vessels.[1]

Trained in this sublime system of doctrines, it is easy to understand how the Persian magi could be brought to a knowledge of the true Messiah by their own study and reflection under the guidance of the Divine Spirit, aided as they doubtless were by some knowledge of Judaism, which at this time had spread over all the regions of the East. They were impelled to this very much by the circumstances in which they lived. The times were out of joint; confusion prevailed among the nations; the world lay prostrate and helpless under the iron hoof of the Roman colossus; and the time for the appearance of the Deliverer or Mediator must have seemed to them to be urgent. Pondering over the deep question of human destiny, and diligently watching the signs of the times, as they were required to do by their profession as well as by their inclination, they observe at length an extraordinary appearance in the heavens. Guided by light from without and from within, from above and from below, after long and wearisome watchings and searchings, they at length discover the true meaning of the star, and set out on their journey to see the new-born King of the Jews.

Tradition has it that there were three of them, Melchior, Caspar, and Baltasar; that one brought gold, another frankincense, and the third myrrh; and that these three were kings. The foundation of such a myth was probably nothing more than the illustrious birth and high rank of these magi.

[1] See Art. "Parsism," in Herzog's Real-Encyclopaedie.

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Quite likely there were more than three, who, with a retinue of servants, formed an imposing caravan, which may help to account for the profound sensation which they produced after they had entered the capital of the Jewish nation.

The sign in the heavens which had guided them on their long journey westward was, we are told, a star. Some have supposed it was a meteor, not higher up in the region of the air than the clouds; that it went before the magi, and moved with them all the way from the East to Jerusalem, and then became stationary when it arrived at the place where the young child lay. But meteors are now better understood than they were formerly. They are not formed out of exhalations in the air, as used to be supposed, but come down to us from the distant regions of space. They are, in fact, of the nature of planetary bodies, revolving around the sun in regular orbits, just as the planets themselves do; but some of them passing near the earth are drawn out of their course and either fall upon the earth, or dipping into its atmosphere and setting themselves on fire by friction, pass out beyond the earth's attraction on their long circuits through space. They never stand still, although sometimes they seem to do so, and are all characterized by the great rapidity of their motions, which of itself is sufficient to show that the star which the wise men saw every evening for many months could not have been one of our ordinary meteors.

Others have supposed that it was of the character of a meteor, created at the time expressly for the purpose of directing the magi, just as the pillar of cloud or the pillar of fire guided the Israelites through the wilderness, halting or advancing just as circumstances required. And still others have supposed that it was the cloudy pillar, or the Shekinah itself, which had once more returned to the earth to direct the wandering fortunes of the church. But such suppositions do not seem to have any solid foundation in the historical narrative, which speaks of the sign in the skies as one of the regular stars, and not as a body created for the purpose, or anything unlike a star. It does not imply or seek to impress

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upon the mind of the reader that there was anything miraculous in its character. Miracles are usually spoken of in Scripture as miracles; they were necessary in certain important junctures in history; but it is not wise, as in this case, to multiply them where there is no necessity. Commiserating those empty, negative critics, who spend their time in vain in attempting to explain the sublime miracles of the Bible by natural causes, we believe that the resources of modern astronomy are amply sufficient to afford a satisfactory explanation of the mysterious star without recourse to a miracle. A rational and intelligent curiosity could ask for nothing more.

Origen, and others of the church fathers, without any critical examination, supposed that it was a comet that heralded the birth of Christ. But this could not have been the case, because at that period of history, as well as subsequently, comets were universally regarded with feelings of fear and dread, as harbingers of evil. Somehow or other, perhaps from their fiery appearance, they have always been looked upon as portending evil to the world, such as civil commotions and bloodshed; and it is certainly a remarkable fact that in a number of cases, which we have on record, they seemed to justify this interpretation of their sudden appearance in the skies. One appeared at the time Julius Cæsar was assassinated, seeming to portend the civil wars that followed; and another is recorded by Josephus as appearing in the sky for a month over Jerusalem when it was beseiged by the Romans. Many others have appeared during important crises in history. It is not likely, therefore, that the Eastern sages could have been led by a comet to set out on their journey to find their Sosiosh, their Saviour, or Prince of Peace. There was doubtless something extraordinary in the appearance of the star. St. Ignatius in the second century describes it as being very bright.[1]

No critical attempt was made to determine its precise character until the beginning of the seventeenth century.

[1] Epis. ad Ephes.

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In the year 1604 there was a curious conjunction of the three planets, Jupiter, Saturn, Mars, which seemed to come from different parts of the heavens, and approach very near each other. At the same time, an entirely new star made its appearance in the right foot of the constellation Serpentarius, not far off, which shone with a splendor exceeding that of the planet Venus, for months, and then disappeared entirely from view. The great astronomer, Kepler, was an attentive observer of these strange phenomena, and wrote an elaborate work on the appearance of the new star. To his serious and thoughtful mind it occurred that such a conjunction of the planets might have been the star of the wise men; and he accordingly went to work and ascertained by a laborious calculation that there actually had been such a conjunction of the leading planets about the time of our Saviour's birth. He discovered, to his great surprise, that there had been no less than three conjunctions of the planets Jupiter and Saturn during the same year, and that in the spring following there was another conjunction of the three planets, Jupiter, Saturn, and Mars. With no very accurate knowledge of chronology he supposed that the conjunction of the three planets in the spring constituted the star that led the wise men from Jerusalem to Bethlehem.

Before we proceed to consider this hypothesis in detail, it is proper that we should explain for the benefit of the general reader the nature of these planetary conjuntions or constellations. We premise by stating that the planets are confined to a narrow belt or zone of the heavens, eight degrees on each side of the ecliptic, or the annual path of the sun through the skies. This is the far-famed zodiac. With the exception of a few of the smaller ones, they do not deviate to any considerable extent on either side from the solar track. Like the sun itself they generally travel eastward among the stars. As they move with different velocities, because they are at different distances from the centre of motion, it is easy to conceive how one of them should overtake another, pass close by it, or even go right over it. This

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would be called a conjunction. As two of them may thus come together and, as it were, greet each other in the skies, and then travel onwards with varying speed in their respective orbits and separate, so three, four, or more may seem to converge, so as to get very near each other, or even to stand one above the other, so as to appear for a short time as one star. The Jewish rabbis have a tradition that at the birth of Abraham a certain star stood in the east in the morning which devoured four other stars. This refers unquestionably to a conjunction of the five planets, Jupiter, Saturn, Mars, Venus, and Mercury, in which all five came together, and, to an observer on the earth, appeared one above the other in the same straight line. As Mercury is comparatively near the sun, such a complete conjunction could occur only in the west, and early in the evening, or in the east at early dawn, according to the tradition. Whether such a conjunction as this took place at the birth of Abraham may be questioned, because it was an opinion among the Jews that planetary conjunctions appeared at the birth of Moses and other great men; yet the tradition is an interesting one as showing that such phenomena of planets coming together, and seeming to devour each other, must have been witnessed within the memory of man. Otherwise they could have hardly been thought of. Those most observant people, the Chinese, have, it is said, a record of a conjunction of no less than five of the planets.[1]

But let us now see how three conjunctions of two planets can take place in the same year. As already said, the planets, as a general thing, move from west to east along the signs of the zodiac in a direct motion. If they were viewed from the sun they would continue to pursue without interruption the same direct course; but as they are seen from the earth, which is itself in motion, moving during one

[1] The reader may call to mind the conjunction of Mars and Saturn in the eastern part of the skies, and a similar conjunction of Jupiter and Venus in the west, in the early part of November last. The two former made a very near approach to each other, whilst the two latter, more conspicuous, were further apart. When the sky was clear, these phenomena were objects singularly beautiful to behold, and well calculated to induce serious thought and reflection.

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half of the year in one direction through space, and during the other half in the opposite direction, they appear at times to stop in their course, then retrograde for a while, and afterwards, turning around again, pursue their forward course. This will serve to explain the three conjunctions that took place during the same year about the commencement of the Christian era. The dates are given as corrected by Encke, the great mathematician and astronomer. The first occurred in the year 747 or 748 of the building of Rome, on the 24th of May; that is, at that time Jupiter, the inner planet, overtook Saturn moving more tardily along its outer orbit, and formed a conjunction; some time afterwards Jupiter commenced to retrograde, went back and met Saturn which had lagged behind, on the 27th of October. Then for a while Saturn was in advance, but Jupiter having described his arc of retrogradation, once more turned around and with his superior velocity passed Saturn a third time at a distance apparently no greater than that of a hand's breadth, on the 16th of November. The next conjunction in the year following, when Mars was added to the constellation, is to be accounted for in the same manner.

Kepler thought that these conjunctions, or at least one of the planets concerned, constituted the star of the east, in which he is followed by Ideler and some of the most distinguished theologians at the present day. The view is somewhat captivating, and hence, perhaps, imaginative theologians are so ready to adopt it. Dean Alford, in his commentary on the New Testament, seems to be carried away with it, without appearing to be annoyed by any of the difficulties in which it is involved. But the objections that can be urged against it are numerous, and, as we think, well grounded. A conjunction of stars is a constellation, not a star; and to suppose that the word star is to be understood in some "wider astrological meaning" is altogether gratuitous. The early church fathers did not so understand it. Following the tradition, that was not yet old, they spoke of it as a star, or a single body, and those who followed them

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so understood it down to the time of Kepler. The Scripture says that the "star went before them, till it came and stood over where the young child was." This means that it was vertical, that is, it must have appeared in the zenith. But neither Mars, Jupiter, or Saturn, as astronomy will teach us, could ever have been in the zenith of Bethlehem. None of them wander far from the ecliptic, not more than a few degrees, Saturn about two degrees and a half, Mars less, and Jupiter still less, only about a degree and a third. Now as the ecliptic is always south of Jerusalem, these planets can never approach nearer the vertical point of Bethlehem than from six to eight degrees, and this can occur very seldom. For the most part they are much further south, just as they always are in our latitude. In order that they might be in the zenith, Bethlehem ought to have been situated under the tropic of Cancer, somewhere in the heart of southern Arabia, some five or six hundred miles south of Arabia.

The chronological objection is also serious, and in our present state of knowledge insurmountable. The conjunctions made their appearance in the year of Rome 747 or 748. That is certain, because their discovery is the result of mathematical calculation; but the conclusions of chronology, which are also reliable, point to the year 749 or 750, as the year in which Christ was born. Those who regard the constellations as constituting the star of the wise men, of course do not feel the force of this difficulty. They settle the question of chronology by the star or conjunctions, and are obliged to maintain that Christ was born six years before the Christian era, and not four. But this does violence to history, and sets aside the results of faithful and learned investigations in the science of chronology. It cannot, therefore, be maintained on this ground, apart from the other improbabilities to which we have directed attention. Besides, it is evidently a far-fetched exposition of what is after all a very simple narrative in Scripture. We must therefore cast around, and ascertain whether astronomy has any other resources which will be of avail in determining the question before us. If the conjunc-

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tions, we may say, were not the star of the magi, they were, no doubt, closely connected with it; as we shall presently see, they were no doubt a link in the history or the *res gestae*, and performed an important part in inducing the wise men to undertake their journey to the West. They were not referred to directly by the sacred writer, who studied brevity, but seem to be implied in the fact that Herod slew all the young children that had been born at Bethlehem from the very time that they had made their appearance, "from two years and under, according to the time which he had diligently inquired of the wise men" (Matt. ii. 16).

As already remarked, a new star made its appearance in connection with the conjunction of 1604 in the constellation of Serpentarius, which shone with superior splendor for many months and then disappeared altogether. This throws light, as we think, upon the subject in hand, and relieves it materially of its difficulties. It seems to be just what is needed to complete the picture. New stars, such as had not been previously visible, though not numerous, are known to make their appearance in the skies from time to time. The annals of China report a goodly number of them. One of the most remarkable occurred in the year 1572, in the constellation of Cassiopeia, and was observed by Tycho Brahe, the astronomer, for many months. His attention was directed to it by a crowd of people in the open air who had been brought together to gaze at it on account of its remarkable brilliancy. It was brighter than any of the planets, cast a shadow, and was visible during daylight. It then gradually grew dimmer, and vanished altogether from sight at the end of sixteen months. Tycho wrote a full account of the changes of this star; and it is said that it induced him to make astronomy his future vocation. The French reformer, Theodore Beza, maintained that it was the Star of Bethlehem, which had returned to our skies in order to announce to men a new era in the spread of Christianity.[1]

[1] It is possible that it was the star of the wise men. It has been supposed by some, with some show of plausibility, that the new stars which appeared in the

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In regard to the cause of the remarkable brilliancy of these stars and then of their apparent extinction, astronomers are not agreed. As a general thing the fixed stars, to which they evidently belong, shine with an equable degree of splendor from age to age. But some of them are known to be subject to changes in this respect, whilst others disappear from view and are lost altogether. The former are called variable stars, and have their periods of maximum and minimum brightness, that are well known, varying from a few days to many years. What are called new stars probably belong to this class of bodies, and differ from them only in the fact that their periods are very long, and their diminution of light so great as to render them invisible to us for a longer period of time. It is said that there is such a star which flashes forth in great brilliancy only once in eight hundred years.

It has been supposed by some that the unusual brilliancy of such stars is owing to the fact that they are worlds on fire, or, in other words, that they are worlds undergoing their final conflagration. Religious writers have been naturally inclined to take this view, as it seems to favor the scriptural account of the destruction of all things in the fire of the last day; but it was held by La Place, who was never suspected of being under the influence of any religious bias. Others suppose that these stars move in very eccentric orbits, alternately approaching the earth, and then receding from it at regular intervals, thus varying in their brilliancy according to their distances from the observer. A very plausible supposition is, that

years 945, 1264, and 1572 were identical, with intervals of about 319 years between their successive appearances. As it is believed that such new stars are periodic, the supposition is not absurd, and it follows that some of us will live to see it appear again some time between the year 1890 and the end of the present century. It should be remarked, however, that others have claimed that Kepler's new star of the year 1604 was the star of Bethlehem returned, because it appeared about the time of the planetary conjunctions, of which we have already spoken as occuring about the same time as the wonderful star. No student well trained in astronomical science would risk his reputation by being positive or dogmatical in a matter of this kind. The data for a positive decision are lacking, and the principle of the sufficient reason is thus far wanting.

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the variation of their light is owing to some cause in their physical constitutions, by virtue of which the combustion going forward on their surfaces is counteracted by some unknown cause for a while, and that this being at length overcome, they shine forth again with unwonted splendor. This would be something similar to what we witness sometimes in our terrestrial volcanoes, which slumber for a time, and then all of a sudden become intensely active. It is now a well established fact that our sun is nearly, if not quite, one of these variable stars. There are times when its surface is covered with dark spots, and its light is diminished; this is followed by a period when it is comparatively free of spots, and its light is intensified. This occupies a period of from ten to twelve years. A recent writer thinks that their periodic character is most satisfactorily accounted for by supposing that during the period when they shine brightest they are passing through a meteoric ring, and are thus supplied with an increase of fuel from falling meteors, which increases their splendor. This last theory may turn out to be not the least plausible, but the whole subject is still involved in much mystery, which speculative astronomers are endeavoring with much zeal to dissipate.

Returning from this digression, we will now gather up the facts in the case on hand, and endeavor to connect them together in one and the same historical picture.

It may be taken for granted that the magi, those famous star-gazers of the East, most diligently observed the three conjunctions of Jupiter and Saturn in the same year, and the conjunction of the three planets during the following spring. We may also well imagine that they cast in their minds to know what these things meant. It was a problem which it was difficult for them to solve — one, too, that required time and patience for its solution. Throughout the Orient it was a general impression that a conjunction of planets indicated the birth of some illustrious personage. As already said, the Jewish rabbis had a tradition that planetary conjunctions announced the birth of Abraham and

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Moses; and it was a belief among them that one of these conjunctions was to precede the birth of their expected Messiah. It was not difficult, therefore, as we conceive, for the magi to interpret in a general way the meaning of the conjunctions. To them it was a fixed fact that some illustrious person was to be born and to appear in the arena of history; but who he was or where he was to be found were questions which they were not prepared to answer. This required time and patient study. It is natural to suppose that they searched their sacred writings with new interest and relish, that they read everything which they could find about their Sosiosh, and that they extended their inquiries into the literature and traditions of other nations. There was a widespread opinion throughout the East that an illustrious individual was to go forth from Judea and attain to universal empire. This must have been general, and spoken of among all classes of society, or else such historians as Tacitus and Suetonius would not have deigned to notice it in their histories. Of course the magi had heard of it, and it contributed materially to the solution of the great question which had come to occupy their profoundest attention. Further, such earnest seekers after the truth in the darkness of heathen lands could not be left without the light and guidance of the Spirit of God, who in all nations sheds light upon the minds of those who love the truth. At length the light breaks in upon their thoughts; a brilliant star is seen from their watch-towers, rising in the evening above the eastern horizon; their minds are made up; local prejudices are thrown to the wind; each one takes up his pilgrim staff; and together they travel to the far West to worship the new-born King of the Jews. Travelling slowly over the burning plains of Persia, Mesopotamia, and Arabia, cheered each night by the bright star shining down upon them approvingly, like the eye of the good Ormazd, the source of all light, they arrive at last at their objective point, the capital of Judea.[1] Here king

[1] It is sometimes supposed that the star had become invisible during the journey, and then suddenly reappeared after the magi left the gates of Jerusalem on

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Herod diligently inquires about the star and all the circumstances attending its appearance. They describe to him the appearance of the heavens for years past; they tell him of the conjunctions of the planets in the constellation of the Fish (a constellation sacred to the Jews), and of the wonderful star now blazing in the sky. That artful and crafty tyrant is himself convinced by the recital of such striking occurrences in the heavens; he believes that the old promise is about to go into fulfilment; but, bold and heaven-defiant, he takes counsel from his fears, and artfully lays his plans for the destruction of the young child. He takes in the whole field of view, knows nothing of the quite recent birth, but is certain that it had occurred some time during the two previous years. Such was his horoscope of the skies; and hence, when he was defeated in his malevolent designs by the warning of an angel, he slew all the children at Bethlehem under two years of age, lest by too narrow an interpretation of the sign in the heavens, he might fail to destroy the object of his fear and hatred.[1]

their way to Bethlehem. But there is nothing in the narrative that will justify such a supposition. It can be maintained only on the theory that the star was a subjective phenomenon, or that it was a luminary specially formed for the occasion.

[1] Ideler in his "Handbuch der Chronologie," Vol. ii., agrees with Kepler that the conjunctions of the planets constituted the star of the wise men, and seeks by means of it to fix the date of our Saviour's birth as having occurred six, instead of four, years before the common era. He does not suppose it likely that any new star made its appearance at the time of the conjunctions, although that was actually the case in Kepler's star of 1604. Ebrard differs from him in this latter point, and maintains that a star did appear, but thinks that it appeared at the time of the conjunctions. He does not see how there could have been two years between the conjunctions and the appearance of the star. The difficulty is not serious; as explained in the text, the magi needed time for reflection. At least, it is not so great as the chronological objection, which, according to the learned researches of Wiesler and others, fix the date of the Saviour's birth about four, and not six, years earlier than the common date. Olshausen thought at first that the language of the Scripture meant a star, and not a star-group; but after reading Ideler he became doubtful (*schwankend*) and regarded the Keplerian view as highly probable. None of these writers seem to make any account of two years preceding the coming of the magi to Jerusalem, over which Herod's mind wandered, and in regard to which he no doubt diligently inquired of the wise men concerning signs and portents in the skies.

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The magi start out in the evening on their way to Bethlehem, and, according to the custom of the East, travel by night. The star which they had seen at home in the east — that is, as commentators say, in the eastern part of the sky — at its rising, had by this time (three or four months after it was seen rising in the evening) nearly reached its culmination in the zenith; and as they travel southward towards Bethlehem they see it before them, and a few hours still to the east of them. Verging near the zenith, it was an additional proof to them that they were nearing the place of their destination, and it is said that "they rejoiced with exceeding great joy." It seems to move with them, and, advancing westward gradually with the other stars, it would reach the point immediately above them by the time their short journey came to an end, and to stand still with them over the place where the young child lay.

The appearance of an entirely new star in the heavens in connection with the preceding planetary phenomena we conceive to be by far the most satisfactory explanation of the star of the wise men. It is simple, and free from the difficulties with which the Keplerian theory of the conjunctions must continue to be invested. It is confirmed, we may add, by the records of the Chinese, which testify that a wonderful star was seen in the sky during the year in which Christ was born. It was, no doubt, the same that guided the wise men. There was an appropriateness in the sudden coming of such a visitant, preceded by extraordinary celestial phenomena in advance, with which no one can fail to be struck. Three conjunctions in the same year, forming a trinity, — a sacred number, — and a triple conjunction in the year following, forming another trinity, would be calculated to create wonder and to excite solemn reflection, even in our sceptical age. How much more must this have been the case when it was more fully believed than at present that there was a vital bond of connection between the natural and spiritual worlds. A new star, following in the wake of these conjunctions, would be still more expressive of some

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great event taking place in the spiritual world. As already said, it had been apparently slumbering for ages; but whilst it thus seemed to be going out in darkness, it was, so to speak, only drawing in its energies and husbanding its resources until the time should come when its service should be called for by its Creator. Then its hidden energies revealed themselves, and it shone forth most brilliantly upon the world,—brighter, probably, than Sirius,—brighter than the planet Venus, or any other star,—so as to impress the minds of the magi with an idea of the greatness of that King that had been just born into the world.[1]

This is what we conceive to be the most satisfactory explanation of the star which guided the wise men. It was a natural star, but a truly wonderful one. It shows the prescience and wisdom of the Creator, who from all eternity holding the idea of our universe in his mind as one thought, so ordered it that when the greatest of all events took place in the history of man, the outward physical universe should be called into requisition to testify to its greatness and glory.

Part Second.

What has been said above constitutes what may be called the natural history of the star—the wonderful phenomenon viewed only from its natural side. This we regard as useful and proper in its place; for where the natural and supernatural come together and blend into one, as they do in the star of the wise men, a clear conception of the earthly may help us materially in embracing and apprehending the heavenly. The external or physical surroundings are, of

[1] The substance of this Article was embodied in a public lecture, which the writer delivered some five years ago on Christmas Eve, at Lancaster, Pa. Subsequently, he met with the interesting volume, entitled "The Wise Men of the East," by Francis W. Upham, LL.D., published in 1873. In regard to the star, and other points of interest, it is in harmony, we were glad to see, with the views advanced in the lecture. We freely commend Dr. Upham's book, written from a Christian standpoint, and embodying valuable erudition. It is a good book, one that can be read with profit during the Christmas festival, and subsequently.

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course, not the main thing; but, constituted as we are, we cannot dispense with any such helps of faith, which God himself has given us, even though they are external and subordinate. Besides, sceptics sometimes ask, contemptuously, the question, how a star could have led learned men, philosophers, to a distant land to bow in adoration at the feet of an infant child. A candid examination of all the facts in the case, with the help of science, may do much, as we think, in breaking the force of their negative criticism, and in showing that what some may be pleased to regard as an idle tale, a puerility engendered during a credulous age, or a mere subjective fancy, after all presents to our view one of the most beautiful and sublime pictures in the gallery of history.

There has, however, always been a feeling, a belief, or persuasion in the Christian church that the star of the east has a mystical, symbolical, or prophetic sense; that is, that it was not only intended to announce the fact that Christ was born, and mechanically to guide the wise men to his place of abode, but that it had a wider and more comprehensive meaning. That comes out continually in our Christian literature, in thoughtful commentaries, in books of devotion, and in our hymns. To the great mass of devout believers it is still the star of the east — a perennial fact — a guide to all to the manger and the stall for homage and worship. We believe this to be eminently scriptural, and that the case in hand is only one instance of the sublime symbolism of divine revelation — one of the ensamples or types intended for us, upon whom the ends of the world have come, no less than it was for the Eastern sages. There is, of course, danger here, as well as elsewhere, of running into puerilities and one-sided excesses in the interpretation of the Scripture. Hence in interpreting the sublime scenery of the natural heavens as they appeared when the Lord of glory was born, we shall endeavor to be discreet, chaste, and reverential, as the word of God always demands of us when we seek to grasp its contents.

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In the first place, the star is the representative of Christ himself, the eternal Logos, in the sphere of history. It announced his advent in our world. It was the first appearance of the star of Christianity and the gospel in our spiritual heavens. Naturally speaking, we have seen that it was new — one that had not been visible in the sky for a long time. For what we know, it may have shone down serenely upon primeval creation, and, with other stars, leaped for joy over a new-born world, and then faded away into darkness over the melancholy spectacle of man's ruin. We do not know certainly its history. But now it comes forth joyously from the dark depths of space, and shines again with its undimmed splendor. That is the nature of such stars. So the Logos, who was the morning star of the first creation, but who had withdrawn, as it were, and concealed himself from view in the depths of eternity when man fell, now comes forth as the true Light of the world. He appears in the very midst of the darkness of nature, in the depths of that moral night which had for ages brooded over the world. Here he shines with a serenity, a beauty, a splendor and glory compared with which all human lights or stars grow feeble and fade away. His advent on earth constitutes the gospel — the good news of salvation and eternal life. Next to the angelic hosts at Bethlehem, the star in the east was, therefore, the first preacher of the gospel, the first herald of salvation to the world. It was very meet and proper that this should be so. When the highest heavens through angels announced the glad tidings that God had come into the world, it was in perfect keeping with the sacred drama then enacted that the physical heavens should respond, catch up the song, and repeat the wondrous story.

Again, the star announced the advent of Christ in our flesh, the particular form under which he appears in history or the world of man — a region above the mere world of nature. It was, therefore, also the star of the incarnation. Man in himself constitutes a world of his own, better entitled to that name than the evanescent order of nature below him.

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It is a universe of activities, which required greater wisdom and a finer skill in God to create and build up, and then when ruined to reconstruct, than were needed when he formed the earth and the heavens. It was also into this world of humanity the Son of God entered when he was born at Bethlehem. He could not be fully and sensibly in this kind of a a world except by his birth of a virgin. It was only in this way, by veiling his divinity under a human form,— by his incarnation, — that he could become part and parcel of humanity. It brought him into vital relation to it, and constituted him a living factor in its onward historical progress. But being in our flesh, tabernacling in our human nature as a region of life, and dwelling among us, Christ, as the Logos or eternal Son of God, could not become nor remain a mere co-ordinate member or branch of the human family. In the nature of the case, he must become its reigning head ; he was the fittest. It was something that was longed for — the desire of the nations. The world needed a head ; but it could not find one ; and this was the cause of the general confusion. It sought in empty and ineffectual struggles for such a headship ; but it was all in vain. The only result was that many heads were set up to rule the world ; but these, being without authority and without capacity for the power and the glory, only aggravated the misery of the situation. The world thus presented an abnormal or monstrous development ; it became hydra-headed ; and the confusion grew worse from day to day. As the heads were destroyed, one after another, others grew up in their place, as in the myth. The appearance, however, of the Son of God in history not as a mere virtue, but as a person, as a divine incarnation, gave him the pre-eminence in all things. He could not, in the nature of the case, be in our flesh or nature without becoming its ruling power, its head and centre. Joined with him in idea from all eternity, this humanity must gravitate toward him now when he appears in the midst of its disorderly elements and its scattered fragments. In his presence human sacrifices, the vain efforts of men to save themselves, ceased, and the

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heathen oracles became dumb. The star in the east led the way to the King of the Jews and of the King of men.

Further, the star not only announced the fact that Christ had come, but proclaimed it to the entire heathen world in its best representatives. It performed an actual part in the realization of salvation in the homage and worship of these good men. It was the star of the epiphany, or manifestation to the world at large of all that was involved in the advent and incarnation of Christ. As already said, he could not be in the world really without revealing himself and challenging the attention of men generally. As the true light of the world, all lands and nations must see it. The darkness could not obstruct such a light, falling upon it from the skies above. As well might the night strive to keep back the light of the rising sun. The actual manifestation, however, was gradual in its progress, and must extend over ages before it becomes complete. The first epiphany — the child Jesus lying in a manger — was to human eyes a feeble light, shining in a dark place. It was appropriately symbolized by the star in the far-off east, just rising above the horizon to the wise men, twinkling and struggling for expression amidst the surrounding mists of the night. And yet even in its first feeble beginnings it was seen and recognized by a few of the wisest and the best of earth. Subsequently the light became brighter. In the miracle at Cana Christ, it is said, began to show forth his glory in a public way. The multitudes glorified God, who had given to man such power to perform such miracles. His whole life indeed, his death, his resurrection and ascension to heaven, were simply a manifestation of his glory for the purpose of redeeming the world. It was the prayer of his life, which he was wont to offer up with much fervor, that the Father might manifest in him the glory which he had with the Father before the world began. It was on this principle that his divine-human life here on earth was unfolded; and now that he is gone up on high it is not otherwise. Having become invisible to mortal eye amidst the effulgence of light which he introduced into the world, he is

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still its true light; and through his church, the means of grace, his word, the sacraments, and the ministry, he is still manifesting himself to the world in ever-widening circles of light and glory. As the epiphany expands in outward extent and in inward depth, it touches on his second coming in glory.

From this the vital character of all true Christianity will appear. It is essentially diffusive, aggressive, and world-wide in its operations. It cannot become local, or even exclusively national. Its field is the world, and its era all the ages that are still to come. It lives and flourishes in the world only as it is *missionary* in its character in the true sense of the word. Its objective point, which becomes clearer and clearer with each new conquest, is the evangelization of all nations. Divest it of this its aim, and its life is gone; its inmost spirit is grieved or quenched. It is no longer an epiphany, but darkness and confusion. The light that is in it is darkness. It has lost one of the first characteristics impressed upon it by the call which it addressed to the Eastern sages to come and see and accept the gift of heaven. Individuals, as well as churches, are smitten as it were with the malaria when they resist this opportunity to exercise themselves in the faith and hope of Christianity. So we are taught in a most graphic manner by the mystery of the star. It was the first to make known the gospel to the Gentile world at large. It passed over and destroyed that middle wall of partition which separated Jew and Gentile, and initiated that communion of saints in which there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek, the high and the low, the rich and the poor. It was, therefore, the first missionary of the cross to heathen nations. It is still to us the star of the world's evangelization.

In the next place, the star in the east was the symbol of the world's conversion, the prophecy of Christ's final victory over all the powers of darkness. So it doubtless appeared to the magi. They hailed the star with great joy, because in their minds it proclaimed the victory of light over dark-

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ness. It announced a great deal more, which in their condition they were not as yet prepared to comprehend. The manifestation of Christ in history is no empty exhibition; it cannot be anything transient; it must become really historical, and be attended with results in human society corresponding to its divine nature. As already said, the mere existence or advent of Christ among men must arrest general attention. But how much more must this be the case when he begins to manifest himself in his proper glory — in the glory which he had with the Father from all eternity — among men, on the arena of history, amidst the darkness and confusion of earth. He comes to men as a prophet, it is true, revealing to them the will of God; but he is unspeakably more than a mere organ of another; Yea, I say unto you, and more than a prophet. He is the revelation of the great God himself in human flesh, the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of his person. As such Christ reveals to men just what they most need, just what they have been looking for and longing for, without knowing it and without being able to find it. In him are revealed infinite and imperishable riches, treasures of wisdom and knowledge, fountains of love and affection; in a word, a boundless supply of resources by which man as a whole or men as individuals may wage a successful war against the powers of darkness. Such an outward, historical epiphany of the glory of God in the person of his Son cannot remain only outward and objective. It must penetrate man, and become something subjective. A manifestation of divine power and glory like this, under the active presence of the Spirit of God, must become overwhelming wherever men are in any way open to these divine powers, and continually tend to bring them into subjection to what is so evidently heavenly and divine. There will be a response from the hearts of men somewhere, and a cheerful submission to the new authority established among them. This is taught practically, as well as prophetically, in the mystic scene in which the star of the east was a mute actor. It not only

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affirmed the fact that Christ was born; but it actually brought the wise men, externally as well as internally, to bow in humble adoration at his feet. This was an actual fact — the conversion of these sages to the faith of Christ. So much Christ as an infant in the manger already accomplished. It was the beginning of all subsequent conversions in the Gentile world down to the present time, and at the same time a pledge, a sure prophecy of the future victories over the powers of darkness in this world.

But, lastly, the new star of victory and conquest, that rose up to view during the first Christmas season, was also the star of reconciliation and peace among men. The conquests which it foretold were not to be outward and enforced by an overwhelming power which it would be futile to attempt to resist, but inward, and cheerfully acquiesced in. The subjugation of man's refractory will was to be followed by his reconciliation with God and himself. After the conquest there was to follow the restoration or the thorough reorganization of human society on the basis of love and good will. The work just inaugurated at Bethlehem and announced to the world by the mystic star was one. The end already revealed itself in the beginning. The latter was the eloquent prophecy of the former. So it appeared in the revelations of the angels to the shepherds. The annunciation that a Saviour was born was made in close connection with the ultimate glory that would accrue to God on the one side, and final peace on earth and good will to men on the other side. The whole history of Immanuel, or God dwelling among men, becomes transparent in the song of the angels, in which the final consummation appears already as a reality. The gloria in excelsis is followed by the good news of peace on earth and good will from heaven towards men. So, no doubt, the mystery of the star revealed itself to the faith of the magi. They were earnest-minded men, who were concerned about the state of the world and longed for its redemption. When others of their class gave up the problem of human destiny in despair, and denied the existence of God or a hereafter, these men

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hoped and longed for deliverance. Human society around them seemed to be tending rapidly towards its final dissolution. There was an external peace in the world; but the nations groaned without hope under the burdens of tyranny and oppression. Men said there was peace; but there was in fact no peace, no real unity, no harmony anywhere. No person could see better than the magi the internal strifes, conflicts, and antagonisms among men. When, therefore, it was revealed to them through the star, that a new prince was born in Judea, they understood its significance at once. Redemption was at hand, the victory of the good over the evil was announced, and the era of peace and harmony was to commence. The sign in the heavens which fixed their eye by night and engaged their attention by day was, with its mute surroundings, a most expressive symbol of the reign of peace. It was not a flashing comet, not an angry storm or tempest, not a display of meteors, or falling stars, not an earthquake, nor the floods of the great deep lifting up their voices, but a star, noiselessly appearing in the starry heavens in the silence and darkness of night. Shining down serenely from above upon this dark earth of ours, how expressive of peace and love! It was, as it were, a messenger that had come from some distant sphere, in which strife had never entered, in order to proclaim a truce to the strife and conflicts forever repeating themselves in this world of ours. It was the angel of peace and reconciliation.

When we speak of peace, the attention is naturally directed to the periods of war that have cursed our world, or to private feuds ever springing up between man and man; and we long for the time when these shall cease. Then the white-winged angels of peace shall come and reign. But the peace on earth, heralded forth by the celestial choir over the hills of Bethlehem when Christ was born, includes much more than the absence of strife among men. It implies the removal of the internal causes which produce the angry conflict or the bitter antagonism. It means the restoration of man with all his talents and faculties to right relationship with himself

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and his Maker. Less than this admits room for jars and discords, and interrupts the general harmony which is the essence of peace.

True peace regards man as a unity, a totality, a kingdom, a constitution, or, as we should say, an organized world, in which there is one general life, that unfolds itself in diversity of operations, in diversity of organs or activities, all of which stand related to each other as parts of the same process. As such, it involves also many integral parts, subordinate worlds or spheres, such as the state, the arts, the sciences, philosophy, religion, and culture in all its ramifications. The reconciliation of the world, or peace on earth, accordingly, of necessity, must involve the proper relation of these different spheres of life not only to Christ, but to each other. They cannot be in conflict with each other, and cannot repudiate their subordination to God, their source, without self-destruction. Now all this is represented to us symbolically, prophetically, and in part actually, in the adoration of the wise men. They were representative men, representatives of the world under its best forms. They embodied in themselves its rank, its wealth, its wisdom, and its highest culture; for, as already said, in their native land they were princes, statesmen, priests, wise men, philosophers, and teachers. Most appropriately, therefore, were they selected by infinite wisdom as actors in a scene which was intended to teach in a figure the conversion of the world and its reconciliation to God. They bowed as individuals before the manger, but they brought with them the wisdom, the power, the rank, the honor, the science, and all other culture to which man may attain, and laid them freely as an offering before the Lord of glory. They prostrated themselves on the ground, thus acknowledging the insufficiency of human wisdom and humbly accepting of that which had descended from above. Aged and venerable sages, accustomed to teach and to rule in the affairs of men, they take the position of worshippers and disciples of the new-born King of glory. They also opened their treasures, representing the wealth and power of the world, and laid

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them at the feet of their new Sovereign for his use. Whilst this is a real transaction it is prophetical, and looks to the future, when all science shall be reconciled with divine truth, and the wealth of the world shall be consecrated to the service of Christ.

The whole scene of the star and of the journey of the wise men is replete with instruction. For the times in which we live, it is the gospel of the day. We live in an age that is striving to be reconciled to itself, and that yearns for the unification of humanity; but strife and conflicts continue. Antagonisms everywhere abound; philosophy and theology clash; science and revelation contradict each other, and so the struggle goes on. There are two forms of evil which are a curse to our civilization, the one showing itself in the theoretical sphere, the other in the practical world, the pride of the human intellect and the love of money. Both spring from the same source in the natural selfishness of men, and both stand in the way of the world's progress in the peaceful solution of its own grand problem. How shall these evils be overcome, the world's fearful conflicts be brought to an end, and the now discordant elements be reconciled? Only, we answer, as the scene of the wise men of the East is continually re-enacted in the lives of individual men, and of communities generally. The light which guided them must be our light, and the light of our age. Their devotion must be ours, and that same star of hope, which led them in their long pilgrimage out of the darkness and selfishness of the natural world, must be the same star of hope to all alike. So we, and in the end the world, will be reconciled to God, and come and lay our offerings at the feet of His Son.

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ARTICLE VII.

AUGUST THOLUCK,

DR. AND PROF. ORD. OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF HALLE-WITTEMBERG, PRUSSIAN SAXONY.

BY PROF. ARCHIBALD DUFF, JR, MONTREAL.

It is very fitting that a memorial be erected to this venerable friend of theology in the Bibliotheca Sacra. His life-work has been to cultivate individual laborers for the field of theology, for the science of religion, especially of the Christian religion. And such a cultivation is also the work of the Bibliotheca, in its gathering together the results of individual laborers, and by laying these before the world, encouraging those who produce to make earnest effort, and thus arousing theological thought in others. This is the real way to be scientific in theology. For the actual state of things in the spiritual world can be fully known only by such as recognize that God has something new, something entirely of its own kind, in each individual of his creation, and that something new can be contributed by each individual thinker. It may be fancied that individual workers at theology can differ merely as to comparatively little matters of method in working. But that is a mere fancy. Each individual soul contains a new revelation of God. Each individual who reflects on his own spiritual relations, — on his own religious consciousness, if you will, — enriches the fund of phenomena whence is to be found by generalization the complete philosophy of religion, the complete natural history of the soul and — yes — of God, the complete system of the science of religion, the complete theology. Theology is not a stereotyped thing or book. It cannot become effete. There is forever discovery going on, and the souls of the discoverers are the mines in which these discoverers search. To increase the number of searchers is at the same time to widen the field of search. And they who do increase this, work rationally for the advancement of the science, for the advancement, too, of that profession whose members must become possessed of the science in some way if they will tend well their flocks. One who wrought to this end patiently, faithfully, daily, through a professorship of over fifty years, was Dr. Tholuck. He sleeps now in the tomb; but his work is carried on — by himself. Years ago he and his most estimable wife so planned their affairs that not only all they were, but all they had, should be given to their life-work, and that the latter — their property — should continue the same work when they themselves were no more.

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We need not now give a sketch of Tholuck's life. Such is already within reach of all American theologians, even one written by himself. When unable to attend the meeting of the Evangelical Alliance in New York, in 1873, he wrote and sent to that assembly a short sketch, which was published at that time in the New York Tribune, and may doubtless be obtained among the published proceedings of the Alliance.

A number of brief sketches, including accounts of little incidents illustrating his daily life and his intercourse with students, have appeared in various places. The writer prepared one for the Canadian Independent Magazine of 1875. Others have been recently published in the religious newspapers by Principal Bancroft of Andover and Rev. Mr. Lawrence of Poughkeepsie, both of whom could write from extended personal acquaintance. These Articles make it unnecessary that this take a similar form. But we give a translation of a short Article in a German periodical, describing the last honors paid to the good man. The story gives a few words on Tholuck's character, by good and great Germans who knew him, and it will also serve, as it pictures the scene, to let many who have loved to live in Halle follow in imagination for themselves the funeral-train as it was marshalled in that well-known garden, so often the scene of Tholuck's walks with students; yes, marshalled in the hall beneath his own quiet study — in that hall where every Christmas the brilliant trees lighted up long tables, spread with simple gifts and Halle Christmas-loaves, one for each of a dozen or more students who might be unable to journey far away to the festival at their own homes. The funeral-train assembled there, and mourned around the bier, as they looked on and listened to the discourse of the good pastor Hoffmann. Tholuck held sittings in the little St. Lorenz church, where Hoffmann has long preached so eloquently of sin and salvation. But Tholuck's seat was scarcely ever occupied; he was seldom or never at church, save when he preached the University-sermons in the Dom. But they misjudge who suppose that all who are absent from church in Germany are godless. From the house in Mittelstrasse the procession moved out to the city cemetery, in the style so striking to a stranger, with its conducting Halloren in old-fashioned cocked hats and knee breeches, and its train of student societies, with officers in quaint student uniform, bearing their craped banners. But let us take the account as written:

"Those were memorable, but sorrowful hours which we recently spent in the old town on the Saale at the funeral of the well-beloved teacher. On Sunday Tholuck died, and on the following day he was buried. With twenty-eight members of the Leipzig branch of the Wingolf Student-Society I journeyed over from Leipzig to Halle. Professors Kahnis and Luthardt were also on the train. At five o'clock the funeral obsequies were to begin in the house, and at six the great solemn procession was to move toward the town-cemetery. I hastened to the house of mourning,

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and found the coffin already closed; but at Mrs. Tholuck's direction the carpenter opened it again to let me and the young Wingolf company look once more on the loved face. A beautiful image of peace it was, as if there stood written on his brow: 'Now I have overcome cross, suffering, fear, and need.' I can never forget the hour I spent with the sorrowing widow, hearing her narrate much that is memorable concerning the latter sufferings and the triumphant words of faith of the departed.

"At five o'clock a numerous assemblage of mourners, including thirty clergymen in their ministerial robes, and most of the professors and lecturers of the university, had gathered in the well-known Gartensaal, around the bier adorned with flowers and palms.

"A well-trained choir of boys from the orphan house (if I mistake not) sang, standing without, the first verse of

'Herzlich lieb hab' ich Dich, O Herr.'"

How often has that same company of lads from the Francke Orphan Institute, clad in queer black coats and tall hats, sung that same verse under Tholuck's dining-room window on Saturday afternoon, whilst the old man dropped his hands on his knee and listened!

"Then followed the funeral address of Pastor Hoffmann, for many years Tholuck's friend and pastor. His text was: "Love never faileth, although prophesying faileth,' etc.; 'but when that which is perfect is come, then imperfect work shall cease.' As Professor Wolters [Tholuck's successor as University Preacher] afterwards said in the cemetery, it was a life-picture, painted on a golden ground, delighting and nourishing one's very inmost soul, held up lovingly and truthfully to our sight. The sermon will be published. Let me give here but a sentence or two which especially impressed themselves on my memory. He began: '"Lord, now lettest thou thy servant go in peace." Thus were we at length suffered to pray on the Sabbath, as we were celebrating the great supper, and the Lord was calling to himself this servant who had led more guests to the supper than any of his contemporaries.' 'Our departed teacher was a richly gifted spirit, who had penetrated far into the mysteries of the Godhead, but still deeper into the mysteries of the human heart. To him was given a tongue which mastered not a few dead languages, but more living ones. He could speak in new tongues of the wonders of the love of God and of the mysteries of the word of the cross; but the noblest thing of all was that he remained constant in humility.' On the words 'Love never ceaseth,' he said, as he described the character of the departed, 'Nearest to his heart were his loved students; but who can count the other men to whom as well the wonderful memory of our sleeping friend was a treasure-house of counsel and consolation!' To the last year of suffering, with its ever increasing mental feebleness, he applied the words, 'But when prophesying and knowledge cease'; and here he related precious incidents which confirm the text, 'Love never ceaseth.' With an earnest

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prayer he closed his soul-stirring address. Then the choir began the two verses of 'Jerusalem du hochgebaute Stadt,' and were joined by the whole company.

"In a few minutes the imposing procession began to move, while the bells of all the churches tolled. First went the funeral music, then the coffin, followed immediately by the three funeral preachers, Hoffmann, Prof. Wolters, and Court-preacher Dr. Kögel of Berlin. Then came the clergy in official dress, the professors, and the whole body of the students with their banners. In front were the Wingolf, of which, as is well known, Tholuck was an honorary member. [At the first Foundation Festival of the Halle Wingolf, which is a professedly active Christian association, in July 1845, Tholuck took a hearty, enlivening part in the organization]. Then followed the Salinger Society, in whom also he took a great interest, and then the other associations. The public of Halle took also a prominent part in this last journey of their most famous and most worthy fellow-citizen. By thousands they lined the streets through which the procession passed.

"At the cemetery the strains of the choir were again heard, receiving us; their song this time the first four verses of 'Jesus meine Zuversicht,' in old rhythm. The body was laid down under the bower of green lindens, while professors, pastors, and students gathered round; the marshals of the societies forming a guard of honor. Then began Prof. Dr. Wolters in the name of the University, and with Paul's words, 'Knowing, therefore, the terror of the Lord, we persuade men; but we are manifest unto God,' as text. He gave a masterly description of the life, the work, and the peculiar character of his former teacher, in later years his colleague. I will quote but one passage: 'Tholuck had this in common with Neander, that he did not found a school; but just that was the most precious gift that was given to him by God — even that he was too large-hearted and far-seeing to be the founder of a school. He had only the one aim, to lead as many souls as possible to the Master whom he served, and whom he loved above all else. Because he knew that up to the point where one finds the Lord the ways of individuals are very varied, and only from the time when he is found do they run on side by side, therefore it was his constant endeavor, from the first, in his intercourse with students, to be and to offer something to each one, in order to win the most. Those whom he has won may be counted by thousands.'

"Dr. Kögel, with wonted polished speech and captivating eloquence, laid a wreath of gratitude on the coffin in the name of the students. More beautifully it could not have been done. 'Yesterday,' he began, 'it was, by the will of God, just one hundred and fifty years since a man was laid to rest in this same churchyard, who was at first much despised, then much beloved, and now deeply revered by all Christendom. It was August Hermann Francke. His funeral text shall be our text to-day —

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these words from the great supper: "And the servant came and said again to his Lord, Lord, it is done as thou hast commanded."' With masterly touches he depicted the time of Tholuck's awakening by the efforts of the Baron von Kottwitz, his work in Rome, his coming to Halle, his unwearied labor and influence among the student youth; and closed with the words: 'Yet there is room. Yes; in our time, in part so soured with pessimism, in part so indifferent through optimism, in part so torn by scepticism, — yes, beloved academic youth, there is room still for you in God's heart and at God's table.' One more hymn, and then they laid the weary body to rest till its glorious resurrection."

Prof. Wolters expresses, as quoted above, exactly what seems to us the great service Tholuck has rendered, and which has made him great indeed. Tholuck has been unlike such men as Ewald, who have spent their lives in constructing elaborate scientific systems, and in insisting that they alone were right, and all others very wrong. Ewald wrote a complete system of Hebrew grammar, history, and theology. Tholuck wrote some works on theology, devotional or eclectic, and not closely connected as one complete system. But he awakened and drew on to independent activity many a bright soul, many a complete system of life and thought, which God himself had planned and built. Was that not more than to force his own opinions on others, when any man's opinions and knowledge are at best fragmentary? There are now engaged in active service many of his pupils, older and younger. Of the younger may be named Prof. Besser of Magdeburg, known in America through these pages; Prof. Cremer, known by his N. T. Lexicon; Lic. Theol. Herrmann, one of Halle's most promising younger theologians. Amongst the elder of his pupils may be reckoned noted professors at most of the universities. Ewald's system is already superseded. His opinions will be fast forgotten. Tholuck's work goes on actively reproducing itself, spreading its influence even over men who have been simply his colleagues. For Halle University has become noted for the warm personal relations between professors and students, and much of this may be traced to Tholuck's example. We do not mean that Tholuck's work has been opposed to that of men like Ewald, as conservatism opposed to liberal thought. On the contrary, Tholuck has been, as it were, the head of the Halle Faculty, i.e. of the leading theological Faculty of the Vermittlungs-Schule, against which the High Church party, — the so-called Orthodox people, — led by Leipzig, have warred well nigh as much as have the most bold of undevout writers of the stamp of the *Protestantische Kirchen-Zeitung*. Tholuck has sought to train men who would be thoroughly liberal in thought, not taking recent tradition, nor yet ancient tradition, as supreme authority, and who would also be really devout men. May we not say he has been in both respects truly rational. It is a pity that the term "rational" should have come into disfavor with anybody. Nobody desires to be irrational. It is a

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pity, too, that Tholuck's name should be used as discouraging what is rational. Rational he was, as those who steadily attended his courses of lectures know. True, his early attention to Oriental studies was not very deep, and soon ceased. True, his commentaries are not models of scholarship in his equipment for the work, nor yet in his results. See, for example, his effort to make the synoptic account of the last supper harmonize with that of the fourth Gospel. Yet his counsel in his lectures was steadily that an exegete be strictly rational. And at the same time his teaching — much more, however, his example, his pervading tone of mind — led his pupils to be fervently devout.

Herein, in his devoutness, lay what we may call the second main characteristic of Tholuck's life-work. He studied students — studied their individual gifts, and cultivated them systematically. Herein he was soundly rational. How else can good theologians be made? How else any sort of good workmen? But he was also soundly rational — yes, soundly reasonable — in being fervently devout, and in leading others to be so. To study each student and to work earnestly to develop each was to recognize that the Great Spirit had plans, and that a man must find them out if he would have success. This was indeed to be truly devoted to God. Again, to be fervently devout was to recognize in his whole feeling and bearing the reality of the great Creator Spirit. And what is more reasonable? What is more like God himself, who is the most reasonable of all beings, and the giver of all human reason? The Faculty of Theology in Halle, whose character he influenced for nearly half a century, contains some leading examples of thoroughly rational methods in investigating and teaching. Who that has followed Prof. Riehm's lectures on Isaiah, the Psalms, Genesis, Job, has not thought him quite ready to sacrifice any hoary tradition, if reason seemed to require it? And other men are there of like mind; yet all looked up to Tholuck as to a foster-father. All felt quite free in his sight to do what they thought right. Singularly, however, that Faculty might also be called a fervently devout one. Prof. Riehm, whom we have named above, is a remarkable illustration of this. A Sunday-school was long led by him, and every Sunday-school man has an introduction to his heart. The little missionary society is always sure of Riehm's help at the opening and closing exercises of the Semester. An earnest address, really a sermon, is not too much for him to contribute on each occasion. I could tell of other instances that equal this, and of one that goes far beyond it (if such an expression could be used) in both respects, strict rationality and earnest devoutness. I refer to Prof. Besser, who was emphatically a pupil of Tholuck.

Ernest Renan says in his address on Spinoza, delivered at the unveiling of the monument at the Hague, Feb. 21, 1877 (see Contemporary Review, April 1, 1877): "Since the days of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, no

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life had been witnessed so profoundly penetrated by the sentiment of the Divine (as Spinoza's). In the twelfth, thirteenth, sixteenth centuries, rationalistic philosophy had numbered very great men in its ranks, but it had had no saints. Occasionally a very repulsive and hard element had entered into the finest characters amongst Italian free-thinkers. Religion had been utterly absent from those lives not less in revolt against human than divine laws, of which the last example was that of poor Vanini. Here, on the contrary, we have religion producing free-thought as a part of piety." Some may be surprised on reading these words here, and may wish to modify them. We will not deny saintliness to a man in whom others see it as they gaze upon him. But the quotation concerning Spinoza expresses correctly what Tholuck's work has really been. He has, indeed, trained men to think freely, faithfully, to reason rigidly as a part of piety. He has taught them too, while busy thinking, investigating, to be ever very humble, very childlike before God.

Is any one dissatisfied with this characterization, and ready to say, — Tholuck himself said rationalism was dying, and warned us against certain schools as being rationalistic? True it is that undevout reasoning must die out, but undevoutly rational is not synonymous with rational. Moreover, men find that undevout reasoning is self-contradictory, and must die out.

One more remark, — Tholuck's life-business seemed to be to find how he himself and all he had might serve to the carrying out of God's ends. It was an illustration of the highest kind of free-will, a subordination of one's own entire conduct to God's way, as being a supremely good way. In like manner, the sovereign of a constitutional monarchy exercises the highest freedom in the realm by finding out the *vox populi*, and executing it; that is, by choosing most gladly to subordinate all his own power to the righteous wish of his country. So Tholuck was a king. With royal grandeur he studied the plans of God which underlie men's lives, and submitted all his own life to the work of carrying out these plans. This third characteristic is really one with the former two; and the three are really common to every true Christian. So that Tholuck was but a bright example for every Christian.

Let me close with a short sketch of Tholuck's Student-Home, established and sustained by Professor and Mrs. Tholuck with their own property; in fact, permanently endowed by them with this property.

In order to accomplish more thoroughly his work of cultivation of individual students, Dr. Tholuck had long wished to have a few living in his own house. I have heard him describe his longing, in a little address at one of the opening feasts in the little Home. Supper over, a finer provision than usual having been made for the occasion, and Dr. and Mrs. Tholuck having partaken of the meal with the students, the good old gentleman sought out and read a passage in the handsome Bible presented at

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the founding by Emperor William for the Home's devotional services. Then he told us of his longing to gather a few young spirits about him; and how at last the way had been made plain; the house next his own, viz. Mittelstrasse 10, purchased, and furnished with beautiful neatness, yet plainly. Mr. Inspector Besser, Lic. Theol., Privat Docent in Theology in the University was engaged to take charge, and the house opened in 1871, to the great joy of Tholuck. The original students who were to enjoy its benefits were selected by Dr. and Mrs. Tholuck, the evident principle of selection being to take such as would likely become very useful men, and would be furthered in becoming so by residence in the house, the pecuniary means of the student not being considered. Such as were able to pay and chose to come were charged about the same as they would pay for like boarding comforts elsewhere in the town. Poorer men were charged less, and according to their means. The same principles have guided in the selection of new residents as the previous ones left, each leaving after a residence of one or two years. The students have no lectures or classes in common in the house, save that once a week an evening is occupied by a meeting for theological discussion, the Inspector presiding, and each student taking his turn in opening the discussion by an Essay on the subject for the evening. In one session the theology of the New Testament was discussed; on each evening the theology of one particular writer. In another session the Formula Concordiæ was taken up, its various doctrines being carefully described and criticised on successive nights. In another session the subject was Dogmatic Theology; in another, the John question, each student discussing on his evening one of the subordinate questions arising as part of the discussion of the whole question. Let me say that the methods followed were strictly rational, and no favor was shown for any traditional doctrine which could not stand the rigid test of reason. In addition to these studies, a meeting for reading some Hebrew text was also held in some sessions. The Inspector, besides presiding at these, conducted the morning devotions, when fifteen minutes were usually spent in a rich exercise of reading, song, and prayer.

Each man has a study to himself, and nearly every one a bedroom to himself. Light and fuel are furnished, also the light German breakfast of coffee and a little roll or two, and supper of a plain sort. All other meals, and washing, every man has to provide for himself. Tholuck's library became at once, and is to remain always, the library of the house, or the nucleus of a larger. Each resident has free access to the garden. A man and his wife are provided by the Tholucks to do all house-work and serve the students as they may desire.

Seven students and the Inspector are all the house accommodates. Thus far one of the number has been almost always some one of the American or English students attending Halle University. The wisdom of the Tholucks in providing thus for a little cosmopolitan influence among

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the German residents is evident. They have desired to enlarge the accommodation, and this especially of late, while opportunity for securing neighboring property has been rather convenient. Knowing this, a large number of men in Britain, who knew and loved Tholuck, leading men of all denominations have formed a committee to endeavor to secure an enlargement of the institution as a fit monument to Tholuck's memory. Nothing could be more appropriate as an honor to him and his work, and as a memento of what he and his work were. For he himself has chosen to perpetuate that work even after his death by this institution. He has chosen, too, one may say, thus to extend his life; since when he is gone, all that he *had* remains supporting this house.

A considerable sum of money has been collected in Britain for this purpose during the past two years, and has been forwarded to Mrs. Tholuck by Rev. Mr. Paton of the Nottingham Congregational Institute. The small sum that was sent to Halle on the occasion of Tholuck's jubilee to aid in establishing a Tholuck Scholarship in the University, belonging entirely to the University, and yielding annually a small income for some student who may be elected to receive it, can hardly be said to render this memorial out of place. A movement has been planned for raising a fund in America, to be added to that just sent from Britain for this Memorial House. This plan will be carried out ere long, although it has been decided to defer it for a while on account of the heavy financial depression in the country.

It is intended that the fund thus collected be sent to Halle in part as a sort of foundation of a German fellowship for men who may be chosen by competitive examination or otherwise, from time to time, for the benefit by different Theological Seminaries which may take part in forming the fund. Such a student will receive at a very low rate all the privileges of residence in the house in the midst of a group of active German Theological students. God bless Tholuck's memory to us, and send success to this plan. May many other men undertake a like work of educating scientific theologians, and carefully trained Christian teachers, with their own means, and this during their own life, not merely by bequests.

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ARTICLE VIII.

RECENT GERMAN WORKS. — THEOLOGICAL.

BY PROF. ARCHIBALD DUFF, JR., MONTREAL.

In our last number appeared an Article describing the various theological periodicals of Germany. We purpose henceforth quoting regularly from these at least the titles of the more important of the newly appearing theological books which they notice; adding also remarks of our own, such as it may be possible to make in spite of the difficulty of seeing the books, or of consulting many Germans who would be able to express valuable opinions. Most of the following have been noticed or have appeared since January 1, 1877. We hope to give soon a list of the more important issues for a longer period past, and also to note the more important philosophical works which have appeared during the past eighteen months. Among those issued or noticed in Germany since the beginning of this year are:

Berliner, Dr. A.: The Massorah for the Targum of Onkelos, containing the Greater and Lesser Massorah. (Die Massorah zum Targum Onkelos, enth. Massorah magna u. Massorah parva.) By Dr. A. Berliner. Leipzig: Hinrich's Publishing House. pp. 143. 8vo. 4 Mark.

Braum, Dr. C.: The Idea "Person" in its Application to the Doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, discussed on the Basis of Studies in the History of Doctrine. (Der Begriff "Person" in seiner Anwendung auf die Lehre v. der Trinität u. Incarnation, auf dogmengeschichtl. Grundlage dargestellt.) By Dr. C. Braun. Mayence: Kircheim. 1876. pp. 162. l. 8vo. 2⅔ Mark. A Roman Catholic work.

Clement, Dr. Aug.: The Stories of the Miracles of Elijah and Elisha in the Books of Kings. A Hermeneutical-apologetical Study. (Die Wunderberichte üb. Elia u. Elisa in den Büchern der Könige. Eine hermeneutisch-apologet. Studie.) By Prof. Dr. Aug. Clement. Grimma (Gensel). pp. 42 l. 4to. 1 Mark.

Domkapit: The Canons and Decrees of the Holy Ecumenical Council of Trent in a New German Translation. (Die heil. ökumenischen, Canonen u. Decrete des Concils v. Trient in neuer deutscher Uebersetzung.) Along with the Regulations of older origin relating to this Matter, and with many of the Declarations of the *S. Congregatio interpretum Concilii Tridentini*, also done into German; with a Historical Introduction for each Session. The original text, according to the Roman edition of 1862, printed on opposite page. Full Index. Appendix: The funda-

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mental dogmatical principles of the Vatican Council, and the more recent papal decisions. Edited by Domkapit, Franz Ser. Petz. In Passau at Bucher's. pp. 566. l. 8vo. 9 Mark.

Godet, Dr. F.: Commentary on the Gospel of John. (Commentar zum Evangelium Johannis.) By Prof. Dr. Godet. Second Part. First Number. Second edition, translated into German by Pastor E. R. Wunderlich. Hannover: Meyer. pp. 1–192. l. 8vo. 4 Mark. Or Part I. and Part II., 1, 8 Mark.

Guthe, Herm.: De Foederis notione Jeremiana commentatio historica. By Hermann Guthe, Lic. Theol. Leipzig: Hinrich. pp. 67. l. 8vo. 2½ Mark. The writer is one of the young theologians who have been largely aided in preparation for future professorial work by the "Foundation" for Repetents or Tutors in the University of Göttingen. Three men can enjoy its privileges at the same time, are admitted to it on strict examination and preparation of a discourse, are then required to take charge of the University Commons for Theological Students, to conduct classes there, and, besides, to give courses of lectures in the university, to aid the university preachers, and to assist the theological librarian. By all this they are tested, as well as trained in fitness to be university instructors. At the end of two years' service they usually pass the examination for habilitation or venia docendi, and become licentiates in theology and privat-docents, or, as we might say, "fellows," next in rank to the extraordinarii or assistant professors. Mr. Guthe is a man of fine character and a hard worker.

Prof. Diestel of Tübingen, author of the important work on "The History of the Interpretation of the Old Testament," reviews this, Mr. Guthe's first publication, in the Jena Literary News (*Jenaer Literaturzeitung*), 1877, No. 29. He gives a brief sketch of the book, thus: "The author describes, in Part I. of this treatise, the idea of the covenant, as found in Jeremiah's writings. For this prophet has used the idea oftener than his predecessors, and appears also to consider it more important than they do. The covenant was given, on God's part, as a benefaction to the people; at the same time, it includes a double right which Jahweh possesses as related to the people, and *vice versa*. The divine obligation is fulfilled in benefits which Jahweh confers on the people; but these are also fruits of grace. Part II. considers the breaking of the covenant. Faith that God's anger will not annihilate the people is a product of the idea of the covenant. The divine visitations will rather make the people better, and more ready to receive the new covenant, which will include in itself, above all, such a renewal of the whole disposition as will make a permanent apostasy impossible. In the Conclusion, the leading thoughts are summed up. The writer considers the idea to have been especially valuable, because, in consequence of it, the people were regarded as not subjected to arbitrary treatment by God, but Jahweh viewed as making

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known his fixed will, and binding himself to suffer his anger to reach only so far as the ultimate aims of the covenant permitted.

"Both choice of theme and method are decidedly praiseworthy. The idea of the covenant is nowadays much spoken of, but its exact meaning and its application far from properly known. Concerning method the author rightly says: 'Non ad nostrae Christianae fidei rationem exigenda sunt quae Jeremias locutus est, sed ad gentis Israeliticae vel potius prophetae nondum Christiani intelligentiam.'"

Heinrich, Dr. J. B.: Dogmatic Theology. (Dogmatische Theologie.) By Prof. Dr. J. B. Heinrich. Second Volume. Third Part. Mayence: Kircheim. 1876. pp. 561–824. l. 8vo. 8 Mark (I. and II. 18½ Mark). A Roman Catholic work.

Hesse, Dr. F. H.: The Terministic Controversy. A Picture of Theological Life in the Period about the End of the Seventeenth and the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century. (Der terministische Streit. Ein Bild theolog. Lebens aus den Gränjahren d. 17 u. 18 Jahrh.). By Prof. Dr. Fredr. Herm. Hesse. Giessen: Ricker. pp. 471. l. 8vo. 8 Mark.

Henermann, A.: The Importance of Statistics for the Study of Ethics. (Die Bedeutung der Statistik für die Ethik.) By A. Henermann, Gymnasium Teacher. Osmabrück and Göttingen: Vanderhoeck and Ruprecht. 1876. pp. 34. l. 4to. 1½ Mark. It is noteworthy that this new line of investigation is receiving much attention, as it deserves.

Bickell, Dr. G.: S. Isaaci Antiochemi, doctoris Syrorum, opera omnia. Ex omnibus quotquot extant codicibus mscr. cum varia lectione Syriace Arabiceque primus ed., Latine vertit, prolegomenis et glossario auxit Prof. Dr. Gust. Bickel. Giessen: Ricker. Pars. II. pp. 353. l. 8vo. 14 Mark. (I. and II. 26 Mark.)

Kahnis, Dr. K. F. A.: Address on the Fulness of the Times. (Die Erfüllung der Zeiten.) By Dr. K F. A. Kahnis. Leipzig: Böhme and Drescher. pp. 42. l. 16mo. ¾ Mark.

Kamp, A. H.: A Critical Exposition of Schleiermacher's Doctrine of God. (Schleiermacher's Gotteslehre kritisch dargestellt.) Magdeburg and Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht. 1876. pp. 42. l. 8vo. 1 Mark.

Katschthaler, Prof. Dr. Joa.: Theologia dogmatica catholica specialis. Liber I.: De regni divini per Deum institutione, seu theologia sensu stricto, complectens doctrinam de Deo uno et trino nec non de Deo creatore. Regensburg: Manz. pp. 527. l. 8vo. 8 Mark. A Roman Catholic work.

Kayser, Pastor Dr.: Critical Examination of the Sources of Information concerning Tetzel the Indulgence-Preacher. (Die Geschichtsquellen üb. den Ablassprediger Tetzel kritisch beleuchtet.) Annaberg: Rudolph and Dieterici. pp. 20. l. 8vo. ½ Mark.

Langlotz, K. W.: Fundamental Truths of the New Theology. (Grundwahrheiten der neuen Theologie.) An Essay. Hannover and Leipzig: Stauffer. pp. 104. l. 8vo. 2 Mark.

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Luther's, Dr. Martin: Complete Works. (Sämmtliche Werke.) Sixteenth Vol. [First Division, Homiletical and Catechetical Writings]. Contents: Miscellaneous Sermons. Published by Pastor Ernest Ludw. Enders. First Volume containing the Sermons from 1518 to 1522. Second Edition. Frankfurt au Maine: Heyder and Zimmer. pp. 543. 8vo. 4 Mark.

Blondel, C.: Μακαρίου Μαγνήτος ἀποκριτικὸς ἢ μονογενὴς — Macarii Magnetis quae supersunt ex inedito bodice ed. C. Blondel. Paris: Klincksieck. 1876. pp. 232. 4to. 9 Mark.

Meurer, Pastor Lic. Theol. Moritz: Church Architecture according to the Views and Usage of the Lutheran Church. (der Kirchenbau vom Standpunkte und nach dem Brauche der lutherischen Kirche.) Leipzig: Dörfling and Francke. pp. 302. l. 8vo. 8 Mark. "A work prepared for the guidance of ministers, church patrons, and church officers." Cl. Brockhaus, in the *Theol. Lit. Zeitung* 14, 1877, says of it: "Its recently deceased author has sought to teach how church-building may be artistically in fit style, adapted for religious worship, and durable; also pecuniarily well projected. Accordingly, in an introductory more general part, the various styles of building, from that of the old Christian basilica down to the renaissance are described, and the principles pointed out which ought to control in building a place of worship. Part II. gives special practical instruction and hints."

Mühlbauer, Wolfg.: Thesaurus resolutionum s. c. consilii, quae consentanee ad Tridentinorum pp. decreta aliasque canonici juris sanctiones prodierunt usque ad a. 1874 cum omnibus constitutionibus et aliis novissimis declarationibus ss. pontificum ad causas respicientibus. Primum ad commodiorem usum ordine alphabetico concinnatus. Munich: Stahl. Tom. III. Fasc. 5. pp. 417–520. 4to. 3 Mark. A Roman Catholic work. We name such books not only to show that, along with a mass of weakly devotional writings, Roman Catholic theologians produce some things of a more solid sort, but also to point out sources of study for such as are investigating Roman Catholic theology and teaching.

Nature, and not the Church, our Common Mother. A Protest against the Encroachments of Clericalism. (La Nature, et non l'église notre commune mère. Protestation contre les envahissements du cléricalisme.) Rome and Zurich: Meyer and Zeller. 1876. pp. 104. l. 8vo. 1 Mark.

Nestle, Dr. E.: The Israelite Proper Names. Their Meanings considered with their Bearing on the History of Religion. (Die israelitischen Eigennamen nach ihrer religions geschishtlichen Bedeutung.) An Experiment. Haarlem and Leipzig: Harrassowitz. 1876. pp. 215. l. 8vo. 8½ Mark.

Palmer Dr. Chrn.: The Communions and Sects of Würtemberg. (Die Gemeinschaften u. Sekten Württemberg's.) By the late Prof. Dr. Chrn. Palmer of Tübingen. Edited from his posthumous papers by Prof. Dr.

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Jetter. Tübingen: Laupp. pp. 215. l. 8vo. 4½ Mark. Of this book Pastor R. Kern of Höpfigheim in Württemberg says, while reviewing it in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1877, 14, as follows: "The phenomena of religious sect-life are here considered only as found in Württemberg, and peculiarly developed there. The first more general section of the book traces the development of the pietistic fellowships in Württemberg, from the time of the Reformation onwards, pointing out the various moulding and co-operating agencies which have determined the character of these communions. At the close we have a carefully studied analysis of pietism and a well drawn characterization of it. The other main division of the book describes the specialties and singularities of the communions and sects in Württemberg, the classic country of conventicle Christianity. First in the series is the theosophic peasant-farmer, Michel Hahn, with the Michelians, named after him; then comes the 'very blessed' company named after Pastor Pregizer; then the 'Confession, or Communion of the Temple,' who became so useful by their settling as a colony in Palestine; and, as an appendix to this, the Bavarian pastor Clöter with his Chiliast flock. Then the ways of the Methodists are described; then come the chosen Saints of the New Church, or the sect of the Nazarines with their 'most exalted' wisdom; then the Baptists of Württemberg, with their rough master Schauffler, and after them the disciples of Swedenborg. The pious G. Werner appears at once worthy of respect, with his Christian socialistic institutions; but the Darbists or Plymouth Brethren seem stranger. The Irvingites, too, have a place in the sacred circle; and finally it is stated that even the Mormons have had triumphs in good Suabia. A few more little bodies with Apocryphal names are mentioned. The general principles which are laid down in the Introduction for pastoral conduct towards the communions and sects are only general, and in the main they simply repeat what Palmer has said on the subject in his Pastoral Theology. With all his love and friendship for the existing evangelical church, he does not expect that it will have predominant authority in spiritual life in the future. He does not think that the method of teaching and preaching used in the church, with its preparation for the ministry by the study of history and philosophy, will any longer be able to form and hold the spiritual life of the great majority of the people. The most will become a prey to the sectarians. The church of the people cannot be saved. Dissolution, her fate, is already hanging over her."

The reviewer in the *Literarisches Centralblatt* of Leipzig says, besides: "Palmer resolved, in 1854, to prepare these lectures, because many of his students complained to him that they were almost paralyzed in their practical work by the confusing multitude of the divisions and phenomena of these sects. Up to 1873 he had delivered the course eleven times. By careful study of all the literature relating to the subject, by information from the

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government, and by private correspondence, he gathered unusually rich material, and then sought to sift it critically and arrange it."

Heiligstedt, Dr. Aug.: The Psalms. Hebrew Text, with a brief Commentary. (Die Psalmen. Hebräischer Text mit einer kurzen Auslegg.) By Dr. Aug. Heiligstedt. Part II. Ps. xxvi.–xlviii. Halle: Herrmann. 1876. pp. 73–140. l. 8vo. 1 Mark.

Rabbinovicz, R. N.: Critical Survey of all the Complete Editions and Editions of Parts of the Babylonian Talmud since 1484. (Kritische Uebersicht der Gesammt- u. Einzelausgaben d. Babylonischen Talmud seit 1484.) Munich: Rosenthal. pp. 132. l. 8vo. 3 Mark.

Herzog's Theological and Ecclesiastical Encyclopedia. (Real-Encyklopädie f. protestantische Theologie u. Kirche.) Second Edition. Edited by Profs. Drs. J. J. Herzog and G. L. Plitt. Parts III.–VI. Leipzig: Hinrichs. Vol. I. pp. 161–480. l. 8vo. 1 Mark per part.

Riehm, Prof. Dr. Ed. C. A. (Halle): The Idea of Propitiation in the Old Testament. (Der Begriff der Sühne im Alten Testament.) Gotha: F. A. Perthes. pp. 88. l. 8vo. 1⅘ Mark.

Riehm, Prof. Dr. Ed. C. L. (Halle): Hand-Lexicon of Biblical Antiquities for Educated Bible-Readers. (Handwörterbuch d. biblischen Alterthums f. gebildete Bibelleser.) With Many Illustrations, Plans, and Maps. Part VI. Bielefeld: Belhagen and Klasing. pp. 481–576. lex. 8vo. 1⅘ Mark.

Schenkel, Dr. Dan.: The Fundamental Doctrines of Christianity, as obtained by Study of the Christian Consciousness, arranged in a System. (Die Grundlehren d. Christenthums aus dem Bewustsein d. Glaubens im Zusammenhange dargestellt. Leipzig: Brockhaus. pp. 529. l. 8vo. 9 Mark.

Schlau, Dr. Carl: The Acts of Paul and Thecla, and the Elder Thecla-Legend. A Contribition to the History of Christian Literature. (Die Acten d. Paulus u. der Thecla u. die ältere Thecla-Legende. Ein Beitrag zur christl. Literaturgeschichte.) Leipzig: Hinrichs. pp. 95. l. 8vo. 3⅘ Mark.

Schöberlein, Dr. L.: The Christian Doctrine of Atonement. (Die Christliche Versöhnungslehre) A Discourse. Heidelberg: C. Winter. pp. 28. l. 8vo. ⅘ Mark.

Solowcyczyk, Rabbi Elias: The Bible, the Talmud, and the Gospel. (Die Bibel, der Talmud, u. das Evangelium.) Translated from the French by Prof. Mor. Grünwald. Leipzig: Brockhaus in Comm. pp. 351. 8vo. 6 Mark. The reviewer in the *Literarischen Centralblatt*, 1877, 40, quotes the author as saying that his aim is, by comparison of the New Testament with the Talmud, and by interpretation of many New Testament expressions according to the Hebrew of the time of Christ, to show that all the doctrines of the church are entirely in unison with those of the synagogue, those of the Bible with those of the Talmud,

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and that therefore there is no reason for maintaining any longer the separation that exists between Jews and Christians. Men may thus be reconciled to one another. The author hopes "to restore the true doctrine of Christ, at the same time to see justice done to the New Testament, and to show that previous commentators have understood the book badly, and have disfigured it." "Then it will be seen," he says, "that the words of the gospel are in no way contrary to our (Jewish) traditions and dogmas, and that all, or nearly all, actually agree, — yes, are often identical — with the words of our own teachers." "In that day the Eternal will be One and Incomparable, and One and Incomparable will be his name." The idealism of such a man is worth studying. It suggests that among many Jews there is a nearness of heart to Jesus' kingdom which we hardly looked for, and which is growing. The scientific value of the book becomes at least questionable when one remembers that the chronology of the composition of the various sayings recorded in the Talmud is in fearful confusion; and that the philological work is simply enormous which must be done before any one can be said to know thoroughly the language of the book, and to have possession of a necessary element in judging whether this or that Talmudic passage arose before Christ, and so independently of him, or contemporaneously, or long after, perhaps as a result of Christ's teaching, and as a forced modification of Judaism. Christianity is becoming better known; and the turning of Jews toward Jesus *may* be because Jesus is immensely superior to Judaism, rather than because Christianity and Judaism agree.

Schleiermacher's Complete Works. (Frdr. Schleiermacher's Sämmtliche Werke). I. Sermons. First cheap edition in parts. Parts 62–71. Berlin: Grosser. l. 8vo. pp. 385–690. $\frac{8}{10}$ Mark per part.

Stade, Dr. B.: On the Old Testament Conceptions of the Condition after Death. (Ueber die alttestamentlichen Vorstellungen vom Zustande nach dem Tode.) An Academical Discourse. Leipzig: F. C. W. Vogel. l. 8vo. pp. 36. $\frac{4}{5}$ Mark. In reviewing this book in the *Jenaer Literaturzeitung*, 1877, 27, Prof. Diestel of Tübingen says: "The book comes well up to the just demand that such a work show itself fully, by its character, to be a product of scientific labor, that the controverted questions be carefully investigated, that there be here and there marks of original work, and hints, too, for further prosecution of the study. There are but few difficult passages (of Scripture) relating to the subject; yet it is a mark of poverty that the science of exegesis has made so little progress in this subject which is so often discussed, and discussed with an eagerness quite disproportionate to its importance. The cause of this is the decided unwillingness to acknowledge openly that a firm belief in the immortality of the the soul did not exist among the Hebrews, more especially among the higher ranks of religious thinking. Not only the older Orthodoxy, but, quite as strongly, the Deism which replaced it, and Rationalism, have shared in this unwillingness.

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As a matter of religious history the fact of the absence of this belief is very remarkable for this reason, that the Egyptians believed, as is well known, in a continuation of spiritual existence after death, and that, too, in a happier state than the earthly. So also the Persians." "Our author points to the doctrine of retribution as making up to the Israelites in earlier times for the lack of the other belief. According to it every man would receive in this life all that he deserved. Yet I must express it as my opinion that a more effective substitute was the belief that the proper work of religion lay in changing society from selfish wildness to a condition where ideal motives would prevail. Thus for the Messianic time, above all things, the restoration of true regard for right to the exclusion of all violence was expected." The Israelites did not expect to rise again, but did rejoice in the expectation of an ideal state for his nation. This was his great comforter, and filled his thoughts so that he did not think much about what would become of himself. "The author describes very correctly the conceptions of Sheol and the nether world."

Stein, Dr. Leop., Rabbin: The Scriptures of Life. The complete contents of the Jewish Religion and Life, in Doctrine, Worship, and Moral Law [Dogma, Cultus, and Ethics]: Exhibited as it is contained in Scripture, in popular style, and for the instruction of Israelites and non-Israelites. (Die Schrift des Lebens. Inbegriff d. gesammten Judenthums in Lehre, Gottesverehrung u. Sittengesetz, [Dogma, Cultus u. Ethik], Schriftgemäss, volksthümlich u. zur Kenntnissnahme f. Israeliten u. Nichtisraeliten dargestellt). In three Divisions. 2d Division, 18th and 19th Parts. Strassburg: Schneider. l. 8vo. pp. 385–432. $\frac{8}{15}$ Mark per part.

Munk, Dr. L.: The Second Targum of the Book of Esther, with the Various Readings collected from the MS. Sources, explained and provided with an Introduction on the History of the Composition. (Targum Scheni zum Buche Esther, nebst variae lectiones nach handschriftl. Quellen erläutert u. m. e. literarhistor. Einleitung versehen.) By Dr. L. Munk. Berlin: Benzian. 1876. pp. 37 and 45. l. 8vo. 2 Mark.

Tholuck, Dr. August: Sermons on the Principal Topics in Christian Belief and Life. (Predigten üb. die Hauptstücke d. christlichen Glaubens u. Lebens.) Second Volume. First Half. Sixth Edition. Gotha: F. A. Perthes. 1876. pp. 1–232. l. 8vo. $2\frac{1}{2}$ Mark per half-volume. It is wonderful what a popularity the published sermons of Tholuck possess. They form the favorite gifts among devout friends, and even among all persons, if a book of such a sort is wanted. They are rich devotional nourishment in eloquent words.

Thomae a Kempis de imitatione Christi, libri IV., quorum textum ad fidem optimarum editionum recognovit Paroch. J. Mooren. Cologne and Neuss: Schwann. pp. 480. 1 Mark. This is a Roman Catholic edition, and no less than three new Roman Catholic editions are announced—

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two of them translations. It is not strange that such an exhibition of the Roman Catholic way of getting God's blessing, — even a pure, holy, joyful heart, — by means of a devotional performance, should be largely dealt out by Roman Catholic priests. But it is a pity that the book and its method are sought out and tried for such an object by so-called Protestants. So-called Protestants are, it is true, often really Roman Catholic; and that lies in the nature of things. It is a sadder pity that prominent preachers in Protestant churches recommend it. They have reflected little on the essence of their religion. Tell people rather to do earnestly the work God gives them in his providence, even in their daily business, — to serve well, — and they shall find their hearts growing light, peaceful, pure, loving, Christlike.

Tschackert, Dr. Paul (Privat-doc., Lic. Theol.): Peter of Ailly. A Contribution to the History of the Great Western Schism, and the Reform-Councils at Pisa and Constance. (Peter v. Ailli [Petrus de Alliaco]. Zur Geschichte d. grossen abendländ. Schisma u. der Reformconcilien v. Pisa u. Constanz.) Appendix: Petri de Alliaco anecdotorum partes selectae. Gotha: F. A. Perthes. pp. 382; Appx. pp. 53. l. 8vo. 9 Mark.

Wackernagel, Phpp.: German Church Song from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century. (Das deutsch Kirchenlied von der ältestein Zeit bis zu Aufang d. 17 Jahrh.) With Consideration of German Hymnology in the Wider Sense, and the Latin Hymnology from Hilary to Georg Fabricius and Wolfg. Ammonius. Fifty-sixth and Fifty-seventh Parts. Leipzig: Trubner. Vol. v. pp. 1057–1248. lex. 8vo. 2 Mark per part.

Wangemann, Dr., Director of Missions: Pictures of Life from South Africa. A Contribution to the History of the Church and of Civilization in the Nineteenth Century. (Lebensbilder aus Südafrika. Ein Beitrag zur Kirchen- u. Culturgeschichte d. 19 Jahrh.) First Vol. With Plates. Third Edition. Berlin: W. Schultze. 1876. pp. 287. l. 8vo. 2½ Mark.

Wieseler, Prof. Dr. K.: The German Nationality of the Galatians of Asia Minor. (Die deutsch Nationalität der kleinasiatischen Galater.) A Contribution to the History of the Germans, Celts, and Galatians, and of their Names. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann. pp. 85. l. 8vo. 1½ Mark. In reviewing this book, E. Schürer says, in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1877, 15, that Professor Wieseler here tries to support the view he took in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians (p. 521 ff. See also Herzog's Real-Encyc. xix. p. 523 ff.), and which was recently contested by Wilib. Grimm (*Studien u. Kritiken*, 1876, 2): Wieseler's view was that taken by almost all theologians; but now this new plea for it seems weak as against Grimm's doctrine that the Galatians were Celts. It is agreed that the mere similarity of the names Galatians, Gauls, Celts, would not decide the matter. But it seems clear that one of the three

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tribes who became the Galatians — namely, the Tectosagi — certainly came from the region of the Pyrenees, and so were Gauls. They may have been in Germany, but only as invaders. The apparent connection of Galatian proper names with German names, which Wieseler regards as very important, is held by Schürer, in concert with many philologists, to be of little consequence. So Schürer. On the other hand, in the *Jena Literaturzeitung*, 1877, 34, Rudolf Buddensieg favors Wieseler, although he concludes by saying, "Even yet the question is not decided."

Zerschwitz, Prof. Dr. v.: The Mediaeval Dream of Empire and its Religious Motives. (Der Kaisertraum des Mittelalters in seinen religiösen Mötiven.) A Discourse. Leipzig: Hinrich. pp. 31. l. 8vo. ½ Mark.

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A. GERMAN WORKS.

DARWIN VERSUS GALIANI,[1] and TELEOLOGY OR CHANCE.[2] — These are two pamphlets; one by Du Bois-Reymond, the other by Professor Wigand — the latter a sharp criticism of the former. Du Bois-Reymond is a rabid Darwinian; Wigand, a moderate one. The former thinks that Darwin has given teleology its death-blow; the latter thinks that reason is compelled by its very nature to seek for *causae finales*. We certainly agree with him in this opinion. Indeed, the present opponents of teleology are unable to avoid teleology. They are constantly finding "purpose," "design," etc., as soon as they forget their *a priori* theories. Wigand makes a severe criticism on Du Bois-Reymond, and well he deserves it. Wigand advocates also the assumption of a causative first principle independent of nature and its laws, maintaining that without it we cannot account for the existence of the world such as we have it before our eyes.

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY.[3] — Dr. Rabus co-ordinates theology as a science, and regards it, along with the other sciences, as a constituent of philosophy. Philosophy concerns itself with the entire cosmos in its entirety; theology with a domain of the cosmos — one, however, so much nearer to the very centre than those with which other sciences are occupied that it must needs have a determining influence in the formation of

[1] Darwin versus Galiani. Rede von Emil du Bois-Reymond. Berlin, 1876.
[2] Die Alternative Teleologie oder Zufall. Von Albert Wigand. Cassel, 1877.
[3] Philosophie und Theologie. Von Dr. Leonhard Rabus. Erlangen. 1876.

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a true philosophy. We mean, of course, Christian theology The book, though a small one, is worth reading. It seeks to do justice both to theology and the natural sciences, protesting equally against the intrusion of dead theological notions into natural science and against the encroachments of natural science on theology. It would be well if our scientists would occasionally descend from their boasted heights, and condescend to read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest discussions like these. They would make fewer mistakes, and might find it necessary to do less for the destruction both of their own and other people's faith.

COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS.[1] — The special excellence of this new Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians is the light it throws on the historical circumstances to which it owed its origin. The Introduction is devoted to such questions as, the Four Chapter Epistle; the Lost Epistle; the Jewish Christianity of Corinth; the Corinthian Judaism; the Christ Party. As to the first-mentioned question, he controverts the views of Hausrath, who has maintained that the first four chapters constitute a separate — in fact, the lost — Epistle of Paul (See his *Der Vierkapitel brief des Paulus an die Corinther*, Heidelberg, 1870), insisting on the unity of the Epistle. With regard to the question of the lost Epistle, Lic. Klöpper refers to a work published by him in 1869, under the title *Exegetisch-Kritische Untersuchungen über den zweiten Brief des Paulos an die Gemeinde zu Korinth;* giving here merely a brief *resumé* of the arguments there employed and results achieved. The reasons in favor of such an epistle are, briefly, the difference between Paul's own description of his last Epistle, given in such passages as 2 Cor. ii. 4; vii. 8; x. 12, and the existing first Epistle; the mode in which he discusses his plans of travel; and that the mission of Timothy to Corinth, of which he spoke in 1 Cor. iv. 17; xvi. 10, 11 as imminent, is not only not referred to in the existing second Epistle, but another fellow-laborer is mentioned, namely, Titus, whose apparent success in the church seems to imply that he must have been specially delegated by Paul to deal with the evils there prevailing, and had taken an epistle with him. Lic. Klöpper accepts as genuine Pauline epistles all those usually attributed to Paul, with the exception of the Pastoral Epistles and that to the Ephesians.

As a commentary, Lic. Köpper's work seems to be marked by thoroughness. In one respect it differs from many German commentaries; it does not contain so much learned ballast, which has its advantages. The custom of controverting every writer who differs from the commentator, and quoting every one with whom he agrees may be carried too far. S.

[1] Kommentar über das Zweite Sendschreibente des Apostel Paulus an die Gemeinde zu Korinth von Lic. Alb. Klöpper. Berlin: G. Reimer. 1874.

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B. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN WORKS.

THEOLOGICAL ESSAYS. By William G. T. Shedd, D.D., Roosevelt Professor of Systematic Theology in Union Theological Seminary, New York. 12mo. pp. 383. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Company. 1877.

"The substance of this volume has been before the public some twenty years or more" (p. v.). The previous editions of the volume are here enlarged and revised. "No change, however, has been made in the dogmatic positions. The reader will find the historical Calvinism defended in the essays upon Original Sin and Atonement; yet with an endeavor to ground these cardinal themes in the absolute principles of reason, as seen in the nature of both God and man. Sin must take its origin, from first to last, in the finite will, and atonement is the necessary requirement of eternal justice. In these two essays, the writer, if he has done nothing else, has at least shown the sincerity of his belief that theology and philosophy have no inherent contradiction, and that the more exact and strict type of theology is the one of all which is the most defensible at the bar of reason and logic; agreeing with Selden, that 'without school divinity a divine knows nothing logically, nor will be able to satisfy a rational man out of the pulpit'" (p. v.). The tendency of this volume is good. It is to encourage doctrinal investigation and doctrinal preaching, to exalt the character of God and to abase the character of the impenitent man. Professor Shedd has already accomplished much, and this work will add to what he has done already, in stimulating clergymen to improve their methods of study and their style of preaching, to quicken their love of inquiry into the profoundest truths of religion, and to augment their enterprise in bringing into the pulpit the results, rather than the processes, of their study. We respect the author of this volume as a self-consistent theologian, and a vigorous defender of the truth as the substance of it is found in the Calvinistic creeds. We cannot, however, accede to all of his statements. Take, for a single example, his analysis of the distributive justice and the benevolence of God. He says: "The two emotions of which we are speaking are clearly discriminated from each other by the fact that one of them is constitutional, and the other voluntary. The divine wrath (ὀργὴ Θεοῦ, Rom. i. 18) issues from the necessary antagonism between the pure essence of the Godhead and moral evil. It is, therefore, natural, organic, necessary, and eternal. The logical idea of the holy implies it. But the love of benevolence, or the divine compassion, issues from the voluntary disposition of God — from his heart and affections. It is good-*will*. It is, consequently, easy to see that the existence of the constitutional emotion is perfectly compatible with that of the voluntary, in one and the same being, and at one and the same moment; and in God from all eternity, since he is unchangeable" (pp. 270, 271). Is not the

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divine justice voluntary? Is it a mere "emotion"? Is it not rather an exercise of the divine will, which is more exalted than a mere sensibility? Is there not a constitutional emotion united with benevolence, as really as there is a constitutional emotion united with justice? May we not resolve love, if we can resolve justice, into a sensibility? Is it not the *will* of God to reward men according to their deeds, as much as it is the will of God to promote the well-being of his universe? Professor Shedd says: "The inspired assertion that 'God is a consuming fire' (Heb. xi. 29) is just as categorical and unqualified as the inspired assertion that 'God is love' (1 John iv. 8), or the inspired assertion that 'God is light' (1 John i. 5). Hence it is as inaccurate to resolve all the divine emotions into love as it would be to resolve them all into wrath. The truth is, that it is the Divine *Essence* alone, and not any one particular attribute, that can be logically regarded as the unity in which all the characteristic qualities of the Deity centre and inhere" (p. 273). Is there no difference between the reasons for believing that all the moral attributes of God are resolvable into benevolence, and the reasons for believing that they are all resolvable into distributive justice? Do we ever read that distributive justice is "the *first* and *great* commandment," and "the second is like unto it: Thou shalt be just in punishing evil-doers"; and "on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets"? (Matt. xxii. 37–40.) Do we ever read that "*all* the law is fulfilled in one word — thou shalt be just in punishing malefactors"? (Gal. v. 14.) Do we ever read: "Owe no man anything but to punish transgressors; for he that hath the disposition to punish transgressors hath *fulfilled* the law. The spirit of distributive justice is *the fulfilling* of the law"? (Rom. xiii. 8–10.) Must we not interpret scripture by scripture, and explain the passage "God is love" in the light of the galaxy of passages represented by the thirteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians?

FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY; Discourses and Essays by Henry B. Smith, D.D., LL.D. Edited, with an Introductory Notice, by George L. Prentiss, D.D., Professor in the Union Theological Seminary, in the City of New York. pp. 496. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1877.

Dr. Prentiss has performed a labor of love in editing this superb volume, and his labor is worthy of our love. Few books have been edited with so much taste and skill. Its title is felicitously chosen. The most eminent characteristic of Dr. Smith was his zeal in harmonizing the philosophical spirit with evangelical Christianity. His Andover Address, which comes first in the present volume, was the first which made him conspicuous in the literary world, and was on his favorite theme, "the Relations of Faith and Philosophy." Perhaps he never excited the interest of his auditors more deeply than when he pronounced this address. Many of these hearers were listening to him for the first time. He knew that

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some of them rejected all forms of evangelical religion; his voice was tremulous with emotion when he spoke of the man who "knows no love too great for Jesus"; and when he said, "So vital is Christ in Christian experience that many are withheld from speculating upon his nature by the unspeakable depth and tenderness of their love for him"; "The name of Jesus has touched the tenderest and deepest chords of man's heart." He knew that some of his hearers were either jealous of philosophy or inimical to it; he declared with a peculiarly strong emphasis: "We rob faith of one of its strongest persuasions, if we do not claim that it is perfectly rational." He knew that some of his auditors were adopting the speculations of Dr. Bushnell; he uttered glowing words against those speculations, and here his language became as rich and beautiful as that of the author whom he was opposing with polished weapons. He knew that some, and the most venerable part, of his audience had an intense aversion to the German divines, especially Schleiermacher; he girded up his garments to defend these divines, especially Schleiermacher; his delicate form became suddenly more erect than it had been; his face became paler and more etherial; he made a lengthened pause, and then, — "in this connection, and in this reverend presence," — with tones of great solemnity and dignity, he exclaimed, "in the name of the republic of letters, in the name of all generous scholarship, in the very name of Christian charity, I dare not refrain from testifying that the indiscriminate censure of all that is German, or that may be so called, is a sign rather of the power of prejudice than of a rational love for all truth." He knew that some of his hearers ranked among the "New England theologians"; he turned his eye upon them as they sat near him on the platform, and, with a smile of arch approval and soothing irony, he drew forth in response a general smile; when he said, in a low and semi-confidential voice: "We have not only discussed, we have also experienced, almost everything; from conscious enmity to God to the profoundest submission to his will; from the depths of a willingness to be condemned to the heights of disinterested benevolence; from the most abstract decrees of a Sovereign down almost to the power to the contrary; we have passed through the very extremes of doctrine, and known them to be real by our inward experience." At the conclusion of this address, in which he spoke to every one a word in season, every one was delighted with it. The men who rejected faith and the men who condemned philosophy, those who believed in Bushnell and those who disbelieved in Schleiermacher, theologians who had a power to the contrary and theologians who had not much power of any kind, — all crowded around the orator of the day, and thanked him for his lessons to their brethren, and praised his diversified gifts.

Other essays in this volume are admirable. We think that those paragraphs are the most important in which the author develops the results of his education in Germany. Few Americans have been so well trained as

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he in the German philosophy. We are glad to perceive that he has left materials for another volume. We hope and presume that ere long they will be given to the public. Some of Professor Smith's opinions, particularly in regard to Dr. Emmons, we are far from adopting; but still desire all the more to read whatever can be published of his historical and theological lectures, and can heartily re-echo the words of Dorner in regard to him: "Festgegründet im Christlichen Glauben, frei und weiten Herzens und Blickes, philosophischen Geistes und für systematische Theologie ungewöhnlich begabt. Möchte doch etwas in dieser Hinsicht aus seinem Nachlass veröffentlich werden."

THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIANITY; with a View of the State of the Roman World at the Birth of Christ. By George P. Fisher, D.D. 8vo. pp. 591. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co.

The historian of the church needs to be a man of various and large gifts. He ought to have a ready and retentive memory; a power to master combinations of facts, and to avoid being, as some eminent German historians are, mastered by them. He must be able to present these facts in their true perspective; and for this end must be able to view them in their widest relations, and to form an accurate judgment of their relative importance. His mind must be disciplined to take a comprehensive view of the different races and ages, and to measure the outward phenomena by the inward character of men. He should have an imagination placing him on an eminence from which he can survey the grand outlines, as well as the special scenery, of both contiguous and distant countries. No less important is it that he possess a logical power, leading him to see events in their causes, and their causes in events, and preventing him from being, as many an historian has been, led astray by his fancy. He must have a quick sympathy with the true, the beautiful, the good; for without such a sympathy the judgment itself becomes unsound. This sympathy makes him candid, hospitable to all new, and retentive of all old, truths. To these qualities, and such as these, must be added the *curiosa felicitas* of diction; a placid but not dull, serene but far from sluggish, flow of speech.

These excellences are exhibited in their perfection by no one, but in a greater or smaller degree by every eminent historian. In an uncommon measure they are possessed by the author of the volume before us. He has already made a name for himself by his volume of Essays on the Supernatural Origin of Christianity, and by his more distinctively historical work on the Reformation. The present volume will probably engage a deeper interest than either of the preceding. Its representations of the Jewish, Roman, Greek religions, of the Greek philosophy, of the characteristics of Christianity in the first century, deserve, as they will receive, careful attention. It exhibits the results without the parade of extensive

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study. We cannot say that we agree with Professor Fisher in all his statements. Some of them, although supported by great names, are, in our view, questionable, at least. These statements, however, are made in a style so neat and they evidently come from a spirit so truth-loving, that they awaken and even refresh the mind, and give a new authority to still more important statements which we are not tempted to controvert. One striking excellence of the work is its independence.

BIBLIOTHECA SYMBOLICA ECCLESIAE UNIVERSALIS. The Creeds of Christendom; with a History and Critical Notes. By Philip Schaff, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, N. Y. In three vols. 8vo. Vol. I. The History of Creeds, pp. 941. Vol. II. The Greek and Latin Creeds, with Translations, pp. 557. Vol. III. The Evangelical Protestant Creeds, with Translations, pp. 880. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1877.

These massive volumes, comprising more than twenty-three hundred octavo pages, many of them closely printed, are a monument of Dr. Schaff's learning and industry. In these, as well as in other volumes from his pen, he has done a good work for the American churches, and merits their gratitude. There is no small amount of hidden instruction in these symbols of the churches. The history of the creeds of Christendom is an epitome of the history of Christendom. We see in them the progress of the Christian church from age to age, and we see the lines of the progress, and catch glimpses of the goal which will be reached ere long. These creeds teach us a lesson of candor and charity. It is true that in actual fact they often do enkindle or perpetuate sectarian strife, but their normal tendency is to awaken a catholic spirit. In the larger part of the creeds the essential agreement of the evangelical denominations is clearly exhibited. The liberal spirit of a scholar pervades the criticisms of Dr. Schaff upon the creeds which he most highly approves, and he is free from bigotry in his remarks on the symbols which he disapproves. We think that he fails to take sufficient notice of the lengthened creeds of various Congregational churches. Some of these creeds, as prosaic statements of the truth, are superior to that approved by the Boston Council.

In the title pages of the three volumes as given above, the general plan of the work is indicated. The first volume may be considered an historical introduction to the others. The second volume contains the Scripture Confessions, the Ante-Nicene and Nicene Rules of Faith and Baptismal Creeds, the Oecumenical, the Roman, the Greek, and Russian Creeds, and the Old Catholic Union Creeds. The third volume contains the Creeds of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, of the Evangelical Reformed Churches, of the modern Protestant denominations. Some of the documents in these volumes were never published before in this country; and Dr. Schaff's work is the only single collection which has ever presented all the documents at once.

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In general the creeds of the different churches are given in such a form as to secure the approval of the most distinguished representatives of those churches. We think that it would have been better to pursue, in all instances, the same course which is pursued in some instances; and to obtain the English translations of foreign creeds from men who are acknowledged as authorities in the interpretations of those creeds. In such cases as the following Dr. Schaff has been wise: "The Dogmatic Decrees of the Vatican Council concerning the Catholic Faith and the Church of Christ, A.D. 1870" are published with the English translation by Cardinal Manning: "The Longer Catechism of the Orthodox, Catholic, Eastern Church" is translated by Rev. R. W. Blackmore, formerly Chaplain to the Russian Company in Kronstadt: the translation of the Augsburg Confession is by Dr. Charles P. Krauth of Philadelphia. All the translations appear to be faithfully and conscientiously made. The entire work is a thesaurus of information which our pastors will find it difficult to obtain elsewhere.

For general readers a collection of creeds is somewhat tedious; but there is so much liveliness and freshness in Dr. Schaff's Notes and Discussions that the tedium of the work is relieved. The common reader will often find isolated sentences which sparkle with interesting suggestions. We take the following almost at random: "The Bible is of God; the confession is man's answer to God." "For this reason a creed ought to use language different from that of the Bible." "A creed is, as it were, a doctrinal poem, written under the inspiration of divine truth" (i. p. 7). "Even when composed by committees or synods, they [creeds, symbols] are mainly the production of one mind" (i. p. 23). (It might have been added that sometimes very few members of a council or synod have believed in all parts of the creed which the council or synod sanctioned as a whole; see, for example, various histories of the Council of Trent, Richard Baxter's account of the Savoy Declaration.) "It is a singular fact that in the non-episcopal churches of Great Britain and the United States the Apostle's Creed is practically far less used, but much more generally believed, than in some state churches, where it is a part of the regular worship, like the Lord's prayer" (i. p. 20). "There are Lord Brethren as well as Lord Bishops; and the tyranny of a congregation over a minister, or of a majority over a minority, is as bad as any other kind of tyranny" (i. p. 826).

MODERN PHILOSOPHY, FROM DESCARTES TO SCHOPENHAUER AND HARTMANN. By Francis Bowen, A.M. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1877.

To any one not personally acquainted with Professor Bowen his Modern Philosophy will be somewhat of a surprise. There is a tone of bold orthodoxy to it, which is all the more refreshing because unexpected. The

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fundamental position of the author is best given by the following quotation from the Preface. "I have faithfully studied most of what the philosophy of these modern times and the science of our own day assume to teach. And the result is, that I am now more firmly convinced than ever that what has been justly called 'the dirt philosophy' of materialism and fatalism is baseless and false. I accept with unhesitating conviction and belief the doctrine of the being of one personal God, the Creator and Governor of the world, and of one Lord Jesus Christ, in whom 'dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily'; and I have found nothing whatever in the literature of modern infidelity which, to my mind, casts even the slightest doubt upon that belief. Not being a clergyman, I am not exposed to the cruel imputation which unbelievers have too long been permitted to fling against the clergy, of being induced by prudential motives to profess what they do not believe. Let me be permitted also to repeat the opinion which I ventured to express as far back as 1849, that 'the time seems to have arrived for a more practical and immediate verification than the world has ever yet witnessed of the great truth, that the civilization which is not based upon Christianity is big with the elements of its own destruction.'"

The historical part of this book constitutes only a sort of series of railroad ties, upon which the author's own system of philosophy shall smoothly run; and that system, as seen from the quotation given, is a Christian intuitionalism. The more jarring elements of modern philosophy are practically ignored. The material of the book furnishes a good example of a sympathetic selection, perhaps partly unconscious. There is little in the book which could have been omitted. The excursus upon Pascal is the only really unnecessary chapter. Our chief regret is that there is not much more to the book. We greatly need a good text-book in the history of philosophy. Nothing could have been better adapted to that purpose than this book, had it been rounded out, so as to present a fuller view of modern philosophy. It is a positive loss to philosophical discussion that Professor Bowen has failed to turn his keen Yankee logic upon such men as Locke and Hume and Reid.

The most thorough part of the work is the discussion of the German development of philosophy. In fact, Kant alone occupies one fifth part of the entire volume; German philosophy from Leibnitz to Hartmann about seven tenths. This discussion, though perhaps on no one author complete, still is uniformly good. German abstruseness is transformed into clear and intelligible English; while the ever-recurring criticism is keen, pertinent, suggestive. With the exception of the exaggerated position and praise given to Hartmann in the closing chapters, Professor Bowen's judgments are candid and logical.

The style of the book cannot be too highly commended. There is a frankness about it which wins the confidence of the reader. With an art

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most unusual among philosophers it unites precision with clearness. Yet beneath the quiet pounding of logic, one is conscious of intense feeling, which more than once breaks out, as if irresistibly, into expression. Behind the philosopher who discusses Spinoza's Theorems the man who feels the truth cries out, "However others may regard it, this conception of the absolute universality of immutable law seems to me not more sublime than appalling. Existence would not be worth having in such a sheet-iron universe, with heavens of brass and a heart of stone. If one could believe it — thank God that I do not — it would drive him to suicide; for what would it matter *when* one bubble more should break on the surface of that cruel waste of waters — that dark abyss of soulless being?"

This personal element in the book, all through, makes it racy reading; while its honest fearlessness ought to win for it respectful study. Our generation has been impudently treated by what has been passed off upon it as philosophy. Even the defenders of truth have often been frightened by the abuse of their opponents, into a caution almost criminal, or startled, by the questionings of error, into a conservatism still less logical.

But this book before us is subject to no "bread-and-butter" criticism. It is the work of a philosopher, not of a clergyman; and, what is better still, it is philosophical from beginning to end. For that reason we welcome it, as a most valuable addition to those works which aim to establish upon a philosophical foundation the superstructure of Christian faith. M. S. P.

Boston Monday Lectures. — Biology, with Preludes on Current Events. By Joseph Cook. With three colored Plates, after Beale and Frey. 12mo. pp. 325. Boston: James R. Osgood and Company. 1877.

Mr. Joseph Cook was invited, early in September 1875, by the Young Men's Christian Association of Boston, to lead the noon prayer-meeting in the Meionaon daily for a week, and to make on each occasion an address of half an hour in length. After four of these services, it was found that the audience had quadrupled in size. Mr. Cook was requested to continue his addresses daily through another week. On Monday noon, September 23d, the subject was "Final Permanence of Moral Character, or the Doctrine of Future Punishment," and it was noticed that a hundred ministers were in the audience. Mr. Cook was then requested to speak on the Atonement on a Sabbath evening, in Park Street Church. He complied with this request, and spoke to an audience filling the house to its utmost capacity. He was then invited by the Young Men's Christian Association to speak every Monday noon in the Meionaon for twelve weeks. October 25th his subject was "Boston Sceptical Cliques." The Daily "Advertiser" had a reporter present, who reproduced a part of the

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address. The "Springfield Republican" began to call attention to the large number of ministers and scholars who were present at the Monday Lectures. It was suggested, in many quarters, that these lectures should be continued regularly through the winter. Meantime, Mr. Cook was delivering one course of lectures at Amherst College, and another at Mount Holyoke Seminary, largely on Materialism, Evolution, and various biological topics. The Meionaon Hall seats about eight hundred persons, and in January 1876 was completely filled by Mr. Cook's hearers. After four months had passed, the assemblies were occasionally gathered in Bromfield Street Church. The lectures continued to be under the auspices of the Young Men's Christian Association until May 1876, when, at a meeting in Bromfield Street Church, resolutions were passed founding the Boston Monday Lectureship, and placing it for the next season under the care of a committee, consisting of Prof. E. P. Gould, of the Newton Theological Institute; the Rev. Dr. E. B. Webb, of Boston; the Rev. Dr. McKeown; the Rev. Samuel Cutler; the Rev. Mr. Deming; the Rev. Edward Edmunds; and the Rev. W. M. Baker, — men of different evangelical denominations. The lectures for 1875–76 continued eight months, and closed with the forty-fifth of the course, on the last Monday in May, in Bromfield Street Church.

In October 1876, the lectures were resumed in the Meionaon, but the hall was found to be too small. It was therefore soon transferred to Park Street Church. Two lectures were given in this large auditorium, when it was found to be much too small, and the audiences were crowded out into Tremont Temple. The first lecture there was given November 13th, 1876. This hall will contain from two thousand five hundred to three thousand people, and was often more than full in the winter of 1876–77. During the delivery of a course of thirteen lectures on "Biology," and of eleven on "Transcendentalism," and of eleven on "Orthodoxy," it was often necessary to turn hearers away, as they could not obtain standing room. From the forty-fifth lecture the Boston Daily "Advertiser" published full stenographic reports of the lectures. The reporter's manuscript was revised by the lecturer. The New York "Independent" regularly republished the lectures from February 1876. The Cincinnatti "Gazette" did the same; and a large number of newspapers throughout the country published extracts from them. In the course of the winter a few replies to certain statements in the lectures were made by Rev. Dr. James Freeman Clarke and other Unitarians, by Rev. Dr. Miner and other Universalist ministers.

From Feburary 1876 most of the Boston Monday Lectures were republished in London by the firm of R. D. Dickinson, Faringdon Street. Individual lectures were republished in the "Christian World Pulpit" and other theological serials of Great Britain. At the close of the course for 1876–77, in May, eighty lectures had been given, of which all from

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the forty-fifth had been published. In September 1877 James R. Osgood and Company issued "Biology, with Preludes on Current Events," a collection of thirteen Boston Monday Lectures. This volume, at the beginning of December 1877, was in its twelfth edition. In November the same house issued another course of Mr. Cook's lectures, entitled "Transcendentalism," and announced still another course, entitled "Orthodoxy."

October 1st a course of ten lectures on "Conscience" was opened, and December 10th a course of ten on "Hereditary Descent." Full stenographic reports, revised by Mr. Cook, are now published in the Boston Daily "Advertiser," the New York "Independent," the Cincinnatti "Gazette," and the New York "Advocate." Very numerous other papers publish large extracts from them. At least a hundred thousand copies appear weekly. The lectures are regularly republished in London.

It ought to be added that since the close of his lectures in May 1877 Mr. Cook has delivered several of them in New York City, Rochester and Syracuse, N. Y., Princeton, N. J., and various other places; has also supplied various pulpits in Boston and other cities. Before a critic passes any severe criticism on these lectures he may wisely ask himself whether, without having a previously established reputation, he would be able for two years to interest congregations containing sometimes fifteen hundred hearers, of whom sometimes five hundred are liberally educated men, assembled in the midst of pressing engagements, and in the whirl of a great city; and whether, in addition to his Monday noon exercises, he would be able to superintend the printing of three volumes of his lectures on abstruse and complicated themes, to preach frequently on the Sabbath, and occasionally to deliver sermons, each one of which is from one to two hours in length.

THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE OF SACRIFICE. By Alfred Cave, B.A. 8vo. pp. 524. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. 1877.

This volume defends, in a very elaborate manner, the doctrine of the atonement as it has been held by the Calvinists for many generations. It argues for the *penal* character of Christ's death. It evinces much research in regard to the sacrifices described in the Old Testament, and also in regard to the use of the term "sacrifice" in the New Testament. Its author aims to give a fair view of the theories which he opposes. He examines with particular care the theories of McLeod, Campbell, Bushnell, Dale. He criticises the positions of Spencer, Outram, Bähr, in regard to the nature of sacrifices. The book is written with evident painstaking, and is a valuable contribution to the theology of our times. Mr. Cave does not seem to care much, at least he does not say much, about the diversified views of American theologians on the subject of the atonement. These views, especially those of Dr. Jonathan Edwards, deserve some attention.

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THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

ROTHE ON DOGMATICS, REVELATION, AND SCRIPTURE.[1]

PREPARED BY JOHN P. LACROIX, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF MODERN LANGUAGES AND HISTORY IN THE OHIO WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY, DELAWARE, OHIO.

THE following is a condensed presentation of the chief points in Rothe's work, *Zur Dogmatik*. This work was first published as three essays in the *Studien und Kritiken*. It was then thoroughly revised and annotated by the author, and issued in a volume, in 1862. In the preparation of this summary of the work I have aimed at strict fidelity to the author. But I have also aimed at the greatest practicable clearness to English readers. Hence my paper is not a translation, but rather a reproduction. I do not make the author responsible for a single sentence of the paper, nor even for its imagery. He is responsible simply for its sentiments, its positions.

The work *Zur Dogmatik* is among Rothe's latest and most serious utterances; and yet it is the very work which, in some points, will most antagonize the prepossessions of the average English theologian. The only apology the author makes for his positions is his thorough conviction of being on the road to the truth. His book undertakes a difficult task — it undertakes to hold fast to the essential truth in Christianity, and yet to tear off from it the swaddling bands

[1] Zur Dogmatik, von Dr. R. Rothe, p. 356. Gotha: F. A. Perthes.

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of certain traditional associations which, as the author thinks, can no longer stand the test of modern thought. The unrivalled eminence of Dr. Rothe, both as a theologian and as a devout and spotless disciple of Christ, certainly entitle his views to the most candid consideration. In this thought I give the following synopsis to the English-reading public.

I. Dogmatics.

Dogmatists are of two classes — those who obtain their theological principles from dogmatics itself, and those who, obtaining their principles elsewhere, construct the science of dogmatics by these principles. I am of this second class.

But what is dogmatics? Evidently it is the science of dogmas. Before there were dogmas there was no thought of dogmatics. And the reason that dogmatics ever was thought of was the actual existence of dogmas, and the consequent felt need of constructing them into a science.

What, now, is a *dogma?* All admit that it is a something that has its roots in religion, and, consequently, that it can be understood only in the light of religion?

What, then, is *religion?* Religion is primarily of subjective quality; it is piety. Objective religion is secondary and derived. Of course, a revelation is presupposed by subjective religion. For it is only through a divine impingement upon the soul from without that our human consciousness becomes a God-consciousness. This impingement may be direct or mediate, supernatural or natural. The true order, then, is, revelation, subjective religion, objective religion. Before there can be objective religion there must be a religious quality to be objectified. This is piety; and piety is that state of the individual in which his entire personality is harmoniously affected by God. Piety, as a state of personalities, manifests itself outwardly — gives to itself shape and form. It affects and shapes the action of the will and the course of thought. Thought, as guided by piety, arrives at religious conceptions. These, when reduced to formal expression, are dogmas.

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In this process there are distinct and successive stages. The first stage is that of *feeling*. We *forebode* God before we *know* him. Our first knowledge of God is in the form of a presentiment. How, now, does this forebodement, this presentiment, objectify itself? Of course, only by assuming a form. But as it is itself only an individually colored presentiment, the form given to it will be shaped by the individual fancy. That is, the form it assumes will be an *image*, a symbol. Consequently, objective religion in this its earliest stage, is *mythology*. This word I use, of course, in a good sense. And I add that it is an essential perfection of any religion, even the Christian, that it has a mythology — a religious fantasy-world.

The next stage of our religious knowledge is, that it rises from its individual to a general or universal form. It rises from the sphere of feeling to that of the understanding. Here it can objectify itself only in a rational manner, i.e. by *words*. In rising to this form it passes through various phases of increasing distinctness. At first it is nothing more than an impression, and its objective form is mere *opinion*. Next it rises from the crudeness of opinion to the form of a distinct *thought;* its objective form is now that of a religious *maxim*. But this process whereby our religious impressions, opinions, rise to the generic form of clear thoughts can take place only in respect to the several separate elements of our consciousness; so that at best our religious knowledge exists only in the form of a plurality of as yet isolated thoughts. But inasmuch as to think is, strictly, to *com*prehend, to construct the units of consciousness into an organic totality, hence the next stage is, that the fragments of our religious knowledge be constructed into organically articulated religious systems.

Now, if this is the goal which religious thought naturally *must* set before itself, it is evident that this goal is attainable; otherwise, there would be a contradiction in the very constitution of things. And, in fact, the objective conditions of such systematic construction are here right at hand. For, evidently, each several religious thought is closely *related* to

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every other, by virtue of the common ground out of which they have sprung, — namely, the specifically attuned religious consciousness, — as also because they are the product of one self-consistently acting apparatus of thought.

Now, the process which we have thus described takes place concretely in the religious community. This community is the *church*. It is only through the church that religious thought receives that precision of form whereby it becomes *dogma*. To the church, therefore, we now turn.

That piety necessarily leads to society — communion — we take for granted. This society or church is, in fact, simply piety as having become concrete or objective. For, as the piety of the individual comes to objective expression, it becomes manifest to the consciousness of other individuals; hence the origin, and, in fact, the inevitability, of religious communion. This communion is communion of will, and also of thought. It is with the latter only that we have here to do.

Primarily this phase of religious communion is simply a communion of presentiments. Hence it is crude and superficial. It can become deep and thorough only by rising from the individual to the generic form — only by passing from instinctive presentiment to rational thought. This takes place when the church gives to the knowledge common to her members an adequate *form*, and *sanctions* it with her *authority*. This sanction comes about primarily only very indefinitely, usually by the force of mere usage. It is only when differences of opinion arise that it becomes sharp and definite. For when strife arises, then the law of self-preservation induces the church to examine closely, to decide positively, and to stamp with authority. When this takes place, — when the church authoritatively moulds her religious thought into such form as constitutes an adequate expression, in any particular respect, of the specific form of piety which she represents, — then she creates a dogma. And it is only when she has done this in respect to all the elements of her collective religious knowledge that the communion of thought

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among her members can be complete. A digest of all the dogmas thus originating constitutes the *symbolum* or articles of faith.

Dogmas necessarily presuppose a church; for only a church can make them. Ever since the dissolution of the church into a plurality of relatively opposed fragmentary churches, Christian doctrine can appear only as the doctrine of some specific branch of the church. Hence dogmas can now appear only as *confessional*. This holds true not of particular dogmas, but of all dogmas. There are no dogmas common to several churches; but in proportion as any church is the *completed* objectification of any specific form of piety, in the same proportion *all* her dogmas belong to her, and to no other. Since the schism of the church there are really no general Christian dogmas. For let the principle of any church be fully carried out, and it will affect every one of its dogmas, without exception.

But with this digested scheme of dogmas we have as yet attained simply to dogmas, but not to *dogmatics*. The dogmas stand as yet simply alongside of each other. They are not yet organized into a unitary system. To so organize them is to construct the science of dogmatics. Occasions for this work occur early in the history of the church. The single dogmas need to be reconciled with each other. The rule, the criterion, the principle for this reconciliation, is the specific form of the religious consciousness of which the church in question is the outward expression. The process of constructing dogmas into dogmatics takes place through the same dialectical procedure whereby the single dogmas are evolved. It is, in fact, but the completion of the already begun logical process. So soon as the church has formed her round of single dogmas she enters upon an age of dogmatizing; that is, she begins to modify, temper, and clarify her dogmas.

A comprehensive definition of dogmatics, then, is this: It is the systematic, that is, scientific, presentation of the official doctrine of a particular church-communion. A mere

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concatenation of dogmas into *locos communes* is but a preparation for dogmatics. Dogmatics itself arises only through the discovery of the common ground-principle out of which the single dogmas sprang, and by the reduction of the dogmas into more complete organic harmony with such principle. The reducing process is both free and bound — free, in that it is wholly intent on effecting a complete harmony of all the dogmas, even at the risk of sacrificing something of what had appeared as true doctrine; but bound, in that it has no other rule of judgment than the one underlying principle or spirit of the church which generated the dogmas.

Dogmatics is, accordingly, a positive, a historico-critical, but not a speculative, science. Its subject-matter is the positive, historically given church-teaching. But it is of the greatest importance that its positive and its critical elements be kept distinct. Though not speculative itself, it necessarily presupposes a speculative system. He who has no such system cannot construct dogmatics; for every dogmatist needs clearly-determined conceptions as his instruments; and where else he can get them, than in a speculative system, is not apparent. And the need is not merely a system of metaphysics, but rather of speculative theology proper. I know that theologians are very prone to make dogmatics a substitute for the speculative theology which they lack; but this is simply an abuse. A commingling of the two works disastrously for both, and is a chief source of the confusion of ideas with which we theologians have been so justly reproached. He who would work at dogmatics is in a bad case so long as he has not wrought out for himself a rounded system of speculative theology. A *mixtum compositum* of dogmatic and speculative elements under the name of dogmatics is the weakest of weak and useless things.

Also the relation of dogmatics to exegetical theology is often misconceived of. Though I freely admit the dependence of dogmatics on the Scriptures, and hence on exegetical theology, still I cannot admit that there is such a thing as

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"biblical dogmatics." In my view the *matter* of dogmatics is simply and purely the *given* dogmas. The dogmatist cannot *make* dogmas; they are ready made for him. Hence the question, Can there be a biblical dogmatics? depends on this other question: Does the Bible contain dogmas? And this I deny. I hold that the *religious teaching* contained in the Bible lacks that developed form to which the word "dogma" is properly applied. The Bible contains the *germs* of dogmas, but not dogmas themselves. It is only with the latter that dogmatics has to do.

Having settled our conception of dogmatics in general, we turn now to Protestant dogmatics in particular. What, then, is the characteristic, the ground-principle, of Protestant dogmatics? This is the same as to ask, What is the principle of the church of the Reformation? This principle can be determined only by determining the specific character of Protestant piety, whereof Protestant dogmatics is simply the objectification. This piety, now, is a species of the genus "Christian piety." The essence of Christian piety in general is, that it is a *real communion of man with God by the mediation of Christ as Saviour from sin.* The specific modification of this piety whereby it becomes Protestant piety has usually been expressed under the dualism of two principles — a *material* and a *formal.* The material principle is the free justification of man by faith in Christ, without the least personal desert. The formal principle is the exclusive and unconditional normative authority of the Bible. Both of these principles are primarily the norms not of Protestant dogmatics, but of Protestant piety. It is only mediately that they are the principles of Protestant dogmatics.

At first glance it seems strange that the Protestant church rests upon *two* principles. It has the appearance that she is devoid of inner unity. Closer examination, however, will show that the inner unity is not lacking — that the two principles are but two phases of the same thing. The fact upon which the Reformed church was founded was the personal experience of salvation through faith alone. The experience

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was the material principle. But in organic union with this experience was the formal principle of Bible-teaching, whereof this experience was the application. The two stages are but stages of one process. If the soul is justified by faith in Christ,—if the church effects man's salvation only mediately, by directing his attention to Christ,—then she must possess Christ—his spirit, his image, his teachings—in such an authentic objective *form* as will enable the sinner, unhelped by any third medium, to exert that faith which saves. This objective representation of Christ is, now, simply the Scriptures. And the seeming dualistic basis and nature of Protestant piety may be expressed in its really unitary character thus: It is that specific form of Christian piety which springs from justification through faith in Christ as objectively presented in the Scriptures. Such being the principle of Protestant piety, and the Protestant church being the objectification of this piety, and dogmatics being the systematized presentation of the thinking of the church, hence the above-stated principle of Protestant piety is also the principle of Protestant dogmatics.

What, now, are the sources of dogmatics? They are twofold—historical and critical—the given dogmas and the divinely guided thinking of the subject. The historical source is, however, more than the naked dogmas proper; it embraces, also, a stream of dogmatic tradition. The using of the historical sources consists, first, in accurately determining what the dogmas are, and then in organically developing them. The genuine dogmatic tradition (for the Lutheran and Reformed churches) lies in such works as preceded the eighteenth century. For at this point the first great stage of dogmatic development ceased, and gave place to a period of relative dissolution.

The fact that the Lutheran and Reformed churches have different symbols and traditions forms an apparent obstacle to the development of a unitary dogmatic system truly representing both of them. But I regard it as only apparent. As both churches sprang out of the same principle (of justifica-

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tion through faith in Christ as presented in the Scriptures), I can but regard them as simply representing two phases of a religious development which, in its full form, will unite them both in a higher unity. The churches are, indeed, different, but not *heterogeneous*. A true consensus of the dogmas of the two churches will furnish the basis of the perfect dogmatics of the Protestant church. The production of such system is a task of the future. The dogmatic development in neither church is as yet anything near completed. Upon very few points is there a settled unanimity in either church; much more, then, is the higher unification of the two a work yet to be awaited.

But what is the process whereby the single Protestant dogmas are to be constructed into a system? This process is simply the logical evolution of the contents of the specifically Protestant God-consciousness. The prime fact of this consciousness is *redemption*. This redemption presupposes a lack of communion with God, from which it redeems. This lack is *sin*. As effected through Christ, redemption proceeds from God; that is, it is of *grace*. The two facts underlying redemption are, therefore, sin and grace. Sin and grace form, therefore, the two chief parts of dogmatics. As sin presupposes God and man, hence the first part of dogmatics falls into: (1) the doctrine of God, or *theology* (proper); (2) the doctrine of man, or *anthropology;* (3) the doctrine of sin, or *hamartiology*. The second part treats of grace, as its fruits spring objectively from the reconciliation effected by Christ, and subjectively from faith in Christ on the part of the subject. Its two subdivisions are, therefore: (1) the doctrine of the Saviour — *soterology;* and (2) the doctrine of salvation — *soteriology*.

At first glance this classification seems to fail in doing justice to the formal principle (the Bible) of the Protestant church. And, in fact, the older dogmatists uniformly began their classification with a chief part entitled *bibliology*. The true position of a discussion of the Bible, however, is under the subdivision, doctrine of salvation; the Bible really being,

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in its present form, one of the means of grace. But if still, in obedience to settled usage, dogmatics treat first of bibliology, it were better that it do so not in the body of the work, but in an introduction.

What, now, is the precise method of treating each dogma in detail. Here we notice three features:

(1) The dogmas are to be presented in their ecclesiastically fixed form, with the greatest possible fidelity. They are then to be measured by the accepted Protestant criterion, the Scriptures. Agreement with Scripture is here the indispensable condition of sound doctrine. No dogma can here be valid except as it is seen to be an organic member of the general system which lies in germ in the sacred text. So, also, no Christian sect can be Christian, except on condition that it can, despite its particularistic character, show itself to be a logical development of one of the phases of essential Christian piety. And a complete ideal dogmatics would be this — one that contained and developed to its maturity all and every of the germinally given doctrines of the Scriptures, and no others. And by the Scriptures we mean the Old as well as the New Testament, but the Old only in the light of and as supplemented by the New.

(2) But the work of the dogmatist extends further than to the mere applying to the dogmas the test of the Scripture text. The Protestant church presents her dogmas as products of scientific thought. And they are such. They are doctrinal definitions, wrought out by the apparatus of theological science. As such they are a proper subject of theological criticism. They are to stand or fall, according as they can or cannot logically make good their right to existence. The church cannot refuse to submit all of her dogmas to this test in all its rigor, without, *eo ipso*, abandoning them as dogmas; for she would thereby confess that they are not dogmas, i.e. products of theological science. This position is also confirmed by the history of dogmas. Dogmas, in fact, are uniformly the products of repeated attempts at the scientific construction of the substance

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of Scripture. Each renewed attempt implied the relative imperfection of the preceding attempt. What, now, will guarantee that any particular last attempt has absolutely reached the ideal? There is no such guarantee. But an unquestionable reason for subjecting dogmas to occasional scientific re-examination is the fact that they are simply the products of such scientific apparatus as was available in the age in which they were elaborated. But this apparatus evidently grows more discriminating, more perfect, from age to age; so that it is successively able to correct, reject, or perfect that to which it previously had given its full sanction.

But what are the special points towards which the work of dogmatic criticism should be directed? First, as to whether each dogma is free from contradiction with itself or with the others; and then, whether or not it is free from ambiguity. Furthermore, whether the conceptions used in constructing the dogma are true and clear, or only partially so. For the alphabet of conceptions (ideas, logical terms) is in constant process of growth and clarification. Note, e.g. the great modifications which the ideas *spirit* and *matter*, *nature* and *personality*, *body* and *soul* have undergone.

(3) Another point to be considered in dogmatic criticism is the fact that all our religious doctrines are ultimately rooted in *feeling*. When the divine revelation which enkindles the religious consciousness impinges upon the consciousness for the first time, it impinges upon it as already *individually* determined, that is, in a word, as *feeling*. The specific modification of this feeling effected by the revelation constitutes the primitive form of the piety of the subject; and this piety, when logically evolved in thought, constitutes the contents of dogmatics for that subject. And each church is also a composite subject, falling under the same conditions. Every particular dogma must therefore, in order to its legitimacy, be seen to be rooted in some phase of the form of religious feeling of which it claims to be the scientific expression. So long as the religious roots of the dogma are undiscovered, so long is that dogma unappreciated. The

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possibility of the purification of the body of dogmas from the sphere of feeling is given in the fact that the essence of the dogmas exists as feeling in the consciousness of each subject before it exists as developed dogmas.

Thus it appears that each dogma is to be tested by a threefold criterion; to wit, as it is related to Scripture, to the apparatus of science, and to the religious consciousness. It is to be criticised *scripturally*, *scientifically*, and *religiously*. The more usual order, however, would be, scripturally, religiously, and scientifically.

The work of this threefold criticism is very especially needed in regard to all dogmas which have been transplanted bodily into Protestantism out of the Catholic church. Such dogmas are *per se* suspected; for they are not the logical product of the Protestant consciousness. Especially in religious and scientific respects are they to be carefully scrutinized. How readily may they be rooted in an unevangelical religious feeling! How probable that the scientific means by which, so many ages ago, they were elaborated is now scientifically antiquated! And it is precisely these dogmas which the evangelical church imported, unexamined, out of the old church, which render modern Protestantism so objectionable to the present age. So that precisely with these dogmas lies the Herculean task of modern dogmatics. It is with the great decisions which the Councils of Nice and Chalcedon prematurely fossilized that the critical efforts of the Protestant dogmatist are most imperatively needed. To spend our pains on the minute differences between Protestant sects, and to leave these momentous ancient decisions utterly untouched, is to strain at gnats, and yet swallow camels, if not to render theology positively contemptible to an impartial outsider.

But when, now, dogmatic criticism shall find defects and hiatuses in the existing dogmas, from what source are these defects to be remedied? By the help of what are the germinal dogmas to be developed out into perfect correctness and self-consistency? Not by the help of dogmatics itself, but

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by the help of that which alone renders dogmatic construction possible, viz. a rounded speculative system in the mind of the dogmatist. Here dogmatics finds itself in organic dependence upon speculative theology. And here we discover the real unity between the contents of revelation and the contents of human reason in general. Revelation comes to incipient reason, and starts it at work. Reason, speculation, philosophic thought constructs the contents it receives from revelation and from all other sources into a logically organized system. One of the parts of this system is necessarily a perfectly correct dogmatics. It is, then, by the help of scientific or speculative reason that dogmas are to be perfected. And reason, in this sense, signifies reason as having taken into itself the contents of all attainable instruction, revelation, of course, included. This furnishes the transition-point of our discussion from dogmatics to

II. Revelation.

Our scheme of dogmatics admits of the treatment of bibliology in the general introduction. But as the Bible rests upon revelation, hence any treatment of bibliology must begin with a discussion of revelation.

What, now, is revelation? Our earlier dogmatics largely identified it with the Bible. It is a merit of recent dogmatics to have distinguished between the two. True, an early and good distinction was made between a *revelatio naturalis* and a *revelatio supernaturalis*. And much of our modern confusion in regard to the function of human reason was avoided by our Protestant fathers by their regarding reason as not already complete, but as in constant process of *becoming*. This thought they included in their idea of regeneration. They held this idea, however, too much as simple purification, and not enough as also development. True, these elder dogmatists railed out against reason. And properly so; for what all did they not include under the term? Reason is indeed a precious power. But who has it? Rationality is, in fact, a *goal* standing out *before* man. It has never been *completely*

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a *fact* in any man — one only excepted. So also is it with freedom. That a man *has* reason means simply that he *can think;* hence he has reason only in the measure that he really *can* think. But who can do this otherwise than merely relatively? Theology has, then, meant to object only to the misuse of reason — to the exaltation of crude reason to the throne which belongs to it only when fully purified and developed.

But our older dogmatists, though right in principle, erred in application. This is apparent in their admission that unaided reason, though blind and worthless as to divine things, is yet capable enough as to worldly and earthly things — an admission which will be made by no one who properly understands the relation between the religious and the so-called worldly and moral. The ground of this false position lay in the incorrect notion of revelation which then prevailed. According to this notion, the process of revelation consisted almost exclusively in imparting to the understanding ready-made religious dogmas, and, in fact, in imparting them directly by a mechanical inpouring. Such a notion conflicts with the nature of reason, and robs the idea of revelation of all vital naturalness. Besides, it is inconsistent with the idea of human history. But with such a notion of revelation the Bible itself is in direct conflict. The Bible represents revelation as a series — a closely connected series — of miraculous historical facts and historical institutions, in connection with which take place manifold supernatural illuminations of prophets, in vision and speech, by the Spirit of God, in the interest not so much of new religious dogmas as in view of preparing for future historical events.

An urgent demand upon modern theology is, accordingly, a rectification of the conception of revelation. To this I here attempt to contribute my mite. I hold that God's revealing work is simply a special phase of his redeeming work, and, in fact, that phase which is the necessary basis of redemption proper. Its end is to prepare for redemption — to render it historically possible. I further contend that

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the essence of redemption consists in a purification and an invigoration of man's God-consciousness — to which God-consciousness man cannot now, because of the effects of sin, attain clearly and fully without higher help than the natural means that lie about him. I do not mean that revelation is the sole manner in which God educates and prepares the race for redemption; for God is constantly educating both heathens and Christians. I simply mean that it is exclusively in the field of biblical religion that God's general educating of the race is specifically directed to the clarification of man's God-consciousness, and is consequently revelative. And history here completely sustains us. For, rich as have been the fruits of the mythical religions in moral culture, yet in religious knowledge they have produced almost nothing.

Revelation, then, is an intensifying of man's consciousness of *God*. God in revelation reveals *himself*. God, and God solely, is the object revealed by revelation. Any other object is revealed only indirectly and incidentally. This is most strikingly seen in the highest point of revelation — *Christ*. Christ reveals but one thing — God, and God only.

But *how* does God purify and intensify man's God-consciousness? The old dogmatic position here is, that man sustains to God in revelation a *mechanical* relation, without co-operating on his own part. The soul is purely passive; God does not begin *in* it and *with* it, but works upon it by a pure act of omnipotence. He pours, in a *magical* manner, a complex of notions into the soul which are not only new, but foreign to it. But if this were the case, then the supposed revelation would not come into the soul at all; for by the very law of our being nothing comes into our personality otherwise than by the co-operation of our freedom, i.e. otherwise than by *moral mediation*. Moreover, such a manner of revelation would preclude all religious development in man. If, then, a real revelation of God is made to man, it must be regarded as partly conditioned by the co-operation of the soul, and as finding a receptive-point for itself already in

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the soul. In a word, all revelation must be *morally* mediated. Herein is the broad distinction between the religion of the Bible and all heathen religions. The latter are based on *magic*. For in spiritual things the magical is simply that which is not personally or morally mediated.

By holding that revelation is co-operated in by the recipient, I do not preclude in the least its immediate directness. It is direct, and yet mediated — directly given, without the intervention of a third factor, but mediated by the responsive action of the recipient soul. Accordingly, when God would purify and intensify the sin-darkened God-consciousness of man through revelation, he necessarily does it in strict harmony with the psychological laws upon which human life is based; that is, he effects the designed impression upon the soul by setting at work the psychical powers of the soul in a normal manner. The conditions of the possibility of such revelation are simply the *impressibility* of the consciousness through outward impressions made in harmony with natural psychological law.

As, in consequence of sin, the soul cannot by the mere help of the natural data about it rise to the requisite intensity of God-consciousness, it follows that the normal manner of effecting the needed intensity is to so *intensify* the influences of those data as that they shall be adequate to reflect into the soul the correct idea of God with the requisite convincing force. There can be concerned here only *outward* religious data; for the supposition of inner ones would imply sorcery on the part of God. These data can only be natural events or historical facts, or both. When God reveals himself to the sinner, therefore, it is by placing in the horizon of his perception such new facts — natural or historical occurrences — as will enable his soul to generate by its normal activity an adequate conception of God, and consequently of his own alienation from God. These outer occurrences must be of such a character as to be explainable only by a correct conception of God. They must be supernatural in such a manner as to imply the full idea of God. And as the idea

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of God is full only by embracing that which constitutes his character, — i.e. his moral attributes, — and as these can be manifested only in the setting and realizing of ends, hence it is chiefly by historical occurrences that God can reveal himself in the fullest degree. But history can rest only upon a background of nature; so that nature and history go hand in hand, the former being subordinate to the latter. Also this twofold means of revelation answers to the twofold contents of the idea of God — the *natural* and the *moral*. God's natural attributes — omnipotence, etc. — are revealable through nature; his moral attributes, — holiness, justice, etc., — through history. And the former set of attributes is so revealable only as subordinate to the latter, i.e. as means of realizing their ends; just as the natural in general is subordinate to the spiritual or moral.

This, then, is the essence of revelation: God enters by a current of supernatural history as an acting person into the current of natural human history, and thus brings himself into such nearness to man that man, despite his sin-darkened vision, cannot fail to recognize him. This is the first great and objective feature in revelation. We shall call it the *manifestation* of the divine.

But this objective phase needs to be supplemented by a corresponding inner, subjective one. In order to the success of revelation it must not only be perceived, but also *understood*, and *correctly* understood. God's end in revelation is to make man conscious not only *that* he is, but also *who* he is. Can, now, the unaided sinful soul of man adequately appreciate the objective manifestation of God, however intensely it be made? Christian experience must answer, No. For the *organ* of cognition is radically damaged. That the outer manifestation, then, come to true appreciation, it must be answered to by an inner influence of God upon man's consciousness — man's cognitive power must be so supernaturally shined upon as to be put into condition fully to comprehend that which comes to it from without. This subjective phase of revelation we call *inspiration*. This

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inspiration is utterly free from magical traits. A distinct receptive point for it in the soul is ready prepared in the intensified religious consciousness generated by the supernatural manifestation. And when, now, the inner divine light falls upon the soul, the natural endeavor of the soul is immediately directed to an inquiry into the full meaning of the manifestation. In this deciphering of the manifestation the inspiration finds its object, and also its limits. They are the two poles which call for each other, and give measure to each other. Manifestation without inspiration would be but a dumb *portentum;* inspiration without manifestation, a mere *ignis fatuus.*

Inspiration assumes different forms according as the knowledge to which it leads is of individual or of general character — instinctive foreboding or clear thought. In the first case the inspired person is a *seer;* in the second, a *prophet.* In the first case the person sees visions; in the second case God so combines the existing thought-store of the soul as that essentially new thoughts are the result — thoughts of such a character that the receiver is distinctly conscious of not having come upon them by personal effort. For a personal experience of at least analogous things we may safely appeal to any person of rich experience in divine things. Also artistic production affords more than mere analogies. This does not imply that it is impossible generically to distinguish between esthetic and divine inspiration. Esthetic inspiration is but subjective, and stands alone; divine inspiration is organically connected with an objective manifestation. Hence the difference is radical.

As both manifestation and inspiration are historically conditioned, hence they can take place only gradually and progressively. The manifestation can be even partially understood only in the degree in which the receiver possesses already such elements of thought as, when combined by inspiration, will furnish a partial understanding of the manifestation. We say partially; for only this is required at first. For when the object manifested is once partially taken

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hold of by humanity, it thenceforth remains displayed on the horizon of human observation, and hence may remain centuries upon centuries engaged in guiding man's thoughts toward a fuller realization of its significance.

It is only in perfected revelation — that is, in Christ — that revelation and the comprehension of revelation go absolutely hand in hand. As the perfected revelation of God, Christ is the God-man, and knows himself as absolutely and incessantly inspired. But this very character of absoluteness in the inspiration of Christ exalts it into a higher genus, and constitutes him the One in whom dwells all the fulness of God, that is, the One who is identical with God. Christ, then, is the sole completely inspired one in the whole scope of Scripture. And as God is the sole object of revelation, and Christ the complete revelation of God, hence the whole of Scripture, in the degree of its inspiration, is essentially simply a revelation of Christ. As any other than Christ is but partially inspired, hence any other than Christ is capable only partially, not absolutely, of reproducing and transmitting to posterity a complete reflex of the spirit of Christ.

The idea of revelation which we have thus presented implies that revelation is strictly *supernatural* — that it is only by the inner help of the divine causality that the outer manifestation is comprehensible. But it no less clearly implies that it is also strictly *natural* — that it is an organic current in the general course of human history. But revelation is not only itself a historical current, it also aims at rendering its contents the normal contents of the human consciousness in general; so that ultimately, from having been strictly supernatural, it will have become purely natural. That is, it will have so elevated humanity that the permanent normal state of man will be that of unclouded vision of God and communion with God. And this inner union with God will then objectify itself in a perfect outer organization of man's worldly relations, social, moral, and political. This transformation of humanity is the main end of revelation. The prime step in its attaining this end is, that it pass over into

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the very life-blood of the consciousness of the race; and it is of only incidental importance that it be framed into words and written into Scripture. Revelation, we say, is history; and history is an organic series of facts. The significance of revelation is not chiefly in the subjective impressions the seer may receive from the objective manifestation, but in the manifestation itself, and in the impressions which this manifestation, as a link in history, will henceforth make with increasing correctness upon collective humanity.

What, now, are the criteria, the characteristic traits, the evidences of revelation? Dogmatists have here written much that is totally superfluous. My answer is, that the evidences of revelation are simply the constituent elements of the idea of revelation itself. My notion is, that the three commonly given *proofs* of revelation — to wit, *miracles*, *prophecy*, and the *testimony* of inspired men — are not proofs of revelation, but, in fact, the essential revelation itself. Revelation is *per se* supernatural, that is, miraculous. It *per se* lifts man into new light, and casts light into the future, that is, is prophetic. It *per se* comes to the race through inspired men, that is, it is witnessed of. Without all three of these features no revelation is possible; and these things are not possible without revelation. They are thus the very elements of revelation itself. They do not witness of revelation, but *are* revelation. The very idea of revelation is inclusive of miracles. Let us first look at miracles.

But what stages are there here? These: The darker humanity is, the more abrupt will be the miracle. Earthquakes, deluges, rains of fire, raisings of the dead are sometimes needed. But the nearer the race rises to God, the less occasion there remains for such abrupt physical miracles. And finally all so-called revelation will utterly cease. But when? When God is already totally revealed and enthroned in the consciousness of all. Here, then, it will cease. But why? Because its end is fully reached, and hence its necessity superseded. Then all will be supernatural, or, rather, simply natural; or, still better expressed, then the antithesis of the natural and the supernatural will have ceased.

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But how about the philosophical difficulties involved in the idea of miracles? I here frankly and with all the innocence of infancy confess that I have never been able to see the least particle of force in any of these so-called difficulties. Perhaps this comes of the fact that I am in my very nature so very thoroughly theistic, and so utterly removed from the least shadow of deism or pantheism. At any rate, the fact is as I state. Doubtless much of the trouble of others at this point springs from the fact that they too generally confound and identify the two questions: Is a miracle possible? and: Are all of the strange incidents recorded in the Bible real miracles? These questions ought to be kept absolutely separate. The one is philosophical; the other is purely historical. The philosophical question ought to be settled utterly irrespective of the historical. The affirming of the first does not pledge us to accept a single so-called historical miracle whatever. But whether, in fact, any such be accepted depends solely on whether it or they can stand the ordeal of strict historical criticism.

The philosophical possibility of miracles is conceded by all intelligent opponents of pantheism and determinism, that is, by all true theists. The speculative presupposition of miracles is a correct idea of the relative self-existence of creation, — the relative self-subsistence of nature, — apart from God. In virtue of this idea, nature is to be regarded as a self-supporting organism of acting forces, having the laws of its development lodged within itself. All this, however, is given to it by God; and it itself constantly remains in God's power, and subject to his intervention, according as occasion may arise. But why can such occasions arise? Because the universe is the theatre not only of mechanism, but also of freedom; not only of dynamics, but also of ethics. Because real freedom in the creature (man) precludes the possibility of providing beforehand in the laws of nature for all future exigencies of human history. It is, therefore, strictly involved in the very idea of God as a free, rational Being that in the religious education of a race of imperfect

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free natures he will intervene, modifying, into the chain of events, and that he will make use of the dynamic (physical) realm as the means of such supernatural intervention; that is to say, it is implied in the very fact that a personal God creates personal creatures that he both can and probably will work miracles. God subordinates nature to natural laws; he so balances the forces of nature in the organic totality of nature that nature has within itself the power of self-evolution. But he does not subordinate himself to natural law. Here, then, is the plain possibility of miracles. The miracle is not, therefore, something arbitrary, unphilosophical, irrational; on the contrary, its possibility is philosophically called for by the theistic conception of God; as also its actuality is likewise rationally called for by the occurrence of contingencies (such as the fall of man), the possibility of which is necessarily involved in the creation of free moral agents.

Our older theology forfeited the possibility of miracles by its erroneous notion of creation. If the whole fabric of nature has no relative self-dependence, if it persists in existing only by virtue of a *creatio continua*, then there is no essential difference between the natural and the supernatural, and hence no foothold for the miraculous — either everything is miracle, or nothing.

A word as to the various degrees of the miraculous:

(1) The intensest form of the miracle is that which is directly wrought by absolute power, without the help of second causes or other media whatsoever. For example, the generation of Jesus, or the turning of water into wine. Such effects are analogous to the first act of creation, whereby the absolute beginning of the universe was made, but not to the subsequent modifications of it which were prepared for by the development which preceded them. Such miracles have a resemblance to magic; hence they can take place only in the field of physical nature, but not in the field of spirit, morality, religion. For the very idea of the spiritual or the moral requires that all effects here wrought must be

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co-operated in by the subject. Hence regeneration is not an effect or miracle of this first class. Miracles of this class do not suspend the operation of natural laws, or in any way conflict with them; for they lie entirely outside of the sphere of natural law. They are effects wrought directly and suddenly by God's causality; as such, they are neither helped nor hindered by nature. Immediately, however, upon their being wrought, their effects, as facts, fall under the sway of natural law, just as other physical facts.

(2) A less intense form of the miracle is such as is wrought by God through natural causes. The miraculousness here consists in the fact that the effects are such as the natural causes *per se* are strictly inadequate to produce. To the working of such miracles it is only needful that God combine the existing forces of nature in extraordinary and to us (as yet) incomprehensible ways. In doing this he simply acts analogously to human action in the field of invention. Man combines the powers of nature so as to work the wonders of photography, telegraphy, etc; God does likewise. Photography is as miraculous to the savage as the parting of Jordan's waves will be to the philosopher in the remote future. God's knowledge of nature's potencies is absolute; hence he will be competent to the production of miracles of this class so long as man's knowledge of nature is not also absolute. The essence, then, of this sort of miracles is, that they are such effects on the field of nature as man can account for only by the supposition of supernatural intervention. Apart from their moral surroundings they are analogous to what we vulgarly call chance. This class of miracles may also be wrought by God through the employment of natural agents higher than man — the angels. And wrought in the same manner, that is, by new combinations of natural forces.

To the above classes of real miracles we may subjoin a third class of merely *relative* miracles. These are such as are wrought by human agency through the strictly normal application of natural forces, but with such wisdom as to produce effects which to the beholder *seem* strictly super-

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natural. Some of the New Testament *healings* may be of this class. And it may be that science will yet be able to trace the precise steps whereby they were effected.

After this brief glance at the classes of miracles, we cannot but recur to the question: Wherein do miracles conflict with nature? And our answer is constantly more intense: Nowhere! Miracles simply lie *beyond* nature. God has not enchained his hands in the net-work of nature. He sits transcendently above it, and modifies and uses it *when* and *as* his wisdom calls for.

It thus appears that I lay great stress upon miracles. But I hasten to add that I do this not at all in the sense of earlier dogmatists, as seeing in them a help to the faith of after generations. The very contrary is the case. The biblical miracles are more a hinderance than a help to faith in this modern age. The significance of miracles is, for us, not apologetical, but historical. We need them not as constituting *chasms* in the course of history, but rather as *links* in it. The essential point is not that we stare at the miraculous facts in the sacred narrative, but that we take into our soul, as a life-force, the divine truths they helped to manifest. And many a one has, I think, so taken in these truths who yet hesitates intellectually to accept miracles. These truths, in fact, after being once revealed and absorbed into a society, may thenceforth remain a common element of the general consciousness, apart from and independently of the miracle which at first manifested them.

So much for miracles as the first criterion of revelation. If revelation were simply manifestation, then miracles would be the sole criterion, that is, the sole element, of revelation. But revelation is both manifestation and inspiration; hence as miracles correspond to manifestation, so *prophecy* corresponds to inspiration. As miracles are the form of manifestation, so prophecy is the objectification of inspiration.

A wide difference must here be made between prophecy (*προφητεία*) and prediction (*μαντεία*). Prophecy is God's verbal elucidation of his manifestations. Prediction is only

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an incidental phase of prophecy. The manifestation is of course intended to act as a historical influence in shaping and regenerating humanity. Prophecy is teleological; it discloses the purpose of the manifestation, and thereby also helps the race to the realization of that spiritual state to which the manifestation was an index — a beacon-light. Prophecy is not an aggregate of isolated words; it is an organically articulated whole. It is a stream running hand-in-hand with God's miraculous manifestations; and they, both of them, lead to and terminate in one point — in the perfect manifestation of God = *Christ*. Thus Christ "fulfils" both. And the stream of prophecy becomes richer and more definite in contents the nearer it reaches its fulfilment. Hence it constantly loses in the element of prediction. For the more its contents enrich the consciousness of the race, the more fully can the race comprehend divine things by the normal use of enlightened reason.

As to the apologetical use of the recorded prophecies, our position is the same as in regard to the use of miracles. The use of both is chiefly for those who first received them. Their purpose was to prepare and educate the race up to a receptivity for Christ, but not to induce future generations to look back with faith upon a now historical Christ. The only possible way (and this is impracticable) for modern Christians to feel the use of miracles and prophecy, would be for us to divest ourselves of the whole weight of our Christian knowledge and culture, and to go back and begin with the very first feeble link in the chain, and thence grope our way up through the devious path of Old Testament history — up to Christ. They were the scaffolding to usher in Christ. What need we of the scaffolding, now that we possess the full building, and even dwell in it? Prophecy and miracles, then, have their rich meaning for the present age; but this meaning is not as a help to our believing in a light that already blazes into our eyes with the glory of noonday, but rather as necessary elements in the series of historical manifestations which culminated in Christ.

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As a third proof of revelation has been adduced the personal *witness* of those to whom the revelation was made. This also, as the other two — miracles and prophecy — is simply one of the elements of revelation itself. For how is the divine manifestation to serve the race, if it be not explained by inspiration? And of what use to the race at large the inspiration, if he who is inspired witness not to others of the things revealed? This also, as the other two criteria, is to us chiefly of historical value. The test and guarantee of the correctness of the testimony is its true correspondence to the objective manifestation of which it is itself the inspired elucidation.

So much for the tests, proofs, criteria of revelation. Another question: Is our body of revelation perfectible, or is it already perfect? It is *not* perfectible. It is already the perfect revelation; for it reveals him who is "God manifest." In one respect, however, there is room for progress, to wit, in our *comprehension* of the revelation, and in our *realization* of it in the holiness of our lives.

III. Holy Scripture.

From our conception of revelation follows directly the necessity of sacred writings. For the end of revelation is to historically prepare for redemption, and ultimately to accomplish it; that is, revelation is to become historical fact. It is not to dart across the sky as a meteor; but to glow upon the horizon as the harbinger of noon-day. It is to cast its roots into the organic texture of human history, and work therein as a co-factor with other historical forces. But it can do this only as it enters into the current of tradition; and it can do the latter uncorruptedly only as fixed by writing. As the divine manifestation is primitively understood only by help of the attendant divine inspiration, so later generations can understand both manifestation and inspired interpretation of it only as both are preserved in essentially correct records. This does not require that the revelation be fully understood either by receivers or recorders, but only that, so

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far as understood, that understanding be correct. Its full understanding is in fact to be a product of its own clarifying effect upon the soul of man throughout the course of the centuries.

The end of the sacred writings is not merely to preserve moral or dogmatic precepts, but chiefly to enable later generations to receive upon their hearts the very same impressions that the revelation made upon its first receivers. It is to enable us, by our plastic imagination, to be present at the original transaction and see it literally transpire before our own eyes. And it is mainly by this subtle, exalting, moral influence, and not as a text-book in ethics and dogmatics, that the Bible is such a potent regenerating factor in humanity.

But how are we to conceive of the origination of the Bible? According to the old Protestant dogmatists, inspiration is to be taken in the sense of pure, direct, absolute, *verbal dictation*. The sacred writers were not authors, but only amanuenses. They neither conceived the thought, gave to it form, nor selected words to express its form. They were purely and simply *passive*, — the instruments, the pens, of the dictating Spirit. The Bible, therefore, is an absolutely true transcript of the divine mind, utterly devoid of error, material or immaterial, essential or incidental, "dogmatical or moral, historical or chronological, topographical or onomastic."

In our criticism of this old orthodox conception of the origin of the Bible, we shall take it as an organic self-consistent logical whole; for such it is. It is so constructed, so framed together, that the abating of one tittle from its rounded fullness would be to remove the keystone, and occasion the fall of the whole superstructure.

In one point we are heartily agreed with our elder dogmatists — that the best, the ultimate evidence of the divine character of the Scriptures, is the direct experience of their regenerative, their divine, influence upon the heart of him who honestly searches into them. Every such person finds

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the Bible a means of grace, — finds that God himself speaks through it directly to the heart, and that, too, all the more clearly the longer he searches into and communes with it. And in fact how could it be otherwise? How could it be but that the deeper vision into this mirror of the divine heart should itself be the result of the clarification of our sin-obscured eye through the use of the mirror itself? Our firm conviction, then, of the divinity of the Scriptures is thus the product of these Scriptures themselves. At this point we go as far as the most hyper-orthodox could possibly go. To us the Bible is *specifically* different from any and all other books whatsoever. It is an authentic voice from God. It is the word of God.

If, now, at this point we must differ from some of the self-styled orthodox, we would have our reason for so doing clearly appreciated. And that is this, — our conviction that the old view is not truthful to the Bible itself, but is violently forced upon it from traditional dogmatic prejudices. And we hold it to be more important to be true to the Bible than to be in harmony with tradition. It is to three points in particular that we turn our attention — in what sense the Bible is *God's word*, in what sense *inspired*, and in what sense *infallible?*

We ask, then, in what sense does the Bible regard itself as the word of God? The answer will be, we think, not in the sense of the old dogmatists — as a book dictated word for word to a mere amanuensis.

The expression "word of God," so frequent in the Bible, was occasioned by the specific biblical conception of God. God is here rational and personal; hence his actions are expressions of thought and will, i.e. they are a *speaking*. Hence, to the Jews God's creating, his legislating, his promising and threatening, no less than his speaking proper, were his uttering of words; hence the decalogue was his ten words; hence the records of all his doings toward man were called his Word; hence, after the time of Nehemiah the written canon itself, as a book, came to be regarded as literally God's

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words. And from the Jews this expression came over into apostolic use, and finally into the New Testament and into dogmatics. But in coming into theology it received a narrow specific sense which does not belong to its biblical use. In the Bible it means the knowledge revealed to us by God, and the publication of it to the world; in theology it is made to mean the successive Hebrew and Greek words of the Old and New Testaments as dictated one by one to the human recorders of the same.

That this dogmatic sense of the "word of God" is not the biblical one has been felt by many recent dogmatists; and various distinctions — e.g. that the Bible *is* not, but simply *contains*, the word of God, etc. — have been attempted, but without satisfactory result. The only remedy will be found, we think, in entirely disusing the dogmatic sense of the "word of God," as designating the Bible. But what shall we put in its place? We propose the word *revelation*. In fact, revelation, in our use of the word, expresses the full, clear conception for which the biblical phrase, "word of God," is but the preparatory germ. This substitution will give us light on more than one point. For while, e.g. the relation of the Bible to the "word of God" is very obscure, that of the Bible to revelation is very clear; the Bible is the original records *as to* revelation, but is not revelation itself. The Bible, then, we would designate as the *Holy* Scriptures. It is the word of God in this sense, that it contains the primitive records as to the self-revelations of God. We have spoken of this point simply from the fact that dogmatic tradition has stamped upon the biblical phrase, "word of God" a technical sense that is entirely misleading.

We next inquire, In what sense is the Bible inspired? Here, if anywhere, we may look for help towards an answer in a direct appeal to the Bible itself. What, then, is the voice of the Bible? As to the Old Testament we think no candid inquirer would ever get from it the thought of its being directly *dictated* to its authors by God. In general, we read only of divine illuminations, visions, conversations, etc.,

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granted to God's chosen organs. But even the highest inspirations of these organs (prophets) is not represented as a purely passive impartation. True, the prophets give out their prophecies as the utterances of God; but of an inspiration which guided them while reducing their prophecies to writing, they say not a word. It is only the "law" and specific oracles that are attributed directly to God. The general frame-work of the books, however, — the historical, chronological, the didactic, the hortatory, — is *not* so attributed. In some cases even the documentary sources which the writers drew upon are directly given.

It was only in the later ages of the Jews that anything like our ecclesiastical notion of inspiration appeared among them. The genesis of the notion is readily accounted for. When the Jews were cured by their exile of their polytheistic tendencies, when they came back to Jerusalem and betook themselves with such unprecedented zeal to the study of their sacred books, what was more natural than that they should gradually extend their reverence from the sacred sense to the written parchment-roll, and to the other books that came to be included in it; and finally, to the very words, syllables, and punctuation itself? Traces of this change are distinctly observable in the Apocrypha. Soon the notion of inspiration assumed almost the rounded mechanical form which prevailed in early Protestant dogmatics. Proofs enough are to be seen in Philo and Josephus.

How, now, does the *New* Testament treat the Old in regard to its inspiration? We shall divide the question, and ask, first, How does Christ treat it? That he had for it the highest reverence, that he fed his heart upon it, and found in it God's full witness of himself, no one will question. But that he regarded it as written by divine dictation, is utterly without evidence. The two passages (Matt. v. 18; xxii. 43), usually cited as evidences, are irrelevant. The context shows clearly that the "one jot or one tittle" of the first passage refers not to the least part of the law as a book of words, but to it as an organism of truth. The second passage implies

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indeed, that David wrote the hundred and tenth Psalm in a state of prophetic ecstasy, but says not a word as to the process whereby these divine communications were shaped into the recorded word.

But the matter is very different with the actual writers of the New Testament books. We find these entertaining the same view which prevailed in Judaism in general; and in their writings they reflect this view. They lose sight of the authors of the Old Testament, and treat all of its words as the direct words of God. Their general formula is: "God said," or, "The Holy Ghost said." The author of *Hebrews* even quotes as a "thus saith the Lord," passages in which God is spoken of in the third person. And this view of the apostles went over to the Fathers; so that the latter regarded the Old Testament as directly inspired at a time when they had not yet thought of so regarding the books which now constitute the New Testament.

It is clear, then, that the orthodox theory of inspiration *is* countenanced by the authors of the New Testament. But is this of decisive dogmatic significance? This view of these authors is evidently organically connected with their exegesis of the Old Testament. If, now, the one cannot stand the test of criticism, how can the other? But how can we concede correctness to their exegesis? They assign meanings which the original does not contain. They quote from memory, sometimes changing the sense. They often quote from the LXX where this version differs from the original, and sometimes where the translators made mistakes. They sometimes give to the same citation different senses in different places, e.g. Isa. liii. 4 in Matt. viii. 17 and 1 Pet. ii. 24; also Gen. xiii. 15 in Rom. iv. 16–18 and Gal. iii. 16. They often find types where the original has no such sense. They put their own new thoughts back into the old text. They take indirect Missianic prophecies as direct ones.

How is all this to be accounted for? In large part by assuming that the New Testament writers used the method of exegesis then prevalent among the Jews. This method

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was very defective. It lacked in historical sense. It knew nothing of development. It was arbitrary in the extreme. It allegorized, seeking for deep spiritual senses in the simplest historical narrative. But the apostles had this advantage over the unbelieving Jews, — that in Christ they had the fulfilment of the Old Testament plainly before their eyes. This was clear enough to them — that *in general* Christ had fulfilled the "law and the prophets." But when they entered into the details of the ancient types and prophecies, they ran great risk of misinterpreting. And the result shows that they did not escape the shoal. They allegorized new senses into the old text. They applied the text with literal strictness where there was only a verbal resemblance.

How, now, does this state of facts harmonize with the notion of a verbal dictation by God of both Testaments to a mere human amanuensis? It does not harmonize at all. The method of the apostles is, therefore, not of a character to countenance the divine dictation of the Old Testament; on the contrary, their procedure practically refutes it.

We come now to inquire as to the inspiration of the New Testament. We ask not: Does the New Testament make upon us the impression that it is a work of the Holy Spirit? (which no real Christian will deny) but: Does it claim to be inspired in the sense of traditional orthodoxy? The grounds for an affirmative answer are notoriously very slender. A common procedure is to argue from the greater to the less, thus: the Old Testament is inspired, therefore, so is the New. To our mind, however, the major premise is without proof. Another course is, to say: The apostles were men filled with the Holy Ghost, and therefore, their writings were dictated to them by this Holy Ghost. We admit the affirmation, but deny that the conclusion justly follows. To be filled with the Holy Spirit is a state not specifically limited to the apostles, but common to all believers. Of course, it existed in various degrees of intensity in different believers; but of a *specific* difference we have no trace. We have no evidence that Paul, e.g. was more inspired when he wrote

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Romans than when he preached at Rome. And, with the exception of a few isolated passages (the seeming force of which a more careful exegesis will remove), this is the case with all the writers of the New Testament. One book, indeed, — the Apocalypse — claims inspiration; but not in the sense of verbal dictation. It claims inspiration for its substance; and this for the plain reason that it is chiefly prophecy.

But the clearest evidence against the correctness of the old orthodox notion of inspiration is given in the *manner* in which the New Testament writers themselves represent their work of composing, as also in various implications. This holds also of the Old Testament. How is it consistent with verbal divine dictation, when the authors in many cases directly cite the literary sources from which they drew? How can we make God the verbal dictator of the imagery of Solomon's Song, of the Proverbs, and of Ecclesiastes? And is David, then, to be utterly robbed of his poetical crown? Was he but the dead reed through which God poured out even the very words of the Psalms? And how to account for the individualities of style, and the syntactical and other imperfections so patent in the different books of the Bible? To say that this is mere adaptation on the part of God, is simply to make a bare assertion; and, besides, to make God do that for which there is no good reason. How, therefore, the notion of a word-dictating inspiration can continue to assert itself in the face of such difficulties is one of the strangest enigmas of human psychology. Nothing but the stifling force of dogmatic tradition throws any light on the subject. We conclude from our whole discussion, therefore, that the New Testament is *not* the product of such an inspiration as orthodoxy asserts; nor even of such as the apostles themselves attributed to the Old Testament.

A single historical circumstance gives striking confirmation of the correctness of this conclusion, and ought to raise serious queries among our opponents; to wit, The age immediately after the apostles admitted of no other *sacred*

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Scriptures than the Old Testament. And very naturally so. They had no thought that the biographies of Jesus and the letters of the apostles were the product of anything other than ordinary authorship. It took generations of time to raise these books into co-ordination with the Hebrew Scriptures. And it is not earlier than A.D. 180 that any express evidence of this co-ordination is discoverable.

But this is only one phase of our answer as to the inspiration of the Bible. Though not inspired in the sense of old orthodoxy, yet in another sense we yield to none in contending that it is thoroughly an inspired, a divine book, as none other ever was or ever will be. Every converted soul knows this from blessed experience — knows that it is pre-eminently just what the apostle calls it in 2 Tim. iii. 16, 17. He knows that it is such a book as can rationally be accounted for only on the assumption of the divine causality as operative in its origination. But does the old inspiration theory answer the requirement here? No; for while the Bible is experienced to be thoroughly divine, it is equally experienced to be thoroughly human. The old theory would reduce this intense humanness of the Bible to mere docetism, that is, would take the very life out of it. It cannot, therefore, be true. The reason why the Reformers held with such desperation to such a theory is readily explainable from their historical surroundings. In rejecting the infallible authority of the Romish church, they felt the need of finding a similar authority somewhere else. They placed it in the written word. And the sense in which they placed it there is readily accounted for. They found in personal experience, as nurtured by Scripture, the criterion of the true and false in religion. But not experience, but Scripture alone, could be formally appealed to in their war upon Romanism. But the Bible text could be logically thus appealed to only on the supposition that it was given by inspiration, without the least intermixture of mere human elements. In a word, it would have to be absolutely free from error. Now, evidently, the Bible could be free from error only in one of two cases — either as written by infallible

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persons, or as written by God. But its writers could not be regarded as infallible; for then they would be no longer men, but Christs. Hence the other case was taken. God was regarded as having dictated the Bible to mere amanuenses. But how was its human naturalness damaged thereby! How difficult to account for many things in it on such a supposition! Besides, the actual Bible is, after all, not adapted to serve the end which this old theory contemplates. It could not serve as a standard of absolute appeal, for two very clear reasons: Frst, we do not possess the text in its absolute purity; secondly, there have ever been, and perhaps ever will be, great diversities of interpretation.

The untenableness of the old theory of verbal dictation soon began to be felt. Modifications were attempted. Calixtus distinguished between the divine *revelatio* and the mere *assistantia* or *directio*. Pfaff held that God permitted the writers to mix in matter of their own. Baumgarten and Töllner gave up entirely the notion of a passive state on the part of the writers. Since their time revelation has been held to relate chiefly to the essentials in the Bible, and to guarding the writers from material error. Verbal inspiration has gradually been given entirely up.

But all this has not helped the matter. The old theory gives no countenance to a distinguishing between inspired and non-inspired elements in the Bible. Moreover, such a distinction is impracticable. It could be but a work of subjective conjecture. Who shall draw the line? How to separate form from contents? In the Bible, more than in any other book, form and substance are one. There is absolutely no ground for holding to an inspiration of the substance, and yet rejecting that of the words. The wonderful effect of the Bible upon the heart is, in fact, inseparable from the words themselves.

In recent times, therefore, it has come to be generally conceded that the old theory is incapable of remedy; in a word, that it must be entirely rejected. The notion of a *direct* inspiration of the Bible has given place to that of an

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indirect. The Bible is the work of men who were inspired. This inspiration (under which the Bible was written) was not specific, but general — the same as that which animated their entire official activity. This form of inspiration entirely suffices for the explanation of that to account for which the old mechanical theory was invented, viz. the peculiar power of the Bible over the religious consciousness. The apostles were the immediate beholders of "God manifest"; hence their minds, as helped by subjective inspiration, give in their writings the truest objective reflection of this revelation of God in Christ. This pure reflection is also all the more secured by the fact that they were men whose minds were as simple, as naïve as possible, as little as possible tinctured with the secular and dogmatic prejudices of the times. This, with their long and intimate communion with the Son of God, rendered their minds true and correct mirrors of the absolute truth. Their religious consciousness was regenerated. Hence their writings are for us, and for all time, normative authority for the religious life. We see Christ *through* them. But as all inspiration falls short of an absolute elucidation of the whole significance of the divine manifestation, hence even the writings of the most Christ-filled of the apostles fall short of being the absolutely adequate expression of the significance of the Son of God.

How, now, are we to conceive of the *act* of writing the sacred books? Did it take place synchronously with the inspiration? No; for inspiration is not thinkable as a continuous state. Hence the reducing of the knowledge given in inspiration to the form of writing was an after-work. This is countenanced, besides, by the writings themselves. They have all the marks of being the product of leisurely meditation.

But are there degrees in inspiration? Yes; both the nature of the case and the form of the books indicate this. Writings of greater weight would naturally be written under the most immediate presence of the assisting Spirit. While John writes what he had directly seen in ecstatic vision, Luke sits down like a historian and collates documents.

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This modern view (and which we heartily favor) is now generally accepted. But its relation to the old view is not clearly seen. Many are wont to regard it as a mere modification of the old one. This is a delusion. It is a radically different view. The old view asserts the *direct* inspiration of the writings. The new view rejects this; it holds simply that the sacred books are the works of persons who had received inspirations, and who consequently were divinely illuminated. The inspiration was a momentary state, but the illumination a habitual one. The modern view does not say that the Bible is inspired, but only that it is the product of divinely enlightened men. We cannot, therefore, longer consistently speak of the Bible as inspired in the old orthodox sense of the term.

Hence, also, we cannot approve of attempts such as those of Beck and Philippi, to adapt the old phraseology to senses different from its fixed historical force. These men give up inspiration as passive dictation, and yet insist on being true to old orthodoxy, and in having in the Bible an absolutely perfect reflex of God's thoughts. But how do they reach this? By holding that God, in inspiring the biblical authors, took their intellects into such organic union with the divine mind that these intellects were enabled by self-activity now to reflect in writing an absolute copy of the divine mind. And why do they feel the need of making such an assumption? Because, say they, the Bible, unless absolutely free of error, could not serve the needs of the church. But this last position we deny; and hence we cannot admit the necessity of such an assumption. Besides, such an assumption presents insuperable psychological difficulties. What is meant by an "organic union with the divine mind"? Is it not a phrase with very nebulous contents? And what is more arbitrary than the notion of a cognitional perfection among the apostles, while yet the moral or thelematic phase of their nature was imperfect?

We are, therefore, by these attempts, only more fully convinced of the correctness of the views we have urged.

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We regard the efforts at modifying the old inspiration theory as simply putting new pieces upon old garments. And this old theory itself we consider as a scientific fiction, invented to give basis to the notion that the written Bible is absolutely faultless, and adapted (in the sense of the old orthodoxy) to be an absolute criterion in all the details of dogmatic controversy. And we frankly confess that we do not feel the force of the position of certain of our eminent compeers; viz. that our religious necessities postulate that the Bible *must* be such a criterion. For to what end would a perfect *codex* serve, while yet there should be accepted no uniform interpretation of the codex?

Nor can we approve of the artifice resorted to by certain dogmatists of the day in order to parry the shock they might otherwise give to old dogmatic prejudice. We refer to their calling the Bible a theanthropic, a divine-human work. There is nothing gained by this save a little mystification. To the superficial glance it seems quite plausible to place the apparent blemishes of the Bible to the score of the human element, and the perfections to that of the divine. The process is very convenient; but it is too superficial to mystify very long. The origin of the phrase is evidently the theanthropic nature of Christ; and its seeming forcibleness comes solely from this analogy. But this very analogy destroys all its real force; for the very idea of a human-divine something is not that of a mere accretion, but that of an absolute interpenetration of the two elements; so that the human, e.g. never appears or acts apart from the divine, but always in absolute synergism with it. Hence if the Bible is divine-human in any just sense of the expression, then the human element of it is so taken up into the divine as to be shorn of all possibility of human imperfection. Hence the use of this expression here is but an artifice; it gives no sort of basis whereon to place the seeming imperfections of the Bible.

Instead of treading such an ambiguous course, I much prefer to throw off all disguises, and frankly to give up the dogma that the Bible is inspired. I do this the more cheer-

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fully as I am perfectly conscious that I do not thereby give up in the least that truly divine power which I, with all who are truly Christian, regard as inherent in it. Nor do I give up inspiration. But I place it anterior to Scripture in the revelation itself, whereof Scripture is the subsequent reflex. It is the subjective phase of revelation, even as manifestation is the objective.

The advantages of this view are that it places things in their right light; and it frees the Bible of burdens which do not properly belong to it; and it is in full harmony with the modern tendency of collective Christianity, viz. the finding of the central force of our whole religious life, not in a *book*, but in a *person*.

From the question of the inspiration of the Bible, we now pass to one very closely connected with it, viz. Is the Bible absolutely free of error? And this will furnish a test of our inspiration theory. For if God's Spirit is the sole author of the Bible, then our view is wrong, and the old one right; and there can be absolutely no shade of error or inaccuracy in the whole body of Scripture.

Now, in the first place, it is perfectly plain that the Bible itself makes no pretension to absolute freedom from error. In fact, passages such as Luke i. 1–3; Rom. xv. 14, 15; 1 Cor. ii. 3, and others, sound quite otherwise. Nor have we the least evidence that the Saviour proposed by the apostles to furnish the world with an absolutely faultless mirror of the absolute truth in their writings.

And with this correspond the ripest results of biblical learning. To-day it is confessed that our Bible contains errors. Nor will it help to say that these errors lie only in matters of minor import. For who is to draw the line, and to separate between the important and the unimportant?

We shall give here no list of what are claimed to be the ascertained errors of the Bible. We shall only mention the notorious fact of the many points which the straight orthodox cannot explain into tenableness save by such arbitrary processes as would utterly ruin the credit of any other piece

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of writing. How difficult, e.g. to justify the apostles for using indirect prophecies as direct predictions! They confessedly use Old Testament texts as direct proofs of that to which these texts really do not allude at all. Another point: Do we possess in the Gospels an absolutely correct picture of Christ, and of his words and work? We do not ask, Can we from the Gospels obtain such a strictly correct picture? but, Do the Gospels severally, taken in the sense evidently meant by the several writers, give this picture? We must answer negatively. There exist, confessedly, chronological and other contradictions; also manifest slips of memory (comp. Matt. xxiii. 35; xxvii. 9; Mark ii. 26; 1 Cor. x. 8). The speeches of Jesus are reported inaccurately. And in one point, especially, have the evangelists clearly failed to report correctly the teachings of Jesus — his eschatology. The manner in which the synoptics have woven together these utterances cannot possibly give the strict sense in which Christ uttered them.

Again: Do the several evangelists and apostles give, each, an absolutely correct conception of Christ and his work? We mean: Is this the case with each of them, his words taken in their natural, common-sense sense? How can this be, since, confessedly, there is not one uniform conception of Christ in the several books of the New Testament, but several differing ones? The Christology of John is not the same as that of the synoptics; nor that of Paul the same as that of John; and that of Paul varies in his different epistles. How, then, avoid the inference that the majority of these conceptions fall short of the absolutely correct conception of Christ; that is, that they are only relatively correct? Nor is it astonishing that the individual apostles separately fell short of a perfect conception of the significance of the Redeemer. It was too great a task for isolated individualities. Nor do the apostles hesitate expressly to concede this (comp. John i. 14; 1 John i. 1, 2; 1 Cor. ii. 7–13; Eph. iii. 18, 19). That they received inspirations could, in the nature of the human mind, not wholly remedy the matter. And the very fact that these

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inspirations were given not to one, but to several, suggests a true solution of the matter. If one or two persons had sufficed to give a perfectly adequate reflex of the divine manifestation, then the employment of many would be an excess, contrary to all analogy of God's manner of working. And besides, how to account for the different conceptions of the same divine manifestation as given by Peter, James, John, Paul, etc.? The reason is plainly this: One single mind, because of the one-sidedness involved in the very nature of its individuality, is incapable of a perfectly correct understanding of the divine manifestation. Its conception would be only proximately correct. It would have defects on the one side, and excesses on the other. The absolutely true conception would be given only when a plurality of such individual conceptions were placed side by side, so that the ones should serve to modify, to tone down, and to tone up, and to supplement, the others. But this absolutely correct conception of Christ — this true Christology — would evidently not be such a simple matter as to be gathered together from a mere glance through the several writers of the New Testament. On the contrary, it would be the far-off goal of milleniums of profoundest exegetical and speculative theological toil. The means of constructing this conception are given in the elementary and self-correcting germs contained in the Gospels and Epistles. The completed conception is the task of the present, as helped by the past, and as to be continued by the future.

Our notion of the matter, on the whole, then, is this: The book of no one apostle, taken by itself, is free from error. A Christology constructed out of it alone would not only be defective, but would contain errors of a positive sort. But the collective books of the whole sacred volume contain the perfect conditions of an absolutely errorless conception of Christ. In other words, the Bible is not *absolutely* errorless; but it is the perfect means to an absolutely correct understanding of God's revelation, inasmuch as it contains in its different parts not only the germs of the absolute truth, but

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also the means of correcting the relative errors of other parts.

Here, then, is the true infallibility of the Bible — a view that we are glad to see prevailing among several of the leading dogmatists of the day, such as Martensen and Lange. Its infallibility lies in its *total effect* as resulting from the self-correction of the one-sidednesses of its single parts by other of its single parts. And the sole means of rendering this infallibility effective upon the world is, not to hamper our thoughts by servilely following the dogmatic definitions of remote ages, but to search ever deeper and deeper into the sacred records themselves, under the light of the intuitions of right reason.

Now, this infallibility of the Bible is of very different nature from that insisted on by the old theology. That was an infallibility of separate books, epistles, texts; this is an infallibility of the whole, resultant upon the self-correction of the minor parts by the general drift. The one is the ready-prepared infallibility of a formal compend; the other is an infallibility as resultant upon the scientific construction of what is given in the Bible simply in the state of germs.

And this, we hold, is the only kind of errorlessness or infallibility called for by the religious interest of the case. In fact, our evangelical experience plainly teaches us that it is by the comparison and modification of Scripture with and by Scripture, and by cleaving to certain parts and elements of Scripture, to the relative neglect of others, that we receive the full religious effect of the book.

And as thus the old form of infallibility does not seem called for by our moral interests, so also it does not seem practically possible. The errorlessness of a writing evidently presupposes the absolute moral and intellectual perfection of the writer. For how can the stream run higher than its source? The only guarantee of absolute errorlessness in the Bible would therefore be the absolute mechanical dictation of it, word by word, to the merely passive human amanuensis, as insisted on by the old theory. But this

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theory we, with nearly the whole drift of modern theology, have rejected. Hence, we repeat it, the infallibility of the Bible is only relative. Hence *all* of the conceptions of all the writers of the Bible are not *per se* of normative authority. This, in fact, has always been regarded as the true state of the case, even by the ultra-orthodox. They have always taken rough liberties with some Scriptures in the interest of others.

But what are the most normative elements of Scripture? There is no need of the possibility of an absolute line here. Our general answer is, Whatever belongs to revelation proper, that is, to the organic series of divine manifestations, or to the inspirational elucidations of the same. The determining of what these elements are is the long task of biblical theology. The elements which would lay the less claim to infallibility would be the mere historical narrations, and the personal reflections of the sacred writers, such as the theoretical theologizings of John and Paul.

The Bible, then, is not *per se* errorless. But, we emphasize it, it is the *instrument to* an absolutely correct understanding of God's self-manifestation to man. Its significance is that it is an authentic documentation as to God's revelations. We say, *as to* revelation; for the Bible is not *per se* revelation. And to have identified Bible and revelation was one of the most serious errors of the old theology. It is a documentation by the right use of which, as an instrument, we can come to clear conceptions of what God's revelations were. It answers to us instead of our having been ourselves eye-and-ear-witnesses of these revelations. And that it might answer this end requires that it should be, as a whole, essentially correct. And the only rational method of using it as an instrument is to use it judiciously, that is, to put it into the crucible of historical criticism. For the several books of the Bible are able only by collective effect to produce in our souls the correct conception of Christ. Each book reflects him only from one stand-point — reflects only the image made by him in one human soul. It is but a single photo-

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graph; but to a fully just impression of such an object there would be needed many photographs. By critically comparing, combining, and supplementing the several reflexes of Christ as given in the books of the New Testament, the devout soul rises to the most perfect possible conception of the incarnation of God — of the Divine Man — of Christ.

And the exercising of this criticism has not even the remotest kinship with rationalism in the tabooed sense. But its kinship is with the most childlike, evangelical piety. For such piety desires, above all things, to get right at the very purest truth itself, and hence is intensely careful against being deceived. For this reason it will not let its eyes be befogged by councils, decrees, or creeds. It will not let the theology of three hundred years ago dictate despotically to it just what conception or sense of the Bible is the only true one, and just what theories it shall hold (and none others) in regard to the Bible. In a word, it claims the freedom of an enfranchised child of God.

And the same historical criticism that is to be exercised in the using of the Bible as a whole is also to be exercised as to the canonicity of the several books. Whether any particular book is a primitive authentic document as to revelational facts is to be decided not by blindly accepting old decisions as final, but by our rational investigations under the light of a God-conscious, earnest heart. The Canon is, then, not to be regarded as *per se* definitively closed. It is easy to interject, that surely Divine Providence would take care to have collected into one book just all the documents that have a right to be regarded as sacred! But this interjection rests upon an utterly false, that is, upon a purely mechanical, conception of God's providence. Analogy would, on the contrary, say that Providence would take care of the canonicity of the Bible only just in so far as to place humanity in a condition to attain through it to the desired goal. This would not, however, strictly imply that un-sacred books might not for ages find place in the Bible (as the Apocrypha did), or that some sacred book might not go astray from it. The

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question of the canon, then, is not to be regarded yet as *per se* absolutely settled. But the pious thought of ages to come may and will properly still work upon the question.

It was one of the worst mistakes of our old Protestant theology that it absolutely identified religion and theology. Thus it degraded the Bible to the level of a hand-book of dogmatics. Thus, also, it necessitated itself to a method of exegesis in many cases forced and arbitrary.

Another of its mistakes was to represent the Bible as important almost exclusively for the isolated individual. It thus largely ignored its no less importance for society, for humanity as a whole. It failed to see that Christianity is not merely in the lids of the sacred book, but also very largely in the objective forms and institutions of our world at large.

The old notion of the Bible was misleading, also, in the manner in which it regarded the Scriptures as the exclusive source of Christian doctrine. This resulted from confounding revelation and dogmas. Doctrine springs, in fact, not simply from the Bible, but also from the laws of human thought. The Bible is, indeed, *for us*, the sole primitive records *as to* revelation which are accessible. But it is not the only sacred records that have ever existed. Several prophetic and apostolic books have confessedly been lost. And the Bible lays no claim to be the sole source of the knowledge of Christ. It nowhere lays claim to exhaustive completeness; and theology, in making such a claim for it, lost sight of the unity, the solidarity, of all truth. Written revelation speaks truly of Christ; for it is reflected out of souls who knew Christ. But creation (nature) speaks also truly of Christ; for it is his work. The Bible is a chief help toward a perfect knowledge of Christ; but this perfect knowledge itself will be the synthetic product of many co-operative factors. All study, all science, all criticism, and, above all, all possible exaltation and clarification of the human intelligence in general will have to contribute thereto.

To this clarification, to this enlarging of the horizon of

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the human mind the Bible is one of the richest contributors. What, then, are we to think of the talk about the Bible's setting "limits" to human knowledge, in which some theologians indulge? Of such a function the Bible itself knows nothing. On the contrary, it is a revealer, not a hider. It leads us up to unscaled heights, opens to us vistas out toward the infinite, and bids us to never weary in exploring them.

It follows from the views that we have presented, that the Bible is something quite different from that which the traditionally trained believer *thinks* it to be. But the *heart-relation* of him and us to it is essentially the *same*. To both of us it is the supernatural means of receiving Christ into our hearts, and of rising from sin into perfect God-likeness. The difference is that we have placed the Bible in the light in which Christian science shows that it *must* be placed, if it is longer to retain the faith and confidence of those who are abreast with the results of modern philosophy and science.

The views I have insisted on are not peculiar to myself. They are essentially identical with those held by the most of our evangelical German theologians. The chief difference is, that whereas these theologians generally, and honestly, aim to represent their views as in harmony with the older theology, I, for my part, regard them as radically different, and have hence not hesitated to discard the old phraseology, and to express myself directly and squarely, just as I understand the matter.

The motive which has, consciously or unconsciously, occasioned what seems to me a disingenuous and damaging retention of old phraseologies (when the sense had entirely changed), is readily seen, and of praiseworthy intent. For he who breaks with time-consecrated traditions is sure to suffer in repute, as also in present influence over those whose prejudices are shocked. To me, however, the gain seems to be bought at too great a sacrifice. Moreover, the hour of disenchantment is sure to come at last. The believing multitude will ultimately awaken to the fact that the old bottles contain no longer the old wine. Then they will feel that

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they have been disingenuously dealt with. Would not a more frank course be far better? When dogmatic definitions become obsolete, were it not wise to disuse them, and gradually to put in their stead the views that have actually taken their stead?

It is in this conviction that I have placed these views before the church. Cold as they may seem to some, they yet come out of a very warm heart, and are the sentiments of one who yields to none in childlike reverence for the Bible, and who finds in it a sanctuary in regard to which he joyfully exclaims, with the patriarch: "Surely the Lord is in this place; this is no other than the house of God, and here is the gate of heaven."

ARTICLE II.

ARISTOTLE.

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No. III. — HIS ETHICS.

In spite of man's vain-glory, he is yet ever haunted by a secret feeling of the shortness of his destiny. There is something in mere permanence that carries with it a dignity that man enviously confesses himself — as phenomenon — to lack. Even wholly insignificant men can so little content themselves with the oblivion that necessarily awaits them, that they seek out the hardest granite, compelling it to preserve the remembrance of the names and deeds that they dare not entrust to their fellow-creatures. When temporal aids fail, it is to the "eternal hills" that we lift our eyes for help. The Colosseum of Rome was at its building no more imposing than that of Boston, except from the lasting nature of the material. It is only because the Roman amphitheatre has so long endured that it oppresses the mind with its greatness; while the ephemeral creation of modern times

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bore so plainly the marks of immediate decay that, for all its size, it was never truly sublime.

Endurance, then, although not itself greatness, is yet the best proof of the greatness of a human work. It makes plain those elements that appeal to the universal and essential principles of our nature, it shows that the popularity of a work that lasts is not due to any local or temporary causes, and it is, in short, the most obvious guide in a critical estimate of human possessions. Time has little to do with truth. What is only relatively true can never have any wide-spread influence; but when one comes upon a great truth, in an old book, the mind leaps with a certain delight over whatever insignificant centuries may have intervened since the author walked and talked, and rejoices as in new found kin. This feeling, which is, to a certain extent, a peculiarity of commentators, is in the case of Aristotle shared by many of those who have won distinction in any of the numerous lines of thought which bear the impress of that great genius.

Apart from his physical investigations, which in spite of modern advances could still call forth the enthusiastic utterance of Cuvier; and apart from his treatises on metaphysics and logic, which can never be wholly superseded, he was the author of four anthropological works which no modern philosopher can afford to neglect, and any one of which would, if it were now first to appear, make the reputation of its author. Concerning the "Rhetoric" Mr. Grote several times in his history expresses himself with great emphasis: "a treatise," he incidentally observes, "which has rarely been surpassed in power of philosophic analysis." Again, quite incidentally he remarks that if there were no other work of Aristotle's remaining, we should from this treatise alone decide that the author was a great man. The treatise on poetry still remains, it is probable, the most scientific, if not the only systematic work upon that subject. Dr. Arnold, who was so familiar with our author that he used to speak of him as "dear old Tottle," actually decided in favor of Oxford rather than Cambridge as his son's university, because, as he

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said "I would not consent to send my son to a university where he would lose the study of him." He looked upon the "Politics" as not only of great assistance in the study of early Roman history, but in the midst of the agitation of the questions of church authority and church government, in which he was so much interested, he asserted: "The Politics of Aristotle are to me of a very great and direct use every day of my life."

The Ethics of Aristotle have long occupied a prominent position at Oxford, and many editions have issued thence; but elsewhere, and especially since the time of Kant, this treatise has received less attention than it deserves. There are parts of it that would fasten the attention of even the most cursory reader, but in general the expression, which in enigmatic terseness rivals that of Tacitus, is little calculated to interest. We should constantly bear in mind the probability that we are dealing not with a finished composition of Aristotle's, but with the analysis or notes which either he or one of his hearers has preserved; a probability increased in the case of the Ethics by the existence of remarks addressed directly to "hearers." We know from Diogenes Laertius the names of twenty-seven dialogues, now lost, and from Cicero that Aristotle had a style distinguished by "*copia et suavitas*"; from which it is easy to infer that the published works were those of which Cicero is speaking, and which we know only by title through Diogenes. Indeed it would not be inappropriate to translate the title "akroamatic," which is applied to the extant writings, by "notes," or "lectures." The Ethics would not occupy a hundred of the pages of this magazine; but the quantity of thought that it contains could never have been imparted successfully in this condensed form. If Aristotle could secure so competent an interpreter as Plato has in Professor Jowett, one who would not hesitate to increase the bulk of this treatise even four-fold, it is not at all unlikely that such expansion would render inviting to a large circle of readers what is the laborious task of a few. It is not, perhaps, too rash an

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opinion for a teacher to advance, that if this work were translated in such a manner, and furnished with a commentary by a scholar in ethics, not philology, it would be the most satisfactory text-book in this much-abused science that could be adopted in our colleges.

There are several reasons for maintaining this opinion. In the first place, the tone of Aristotle's writings is thoroughly scientific, that is, judicial. Many of our modern ethical treatises are written in a vein of maudlin sentimentality that inevitably excites the contempt of an intelligent youth. A text-book it seems to be forgotten is to be in great part committed to memory and recited. Now, any one would shrink from repeating a passage charged with really fine sentiment, unless to a sympathetic audience, after due preparation, and with consciousness of fitness for the task. — What becomes of the most touching speech in Shakespeare in the mouth of a dunce of a school-boy on a public stage! But when the sentiment is of the dishwater kind, although it may be tolerated in rapid reading, if the attempt is made to commit it to memory and recite it, there can only result disgust to the learner and derision from his fellows. No sturdy young man can preserve his self-respect while repeating the turgid eloquence and highly-wrought bathos of our modern moralists. "Beauty unadorned is adorned the most," and the severe beauty of righteousness presents an especially sorry figure in the tawdry and meretricious garments of an artificial rhetoric. Facts and principles are what is wanted in a text-book, if there is to be any "gush," that can be furnished cheaply by the teacher in quantities to suit the occasion. The fiery outbursts of a generous heart aroused by the stimulus of a glimpse of truth or report of wrong are to be welcomed and honored; but separated from the excitement of the occasion and the person they are no more the same than the tufa is the same as the volcanic eruption. The best sermons make the worst text-books.

Now in the case of Aristotle's Ethics, facts and principles, with reasons, are all that he offers us. There is not an

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indication of personal feeling, nor an appeal to prejudice, or anything but reason, throughout the whole book. The most fastidious reader could find nothing pedantic, redundant, or superfluous. There is not a remark that any one need fear ridicule for making to-day. The book is full of shrewd sayings that strike the attention like proverbs. It is so *sensible*, so wise, and yet so free from all affectation, that a certain kindly and trustful feeling is produced in the mind of the reader. He feels as he is led along that he is not having opinions forced upon him, but that he is on a voyage of discovery with an intelligent and companionable guide, who has no personal glory at stake, and cares only to give the traveller the best possible knowledge of the country he is traversing.

A second merit possessed by this work is, that it is not devoted to the establishment of any metaphysical doctrine, but is, what ethics itself eminently is, thoroughly practical. Instead of interminable arguments on the freedom of the will, — a subject concerning which no one, however clear and positive his own convictions, can be so infatuated as to expect mankind will ever agree, — Aristotle simply points out the important fact that practically the question can be ignored without damage to morals. As men of equal virtue have always been found on opposite sides of this question, and have vigorously maintained that their opponent's views were subversive of all morality, we cannot but regard the position of Aristotle as decidedly the most judicious for a teacher of morals; although we should be glad to have had somewhere else a fuller presentation of his own views. As the opinion is sometimes maintained that this question was unknown to the Greeks, the remarks of Aristotle are worth quoting.

"Since the end is what is willed, but the means what is deliberated about and preferred, the acts relating to these should be according to choice and voluntary; such are the active displays of the virtues. Now virtue depends upon ourselves, and so vice; for whenever doing is in our power so also is not doing, and *vice versa*. So that if it is in our power to do a thing which is honorable, it is also in our power not to do it, which is base; and if to leave undone is honorable and in our power, to do,

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which is base, is also in our power. But if doing and leaving undone what is honorable and what is base are in our power,—which is being good or bad—then being good or bad is in our power.

But as to the saying, 'No one is willingly wicked nor unwillingly blessed,' this is in one sense true, in another false. No one is unwillingly blessed, but vice is voluntary; or else we must contradict what we have just said, and deny that man is a principle, or originator of his acts, as of children. But if this be so, and we cannot refer to other principles except those in ourselves, then the things of which the principles are in our power are themselves in our power and voluntary. This is borne witness to both by individuals and lawgivers, for they chastise and punish evil-doers who are not such from compulsion, or ignorance of which they are not the cause. And they honor the doers of good so as to foster the latter and repress the former. And yet no one encourages us to things not in our power nor voluntary, not thinking it worth while to persuade us not to be hot or cold or hungry or any such thing, for we shall suffer them none the less. For people are punished for ignorance itself if they seem to be the cause of their ignorance; as punishment is double for drunken people, for the principle (of action) is in themselves, since they were able not to get drunk, and this is the cause of their ignorance. And those who are ignorant of anything in the laws, which they ought to know, and is not hard, are punished; and so in the case of others who are ignorant from negligence, their ignorance being owing to themselves, since they were able to pay attention. But (it may be replied), such a man cannot give his attention. Still he is the cause of this inability, because he has lived intemperately; and men are themselves the causes of their being unjust and intemperate by doing unjust and intemperate acts; for practices of any kind make characters of that kind. This is clear from those who are given to any exercise of conduct, for they are continually practising. Now it is certainly stupid not to know that from continual activity in special directions habits are produced. Furthermore it is unreasonable that he who practises injustice should not wish to be unjust, or that he who acts intemperately should not wish to be intemperate. Now if any one not being ignorant does those things from which he will be unjust, he would be voluntarily unjust; nevertheless, he will not be able whenever he wishes to leave off being unjust and be just: for the sick man cannot be well, even if it so happen that he is voluntarily sick from living recklessly and disobeying his physicians. At one time it was in his power not to be sick; but by yielding and not controlling himself he has lost the power; just as it is no longer in the power of one who has thrown a stone to recall it, while yet throwing and hurling was in his own power, for the principle (of action) was in his power. Thus in the first place it was in the power of the unjust and the intemperate not to become so, and therefore they are so voluntarily, although when they have become so it is no longer in their power not to be so.

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Not only the vices of the soul are voluntary, but, in some cases, those of the body are so, and these we blame. For no one blames those who are ugly by nature, but those who are so from lack of exercise or negligence. In like manner, also, concerning weakness and deformity and mutilation; for no one would revile a man blind by nature or disease or a blow, but rather pity him; but every one would blame him who becomes blind from drunkenness or other intemperance. Now of the faults of the body, those which are in our power are blamed; those which are not in our power are not blamed. And if this is so also in other things, the faults that are blamed would be those in our own power.

Now if any one should say that all men aim at what they imagine to be good, but are not masters of their imagination, that but the end appears to every one according to what his character is, ; if every one is, in a certain sense, the cause to himself of his own character, he will also be, in a certain sense, the cause of his own imagination. But if no one is the cause to himself of his own bad acts, but does them through ignorance of the end, thinking that through them the best results will follow, and that the aiming at the end, by which he judges well and will choose what is truly good, is not a matter of his own choice, but is a natural endowment, like the possession of sight, and that he is naturally favored who is born with this faculty (for he will have the greatest and most honorable thing, and one which he cannot get or learn from any other man, but will have it just as it was given him by nature — and to be well and honorably endowed with this by nature constitutes the perfect and true natural goodness),—if this be true, how will virtue be more voluntary than vice? for to both alike, the good as well as the bad, the end is apparent and laid down by nature, or in some such way, and referring everything else to this, they act accordingly. Whether then the end, of whatever sort it is, appears to every one, not by nature, but is something *his*, or whether the end is fixed by nature, but the good man performs the remaining things voluntarily, virtue is voluntary and vice is no less so; for there is just as much spontaneity (τὸ δι' αὑτόν) in the acts of a bad man, even if not in the end. If then, as has been said, the virtues are voluntary, for we are ourselves in some way joint causes of our habits, and from our being of a certain character we propose to ourselves a corresponding end, the vices would also be voluntary, for the case is the same."[1]

This is certainly an admirable treatment of a most difficult subject. No determinist can object to the statement that if vice is involuntary so also is virtue; and no advocate of freedom can deny that habits escape the control of the will. Both can unite on the ground, which is entirely sufficient

[1] Eth. Nik., iii. 5.

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for all practical purposes, that, apart from all hereditary or natural tendencies (as Aristotle calls them), a man is to be adjudged virtuous or vicious by his deliberate acts. Greater fulness may be desired on such a subject, but not greater fairness.

Still, it is doubtful whether it is not better that the discussion of this question should be carried on in treatises professedly devoted to metaphysics or theology. Ever since the time of Augustine and Pelagius, — that is, ever since the church has patronized philosophy, or philosophy has served as a handmaid to the church, — this great controversy has tended to overshadow the path of ethics. We should now feel that an ethical treatise where the will was not the most prominent feature in the discussion was like the play of Hamlet with the part of Hamlet omitted. The doctrine of sin, depending practically on the question of responsibility, has inevitably led to the most prolonged and embittered struggle that the schools have ever experienced; and, in spite of all arguments and discussions, bulls and catechisms, assemblies and councils, — in spite, even, of wars and persecutions, — philosophers are still as far as ever from agreement. The question has thus become so entangled with its real or supposed corollaries that the very mention of the words "necessity" and "freedom" is enough to arouse the passions of strife and becloud the reason. Let a philosopher once be called a necessarian, and his influence with many is immediately gone, no matter what the value of his other teachings; and with the believers in determinism the hearing accorded to a teacher of the freedom of the will would not perhaps be more attentive. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that ethics as a science may and should exist apart from theology. The relation of man to his own development, and his relations to the corresponding development of his fellows, is an entirely legitimate subject of scientific investigation, apart from the relation of man to his Creator. The righteousness of man may be as filthy rags, compared with the righteousness of God; and yet it has a real and very im-

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portant existence in all the relations of human life, and therefore has a claim to scientific treatment in an even greater degree than most other phenomena of society. Such a science, as we shall see, may be related to that higher science which connects man with God, and here the question of the freedom of the will cannot be evaded; but, however necessary the connection may be in fact, both sciences may be elaborated separately.

No philosopher has done anything to vindicate the freedom of the will in comparison with Kant; not that by his own individual labors he accomplished so much, but that he originated a movement which has had a prodigious influence upon the present century. In great part through Coleridge, who seems to have freely used the treasures that he discovered in Germany, an entirely new element was introduced into English thought. The doctrine of Adam's sin, as expounded by Dr. N. W. Taylor, of New Haven, seems to require as its ultimate basis the ground of Kant, that the soul is a thing-in-itself. The great work of Müller on the Christian Doctrine of Sin is Kantian, and in its logical conclusion, the pre-existence of the soul, is but carrying out the principles of Kant. Kant saw, as well as Hume, that we perceive only phenomena, and never causal connection; but the irresistible tendency to discern more than what the senses give us demanded his explanation. He observed that in internal phenomena, or consciousness, we follow the method of science when we discern motives. They are causes in the phenomenal sense of telling *when* certain results will follow; but they never tell *why* they will follow. This question can never be answered in the case of external objects — why they cause certain results; but in Kant's view the *ego* is a thing-in-itself, of which we are immediately conscious; in fact, the only one. Hence we know what causal energy is in our own selves. The motive is the *when;* the will is the *why.*

It is difficult to convey, in short space, the meaning of Kant; but the following passage will serve to show how inevitably Müller was driven to the conclusion that he has been so derided for adopting.

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"When it is admitted that the intelligible person may, in regard of any given act, be free, even while as a person belonging in part to the world of sense he is mechanically conditioned, it still seems as if we must admit that the actions of mankind have their determining ground in somewhat entirely beyond their power; so soon as we admit that God, as the Author of all things, is the cause of the existence of substance (a position which cannot be deserted without abandoning theology). Here it would seem that all man's actions have their last ground in the causality of a Supreme Being, different from himself; and, in truth, if the actions of man which belong to his modifications in time be not mere determinations of him as phenomenon, but of him as a thing-in-itself, then freedom would irrecoverably be lost — man would be an automaton, wound up and set agoing by some supreme artist. His self-consciousness would no doubt make him a thinking automaton, where, however, the consciousness of his spontaneity, if deemed freedom, were illusory, as it could only be called so comparatively speaking; since the next determinators of his movements and their series up to their last cause would, it is true, be internal, but the last and highest would be met with in a different hand. ..... The solution of the said difficulty can be effected shortly and clearly, as follows: If existence-in-time is a mere sensitive kind of representing appertaining to the thinking subjects in the world, and so quite unrelated to things-in-themselves, then the creating of these latter beings is a creating of things-in-themselves, because the notion of creation has nowhat to do with the sensitive representing of an entity, but refers to noumena. When, then, I say of beings in the sensible world, '*They are created*,' so far I regard them as noumena. And as it would import a contradiction to affirm that God is the originator of the phenomena, so it is likewise a contradiction to affirm that he is as Creator cause of the actions, which as phenomena are exhibited in the sensible world, although he is cause of the existence of the agent as a noumenon. And if, now, it is possible to assert freedom without prejudice to the mechanism of the system of actions as phenomena, then it cannot make the least difference that the agent is regarded as created; since creation refers to intelligible, not to sensible, existence, and so cannot be figured as a ground of the determination of phenomena; which result, however, would fall out the other way if the finite beings existed in time as things-in-themselves, since then the Creator of the substance would be the Author of all the machinery attaching to the substance. Of so vast importance is the separation of time from the existence of real entities effected in the *Critique*."[1]

To a mind uncommitted to any dogmatic system, and only anxious to learn the truth, it might appear that freedom cannot exist if time is an objective reality, that is, the view

[1] Metaphysic of Ethics (Temple's translation), pp. 135–137.

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of Kant is correct; but the solution must ever be to ordinary comprehension more difficult than the original difficulty. A method which requires us to think away time in order to establish freedom would go far to prepare the mind to think away freedom in order to re-establish time. Such an inquiry as that of Kant is entirely legitimate as a metaphysical speculation; but, although the results may be used in ethics, — that is, we may maintain that the will is, so far as ethics are concerned, free, — the treatment of Aristotle is much better adapted for the common understanding, and, although not so profound as that of Kant, it is, so far as it goes, equally scientific in spirit. Kant's efforts did, indeed, result in the discovery of a semblance of a door, after showing that all other conceivable paths were vain; but they put it so far off that we can never know whether it is more than a semblance; and should we, gifted like him with superhuman powers, reach this door and find it real, we should still discover that it was locked upon the other side — reason never being able to free herself from the categories. Yet even this semblance is enough to frighten off absolute scepticism.

In spite of the lapse of centuries, the framework of ethics, both practical and theological, has remained nearly as Aristotle first constructed it. The doctrine of ends or final causes elaborated by him has established itself as firmly and as necessarily as his logic. It is (so far as I know) not probable that President Edwards had ever read the Ethics of Aristotle; nevertheless, the beginning of his treatise "Concerning the End for which God created the World" bears a striking resemblance to Aristotle's opening of his subject; while the dissertation on the "Nature of True Virtue" is, apart from its specific assumptions, fundamentally Aristotelian. In the first-mentioned treatise Edwards begins by distinguishing ends, chief and inferior, ultimate and subordinate, which is just what Aristotle does in his first chapter. After this, in both treatises, follows the question, What is the greatest good? where the formal conclusions are the same, although the theological subject of Edwards causes his

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material results to be different. In the view of Aristotle the highest of sciences was that which he called political — not in the restricted sense of governmental in which we now use the term, but in that larger sense which it is fashionable to express by that deplorable word "sociology." "The end of this science will be *the good* of man. To discover the good of an individual is well; but it is noble and divine to discover that of a state." It is, of course, not necessary to state, in these pages, that Edwards's definition of the chief good is something quite different from this. In fact, it may be feared that Aristotle and all his followers, so far as they were not duly attentive to the glory of God, have woven for themselves a web of their final causes that draws them so close to an evil end that only their ignorance can save them. But as it is quite certain that Aristotle, if he had admitted the postulates of Edwards, would have coincided with him in his conclusions, we may be permitted to hope that these great spirits are not now separated in their contemplations.

The style of Edwards is unfortunately too diffuse to admit of his being here quoted; but a few words from Aristotle will at once be recognized as furnishing the key to the Edwardean system:

"The best end is something perfect; so that if there is some one end which is alone perfect that would be what we are in search of — if more, the most perfect. The object pursued for its own sake is more perfect than that pursued for the sake of something else; and that which is never chosen on account of anything else is more perfect than those chosen both on their own account and on account of that other. In a word that is simply perfect which is always chosen on its own account and never on account of anything else."[1]

At this point, however, we meet with what appears to be a startling divergence of views. Aristotle immediately adds that this perfect end is happiness; while according to Edwards it is the glory of God. If we were to stop here we should certainly be obliged to admit the common depreciation of Aristotle to be correct. That it is not correct we may show more clearly hereafter. For the present, we must

[1] Eth. Nik., 1, 7.

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observe that the word inadequately translated happiness is εὐδαιμονία, which is really not very different from the election of God. If we were to say that the perfect end of human action is to be elected of God, the modern theologian might well hesitate before denying this proposition. He might reply that such was the perfect end in the sense of being the perfect result so far as man is concerned, although not the perfect end in the sense of aim or purpose. This distinction, as we shall see, is of great importance; but, after all, Aristotle does not use the word in its etymological sense. Happiness is, in the first place, something "self-sufficient" — something which apart from everything else makes life eligible and in no respect lacking. It is, again, the activity of the soul according to reason, and not any passive state; which is, again, called the activity of the soul according to virtue, or to the best and most perfect virtue, and this too in a perfect life; "for one swallow does not make spring, nor does one day make a man happy." Here, now, the Edwardean philosophy must again pause before denying that the perfect end of human action is the activity of the soul according to virtue.

It is plain that everything depends on the question, What is virtue. Aristotle soon decides that virtue is not found in the irrational soul, but in the reason, on the one hand, and in the control of the reason, on the other — the will, it should be remembered, is included by him under the reason — and thus a twofold virtue appears — intellectual, and what may be called moral, where the appetites obey reason. Wisdom and prudence are of the first class of virtues, liberality and temperance of the second. Virtue, it further appears, is a habit, accompanied with deliberate choice, exercised in a mean state, so far as we are concerned, controlled by reason, and especially the reason of a discreet man." The "mean" is the right course between the too much and the too little, both of which are wrong. But with reference to the standard of goodness, virtue is an extreme. Deliberate preference has nothing to do with desires and passions, to which

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it is often opposed. And, finally, the conclusion is reached that we wish or will ends, the virtuous wishing the real good, the vicious, that which appears to each one good; the good man seeing the truth in every case, while most men are deceived by pleasure. Deliberation is solely concerning means, and deliberate choice is also of means — for we cannot be said to *choose* immortality, but to *wish for* it; nor do we choose happiness, but the means of being happy; and in general we choose only what is in our power.

It thus appears that what the virtuous man desires or wishes is the most perfect activity of his soul, and that he chooses the means of attaining this activity. This use of language is quite different from that of Edwards, who would say that we *choose ends;* but the ordinary usage is certainly that of Aristotle. We desire a remote result, as health, and we choose the best of the means offered for attaining health. We can, in short, choose to *do*, to *act;* we cannot choose to *be*, or that others should *be* or *do*, however much we may wish it. We may loosely say that a man prefers health to sickness, meaning that he likes health and dislikes sickness; or we may say that he chooses to be well rather than to be sick, with the same meaning; but in strictness the proper expression would be that a man wishes to be well, and chooses to do what is necessary for health, and it is by metonymy that he is said to choose health. No one prefers sickness to health or pain to pleasure; but many prefer acts that result in sickness and pain.

This difference, however, is not material, since Aristotle holds that he who chooses to act unjustly virtually chooses to be unjust. We have, therefore, to compare the proposition — virtue consists in benevolence to being in general, with the definition of Aristotle. The first inquiry that suggests itself is, whether benevolence or love to being is a habit. Now in spite of his own words it is generally admitted that Edwards did not mean the mere sentiment of love, but the exercise of this sentiment in appropriate acts, and not the occasional, but the constant, exercise. It might well,

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therefore, be called a habitual exercise, and Edwards would be the last to deny that it was in consequence of deliberate choice, and controlled by reason, which, with Aristotle, includes the conscience. So far the two systems are at one; and we have now to consider in what sense virtue is a mean state and connected with prudence. Aristotle repeatedly uses proportions to illustrate his doctrine, and the idea of a judicious steering between the extremes of conduct is fundamental with him; "as it is possible to be wrong in many ways, but right in one alone."

On the other hand Edwards observes: "After benevolence to being in general exists, the *proportion* which is observed in objects may be the cause of the *proportion* of *benevolence* to those objects; but no *proportion* is the *cause* or ground of the existence of such a thing as benevolence to being. The tendency of objects to excite that degree of benevolence which is proportionable to the degree of being, etc., is the consequence of the existence of benevolence, and not the ground of it."[1] If this be taken to represent Edwards's view, then love to being in general is one thing and love to being in proportion to its worth is another; or else if a man have love to being in general he will love it in proportion to its worth; and, conversely, he who has not love to being in proportion to its worth has not love to being in general. The latter is of course the view of Edwards, as appears in the position that he who has not love to being in general has no virtue. So that in spite of the above quotation, it is not the love to being that in itself constitutes virtue, but to being *in general*, or in proportion to its worth. It is therefore the *proportionality* of the love, and not its mere existence, that constitutes virtue. One man may have a much greater degree of love than another, but as he applies it to a limited circle of being, he will be vicious; while the latter, by loving being in general, will be virtuous. There thus appears to be no virtuous quality in love to being apart from the due distribution of that love, from which it follows that virtue

[1] Works, iii. p. 116. New York, 1829.

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coincides with justice, as Aristotle also says, and is simply equity, or giving every one his due. This can be established beyond all question by the following passage: "When I say true virtue consists in *love to being in general*, I shall not be likely to be understood that no one act of the mind or exercise of love is of the nature of true virtue but what has being in general, or the great system of universal existence, for its *direct* and *immediate* object; so that no exercise of love or kind affection to any one particular being, that is, but a small part of the whole, has anything of the nature of true virtue. But my meaning is, that no affections towards particular persons or beings are of the nature of true virtue but such as arise from a generally benevolent temper, or from that habit or frame of mind wherein consists a disposition to love being in general."[1]

As, according to Edwards, the wicked may clearly see and understand that they are loving private being rather than universal, and yet persist in so doing, he does not make vice to consist in any weakness of the understanding, any ignorance of the consequences of sin, but in an abominable and native perversity of the will, which, in spite of all light and all good influences, will, except for the grace of God, always choose wrong. The doctrine of total depravity is thus logically unassailable if this assumption be granted. Most of the assaults against it are utterly futile, involving an *ignoratio elenchi*, and it is worthy of remark that probably the most able and successful attack upon this doctrine that has ever been made was made before the doctrine was ever dogmatically in existence — in the teaching of Socrates that virtue was knowledge. So far as Aristotle and Kant are concerned, their systems furnish the most solid support to this much-berated dogma. They would, equally with Edwards, say that the man who wished his own good, and not the greatest good, was a bad man; although Kant and Edwards would say that his will was bad, Aristotle that his reason was defective.

Yet when the problem is reduced to this form it may be

[1] Works, iii. p. 95. New York, 1829.

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questioned whether the reason be not a better term than the will. Sin has become a mere question of mathematics; the sinner deliberately chooses one instead of ten; the righteous loves ten better than one. Quality is expressly excluded by Edwards and impliedly by Aristotle, and the whole question being made purely quantitative, becomes pre-eminently a matter of reason. To the question, why is it wrong to choose to take one and not ten (*ceteris paribus*), no answer can be given, except that it is irrational. No answer, that is, that will not eventually lead around in a circle to the same question. The fundamental basis of all morality, then, which underlies the system of Aristotle and Edwards, and, as will appear, of Kant also, is *the subjective appearance of that principle which, under the name of the sufficient reason of Archimedes and Leibnitz, is objectively the basis of all dynamical explanation of natural phenomena.*

Nothing happens without a reason why it should be so rather than otherwise. If there be a pair of scales in every respect exactly alike on each side, and with no weights, or equal weights in each scale, it must remain motionless, because there is no reason why one side should go down rather than the other. No mechanical science is possible without the assumption that if a body is acted upon by two perfectly equal forces it will move equally between them; and the only justification that can be offered this assumption (apart from the purely empirical one that it has always been so), is that no reason can be given why it should move more to one side than to another. Any violation of this law we should call a violation of reason itself; a balance that refused to weigh evenly we should call a bad balance; and in the same way we call a will that prefers the less to the greater good a bad will. It is bad because it is irrational; because no sufficient reason can be assigned why it should take the less good.

This principle is required to harmonize all the varying theories of morality. All other explanations will be found themselves to require explanation; and this can only be offered in the above formula. Sin consists in a violation of

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the law; but why is it sinful to violate the law? Because we ought to keep the law. But why ought we to keep the law? Because it is right to keep it, and wrong to break it. But why is it right to keep the law? To this the usual reply is a meaningless iteration: What is right is right, and must be done rather than what is expedient; which is mere dogmatism. But the only proper explanation is, that no reason can be given why if a man admits the law at all — which he must if he is a moral being — he should make any exception to it in his own case. By the very fact that he made exception he would establish another law, viz. that any one could make exceptions to the law when he greatly desired it; and this he would at once see would do away with all law.

Again, if it be said that sin is selfishness, it may be asked, why is selfishness sinful? It is not enough to say, Because it is. Nor is it of any avail to say that selfishness is contrary to the greatest good of the greatest number, for instantly the question reverts to its quantitative form, why is it wrong to choose ten rather than one? To which the only answer is, that no reason can be assigned why one should be chosen rather than ten. So also if it be said with the Utilitarians, that the greatest good of others is the greatest good of the individual, and that he that is selfish neglects his own greatest good, we arrive at the same question, Why should he not neglect his own good? and at the same answer, Because there is no reason why ten should be taken rather than one. This is a purely rational principle, and at the same time implies the only dynamical principle of the reason, containing the the two moments: I choose to act, which is the same as rational existence in general, and explains why some choice must be made, either of ten or of one; and, secondly, this action must be in accordance with reason, that is, quantitative, showing why ten is taken rather than one. All reasoning consists in the knowledge of the equality or identity of objects or relations, taken first in pairs and then compounded into more complex units; and the judgment that a right act must be performed is as purely a rational judgment as that

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of equality. As it would be called irrational to maintain that two does not equal two, so it is irrational to desire ten rather than one, to choose the less good before the greater. Bad reasoning, then, as well as bad action, is bad because it is inequitable. Love to a small portion of being is wrong, because it is disproportionate or inequitable, and the virtuous man occupies a mean, because that is equitable. So the principle of Kant — act as if the maxim of thy will were to become, by thy adopting it, a universal law of nature — may be reduced to the same basis, since if the individual make an exception in his own case, when the same could not be made into a universal law, he is violating reason by making one equal to ten. And the principle of Bentham — every one to count for one, and no one for more than one — falls also under this law; for after the assumption that every one's interest is the same in amount, so far as moral questions are concerned, that is, that the worth of every soul is the same as that of every other, no reason can be given why one should be taken before another. So far as doing right in the abstract is concerned, the particular person is not important, — we cannot say to another, it is better that thou do wrong than I, — and therefore all must be treated equally by the law.

In Aristotle's discussion of justice, which he finds to coincide with virtue, except that justice is relative and virtue is absolute, he expresses himself as follows:

"Since the unjust man is unequal, and what is unjust is unequal, it is plain that there is some mean of the unequal, and this is the equal; for in whatever action there is the more and the less there is also the equal. If then the unjust is unequal, the just is equal; which is without argument admitted by all; and since the equal is a mean the just would also be a mean. The equal is in at the least two things, hence the just being a mean as well as equal must relate to some things and some persons. So far as it is a mean it is of things, that is, the more and the less; and as equal it is in relation to two; and as just, to certain persons. Hence justice implies four forms at least; for there must be two persons to whom it relates, and two elements in the things to which it relates. And there will be the same equality between the persons and between the things, for as the things are to each other so are the persons; if the persons are

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unequal they will not have equal things. Fights and quarrels arise whenever either equal persons do not have equal things, or unequal persons have or get equal things. This is evident from the regard according to worth; for all confess that in distributions what is just must be according to some standard of worth, although they do not all make the standard the same. ..... Justice, therefore, is something proportionate, for proportion is not peculiar to arithmetic, but of everything quantitative (ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ), for proportion is an equality of relation (reason or ratio, λόγου), and in the case of at least four terms. ..... And justice is in at least four terms, and the relation is the same; for they are similarly divided, both the things and the persons receiving them. A : B :: C : D or A : C :: B : D or A+C : A :: B+D : B, which is the formula for just distribution. ..... Injustice is disproportion, either in excess or deficiency. And this is the case in acts, for he who acts unjustly has too much, and the one that suffers injustice too little good. The opposite is the case in regard to evil, for the less evil stands in the relation of good compared with the greater; for the less evil is rather to be chosen than the greater, and what is deserving of choice is good, and what is more deserving is greater good."[1]

This implies, beyond mistake, the Edwardean principle of love to being according to its worth or quantity. In fact, although Edwards maintains that "agreement and consent of different things" is only a secondary kind of beauty, and not that of true virtue, he so involves the idea of proportion, which is fundamental to his whole argument, that he cannot escape the conclusion of Aristotle. The substance of what he says is expressed in the following passage, which should be compared with a previous extract:

"Indeed, most of the duties incumbent on us, if well considered, will be found to partake of the nature of *justice*. There is some natural agreement of one thing to another, some adaptedness of the agent to the object; some answerableness of the act to the occasion; some equality and proportion in things of a similar nature, and of a direct relation one to another. So it is in relative duties; duties of children to parents and of parents to children; duties of husbands and wives; duties of rulers and subjects; duties of friendship and good neighborhood; and all duties that we owe to God, our Creator, Preserver, and Benefactor; and all duties

[1] Eth. Nik., v. 3.

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whatsoever considered as required by God, and as what are to be performed with a regard to Christ. . . . . But there is another and higher beauty in true virtue, and in all truly virtuous dispositions and exercises, than what consists in any uniformity or similarity of various things; viz. the *union of heart* to *being in general*, or to God, the Being of beings, which appears in those virtues; and of which those virtues, when true, are the various expressions or effects."[1]

What is here meant by "union of heart to being in general" is of course deplorably uncertain, so far as the language casts any light upon the question. Edwards, of course, does not hold that virtue resides in the natural affections. As we have before observed, he does not regard the mere *feeling* or *sentiment* of love to being as having anything to do either as cause or as effect with virtue. ("Natural affection does not arise from a *principle* of virtue, and has no tendency to produce it."[2]) It is the correct and proportionate distribution of this feeling that introduces virtue as it introduces the choice. We must therefore suppose that the meaning of the above passage is, that virtue does not consist in the *proportion itself*, but in *acting*, *willing*, or *choosing* according to this fitness or natural agreement. And this is precisely the view of Aristotle. The position of Edwards, therefore, contains nothing new compared with that of Aristotle, except the introduction of the concept of God as equivalent to being in general. This, however important theologically, does not in the least affect the reasoning of ethics. Aristotle, as much as Edwards, could maintain that virtue consisted in love to being according to its worth, although his view was more restricted in estimating the quantity of being. The foundation that he laid, although verbally different and more complex in conception, is really that upon which Edwards built; and no incongruity would result if a theological superstructure were put upon Aristotle's ethics. The following passage shows where such an addition might naturally be made:

[1] Works, iii., p. 115. [2] Ibid., p. 137.

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"That the perfect happiness is a kind of contemplative or speculative (θεωρητική) activity might appear from the fact that we regard the gods as especially blessed and happy. But what actions can be attributed to them? It would be ridiculous to regard them as just in bargaining, repaying deposits, and such things. Or are they brave, encountering terrible things and exposing themselves to danger because it is honorable? Or are they liberal? But to whom will they give? And it is absurd to suppose they have money or anything of the kind. Or can they be temperate? Such praise would be inept, because they have no bad desires. And if we went through the whole list, all moral acts would seem trifling and unworthy of gods. But yet all suppose that they live and are active; for they do not sleep like Endymion. But if life is without ordinary transactions and productions, what is left except the use of the reason [θεωρίας]? So that the activity of God as it excels in blessedness would be speculative [cf. Plato, God geometrizes]. Hence that human activity which is most akin to this would be the happiest. He who is active intellectually, and guards his mind, and keeps it in the best state, is likely to be the most beloved of the gods; for if they have any regard for human affairs, as is probable, it is reasonable that they should rejoice in what is best and most akin to themselves; but this is the mind. And they would benefit those who especially loved and honored this, as those paying attention to their friends and acting rightly and honorably. Now, that all these qualities belong especially to the wise man is not doubtful; he is therefore most dear to the gods, and in this sense he is the happiest man."[1]

In technical language the definition of virtue given by Aristotle is *formal;* by Edwards it is *material.* From a scientific point of view, therefore, the Aristotelean definition is much superior, as any moral action may at once be tested, and it involves no reference to any particular religious belief or even metaphysical doctrine. It is as general in its application as the laws of number or of the reason itself. It does not specify the worth of any object, but simply points out that decision must be made in accordance with worth. So long as virtue is made a matter of reason, so long as the natural affections are denied all moral quality, this position cannot be overthrown. On this foundation, although perhaps in ignorance of its existence, Edwards built his system. It consists of an axiom and a postulate. The axiom is that of Aristotle — Action must be in proportion to end, or love to being must be distributed according to its worth.

[1] Eth. Nik., x. 8.

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The postulate is in this application perhaps peculiar to Edwards — God is the greatest quantity of being. This postulate is a necessity for his system as a system of theology, and its assumption transforms the science of ethics into theology.

We may here notice a reproach often made against Edwards, but which, if it applies to him, applies equally to Aristotle. According to Edwards, it is said, God is the most consummately selfish being in the universe. The position of Edwards is logically evident enough. If virtue consists in love to being in general, God as the greatest quantity must love himself the most. If any one wishes to avoid the conclusion, he must deny the condition. The explanation of the term "love" given by Edwards is perfectly satisfactory; but it cannot be denied that it is his own fault that he has been misunderstood. The word "love" always has been, and always will be, in common parlance, a word signifying an emotion or feeling or affection. Now, to maintain that virtue has nothing to do with the natural affections, and then to select a word to define virtue that could not fail to suggest these affections, was to invite misunderstanding. Hence the bitter feeling so often excited by this system of theology. Men knew that love could not at the same time be virtuous and evil, and yet this unanswerable logician showed that it must be so. Assent could not be refused, nor consent granted. Edwards therefore deserved his ill success; the men he convinced were convinced against their will, with the usual consequence. And so this great man,—a mind which in the power of sustained deductive reasoning may be ranked with that of Newton,—from his neglect to frame his leading positions in clear and unambiguous language, will be forever misunderstood. Posterity can cling to but a few of any man's utterances; and where the very catch-words of a system are uncertain, the whole must pay the penalty.

We find, however, an explanation of the term "self-love" that is clear enough for any purpose:

"Self-love, I think, is generally defined, 'a man's love of

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his own happiness'; which is short, and may be thought very plain..... A man's *own happiness* may either be taken universally, for all the happiness or pleasure of which the mind is in any regard the subject, or whatever is grateful and pleasing to men; or it may be taken for the pleasure a man takes in his own proper, private, and separate good. And so self-love may be taken in two ways: 1. It may be taken for the same as his loving whatsoever is pleasing to him, or loving what he loves..... This is only a general capacity of loving or hating, or a capacity of being either pleased or displeased, which is the same thing as a man's having a faculty of will. For if nothing could be either pleasing or displeasing, agreeable or disagreeable, to a man, then he could incline to nothing, and will nothing. But if he is capable of having inclination, will, and choice, then what he inclines to and chooses is grateful to him, whatever that be — whether it be his own private good, the good of his neighbors, or the glory of God. And so far as it is grateful or pleasing to him, so far it is a part of his pleasure, good, or happiness..... This may be a general reason why men love or hate anything at all, and therein differ from stones and trees, which love nothing and hate nothing..... Self-love, as the phrase is used in common speech, most commonly signifies a man's regard to his confined *private self*, or love to himself with respect to his *private interest*. By *private* interest I mean that which most immediately consists in those pleasures or pains that are personal. For there is a comfort and a grief that some have in other's pleasures or pains, which are in *others* originally, but are derived to them, or in some measure become theirs, by virtue of a benevolent union of heart with others. And there are other pleasures and pains that are originally our *own*, and not what we have by such a participation with others; which consist in perceptions agreeable or contrary to certain personal inclinations implanted in our nature, such as the sensitive appetites and aversions, etc.[1]..... And

[1] Works, iii., pp. 118, 119.

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though self-love is far from being useless in the world, — yea, it is exceedingly necessary to society, — yet everybody sees that if it be not *subordinate* to and regulated by another more extensive principle, it may make a man a common *enemy* to the general system." [1]

The refutation of the charge that he makes God a selfish being follows a somewhat similar line of reasoning, but is too much expanded to be here presented. It is found in the treatise on God's chief end in creation. What we wish to call attention to is the similarity of the above-quoted explanation to that given by Aristotle. The question comes up in his celebrated discussion of friendship, when he remarks:

"It is a question whether a man ought to love himself or some other best; for we may blame those that have an especial affection for themselves, and, as if it were disgraceful, call them self-lovers. The bad man seems to do everything for his own sake, and all the more the more wicked he is. They censure him, therefore, because he does nothing without reference to himself. But the good man acts from honor, and the more excellent he is the more he is governed by honor and by regard for his friend; but he disregards his own personal convenience. But facts are not in accord with these words, and not unreasonably so. For they say that one should love best the one who is most of a friend. Now he is most friendly who wishes good to another on his own account, even if no one should know it. Now this, as well as all the other things that make up the definition of a friend, is especially true in the relation of a man to himself, for it has been stated that from himself proceed all friendly feelings even towards others. And all the proverbs agree in this, as "one soul," and "everything in common among friends," and "friendship is equality," and "the knee is nearer than the ankle"; for all these things exist especially in regard to oneself; for every one is a friend to himself, and therefore ought to love himself most.

"It is therefore a reasonable question, which of these views we are to follow, since both seem credible. Perhaps, then, it is necessary to analyze such arguments, and define how far and in what sense they are true. If then we were to take the word "self-lover" and see how each uses it, we should be likely to get at the truth. Those, then, who apply it as a reproach call those self-lovers who take to themselves the greater share of money or honors or bodily pleasures, for most men are striving after these, and are most desperately in earnest about them, as if they were the best things; whence also they are very much fought about. Now those

[1] Works, iii., p. 143

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who are eager for such things gratify their desires and, in general, their passions and the irrational part of the soul. But most men are of this kind; hence also the appellation has arisen from the fact that the generality of men are bad. Accordingly it is just that self-lovers in this sense should be reproached. And it is clear that the many do call those self-lovers that so discriminate in their own favor. For if any one is always eager that he himself especially of all should do what is just or temperate or anything virtuous, and in general wishes always to win honor for himself, no one would call such a man a self-lover, nor blame him.

"And yet such a one would seem to be all the more a self-lover; for he assigns to himself what is most honorable and especially good, and gratifies the most superior part of himself and obeys this in every respect. And as the supreme part especially seems to be the state and every other system, so it constitutes the man; and therefore he that is devoted to this part, and gratifies it, is especially a self-lover. And so a man is called continent or incontinent according as the mind rules or not, as if this were the individual. And men think that what they do with reason they themselves especially do, and do voluntarily. Hence it is plain that this especially constitutes the individual, and that the good man is especially devoted to this. Hence he would be especially a self-lover, in a different sense from the reproachful one; differing as much as living according to reason differs from being governed by passion, or as desiring what is honorable differs from desiring what seems profitable.

"Accordingly all approve of and praise those who are chiefly concerned about honorable acts. If all contended for the honorable and strove to do the most honorable things, every one in general would have his due, and to every individual there would be the greatest of the goods, if virtue is what we say it is. So that it is necessary that the good man be a self-lover, for he himself will be delighted in doing what is honorable and will profit everybody else. But this is not necessary in the case of the wicked man; for he will injure both himself and his neighbors, following evil passions. To the wicked man, then, what he ought to do and what he does are at variance; but the good man does what he ought; for all mind chooses for itself what is best, and the good man obeys his mind. And it is true of the worthy man that he does many things on account of his friends and his fatherland, even if it becomes necessary to die. For he will cast aside money and honors, and, in short, all those goods that are objects of strife, gaining for himself honor. For he would prefer a great and short pleasure rather than a little and protracted one, and to live one year honorably rather than to live in the ordinary way for many years, and to do one great and honorable act rather than many little ones. This is what happens to those who die for their country. They choose great honor for themselves and would relinquish money that their friends might receive more of it; for the money goes to the friend, but

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the honor to himself, so that he takes the greatest good to himself. And with respect to honors and great place it is the same; for he gives up all those to his friend, for this is honorable to himself and praiseworthy. Hence he is justly regarded as a good man, choosing honor before all things. It is even possible that he give up the performance of such acts to his friend, and that even more honorable than his own doing of a thing may be the causing a friend to do it. In all laudable things, therefore, the excellent man seems to assign himself the greater share of what is honorable. Thus, then, it is necessary to be a self-lover, as has been said; but in the way that the many are, it is not necessary." [1]

In spite of all that has been written upon this question, nothing has been added to what Aristotle here gives us. Every source of misunderstanding is disposed of, with but a word in many cases, but a word that ends dispute. One touch is especially fine, where it is observed that a truly good man, whose sole end is upright conduct, will even stand aside to allow a friend to perform an honorable act, and thereby gain the greater honor. But the chief merit of this explanation is that it makes clear beyond all mistake that honorable conduct is in the nature of things a good in itself, and the highest good. Hence a man cannot be virtuous without securing to himself the greater good, aye, even aiming at it for himself. So that the altruist cannot escape aiming at his own greatest good, from the simple fact that self-abnegation may be the greatest good. For a man to disregard himself, in the sense of Aristotle that his reason or conscience is himself, is to be mad or wicked, and not noble. For a man to disregard his own desires and passions that he may obey his reason is not to disregard *himself;* unless his passions constitute himself, and not his reason. The whole question, therefore, depends upon the definition of self, and it would have saved uncountable disputes of those eager enthusiasts whose anxiety to repudiate selfishness is itself an illustration in its most annoying form of the feeling against which they contend, if these hasty correctors of mistakes that are really their own, but which they impute to others, would have strengthened their understandings

[1] Eth. Nik., ix. 8.

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with a little study of the great moralists. Whatever definition be chosen there is no doubt that he is unjust (and therefore in the common sense selfish) who condemns others without a most thorough examination of their words; and it is never edifying — unless as a disgusting but wholesome medicament — to behold self-conceit striving to win popular applause by lauding unselfishness.

We cannot but regard the whole controversy between the opposing schools of moralists as depending upon a confusion between the final cause or end of actions and their result. It is quite possible — and we venture to say it is common — for two opposing authors to dispute *ad infinitum* simply because one uses the word "end" in the sense of purpose, while the other employs it in the sense of result. The difference inevitably leads to results as wide as the poles asunder. In one sense the end of virtuous action is itself — it is to act virtuously, to do what is right for no ulterior reason, but simply because it is right — because reason and conscience demand it, because it is complying with the law, because it is the greatest good, or whatever form of words be employed. But the end of virtuous action in the sense of the result, is happiness, and the greatest good to oneself. To confuse these two conceptions is to hopelessly involve the whole subject of morals; but this is what is too often done by the controversialists. The utilitarian really means that what is best for him is what will make him happiest, and he does not, as is too often absurdly supposed, maintain that the gratification of his senses will make him happiest, but the obedience to his reason; and this is precisely the virtue of the other school; so that if one says, I do this because it will make me happiest, and the other, I do this because it is right, their differencce is only an accidental, and not an essential one; for, if they be pressed for further reasons, the one will reply, it will make me happiest because my reason will not allow me to act otherwise; and the other (if he can be persuaded to cease iterating, as Cicero does, from one end to the other of his treatises, without ever stum-

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bling upon another idea — because it is right) must answer, it is right because reason requires it.

It is perfectly consistent with utilitarianism for a man to lay down his life for his friend or his country; and greater love hath no man than this. To insist that a man shall not think of the results to himself of his own acts is to insist that he shall not think of their results at all; to reduce virtue from a matter of reason to a matter of impulse. Now it is, perhaps, a sound view to regard virtue as not consisting in rational choice, but in good impulses; but if so, it should be properly explained before criticism of the existing theories which are certainly founded upon another basis. The proposition which harmonizes both schools is this: The virtuous man is he who so acts as to promote the highest good of all, by doing which he indeed insures to himself the highest good also; but what fills his mind in his deliberation and action is not himself — the thought that *he* is to be benefited, but the good results that are to follow. In other words, his view is purely objective, and the more it is subjective the less it is virtuous. Who does not recognize as those he *respects* most, those quiet men of clear and powerful reason who seem unconscious of their own existence in their devotion to the ends for which they labor; who sink altogether their own personality in their work, so that they are astounded when flatterers come to praise them; who dislike to be thanked or be reminded that they are admired, that being foreign to their purpose; men who do not wish to say, *I did it;* but *it is done;* perfect servants of God, who calmly fulfil their appointed round of duties, as the great earth quietly swings about the sun, not without internal commotions and struggles, as the earth has its tornadoes and volcanoes, but just as little affected by them, because of the immensely overmatching force of the divine controlling reason.

Before quitting this passage from Aristotle, it is important to notice the great principle implied in his remark that self-love in the bad sense means taking to one's self the greater share of money, honors, or sensual pleasures. It might be

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asked why this should be so wrong, and yet it be so right to secure the highest degree of honor. One obvious distinction is that the former are means, while honor is an end-in-itself, or absolute good. This may have been the meaning of Aristotle; but there is a deeper truth in his remark. All such things as money, honors, and bodily pleasures are limited in quantity; while to honor itself no such relation can be applied. There are many human beings, and only a moderate amount of worldly goods. He, therefore, who seizes for himself a disproportionate share of the surface of the earth does unjustly; for he deprives another of what this other has an equal claim to, thereby sinning against his reason in making an exception to law in his own favor. So, as by a natural law the numbers of both sexes are made equal, he who does not content himself with one woman sins against justice. But with righteousness there is no limit, nor has any one yet found that for him there was no share of goodness. The fountain of virtue is not to be drained dry, though millions drink thereat; for it is inexhaustible as time, and like space it has no end. Here, then, the spirit of man finds its freedom; for there is nought to restrain, and no excess is possible. The appetites are not the man, as Aristotle says, but the mind; and to the free play of reason no opposition is found. What constitutes freedom is freedom from the control of the appetites, which are something foreign to the soul, and the most complete and hearty abandonment to one's own self, to the loftiest and widest flights that reason can attain.

It is not necessary, in these pages, to refer to the New Testament for passages to illustrate this great truth. For popular apprehension the language there used will not be superseded. But as a scientific basis for the possibility and reality of freedom, the absence of all quantitative determination of the will in its desire for truth and righteousness is as important as the presence of the same element in the decisions of justice. And here we may catch a glimpse, although an uncertain one, of the freedom proclaimed by

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Kant. It would, however, lead us too far from our subject to follow further this discussion. We may content ourselves with simply recalling the profound remark of Aristotle, that virtue and justice are nearly the same, except that justice is relative, while virtue is absolute.

It may be remarked, in reference to Kant, that he apparently does injustice to Aristotle (although he does not refer to him by name) in his sweeping condemnation of Eudemonism. He says that "the consciousness of agreeable sensations, regarded as uninterrupted through the whole course of life, constitutes happiness; and the ruling principle to make regard to one's own happiness the supreme and single determination to action is the principle which is justly called self-love. Consequently all material principles which put the determinator of choice in the pleasure or pain resulting from the existence of an object are to this extent all of the same kind — that they belong to a system of Eudemonism, and rest on one's own self-love."[1] Now, as we have seen, Aristotle does not at all make happiness to consist of the consciousness of agreeable sensations, but in a virtuous, rational activity; and, although Kant is correct if his definitions be accepted, yet these definitions by no means represent the view of Aristotle. Again, we have seen that the principle of Aristotle is no material principle, but as purely formal as that of Kant himself; indeed, that both principles are at bottom the same, and differ rather as different aspects of the same truth than as opposing theories.

How much Kant misrepresents the view at least of many self-called utilitarians may be seen by taking one of his illustrations: "A fourth, possessing wealth, observes others struggling with difficulties; and, though he might easily assist them, he says, What concern is it of mine? Let every one be as happy as he can. I neither hinder nor envy any one, nor can I take the trouble to exert myself to advance his welfare nor to redress his sorrows."[2] This is not virtue in the utilitarian sense, which is to gratify not simply the

[1] Met. of Ethics, p. 79. [2] Ibid., p. 34.

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desire of ease, but all our impulses, including that of justice, and all in due proportion. Again, Kant says: "If a person were to attempt to justify his having borne false witness by alleging to his friend the sacred obligation he lay under of consulting his own happiness, by enumerating the profits and advantages accruing from this falsehood, and if he were in, conclusion, to point out the extreme cunning he had employed in the whole matter to fortify himself against detection, and to add that, although he now intrusted to his friend this secret, yet he was ready to deny it stoutly at any future occasion, and that in all this he was discharging a humane and reasonable duty, — certainly his friend must either laugh him to scorn or turn from him with disgust; although, if maxims are to be constructed singly with respect to one's own advantage, nothing of moment can be urged against such a line of conduct."[1] Certainly his friend, if a utilitarian, would laugh him to scorn or turn from him with disgust, and would be but a poor teacher of his principle if he could urge nothing of moment against such conduct. No man could take pleasure in such gains, and no gains are advantageous in the utilitarian view unless they afford pleasure, and that not mere sensual pleasure, but that higher delight that comes from the exercise of the moral reason. So that it is only the most degraded kind of Hedonism that Kant is opposing — that which, as Aristotle says, makes the man to consist in his appetites, and not in his reason; while the modern school of utility entirely coincides with Kant in making the reason supreme. The difference arises from the fact that they speak of the *test* or *proof* of right as if it were the *end* or *purpose*. The two eventually coincide, but ought not to be confused. The fact that a right act results in my own greatest happiness is a most serviceable and practical test of rightness; but it does not follow that it is the end present to the mind in action. If this be maintained by utilitarians, or any other school, they lie open to the destructive criticism of Kant.

[1] Met. of Ethics, p. 95.

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The whole discussion of the question of pleasure by Aristotle is so admirable that it is an injustice to quote any part of it. He disposes with masterly good sense of those who maintain that pleasure in itself is an evil — a doctrine, it is safe to say, that is only theoretically held, and never exemplified. Pleasure, it is clear, cannot be the chief good; but that does not hinder us from regarding it as a good. It is, in Aristotle's language, the perfection of an energy. It is not itself an end, except in connection with a virtuous activity; it is like the bloom of youth to those in their prime. So long as perception and thought are in all respects sound, there will be pleasure in their exertion. Pleasures are of as different kinds as the activities — some good and some bad. Pleasure is not thought or perception, although some foolishly suppose that because they cannot be separated they are the same. Pleasure, then, is an invariable attendant of the activity of the perfect man; it is not an efficient cause of happiness, but a formal one. Against pleasure as thus explained no reproach can be brought. It is not made the final cause of action, and, with this restriction, is a blessing, and not a curse, the fair handmaid of virtue, the exquisite scent of a perfect flower, and not the temptress of Hercules.

It might seem from the speculative character of the themes on which we have been engaged that the treatise of Aristotle was of an abstract description. But in fact this great philosopher intermingles with his practical remarks sentences of such deep and far-reaching truth as, if expanded, would indeed alter the appearance of the work. The explication of these truths may not, perhaps, be uncalled for in the present backward state of ethics in this country; and yet it is certainly desirable to recall attention to the admirable delineations of the particular virtues that make up the most fascinating part of the Nikomachean Ethics. Especially noteworthy in the discussion of such subjects is the delicate discrimination in the meaning of the different terms employed in ethics. No preparation would be of greater advantage to the student, for instance, of Theological ethics, as

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enabling him to thread his way understandingly through the confused maze of casuistry and speak convincingly to men, than a careful examination of these celebrated portraitures. They are gems as perfect in their way as cameos. Nor should the distinction be neglected, although we cannot here dwell upon it, of the virtues into those that are purely rational, and those that arise from the control of reason over the appetites, or intellectual and moral virtues. It is a distinction verbally known, but perhaps not fully appreciated in all its bearings, and would reward the student for its investigation. The same quantitative determination that we have already alluded to will be found here to mark the moral virtues and not the virtues of the reason. Here we may discover again an adumbration of the doctrine of Kant, that the soul is a thing-in-itself, or noumenon, and its true activity is free from all bonds of space and time.

Sir Henry Maine remarks in his "Ancient Law" on the total change effected in the science of ethics by the system of Kant. How can this be true, it may be asked, if the great principles of Kant were proclaimed by Aristotle in the work that, until this century, dominated the science? In reply it may be observed that Aristotle only implies what Kant makes most prominent. The system of Aristotle may be harmonized with the principles of Kant, which shows that it is in reality based upon the same truth; but the aim of Aristotle was especially descriptive, while that of Kant was speculative. It is no reproach to Aristotle that he did not elaborate principles in his ethics that were elsewhere discussed by him, and were here foreign to his purpose; nor is it any disparagement to Kant to say that the great Stagirite had dimly felt what he clearly saw — he, that sublime genius whose lofty flights conducted him so far into the realm of pure being that his voice descends to us as a voice from out of the heavens. All truth has ever been within the reach of man — the ability to discern it, no matter when, is the test of genius. The keen eye of the artist that detects, in a work that all but him have slighted and despised, the in-

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spired hand of a former master, implies in himself the possession of a like inspiration.

All truth is one; and the deeper the penetration of two great minds the nearer do they approach. The works of both Kant and Aristotle in ethics are needed, and, one might almost add, no others. One point especially in which Aristotle fails us and where Kant's glory shines brightest, is the presentation of the only feeling, or correlate to feeling, that his vigorous system admits — reverence for the law. This "spring" of action is enough; but as much as this is needed. This humbles the haughtiest, be he king or philosopher. Back of this no mortal can ever go. To him who would still ask, when morality has been shown to be ordained by reason, Why should reason be obeyed? no answer can be given but that contained in these great words: "How naked reason, independently of every other spring, can be itself active and spontaneous, i.e. how the mere principle of the validity of its maxims for universal laws, independently on every object man may be interested in, can be itself a spring to action, and beget an *interest* which is purely *ethical;* to explain this, I say, *how reason can be thus practical*, is quite beyond the reach and grasp of all human thought, and the labor and toil bestowed on any such inquiry is fruitless and thrown away. The idea of a pure cogitable world, as an aggregate of reasonable beings, to which we ourselves belong, although still parts in a physical system, is a most fertile and allowed idea for the behoof of a reasonable faith, all knowledge falling short on this side of it. Nor can the august ideal of a universal kingdom of ends in themselves fail to excite in man a lively interest in the moral law, since mankind can only then figure themselves its inhabitants, when they most industriously adhere to the imperatives of freedom, as if they were necessary laws of the physical system."

[To be continued.]

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ARTICLE III.

CHRIST'S WORDS ON THE DURATION OF FUTURE PUNISHMENT.

BY REV. CEPHAS KENT, RIPTON, VT.

[PREFATORY NOTE. — The design of this Essay is to furnish aid in determining the proper signification of those words in the New Testament which are chiefly employed in teaching the doctrine of future retribution. The Great Teacher uttered these words. What do they mean? In order satisfactorily to answer this question, their *use* must be examined. To facilitate this, a table of references has been prepared, pointing out *all the places in the New Testament where the words are found.* The completeness of this list brings to the careful student of the English Bible, as well as to those acquainted with the original language, the great means of forming an independent opinion as to the teachings of Scripture in the use of these words.

But further, these words are understood to derive much of their significance from a Hebrew word of like import in the Old Testament. It is therefore claimed that the Greek words in question cannot be fully explained without a faithful comparison with the corresponding word in Hebrew. To answer this claim, and as preliminary to the discussion, the use of this Hebrew word has been examined, and a list of references made out marking *all the places* in the Old Testament in which the word occurs.

These lists together are a complete concordance of these words. In them the reader has before him, or within easy reach, the entire basis of the argument on the subject in question, so far as it depends on the use of these words.

The result brought out in this Essay derives its force from the fulness of the references and from the facility thus furnished to any patient investigator to detect and point out any fallacy that may be thought to be discovered, and to satisfy his own mind in respect to the just weight of the argument.]

ETERNAL PUNISHMENT. — עוֹלָם, *Αἰών, Αἰώνιος.*

THE question whether our Saviour taught the doctrine of eternal punishment is to be determined by appeal to his verbal utterances on the subject, and to the general outlook of his instructions. If these do not help us to give a clear,

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definite, and unhesitating answer, it must remain in doubt till a new revelation is given us.

Were the seventeen hundred and eighty-two years which have passed since the last of the Gospels was written to be dropped out of existence, or buried in utter oblivion, leaving us the Bible as we now have it, the proper means of ascertaining the truth on the subject before us would be precisely what they are now. For, since the completion of the inspired volume there has been no voice from heaven to teach us with authority how its instructions are to be interpreted. We are, therefore, to take the Bible as we find it, and learn what it means from itself.

The Old Testament Scriptures, as I understand, are the only writings in the Hebrew language in existence of as early a date as the last of the prophets; the traditions of the Talmud not having been reduced to writing till about the year A.D. 150. It follows from this that the meaning of Hebrew words is to be learned from their use in the Hebrew Scriptures, unaffected in the least by the new meanings, or modifications of meaning, which were introduced into the language hundreds of years afterwards.

Almost the same may be affirmed of the Greek translation of the Old Testament called the Septuagint. This translation is said to have been made from the Hebrew about two hundred and fifty years before the birth of Christ. Although doubt is entertained by learned men whether the work was completed at so early a period, the quotations from it in the New Testament by the writers of the Gospels and by the apostles are proof that it was in existence in the time of Christ, and was in common use among the Jews. It is written in what is called Hellenistic Greek, or the Greek as spoken by the Jews in Egypt. This differs somewhat from what is known as classic Greek, or the Greek language in use among educated men to whom Greek was their mother-tongue. The meaning of Greek words in the Septuagint is therefore to be finally determined by their use in this book, comparing them also with the original Hebrew, and not by their use in classic

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Greek, or even the Hellenistic Greek in use two or three hundred years afterwards, and modified by prevailing or popular systems of philosophy or religion.[1]

It is exceedingly important to bear in mind, while endeavoring to understand the words of the Great Teacher on our subject, that at the close of the Old Testament canon of Scripture, the meaning of its language was fixed. No changes which the lapse of time or other causes might subsequently bring about in its use could alter the meaning of that book. The same is true of the Hellenistic Greek of the Septuagint in the time of Christ, and of the words of the New Testament after its various documents passed from the hands of those who wrote them. Keeping this in mind, it will be seen how cautious we must be in the use of arguments as to the meaning of the writers drawn from a different use of words in Talmudic Hebrew or classic Greek, or Hellenistic Greek as used after the times of the apostles and under the influence of the gnostic philosophy or other prevailing errors.[2]

Christ used the word *αἰών* in some of its forms, and its derivative adjective *αἰώνιος*. How came he to use them? He found them in use among the people, and in the Greek translation of the Old Testament. There can be no doubt that he employed them in the sense which they generally bear in that book. What is that sense? And how can we determine it? We need not inquire how they were employed by the historians, poets, and philosophers[3] of ancient Greece, or even by the Christian Fathers,[4] so-called, of the early centuries. It is enough to ask, simply, what is the sense of the Hebrew words to which they correspond. In this way, and by examining their use in the New Testament, we can judge with reasonable certainty as to their meaning in the instructions of the Saviour on the subject of future retribution.

If the words in question were of infrequent occurrence, it would be natural to seek help in determining their meaning from their etymology or history. But here there is no need of this. They are found in so common use and in so various

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connections that there is little danger of misinterpreting their true significance in any place where they occur.

Let us examine them. First: עוֹלָם.

Our interest in the examination of this word for the purpose now before us grows out of the fact that the Greek *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος* are so often employed by the Septuagint translators to express its meaning in their version as to assure us that when we understand the meaning of עוֹלָם we also know the meaning of *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος*. The table of references appended to this Article points out its occurrence in the Old Testament four hundred and forty-five times. Careful attention has been given to each one of these in the original, and no single instance has been discovered in which it does not relate to *duration*. There are two in which, in our version, it is rendered *the world*. In one of these (Ps. lxxiii. 12) the translators, as it seems to me, miss the point of the writer. They have it: "These are the ungodly, who prosper (עוֹלָם) in the world: they increase in riches." But the writer designed to give expression to the intensity of what he soon acknowledges to be his unreasonable and wicked dissatisfaction and impatience at the way things were managed: "These are the ungodly, and they are *always* prosperous: they heap up riches; while *I* find that there is no use in trying to be good, for I am plagued all the day long."[5]

The other place where עוֹלָם is translated *the world* is Eccl. iii. 11. This is the meaning given to this text in Buxtorf, and Gibbs's Gesenius. But as no parallel passage is referred to by either to favor such a construction, and as *eternity*, in the connection, to say the least, gives as good a sense, it is proper to regard such translation as merely conjectural and without warrant. With these two passages thus disposed of, it is proper to say that עוֹלָם *invariably* has respect to *duration*.

The plural form occurs twelve times, but without any meaning different from that conveyed by the singular, as may be seen by consulting the following references: 1 Kings viii. 13; 2 Chron. vi. 2; Ps. lxi. 5; lxxvii. 5, 7; cxlv. 13; Eccl. i. 10; Isa. xxvi. 4; xlv. 17 (twice); li. 9; lvii. 11.

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As a late writer, in the endeavor to prove that this word does not mean eternity, but simply *an age*, has asserted that, in accordance with that theory, there are found such "reduplications of the word as an עוֹלָם of עוֹלָמִים, or an age of ages," I remark that I have discovered no instance of such reduplication.[6] It seems pertinent to the subject before us to say this, preparatory to presenting the word itself.

Meaning of עוֹלָם.—This word is used in Scripture in senses directly opposite to each other. For what can be more opposite to the future than the past, or to the past than the future? In the more common use of the word, it has respect to duration in the future. But the instances in which it refers to the past are too numerous to be properly called "catachrestic," or exceptions to general usage, as they are called by Professor Stuart. *Ancient times*, *of old*, *of old time*, *long ago*, or something equivalent, is legitimately a common meaning of עוֹלָם. I have found fifty-two instances where it is employed in this sense, though not always so rendered in the common version. This number comprises about one eighth of all the cases in which the word is found.

But further, not only has this word two opposite significations as past and future, but each of these — עוֹלָם *past* and עוֹלָם *future* — has two different meanings, one describing *the indefinite*, the other *the infinite*. A careful examination of the word, in its various connections, can scarcely fail to convince one that these four meanings attach to it, and that they cannot but be recognized in any faithful translation of the Scriptures. But notwithstanding this diversity, there is seldom any confusion or ambiguity of meaning, more than there would be, in common discourse, in the use of the word *hemlock*, meaning both an evergreen tree and a poisonous herb; or more than if the four senses in which עוֹלָם is used were expressed each by its own appropriate word of a single signification. In almost all cases, the connection shuts up the sense to the one meaning which there belongs to it, and shuts out the other three.[7]

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This shows how needless and how futile all endeavors must be to fix upon the word a meaning independent of its connection, or to argue that because in one place it evidently points to an indefinite and finite future, it cannot in another place be *known* to mean an infinite future.

It is a most noteworthy fact that עוֹלָם is not used, in a single instance, to designate a limited or definite period, either past or future. For our present purpose no further remark is called for in relation to those fifty-two cases which have reference to the past.

But in seven eighths of the instances in which עוֹלָם is used in the Bible it speaks of an indefinite or infinite *future*. The sacred writers employ it very often to point out an indefinite, though less than infinite, duration, just as forever and everlasting are used in our common speech, where an infinite future is not intended. At the same time, it is unquestionable that it is generally employed to express the *infinite* future. This idea is sometimes conveyed by other words and forms of expression. But עוֹלָם where it means *forever* or *everlasting*, is found many times throughout the Bible where any other word of like meaning is found once. This is the word that describes Jehovah as the everlasting God in Gen. xxi. 33; Ps. xc. 2; Isa. xl. 28. It is this in which is declared his eternal dominion in Ex. xv. 18; Ps. ix. 7; x. 16; xxxiii. 11; lxvi. 7; and it is this word, עוֹלָם, that is employed so many times in the Psalms, and elsewhere in the writings of the historians and prophets of the Bible, to set forth God's eternal existence and dominion, his title to everlasting praise, and the glorious truth that the mercy of the Lord endureth forever. To describe the infinite, eternal God, or what belongs to him, it is used seventy-six times.

It is this fact — that this word is so applied to the self-existent God and to his unchangeable government and attributes — that, beyond all reasonable controversy, *fixes* upon it the meaning of *eternity*. That when applied to other subjects of a temporary and perishing nature it has a more restricted meaning, we have already seen. But that in its

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application to God, his government, and attributes it means eternal, it is as impossible for us to doubt as it is to doubt the divine self-existence. If this does not mean eternal, there is no word or combination of words, from Genesis to Revelation, to tell us anything of the infinite past and the boundless future; and all that we can know of eternity, without a new revelation, must be gathered from sources independent of any light that comes to us from between the covers of the Bible.

But here the question comes up: If the word has so different meanings, when is it to be regarded as referring to the *infinite future?* In view of the fact that it is so often applied to the infinite God, the answer must be that *it means eternal or everlasting, in all cases when the connection, properly understood, does not positively show that it is more restricted.* Thus, when in Jer. x. 10 we read that "God is an עוֹלָם King," the sense does not restrict it, and we know that it means *eternal.* But when Solomon, in 1 Kings viii. 13, speaks of the temple which he had built as "a settled place for God to dwell in עוֹלָמִים," the sense shows that it does *not* mean eternal.

Second. Let us now examine *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος* synonymous in the Septuagint with the Hebrew עוֹלָם.

The interpretation of עוֹלָם has been thus dwelt upon for the reason that its whole meaning is transferred to the Greek of the Old Testament by means of *αἰών* and its derivative *αἰώνιος*. In four hundred and fifteen places where some form of עוֹלָם is found, only seven have been found where it is translated by any other word than *αἰών* or *αἰώνιος*. This shows a remarkable correspondence between them.

This all but universal use of *αἰών* and its derivative by the translators of the Septuagint to give the sense of the Hebrew עוֹלָם, shows that the words must carry with them into the Greek the two opposite meanings of past and future, and the two subordinate variations of each as indefinite and infinite.

In the New Testament, however, *αἰών* has the sense of *world*, which, so far as I have been able to learn, it never

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bears in the Septuagint.[8] It is several times a loose synonyme of *κόσμος*, *world*,[9] but whether this world or the world to come depends wholly on the connection. Considering how often the word is employed in both senses, it is remarkably free from ambiguity. It occurs thirty-two times in the sense of world, or where it is not designed to express the idea of past or future time. These thirty-two, or (including Eph. ii. 2, where it is rendered *course*) these thirty-three instances of its use in the New Testament, may therefore be set aside as having no bearing on the present discussion. Besides these, *αἰών* is found in the New Testament (if no mistake has been made in the examination) seventy-one times where it has reference to time or duration, past or future. The adjective *αἰώνιος* follows this sense of *αἰών* throughout all cases of its use, and, so far as I can ascertain, is in no case employed in the sense of worldly, or of pertaining to the world. As these two words, the noun and the adjective, are so nearly related to each other, it does not seem necessary to consider them separately, further than to state that *αἰών* is used in reference to the indefinite past seven times, and *αἰώνιος* three times. Leaving out these, and for the present those passages also which relate to future retribution, we find *αἰών* used of the indefinite or infinite future fifty-five times, and *αἰώνιος* in the same sense fifty-nine times. In all these instances *αἰών* may properly be translated *forever*, or, with a negative particle, *never; αἰώνιος* is rendered *everlasting* or *eternal*. These words are applied to God, his glory, and kingdom thirty-eight times, and sixty-two to the blessedness of the righteous. The thirty-eight which relate to the existence, attributes, and government of God leave no question that in such connection they are to be interpreted in their most extensive signification, as forever and eternal. And there can be no doubt that, if the element of duration is introduced at all,[10] this same meaning belongs to them in the sixty-two cases where they are used to set forth the glory of future blessedness, so that they point to a duration which will have no end.

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We find, then, in the New Testament, one hundred and seventy-three instances in which occurs, in one form or another, one or the other of these words, *αἰών* or *αἰώνιος*. Throwing out the thirty-three of *αἰών*, where it has no reference to time or duration, and the ten instances of their use where they have reference to the past, and the remaining one hundred and thirty point to the future. Leave out also from our consideration, just at this stage of our discussion, the fifteen which relate to the future condition of those who die without repentance. The thirty-eight cases where the words refer to God incontestably carry with them the idea of everlastingness or eternity. The sixty-two pointing to the happy condition of the righteous are generally regarded as equally clear in asserting that this condition is to be absolutely without end. There remains fifteen instances of a miscellaneous character, not reckoned in the above, in most of which the words as clearly mean forever or eternal. In no case is either word used to describe a period of known and definite limits.

In a few instances *αἰών*, meaning ever or forever, or, with the negative never, is employed as in common speech we use the words forever and never, when we have in mind no direct reference to a never-ending future. Thus Paul said, "If meat make my brother to offend I will never eat meat; or I will by no means eat meat forever; that is, I will forever abstain from it." So the Saviour said to the fruitless fig-tree: "Let no man eat fruit of thee forever." Such a use of these words misleads no one, and brings no doubt as to their true meaning when applied to things which are in themselves capable of an absolutely boundless future. The steps of the argument here attempted may be thus recapitulated.

1. עוֹלָם in Hebrew is the word above any other, and used many times more than all others, to express eternal duration.

2. This word is rendered in the Greek translation of the Old Testament, which was in use in the time of our Saviour, by *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος* nearly fifty times to one where it is ren-

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dered by any other word; thus proving that these were the words in general use in the days of Christ, to express the meaning forever and everlasting of the Hebrew עוֹלָם.

3. This meaning of these words is confirmed throughout by the usage of them in the New Testament. For if we leave out thirty-three instances where *αἰών* does not relate to duration, and the ten in which it and its derivatives relate to the past, in the sense of ancient times, or from everlasting; and, further, leave out, for the present, the fifteen which apply to future retribution, we find these words, one or the other, one hundred and fifteen times; one hundred, or more than three fourths of these, relate either to God or the blessedness of his people; and the remaining fifteen in general correctly translated forever or everlasting, but sometimes in the sense of always or perpetually, or with a negative by never, as when Peter said, "Thou shalt never wash my feet." It is to be carefully noted that, while the noun *αἰών*, with a preposition used adverbially in the sense of forever, is applied, as in this case, simply to all future *time*, the adjective *αἰώνιος* is never used in the New Testament except in the sense of *eternal*, having reference either to the past or the future, unless we except from this those instances in which it is applied to the future condition of the wicked.

Shall these be excepted? Is there any ground in philology to make them exceptions to the general usage of *αἰών*, and to the otherwise uniform usage of *αἰώνιος*? If we believed that Jesus and his disciples who employed these words in setting forth the subject before us spoke with no more than human authority, we should discover no ground to hesitate as to the meaning of their language and the doctrine which they intended to teach. We should interpret their words as teaching the doctrine of eternal punishment, as they are generally interpreted by those who disbelieve in their divine inspiration and authority. Of words that are met with as frequently as עוֹלָם in Hebrew, and *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος* in Greek, and forever and everlasting in English, I think it would be difficult to find one in either of the languages of a more con-

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sistent, and, in their proper connections, uniform and unfluctuating signification than any one of these three.

Christ uses the word *αἰών* once, and *αἰώνιος* four times in reference to the condition of the wicked. In Matt. xviii. 8, "It is better for thee to enter into life halt or maimed, rather than having two hands or two feet to be cast into everlasting fire." Matt. xxv. 41, "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." Matt. xxv. 46, "These shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal."

In this last example it is important to notice the clear contrast between the condition of the righteous and of the wicked, as here set forth. The difference is not in the duration of one or the other, for the same word is used in both cases to describe this idea; but one is punishment, while the other is life. As to the quality of duration they are asserted to be exactly parallel. Everlasting punishment, *κόλασιν αἰώνιον*; everlasting life, *ζωὴν αἰώνιον*.

In view of the language here employed by the Saviour, uncontradicted and unmodified by any other word of his, but strengthened by all his instructions bearing upon this subject, it is as certain as language can make it that, if he intended to teach the eternal blessedness of the righteous, he also intended to teach the eternal punishment of the wicked. In Matt. xii. 32, "The blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall never be forgiven, neither in this world nor in the world to come." This world and the world to come take in the whole existence of the human race. To fail of forgiveness both in this world and the world to come is to fail utterly, as long as the soul exists.

Consider, also, the Saviour's discourse as recorded in Mark ix. 43–48 inclusive, where, in setting forth the doom of the wicked, he thrice repeats his appeal to "the unquenchable fire, where their worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched"; the eternal duration of punishment being asserted not by the words forever or everlasting, but by denying its end: "their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." [11]

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Of like import is the instruction given in Luke xvi., in the story of the rich man and Lazarus,[12] "Between us and you there is a great gulf fixed, so that they which would pass from hence to you cannot, neither can they pass to us that would come from thence." These words were put in the mouth of Abraham by the Saviour, to teach something in regard to the condition of departed souls. Besides other instruction imparted by the story, there was this: that the gulf between the righteous and the wicked, after the death of the body, is impassable. To suppose that out of regard to Jewish prejudices, or for any other reason, he would give the countenance which he here does to such an opinion when it was contrary to truth, a mere fiction or Jewish fable, is opposed to all that he tells us of his errand into this world: to bear witness to the truth, to be the way, the truth, and the life. Now make the supposition that instead of the declaration above, the Saviour had put into the mouth of Abraham the utterance, substantially, of Henry Ward Beecher, in Plymouth Pulpit (New Series, p. 97): "Son, be comforted; for if there be summer in heaven you will find it. Though you be plunged into the depths of hell, if you long for such a God as is manifest by Jesus Christ, you will find him. You will see him for yourself, and not another for you. You will be like him yet, though it be myriads of ages hence." Had the Saviour done this, he would have left no doubt that he intended to teach that all men would eventually be restored to the favor of God. This would have given full warrant to the preacher's closing and emphatic announcement in the above discourse, thus: "This is my gospel, the tidings of a God, who is, out of his own patience and suffering, working the salvation of the universe. *Yea and amen.*" But instead of this, Christ said, "Between us and you there is a great gulf fixed, so that they which would pass from hence to you cannot, neither can they pass to us that would come from thence." Clear and decided is the declaration here made that that gulf *cannot be passed.* Who then really believing in Jesus as a divine and infallible

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teacher will venture to say that it *can* be passed, even "though it be myriads of ages hence."

But let us look at the subject as independent of all the explicit testimony which has been here brought forward. On the supposition that *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος* had never been used in relation to future retribution, and that those discourses of the Saviour in Matt. xxv., Mark ix., and Luke xvi. were not found in the Scriptures, how would the matter stand? What is the general outlook of the Saviour's teaching on the subject? Reference can be made only to a few of many citations which would be in point. "The broad way, the wide gate, which leads to destruction; many go in thereat" (Matt. vii. 13). "And the ruin of that house was great" (Luke vi. 49), "The Son of Man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend and them which do iniquity, and shall cast them into a furnace of fire; there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth" (Matt. xiii. 41, 42). "So shall it be at the end of the world; the angels shall come forth and sever the wicked from among the just, and shall cast them into the furnace of fire; there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth" (Matt. xiii. 49, 50). "But he shall say, I tell you I know you not whence ye are; depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity; there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth, when ye shall see Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and all the prophets in the kingdom of God, and you yourselves thrust out" (Luke xiii. 27, 28). "The hour is coming in the which all that are in the grave shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation" (John v. 29). Most noteworthy is the manner in which these instructions were given. That loving Saviour, who came down from heaven to save men, spoke of these terrible things without apology, misgiving, or reserve, and left no single word to allay the terror they must awaken.

Only one more quotation will be given from the words of

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Christ. They are from his last prayer, recorded in John xvii.: "I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me." Is it possible to regard otherwise than utterly and forever hopeless the condition of those whom the Saviour distinctly and specifically excepts from the benefits of his prayer?

The argument as presented rests entirely on the words of Christ, and need not be prosecuted further. For if it is not proved that he taught that the punishment of the wicked would be without end, it cannot be proved that the apostles believed or taught it, or that anybody else ever believed or taught it. As doctrines of revelation, that of eternal life and that of eternal death rest upon the same basis of scriptural proof. They must, therefore, stand together or fall together. Every argument drawn from the Saviour's teachings in favor of the eternal blessedness of the righteous, is equally valid to prove that the wicked will go away into eternal punishment; and no argument can legitimately be drawn from the language of the Saviour's instructions against the doctrine of eternal punishment which does not strike with equal force against the scriptural proof of the doctrine of eternal life. For since the duration of punishment to the wicked and of life to the righteous is expressed by the same word, to deny the eternity of punishment is to deny the authority and validity of the Saviour's promise of eternal life to his followers, except so far as we may fancy reasons for trusting in his promise, independent of our confidence in him as our infallible and authoritative Teacher. Considering that he who came to bear witness of the truth uttered those words in Matt. xxv.: "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels," and "These shall go away into everlasting punishment," — to deny the doctrine of eternal punishment because we cannot see its consistency with the divine benevolence, must logically involve the denial of the divine origin of Christianity.

We know so little of the latent influence of prejudice or misconception and false training on religious belief, that it may

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be proper for us charitably to believe that many who deny the plain instructions of Christ on this subject, are yet so far loyal to him in heart that they will be personally accepted by the heart-searching Judge as his true friends and disciples. But if called on to give our sanction to any one as a religious *teacher* or *preacher* of the gospel who denies this, or holds it so feebly and hesitatingly that he does not preach it, such charity is entirely misplaced. In his commission to his ministers, the Saviour says, "Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you." We cannot doubt that true loyalty to him will prompt careful obedience to his instructions; and that such obedience will demand, and will be seen to demand, from the professed teacher of religion the earnest declaration of the truth, as taught by the Saviour's own lips, that when the righteous are received to life eternal the wicked will go away into everlasting punishment. To call this in question is to the same extent to call in question the reality of a supernatural revelation. For nothing can be more preposterous than to admit the divine origin of the Christian religion and the infallibility of the Founder, and yet deny a doctrine which he taught so clearly and with such emphatic reiteration. And not less preposterous is it to suppose that an infallible Teacher, with a heart full of kindness to the race which he came to redeem, would employ the same word to describe the duration of punishment to the wicked as of life to the righteous, if it were not as truly his purpose to inflict the one as to bestow the other. Nothing could be more at variance with veracity and with the spirit of true benevolence than to seek to frighten men with the threatening of evil that was sure never to come.

The earnest study of this subject can scarcely fail to convince every sincere inquirer after truth that no man is worthy to be approved or employed or listened to as a Christian teacher who has any misgiving as to the fact that the Lord Jesus Christ taught that the punishment of the wicked will be eternal, and that this doctrine is true.

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This Table of References is intended to point out every verse which in the Hebrew Scriptures contains the word עוֹלָם, in any of its forms; and every verse in the New Testament containing the words *αἰών*, or *αἰώνιος*. The words sometimes occur more than once, in the same verse.

עוֹלָם.

Gen. iii. 22; vi. 3, 4; ix. 12, 16; xiii. 15; xvii. 7, 8, 13, 19; xxi. 33; xlviii. 4; xlix. 26. 13
Ex. iii. 15; xii. 14; xvii. 24; xiv. 13; xv. 18; xix. 9; xxi. 6; xxvii. 21; xxviii. 43; xxix. 9, 28; xxx. 21; xxxi. 16, 17; xxxii. 13; xl. 15. 17
Lev. iii. 17; vi. 18, 22; vii. 34, 36; x. 9, 15; xvi. 29, 31, 34; xvii. 7; xxiii. 14, 21, 31, 41; xxiv. 3, 8, 9; xxv. 32, 34, 46. 21
Num. x. 8; xv. 15; xviii. 8, 11, 19, 23; xix. 10, 21; xxv. 13. 10
Deut. v. 29; xii. 28; xiii. 16; xv. 17; xxiii. 4, 7; xxviii. 46; xxix. 28; xxxii. 7, 40; xxxiii. 15, 27. 12
Josh. iv. 7; viii. 28; xiv. 9; xxiv. 2. 4
Judges ii. 2. 1
1 Sam. i. 22; ii. 30; iii. 13, 14; xiii. 13; xx. 15, 23, 42; xxvii. 8, 12. 10
2 Sam. iii. 28; vii. 13, 16, 24, 25, 26, 29; xii. 10; xxii. 51; xxiii. 5. 12
1 Kings i. 31; ii. 33, 45; viii. 13 pl.; ix. 3, 5; x. 9. 8
2 Kings v. 27; xxi. 7. 2
1 Chron. xv. 2; xvi. 15, 17, 34, 36, 41; xvii. 12, 14, 22, 23, 24, 27; xxii. 10; xxiii. 13, 25; xxviii. 4, 7, 8; xxix. 10, 18. 24
2 Chron. ii. 3; v. 13; vi. 2 pl.; vii. 3, 6, 16; ix. 8; xiii. 5; xx. 7, 21; xxx. 8; xxxiii. 4. 12
Neh. ii. 3; ix. 5; xiii. 1. 4
Ezra iii. 11; ix. 12. 3
Job vii. 16; xxii. 15. 2
Ps. v. 12; ix. 5, 7; x. 16; xii. 7; xv. 5; xviii. 50; xxi. 6; xxiv. 7, 9; xxv. 6; xxviii. 9; xxix. 10; xxx. 6, 12; xxxi. 1; xxxiii. 11; xxxvii. 18, 27, 28; xli. 13, 14; xliv. 8; xlv. 2, 6, 17; xlviii. 9, 14; xlix. 8, 12; lii. 8, 11; lv. 23; lxi. 4 pl., 7; lxvi. 7; lxxi. 1; lxxii. 17, 19; lxxiii. 12, 26; lxxv. 9; lxxvii. 7 pl., 8 pl.; lxxviii. 66, 69; lxxix. 13; lxxxi. 15; lxxxv. 5; lxxxvi. 12; lxxxix. 1, 2, 4, 29, 36, 37, 52; xc. 2; xcii. 9; xciii. 2; c. 5; cii. 13; ciii. 9, 17; civ. 5, 31; cv. 8, 10; cvi. 1, 31, 48; cvii. 1; cx. 4; cxi. 5, 8, 9; cxii. 6; cxiii. 2; cxv. 18; cxvii. 2; cxviii. 1, 2, 3, 4, 29; cxix. 44, 52, 89, 93, 98, 111, 112, 142, 144, 152, 160; cxxi. 8; cxxv. 1, 2; cxxxi. 3; cxxxiii. 3; cxxxv. 13; cxxxvi. 1–26; cxxxviii. 8; cxxxix. 24; cxliii. 3; cxlv. 2, 13 pl., 21; cxlvi. 10; cxlviii. 6. 141
Prov. viii. 23; x. 25, 30; xxii. 28; xxiii. 10; xxvii. 24. 6
Eccl. i. 4, 10 pl.; ii. 16; iii. 11, 14; ix. 6; xii. 5. 7
Isa. ix. 6; xiv. 20; xxiv. 5; xxv. 2, 26 pl.; xxx. 8; xxxii. 14, 17; xxxiii. 14; xxxiv. 10, 17; xxxv. 10; xl. 8, 28; xli. 14; xliv. 7; xlv. 17 pl.; xlvi. 9; xlvii. 7; li. 6, 8, 9 pl., 11; liv. 8; lv. 3, 13; lvi. 5; lvii. 11 pl., 16; lviii. 12; lix. 21; lx. 15, 19, 20, 21; lxi. 4, 7, 8; lxii. 9, 11, 12, 16, 19; lxiv. 3, 4. 45
Jer. ii. 20; iii. 5, 12; v. 15, 22; vii. 7; x. 10; xvii. 4, 25; xviii. 15, 16; xx. 11, 17; xxiii. 40; xxv. 5, 9, 12; xxviii. 8; xxxi. 3, 40; xxxii. 40; xxxiii. 11; xxxv. 6; xlix. 13, 33; l. 5; li. 26, 39, 57, 62. 32
Lam. iii. 6, 31; v. 19. 3
Ezek. xvi. 60; xxv. 15; xxvi. 20, 21; xxvii. 36; xxviii. 19; xxxv. 5, 9; xxxvi. 2; xxxvii. 25, 26, 28; xliii. 7, 9; xlvi. 14. 18
Dan. ii. 4, 20, 44; iii. 9, 33; iv. 34; v. 10; vi. 6, 21, 26; vii. 14, 18, 27; xii. 2, 3, 7. 21
Amos ix. 11. 1
Joel ii. 26, 27; iii. 20. 3
Obad. 10. 1
Jonah ii. 7. 1
Micah ii. 9; iv. 5, 7; v. 2; vii. 14. 5
Zeph. ii. 9. 1
Hab. iii. 6. 2
Zech. i. 5. 1
Mal. i. 4; iii. 4. 2
Total, 445

Αἰών.

Matt. vi. 13; xii. 32; xiii. 22, 39, 40, 49; xxi. 19; xxiv. 3; xxviii. 20. 9
Mark iii. 29; iv. 19; x. 30; xi. 14. 4
Luke i. 33, 55, 70; xvi. 8; xviii. 30; xx. 34, 35. 7

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John iv. 14; vi. 51, 58; viii. 35, 51, 52; ix. 32; x. 28; xi. 26; xii. 34; xiii. 8; xiv. 16.	13
Acts iii. 21; xv. 18.	2
Rom. i. 25; ix. 5; xi. 36; xii. 2; xvi. 27.	5
1 Cor. i. 20; ii. 6, 7, 8; iii. 18; viii. 13; x. 11.	7
2 Cor. iv. 4; ix. 9; xi. 31.	3
Gal. i. 4, 5.	2
Eph. i. 21; ii. 2,7; iii. 9,11, 21; iv. 12.	7
Phil. iv. 20.	1
Col. i. 26.	1
1 Tim. i. 17; vi. 17.	3
2 Tim. iv. 10, 18.	2
Titus ii. 12.	1
Heb. i. 2, 8; v. 6; vi. 5, 20; vii. 17, 21, 24, 28; ix. 26; xi. 3; xiii. 8, 21.	13
1 Pet. i. 23, 25; iv. 11; v. 11.	4
2 Pet. ii. 17; iii. 18.	2
1 John ii. 17.	1
2 John ii.	1
Jude xiii. 25.	2
Rev. i. 6, 18; iv. 9, 10; v. 13, 14; vii. 12; x. 6; xi. 15; xiv. 15; xv. 7; xix. 3; xx. 10; xxii. 5.	14
Total,	104

Αἰώνιος.

Matt. xviii. 8; xix. 16, 29; xxv. 41, 46.	6
Mark iii. 29; x. 17, 30.	3
Luke x. 25; xvi. 9; xviii. 18, 30.	4
John iii. 15, 16, 36; iv. 14, 36; v. 24, 39; vi. 27, 40, 47, 54, 68; x. 28; xii. 25, 50; xvii. 2, 3.	17
Acts xiii. 46, 48.	2
Rom. ii. 7; v. 21; vi. 22, 23; xvi. 25, 26.	6
2 Cor. iv. 17, 18; v. 1.	3
Gal. vi. 8.	1
2 Thess. i. 9; ii. 16.	2
1 Tim. i. 16; vi. 12, 16.	3
2 Tim. i. 9; ii. 10.	2
Titus i. 2; iii. 7.	3
Philemon 15.	1
Heb. v. 9; vi. 2; ix. 12, 14, 15; xiii. 20.	6
1 Pet. v. 10.	1
2 Pet. i. 11.	1
1 John i. 2; ii. 25; iii. 15; v. 11, 13, 20.	6
Jude vii. 21.	2
Rev. xiv. 6.	1
Total,	70

NOTES TO PRECEDING ARTICLE.

[The preceding Article was completed and sent to the printer before the occurrence of recent events which may seem to make it personal. The following notes have been prepared not by the author of the Article, but by another contributor to this magazine.]

[1] While the classic Greek may be used as a source of much information in respect to the language of the Septuagint, still, in case of doubt, the decisive appeal is to be made to the Septuagint alone. The peculiarity of the subject among subjects treated in Greek, the fact that the work is a translation, which class of work never exhibits the pliability of an original essay, and the evident ignorance of Hebrew displayed by some of the translators, make the Greek of the Septuagint almost an idiom by itself. Nor can the original Hebrew be always used as determining the meaning of its translation, so frequent are the mistakes of the translators.

[2] Writers should be careful, in searching out parallel uses of Greek words in classic works, to get the *popular* uses of such words. The New Testament is eminently a book of the people. Christ spoke the language of the people, and so did his disciples. John's λόγος is not Philo's λόγος. True, there are technical terms in the Bible, — λόγος is one, "life" is another, and there are many more. New Testament Greek is a "converted language." But biblical technics have their roots in the speech of the common people, and are to be explained in accordance with it. The schools had another set of technical terms, modelled upon their own ideas. Of these, as above said, we are to beware.

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[3] There was a good deal of philosophy in the air in those days, which may have affected the common speech greatly, although insensibly. It is so to-day. Our missionaries in the Orient find among Armenian lads, who have never seen a book on that subject, or heard a lecturer, deep questions about development. These thoughts come from the mental environment of the age. If so now, why not so then? Yet the ideas are in these days popular in form, and are expressed in words which interpret themselves.

[4] The *philological* interpretations of the Greek Fathers should always be respectfully listened to. Being Greeks, they could *feel* their mother tongue as we cannot. But their fancies are too likely to lead us astray, if we depend upon them further than this.

[5] Vide Lange's Com. Note by Rev. J. F. McCurdy, and Prof. Conant's translation.

[6] The most the Hebrew can offer as analogous to the Greek *οἱ αἰῶνες τῶν αἰώνων* is the phrase קְדֹשִׁים קֳדָשִׁים.

[7] The word "always" is used in our common speech with a similar modification of meaning. Take, for example, the cases quoted in Webster's Dictionary as illustrative of the *same* meaning of this word: "God is *always* the same," and:

> "Even in heaven his [Mammon's] looks and thoughts
> Were *always* downward bent."

What a difference of meaning! And yet who can mistake it? The latter, however, is a case of modification, and not the strict use of the term.

[8] The application of researches made upon the digamma to this word has cleared many difficulties as to its variation in signification, and has settled the temporal reference of its derivative *αἰώνιος*. Αἰών is derived from the root *αϝ*. This root appears in Greek as *ἀεί, always;* in Latin as *aevum;* in German as *ewig;* in English as *ever.* Ἀΐδιος, the other word for *eternal* (Rom. i. 20; Jude 6) is from the same root (Vide Liddell and Scott, last ed.). The idea of time is, therefore, inextricably involved in the very origin of the word. With the idea of *totality of duration* as the primitive meaning, the word, if applied to a man, would easily come to mean *lifetime*, since it is then restricted like all similar words according to the nature of its subject. The meaning *generation*, arises in a similar way. Transition from *lifetime* to *time of life* is the same on any theory of the origin of the word. The meaning *dispensation, world*, that is, *a long space of time peculiarly marked off*, is obtained by the same process of restriction according to the nature of the subject. Such changes, as from *lifetime*, through *life, principle of life*, to *spinal marrow* become, explicable when the root idea is properly conceived. But even if these changes are inexplicable, no such meaning as *spinal marrow*, e.g. can be used as an irrefutable agument against *eternity* as the proper meaning. Absolute contradictions are found in two meanings of the same word, and yet neither can be denied. Who will explain to the perfect satisfaction of one who

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demands to know all the steps of the change of meanings, the case of the Hebrew יָדַע which means *to know*, and *not to know*? In fact, there are not always *steps* in these changes for language *leaps*.

[9] E.g. Titus ii. 12; Heb. i. 2; ix. 26; xi. 3. Nearly always, some trace of the original distinction between κόσμος and αἰών can be seen.

[10] The "element of duration" must be introduced; for it is in the very ground-work of the word. The absurdity of giving αἰώνιος a qualitative force, instead of a temporal force, as is done by the advocates of restoration, is illustrated very forcibly by substituting this rendering in 2 Cor. xiv. 17–v. 1. The whole point of the passage is to be found in its contrasts between temporariness and eternity. "For our light affliction which is *but for a moment*, worketh for us a far more exceeding weight of glory *in another world*." This will pass, but is far inferior in force to our translation.—"While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen *belong to this world*, but the things which are not seen *to another*." Indeed! quite a piece of information! Now, can we believe that a sensible writer would say this?—"For we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle *were dissolved*, we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, in the heavens, *in another world*." That this is the sense is incredible.

[11] Some, as, for instance, the late Canon Kingsley (see his Life, recently published), assert that, as the only office of fire or of the worm is to purify by consuming corrupted matter, setting the elements free to enter into new combinations, so the punishment of the future world is merely to purge the soul of sin. The fatal objection to this interpretation is, that such is not the popular conception of fire and the worm. The man of science looks at them so; but the people think only of the *destroying* fire and the *gnawing* worm. Christ, in talking to the people, must have used popular language. This interpretation forces upon the words a meaning belonging only to the nineteenth century and science. It cannot stand.

[12] Restorationists call attention to the fact that the rich man is said to be not in Hell (Γέεννα), but in Hades (Ἅιδης). They therefore declare that this concerns only the intermediate state, and cannot be used as an argument in this discussion. But it is not so certain that it is not properly translated Hell (vide Smith's Bib. Dict., Art. "Hell, Supplement, by President Bartlett.) At any rate, it is a Hades which will issue in Hell; for it is the region of torments, the lowest deep, whence Dives looks *up*. Waiving this point, we may further ask what light is here thrown upon the probability of repentance under future discipline? Not the slightest evidence of repentance can be presented. Dives wishes his *agony* may be relieved, but does not speak of sorrow for *sin*. He would send Lazarus to save his brethren from *pain*, but never a lisp is there of desire to save them from *sin*. Can better evidence be presented of the adamantine hardness of his heart than this,—that, even under the wrath of a loving God, his only thought is of selfish relief? F. H. F.

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ARTICLE IV.

HORAE SAMARITANAE; OR, A COLLECTION OF VARIOUS READINGS OF THE SAMARITAN PENTATEUCH COMPARED WITH THE HEBREW AND OTHER ANCIENT VERSIONS.

BY REV. B. PICK, PH.D., ROCHESTER, N.Y.

DEUTERONOMY.

CHAP. I.

1 and in the south — Sam. בנגב in the south.

8 behold — Sam. ראו behold ye; Sept. ἴδετε; and the other ancient versions.

which the Lord sware — Sam. אשר נשבעתי which I sware; Sept. ἣν ὤμοσα.

unto them and to their seed — Sam. לתת לזרעם unto their seed.

12 and your burden — Sam. your burden.

15 and captains over fifties — Sam. captains over fifties שרי.

28 our brethren — Sam. ואחינו and our brethren.

and taller than we; the cities — Sam. ורב ממנו ועירים and more than we; and the cities.

35 sware to give unto your father — Sam. נשבעתי לאבתיכם sware unto your fathers; Sept. ὤμοσα τοῖς πατράσιν αὐτῶν.

36 because he hath — Sam. because while he hath יען כי.

39 and your children which in that day had no knowledge between good and evil, they shall — Sam. ובניכם הם and your children they shall.

41 against the Lord we will — Sam. ליהוה אלהינו against the Lord our God, we will; Sept. κυρίου τοῦ θεοῦ; Syr.

43 commandment of the Lord, and — Sam. commandment of the Lord your God, and אלהיכם.

44 and the Amorites who — Sam. והאמרי העמלקי והכנעני and the Amorites, the Amalekites, and the Canaanites who.

CHAP. II.

5 of their land — Sam. מארצם ירשה of their land a possession.

7 of thy hand — Sam. ידיך of thy hands; Sept. τῶν χειρῶν σου.

At the end of this verse the Samaritan reads what is found in Numb. xx. 14, 17, 18: And I sent messengers to the king of

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Edom, saying, I will pass through thy country. I will not pass through the fields or through the vineyards, neither will we drink of the water of the wells: we will go by the king's highway, we will not turn to the right hand nor to the left, until we have passed thy borders. And he said, Thou shalt not pass by me, lest I come out against thee with the sword.

9 contend with them in battle — Sam. והתגרבו ואל contend with them.

11 which also were accounted giants, as the Anakims; but the Moabites call them Enims — Sam. (the first part is wanting, and reads) but the Moabites call them Enims.

12 destroyed them from before them, and dwelt — Sam. וישמדם יהו״ה מפניהם וירשום וישבו and the Lord destroyed them from before them, and succeeded them and dwelt.

13 now rise up — Sam. ועתה קימו סעו and now rise up, take your journey; Sept. *καὶ ἀπάρατε ὑμεῖς καί.*

31 give Sihon — Sam. סיחון מלך חשבין האמרי give Sihon the king of Heshbon, the Amorite; *βασιλέα Ἐσεβὼν τὸν Ἀμορῥαῖον.*

34 of every city — Sam. את כל ערינו of all cities.

36 לפנינו before us — Sam. בידנו into our hands; Sept. *εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἡμῶν.*

CHAP. III.

12 by the river Arnon — Sam. אשר על שפת נחל ארנן by the brink of the river Arnon; Sept. *παρὰ τὸ χεῖλος χειμάῤῥου Ἀρνῶν*; Syr. ספתא.

14 Jair the son — Sam. and Jair the son ויאיר.

וחמעכתי Maachathi — Sam. וחמכתי Machathi; Sept. *Μαχαθί.*

19 your wives, and your little ones, and your cattle — Sam. your little ones, and your wives, and your cattles; Sept. *τὰ κτήνη ὑμῶν.*

21 all that the Lord your God — Sam. עת אשר עשה יהוה all that the Lord.

CHAP. IV.

2 command you — Sam. אתכם היום command you to day.

5 ראה behold — Sam. ראו behold ye; Sept. *ἴδετε.*

21 וישבע and sware — Sam. omitted.

25 when thou shalt beget — Sam. כי תוליד when ye shall beget.

יהוה אלהיך the Lord thy God — Sam. יהוה אלהיכם the Lord your God.

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33 the voice of God — Sam. עם קיל אלהים חיים the voice of the living God; Sept. ζωντός.

37 with his mighty — Sam. ובכחי תגדול and with his mighty.

45 ויתחקים and the statutes — Sam. חוחקים the statutes.

49 sea of the plain, under — Sam. חצרבת ים חמלח חותח sea of the plain, the salt sea, under.

CHAP. V.

5 I stood — Sam. ואנכי and I stood; Sept. κἀγώ.

8 כל תמונח any likeness — Sam. וכל תמונח or any likeness.

18 thou shalt not do — Sam. ולא תעשח בו in it thou shalt not do; Sept. ἐν αὐτῇ.

nor thy man-servant — Sam. עבוך thy man-servant.

nor thine ox — Sam. שוך thine ox.

19 neither shalt thou — Sam. thou shalt not לא.

21 thy neighbor's wife — Sam. thy neighbor's house.

thy neighbor's house — Sam. thy neighbor's wife.

At the end of this verse the Samaritan inserts, with some alterations, xxvii. 2–6 and xi. 30, as in Ex. xx. 17, where the quotation is given.

22 fire, of the cloud — Sam. מחוך חאש חשך ענן fire, of the darkness, the cloud; Sept. σκότος, γνόφος.

27 and his greatness — Sam. את גדלו his greatness.

29 keep all my — Sam. את מצוחי keep my.

31 and the statutes — Sam. חחקים the statutes.

CHAP. VI.

2 which I command thee — Sam. חיום which I command thee to day; Sept. σήμερον.

7 in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when — Sam. בלכחך בוךך בשכבך in the house, when thou walkest by the way, when; Sept. ἐν οἴκῳ.

8 thine hand — Sam. ידיך thine hands.

9 of thy house — Sam. בחיך of thy houses; Sept. τῶν οἰκῶν σου; Syr.

11 and houses — Sam. בחים houses; Sept. οἰκίας.

and wells — Sam. בורות wells; Sept. λάκκους.

12 forget the Lord — Sam. forget the Lord thy God יחוח אלחיך; Sept. κυρίου τοῦ θεοῦ σου (id. vs. 18).

20 and when — Sam. והיח כי and it shall come to pass when; Sept. καὶ ἔσται ὅταν.

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20 and the statutes — Sam. והחקים the statutes.

23 which he sware — Sam. אשר נשבע יהוה which the Lord sware; Sept. κύριος ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν.

24 that he might — Sam. ולהחיותנו and that he might.
as it is at this day — Sam. פיום הזה as to-day; Sept. ὥσπερ καὶ σήμερον.

CHAP. VII.

4 ויעבדו that they may serve — Sam. ויעבד that he may serve; Sept. καὶ λατρεύσει; Vulg.

5 תעשו ye shall deal — Sam. תעשה thou shalt deal.

6 בך thee — Sam. ובך and thee.

11 ואת החקים and the statutes — Sam. את החקים the statutes.

13 ויצהרך and thy wine — Sam. וציהרך thy wine.
אשר נשבע which he sware — Sam. אשר נשבע יהוה which the Lord sware; Sept. κύριος.

19 והאתות and the signs — Sam. האתות the signs; Sept. τὰ σημεῖα; Syr. אתותא.

22 מפניך before thee — Sam. מלפניך from before thee; Sept. ἀπὸ προσώπου σου.

CHAP. VIII.

7 into a good land — Sam. אל ארץ טובה ורחבה into a good and wide land; Sept. καὶ πολλήν.

8 and vines and fig-trees — Sam. גפן ותאנה vines, fig-trees; Sept. ἄμπελοι, συκαῖ.

15 and scorpions — Sam. עקרב scorpions.

18 that he may — Sam. ולמען and that he may.
unto thy fathers — Sam. לאבותיך ולויעקב לאברהם ליצחק unto thy fathers, unto Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

CHAP. IX.

5 the Lord thy God doth — Sam. the Lord doth יהוה; Sept. κύριος.
which the Lord sware — Sam. אשר נשבע which he sware.

7 forget not — Sam. ואל תשכח and forget not.
thou didst depart — Sam. יצאתם you did depart; Sept. ἐξήλθετε; Syr. דנפורתון.

10 with you — Sam. אליכם to you; Sept. πρὸς ὑμᾶς.

11 two tables of stone, even the tables of the covenant — Sam. שתי לוחת חבריח two tables of the covenant.

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12 a molten image — Sam. עגל מסכה a molten calf.

24 that I knew you — Sam. דעתו that he knew you; Sept. *ἐγνώσθη*.

26 with a mighty hand — Sam. ביד תוחוקה with thy mighty hand; Sept. *ἐν τῷ βραχίονί σου*.

28 lest the land — Sam. יאמרו עם הארץ lest the people of the land; Sept. *οἱ κατοικοῦντες τὴν γῆν*.

29 broughtest out by — Sam. הוצאת ממצרים broughtest out from Egypt by; Sept. *ἐκ τῆς Αἰγύπτου*.

CHAP. X.

4 אליכם unto you — Sam. עמכם with you.

6 and the children of Israel took their journey from Beeroth of the children of Jaakan to Mosera — Sam. בני ישראל נסעו ממסרות ויחנו בבני יעקן and the children of Israel took their journey from Moseroth, and pitched in Bene-jaakan.

there Aaron died, there he was buried, and Eleazar his son ministerred in the priest's office in his stead — Sam. omitted.

7 from thence they journeyed unto Gudgodah — Sam. משם נסעו ויחנו הגדגדה from thence they journeyed, and encamped at Gudgodah.

and from Gudgodah to Jotbatha — Sam. משם נסעו ויחנו ביטבתה from thence they journeyed, and encamped at Jotbatha.

At the end of this verse the Samaritan inserts: From thence they journeyed, and encamped at Ebronah. From thence they journeyed, and encamped at Ezion-gaber. From thence they journeyed, and encamped in the Wilderness of Zin, which is Kadesh. From thence they journeyed, and encamped at Mount Hor; and there Aaron died, and was buried there, and Eleazar his son ministered in the priest's office in his stead." (Comp. Numb. xxxiii. 31–38.)

10 he would not — Sam. ולא אבה and he would not.

11 before the people — Sam. לפני העם הזה before this people; Sept. *τοῦ λαοῦ τούτου*.

13 to keep — Sam. ולשמר and to keep.

of the Lord — Sam. יהוה אלהיך of the Lord thy God; Sept. *κυρίου τοῦ θεοῦ*; Syr. אלהך.

17 a mighty — Sam. and a mighty; Sept. *καὶ ὁ φοβερός*; Vulg. *et potens*; Syr. וגברא.

20 him — Sam. ואתו and him.

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CHAP. XI.

1 and his statutes, and his judgments, and his commandments — Sam. חקיו ומצותיו ומשפטיו his statutes, and his commandments, and his judgments; Sept. καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτοῦ.

2 his mighty hand — Sam. and his mighty hand; Sept. καὶ τὴν χεῖρα.

3 and his miracles — Sam. his miracles.

unto Pharaoh the king of Egypt — Sam. למרעה unto Pharaoh.

6 and swallowed them up and their households — Sam. ואת כל האנשים אשר לקרח ואת בתיהם and swallowed them up, and all the people which were with Korah and their households.

8 all the commandments — Sam. the commandments.

command thee — Sam. מצוה אתכם command you.

9 to give to them and their seed — Sam. לתת לזרעם to give to their seed.

10 whither thou goest — Sam. אשר אתם באים whither you go.

thy foot — Sam. ברגליך thy feet.

13 and to serve him — Sam. לעבדו to serve him.

14 and I will give the rain of your land — Sam. ונתן מטר ארצך and he will give the rain of thy land; Sept. καὶ δώσει τὸν ὑετὸν τῆς γῆς.

and thy wine — Sam. thy wine.

15 and I will give — Sam. and he will give; Sept. καὶ δώσει.

18 your hand — Sam. your hands.

19 in thine house, and when thou walkest — Sam. בביתך בלכתך in the house when thou walkest; Sept. ἐν οἴκῳ.

20 of thine house — Sam. בתיך of thine houses; Sept. τῶν οἰκιῶν.

22 I command you — Sam. מצוה אתכם היום I command you today; Sept. σήμερον; Syr. יומנא.

23 before you — Sam. מלפניך before thee.

than yourselves — Sam. ממך than yourself.

23 from the river — Sam. ומן הנהר and from the river; Sept. καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ; Syr. ומן.

30 of Moreh — Sam. מורא מול שכם of Moreh over against Sichem.

32 and judgments — Sam. ואת כל המשפטים and all the judgments.

CHAP. XII.

5 shall choose — Sam. בחר chooses.

thou shalt come — Sam. ובאתם shall ye come; Sept. εἰσελεύσεσθε.

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6 ואת תרומת ידכם and the heave-offerings of your hand — Sam. ואת תרומתיכם any of your heave-offerings; Sept. *καὶ τὰς εὐχὰς ὑμῶν.*

7 your hand — Sam. ידיכם your hands; Sept. *τὰς χεῖρας ὑμῶν.*

11 will choose — Sam. בחר chooses (id. vs. 14, 18, 21, 26)

your tithes — Sam. and your tithes.

and the heave-offerings of your hand — Sam. ותרומתיכם ונדבתיכם and your heave-offerings and your free-will-offerings; Sept. *καὶ τὰ δώματα ὑμῶν.*

12 and your men-servants — Sam. your men-servants.

16 ye shall not eat — Sam. לא תאכל thou shalt not eat.

17 or of thy vine — Sam. of thy vine.

of thine hand — Sam. of thine hands; Sept. *τῶν χειρῶν ὑμῶν.*

18 and thy man-servant — Sam. עבדך thy man-servant.

of thine hand — Sam. ידיך of thine hands.

20 אלהיך thy God — Sam. אלהים God.

21 לשום שמו to put his name — Sam. לשכן את שמי to cause his name to dwell.

28 and hear — Sam. ושמעת ועשית and hear and do; Sept. *καὶ ἄκουε καὶ ποιήσεις.*

I command thee — Sam. מצוך חיום I command thee this day; Sept. *σήμερον*; Syr. ריומא.

is good and right — Sam. הישר וחטיב is right and good.

32 I command you — Sam. מציך חיום I command thee to-day; Sept. *ἐντέλλομαί σοι σήμερον*; Vulg. *praecipio tibi.*

thou shalt not add thereto, nor diminish from it — Sam. you shall not add thereto, nor diminish.

CHAP. XIII.

5 your God — Sam. thy God; Sept. *τοῦ θεοῦ σου.*

which brought you — Sam. המציאך which brought thee; Sept. *τοῦ ἐξαγαγόντος σε.*

6 thy brother — Sam. אחיך בן אביך thy brother, the son of thy father; Sept. *ὁ ἀδελφός σου ἐκ πατρός σου.*

the son of thy mother — Sam. או בן אמך or the son of thy mother; Sept. *ἢ ἐκ μητρός σου.*

11 ולא יוסיפו לעשות and shall do no more — Sam. ולא יוסיפו עוד לעשות and do henceforth no more; Sept. *καὶ οὐ προσθήσουσιν ἔτι ποιῆσαι*; Vulg. *et nequaquam ultra faciat.*

18 הישר right — Sam. הישר וחטוב right and good; Sept. *τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἀρεστόν.*

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CHAP. XIV.

2 the Lord hath chosen — Sam. בחר יהוה אלהיך the Lord thy God hath chosen; Sept. *κύριος ὁ θεός σου*; Syr. אלהך.

3 thou shalt not eat — Sam. לא תאכלו you shall not eat; Sept. *οὐ φάγεσθε.*

4 these — Sam. וזאת and these.

the sheep — Sam. ושה and the sheep; Sept. *καὶ ἀμνόν.*

5 and the wild ox — Sam. תאו the wild ox.

7 the cloven hoof — Sam. חפרסת the hoof.

8 פרסת הוא the hoof — Sam. פרסת הוא ושסע שסע פרסת the hoof and cleaveth the cleft; Sept. *καὶ ὀνυχίζει ὄνυχας ὀπλῆς.*

ולא גרה and cheweth not — Sam. והוא גרה לא יגר and the same cheweth not the cud; Sept. *καὶ τοῦτο μηρυκισμὸν οὐ μηρυκᾶται.*

9 these — Sam. ואת זה and these.

13 והראה and the glede — Sam. ואת הראה and the vulture; Sept. *καὶ τὸν γῦπα.*

והדיה and the vulture — Sam. omitted.

15 and the cuckoo — Sam. השחף למינו and the cuckoo after his kind.

the hawk after his kind — Sam. the hawk.

16 the little owl — Sam. ואת הכוס ואת התלוך and the little owl and and the cormorant.

17 and the cormorant — Sam. omitted.

19 they shall not be eaten — Sam. לא תאכלו מהם ye shall not eat of them; Sept. *οὐ φάγεσθε ἀπ' αὐτῶν.*

23 shalt eat — Sam. ואכלתו shalt eat it; Sept. *αὐτό.*

he shall choose — Sam. בחר יהוה אלהיך the Lord thy God hath chosen; Sept. *κύριος ὁ θεός.*

24 shall choose to set — Sam. בחר יהוה אלהיך לשכן את has chosen to place.

25 shall choose — Sam. בחר has chosen.

26 וביין or for wine — Sam. ביין for wine.

38 and lay — Sam. ותנחתו and lay it; Sept. *αὐτό.*

29 of thine hand — Sam. ידיך of thine hands.

CHAP. XV.

2 ואת אחיו and his brother — Sam. את אחיו his brother.

4 יהוה the Lord — Sam. יהוה אלהיך the Lord thy God; Sept. *κύριος ὁ θεός σου*; Vulg. *Dominus Deus tuus*; Syr. אלהך.

7 in thy land — Sam. בארץ in the land; Sept. *ἐν τῇ γῇ.*

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10 thine heart — Sam. בלבבך in thine heart.
thine hand — Sam. ידיך thine hands.
18 לא not — Sam. ולא and not.
20 shall choose — Sam. בחר has chosen.
21 have any blemish — Sam. או כל מום רע or have any blemish.

CHAP. XVI.

2 which the Lord shall choose — Sam. אשר בחר יהוה אלהיך which the Lord thy God hath chosen; Sept. κύριος ὁ θεός; Vulg. *Dominus tuus;* Syr. אלהך (id. vs. 15).
3 thou shalt not eat ... thou shalt eat — Sam. ye shall not eat ... ye shall eat תאכלו.
4 at even — Sam. בין הערבים between the two evenings.
5 לא not — Sam. ולא and not (id. vs. 19).
6 אל המקום at the place — Sam. במקום in the place.
shall choose — Sam. בחר hath chosen (id. vs. 7, 11, 16).
8 עצרת solemn assembly — Sam. חג a feast.
מלאכה a work — Sam. כל מלאכת עבדה any servile work.
10 of thine hand — Sam. ידיך of thine hands.
11 and thy man-servant — Sam. עבדך thy man-servant (id. vs. 14).
12 in Egypt — Sam. בארץ מצרים in the land of Egypt; Sept. ἐν γῇ Αἰγύπτῳ.

CHAP. XVII.

4 and it be told — Sam. והגידו and when they tell.
6 or three witnesses — Sam. או על פי שלשה עדים or at the mouth of three witnesses.
8 between plea — Sam. ובן דין and between plea.
shalt choose — Sam. בחר hath chosen (id. vs. 10).
9 and thou shalt inquire — Sam. ודרשו and they shall inquire; Sept. ἐκζητήσαντες.
10 the Lord — Sam. the Lord thy God; Sept. κύριος ὁ θεός.
11 according to the judgment — Sam. according to the sentence of the judgment מהמשפט.
not — Sam. ולא and not.
12 אל or unto — Sam. ואל and unto.
20 in his kingdom — Sam. על כסא ממלכתו upon the throne of his kingdom.

CHAP. XVIII.

1 אשי offerings — Sam. אשה offering; Sept. (Codd. A X) κάρπωμα.
5 לשרת בשם to minister in the name — Sam. לעמד לפני יהוה אלהיך

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לשרתו ולברך בשמו to stand before the Lord thy God, to minister unto him and to bless in his name; Sept. *παρεστάναι ἐναντι κυρίου τοῦ θεοῦ σου, λειτουργεῖν καὶ εὐλογεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι κυρίου.*

6 shall choose — Sam. בחר hath chosen.

8 they shall eat — Sam. יאכל he shall eat; Sept. *φάγεται.*

10 or an enchanter, or a witch — Sam. מנחש מכשף an enchanter, a witch.

11 or a charmer — Sam. חבר חבר a charmer.
or a consulter — Sam. שאל איב a consulter.

12 unto the Lord — Sam. unto the Lord thy God אלהיך; Sept. *τῷ θεῷ*; Syr. אלהך.

14 thou shalt possess — Sam. ירשתם ye shall possess.

15 from thy midst, of thy brethren — Sam. מקרב אחיך from the midst of thy brethren.

16 and the fire — Sam. ואת אשו and his fire.

19 my words — Sam. דבריו his words; Sept. *τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ.*

22 thou shalt not be afraid — Sam. לא תגורו ye shall not be afraid; Sept. *οὐκ ἀφέξεσθε*; Syr.

CHAP. XIX.

5 of the cities — Sam. מן הערים out of the cities; Syr. מן; Chald. מן (id. vs. 11).

9 and to walk — Sam. ללכת to walk.

11 ובי but if — Sam. כי if.

13 ומת and he die — Sam. והומת and be killed.

15 if — Sam. וכי but if.

21 ולא and not — Sam. לא not.

CHAP. XX

1 thy enemy — Sam. איביך thy enemies; Sept. *ἐπί τοὺς ἐχθρούς σου*; Vulg. *contra hostes tuas;* Chald. בעלי דבבך; Syr. בעלדבבך; the Samaritan reading is also supported by more than thirty-four MSS.

4 to save — Sam. ולהושיע and to save; Sept. *καί.*

17 the Hittites, and the Amorites, the Canaanites — Sam. the Canaanites, and the Amorites, and the Hittites, and the Gergesites והגרגשי; Sept. *καὶ τὸν Γεργεσαῖον.*

CHAP. XXI.

2 and thy judges — Sam. ושטריך and thy officers.

5 לשרתו to minister unto him — Sam. לשרת to minister.

17 to him — Sam. ולו and to him.

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19 and unto the gate — Sam. אל שער unto the gate.
20 the elders — Sam. אל אנשי the people.
22 and if — Sam. כי if.

CHAP. XXII.

1 or his sheep go astray — Sam. שחו או את כל בחמחו or his sheep or any of his cattle go astray.
2 until thy brother seek it — Sam. until thy brother seek it of thee אחי מעמך.
4 or his ox — Sam. או את כל בחמחי or his ox or any of his cattle.
17 he puts — Sam. ויא שם לח he puts to her; Sept. αὐτῇ.
and they shall spread — Sam. ופרש and he shall spread.
18 that man — Sam. that selfsame man; Sept. ἐκεῖνον.
20 הדבר הזה this thing — Sam. הדבר the thing.
26 thou shalt not do — Sam. לא תעשו ye shall not do; Sept. οὐ ποιήσετε.

CHAP. XXIII.

3 יולדו that are begotten — Sam. יולידו which they shall beget.
11 and it shall be, when evening comes on, he shall wash himself with water, and when the sun is down he shall come into the camp again — Sam. כי אם רחץ בשרו במים ובא השמש ואחרי כן יבוא אל המחנה but if he has washed himself with water, and the sun is down, afterwards shall he come into the camp.
12 תהיה thou shalt have — Sam. יהיה shall be; Sept. ἔσται.
17 there shall not be — Sam. לא תהיה there shall not live.
nor shall be — Sam. ולא יהיה nor shall live.
20 thine hand — Sam. ידיך thine hands.
23 וכי and if — Sam. כי if.
24 the Lord thy God — Sam. the Lord.

CHAP. XXIV.

1 a wife, and married — Sam. ובא אליה ובעלה a wife and go in in unto her, and married.
4 and thou shalt cause to sin — Sam. ולא תחטיאי and ye shall not cause to sin.
8 and do — Sam. לעשות to do; Sept. ποιεῖν.
according to all that — Sam. ככל תחורה אשר according to the whole law that; Sept. κατὰ πάντα τὸν νόμον.
11 יוציא shall bring — Sam. ויוציא he shall bring.
18 משם thence — Sam. omitted.
22 לעשות to do — Sam. omitted.

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CHAP. XXV

6 the first-born — Sam. תבן תבכור the first-born son.
11 במכשיו the secrets — Sam. בבטרי the flesh.

CHAP. XXVI.

2 כל־פרי all the fruit — Sam. פרי the fruit; Sept. τῶν καρπῶν.
shall choose — Sam. בחר hath chosen.
5 mighty — Sam. ויצום and mighty.
8 great terribleness — Sam. גדול ובמראות great vision; Sept. ἐν ὁράμασι μεγάλοις: Chald. ובחזונין רבדבין; Syr. ובחזוא רבא.
12 ונתתה and hast given — Sam. ומתתו and hast given it.
13 and unto the stranger — Sam. לגר unto the stranger
17 ומשפטיו and his judgments — Sam. omitted.
19 and in honor — Sam. לשם in honor.

CHAP. XXVII.

1 שמר keep — Sam. שמרו keep ye; Sept. φυλάσσεσθε.
4 in mount Ebal — Sam. in mount Gerizim גריזים (id. vs. 12).
9 לעם a people — Sam. לעם קדש a holy people.
12 and Judah — Sam. יהודה Judah.
and Joseph — Sam. יוסף Joseph.
13 and Zebulun — Sam. זבולן Zebulun.
16 it shall say — Sam. ואמרו and they shall say; Sept. ἐροῦσι (id. vs. 17–26).
26 the words — Sam. את כל דברי all the words; Sept. ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς λόγοις.

CHAP. XXVIII.

1 to do — Sam. ולעשות and to do; Sept. καὶ ποιεῖν.
all nations — Sam. כל גוי every nation.
8 thine hand — Sam. ידיך thine hands (id. vs. 12, 20).
12 and to bless — Sam. לברך to bless.
14 command you — Sam. מצוך command thee; Sept. ἐντέλλομαί σοι.
15 לעשות את כל to do all — Sam. omitted.
18 and the fruit of thy land — Sam. ופרי אדמתך ופרי בהמתך and the fruit of thy land, and the fruit of thy cattle.
20 vexation — Sam. ואת המהומה and vexation; Sept. καί.
until thou be destroyed — Sam. עד תשמידך until they destroy thee.
and until thou perish — Sam. ועד תאבידך and until they perish thee.

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22 and they shall pursue thee until thou perish — Sam. they shall pursue thee until they perish thee.

24 until thou be destroyed — Sam. עד השמידוך until they destroy thee (id. vs. 45).

25 into all the kingdoms — Sam. ממלכת into every kingdom.

26 לכל עוף unto all fowls — Sam. לצוף unto the fowls; Sept. *τοῖς πετεινοῖς*; Syr.

29 דרכיך in thy ways — Sam. דרכך in thy way.

33 the fruit of thy land and all thy labors — Sam. and the fruit of thy land and all thy labor ופרי ... יגעך.

37 and thou shalt become an astonishment, a proverb — Sam. and thou shalt become a name and a proverb לשם ולמשל.

49 eagle flieth יראה — Sam. eagle appears יראה.

51 wine — Sam. ותירש and wine.

53 which the Lord thy God hath given thee — Sam. אשר נתן לך which he hath given thee.

56 and toward her son — Sam. toward her son.

59 then the Lord will — Sam. then the Lord thy God will יהוה אלהיך.

62 thou wouldest not obey the voice of the Lord thy God — Sam. ye would not obey the voice of the Lord your God כי לא שמעתם; Sept. *ὅτι οὐκ εἰσηκούσατε τῆς φωνῆς κυρίου τοῦ θεοῦ ὑμῶν.*

65 and failing of eyes — Sam. failing of eyes.

68 I spake unto thee, thou shalt see — Sam. לכם לא תוסיפון I spake unto you, you shall see.

CHAP. XXIX.

5 and thy shoe — Sam. ונעליכם and your shoes; Sept. *καὶ τὰ ὑποδήματα ὑμῶν*; Syr. and Vulg.

upon thy foot — Sam. מעל רגליכם upon your feet; Sept. *ἀπὸ τῶν ποδῶν ὑμῶν*; Syr. and Vulg.

8 for an inheritance — Sam. נחלת an inheritance.

11 your wives — Sam. ונשיכם and your wives; Sept. *καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες ὑμῶν.*

unto the drawer — Sam. ועד שאב and unto the drawer.

19 to add drunkenness to — בשרירות to add freedom to.

22 וראו when they see — Sam. וראה when he sees.

34 what — Sam. ומה and what.

CHAP. XXX.

1 hath driven thee — Sam. יריחך shall drive thee.

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5 and he will do thee good — Sam. omitted.
8 the Lord — Sam. יהוה אלהיך the Lord thy God; Sept. τοῦ θεοῦ σου; Syr. and Vulg.
9 of thine hand, in the fruit of the body — Sam. of thine hands, in the fruit of thy body.
15 היום this day — Sam. omitted.
19 whither thou passest over — Sam. אתם עברים whither ye pass over; Sept. διαβαίνετε.

CHAP. XXXI.

3 Joshua — Sam. ויהושע and Joshua; Sept. καὶ Ἰησοῦς.
7 תבוא must go — Sam. תביא must bring.
11 which he shall choose, thou shalt — Sam. בחר יקרא which he hath chosen, it shall be read.
13 the Lord your God — Sam. יהוה אלהיהם the Lord their God.
16 and will forsake me and break — Sam. and they will forsake me and break; Sept. καὶ καταλεῖψουσί με καὶ διασκεδάσουσι.
17 and they shall be devoured — Sam. והיו לאכלה and they shall be for a food; Sept. καὶ ἔσονται κατάβρωμα.
18 my face in that — Sam. אסתיר פני מהם my face from them in that; Sept. ἀπ' αὐτῶν; Syr. and Chald.
19 put it in — Sam. ושימה and put it in.
20 father — Sam. לאבותיו ליתן להם fathers, to give it to them.
21 I sware — Sam. I sware unto their fathers לאבותיו; Sept. τοῖς πατράσιν αὐτῶν; Syr. לאבהתון.
26 take — Sam. לקחו take ye; Sept. λαβόντες.

CHAP. XXXII.

2 shall distil — Sam. ויזל and shall distil.
3 the name — Sam. בשם in the name.
ascribe — Sam. and ascribe.
5 their spot is not the spot of his children — Sam. שחתו לא לו בני מום not to him are children with spot; Sept. ἡμάρτοσαν οὐκ αὐτῷ τέκνα μωμητά; Chald. חבילו לחין לא ליה ב'; Syr. תבלו ולא לה בניא דמיכא.
7 remember — Sam. זכרו remember ye; Sept. μνήσθητε.
9 his people — Sam. his people Jacob יעקב; Sept. Ἰακώβ.
Jacob is the lot of his inheritance — Sam. the lot of his inheritance Israel ישראל; Sept. Ἰσραήλ.
10 ימצאהו he found him — Sam. יאמצהו he strengthened him; Sept. αὐτάρκησεν.

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10 and the waste howling wilderness — Sam. ובתוחללית ישמנהו and in praises he made him fat. Houbigant reads יָשְׁמְנֵהוּ בְּתוֹחוֹלְלוֹת in the desert he made him fat; Gesenius, however, reads יָשְׁמְרֵהוּ בְּתַהֲלֻלוֹת in laudationibus posuit eum, i.e. gloriosum reddidit eum.

he instructed him — Sam. ויבוננהו and he instructed him; Sept. *καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν αὐτόν.*

he kept him — Sam. ויצרנהו and kept him; Sept. *καὶ διεφύλαξεν αὐτόν.*

11 over — Sam. ועל and over.

he took — Sam. ויקחהו and he took; Sept. *καὶ ἀνέλαβεν.*

13 that he might eat — Sam. יאכילהו he made him eat; Sept. *ἐψώμισεν.*

14 fat of lambs — Sam. butter of lambs חמת.

At the end of this verse the Samaritan adds: ויאכל יעקב וישבע Jacob shall eat and be full.

15 and he waxed fat — Sam. ישמן he waxed fat.

and lightly esteemed — Sam. ויגבלי and they lightly esteemed.

16 they provoked him — Sam. ויקנאוהי and they provoked him.

17 with abominations — Sam. ובתיעבות and with abominations.

18 מחללך formed thee — Sam. מחללך that made thee glorious.

20 I will see — Sam. ואראה and I will see; Sept. *καὶ δείξω.*

תהפכת froward — Sam. תהפכות of destruction.

22 and shall consume — Sam. תאכל it shall consume.

and set on fire — Sam. תלחם set on fire.

23 my arrows — Sam. וחצי and my arrows.

24 מזי they shall be burnt — Sam. מזה hence.

ולחמי and devoured — Sam. לחמי his bread.

וקטב מרירי and with bitter destruction — Sam. קטף מרירים of bitter plagues.

25 the suckling — Sam. ויונק and the suckling.

26 I would scatter them — Sam. אמי דם, which may mean "where are they?" Vulg., Aquila, Luther; Syr. אימא אנון, or "they are my wrath." (?)

27 enemy — Sam. איבי enemies.

צרימו their adversaries — Sam. צרינו our adversaries.

28 אבד עצות המה void of counsel they are — Sam. אבדי עצותיהם perishing in their counsels.

29 לו oh that — Sam. ולא and not; Sept. *οὐκ.*

they would understand — Sam. וישכלו and they would understand.

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29 they would consider — Sam. ויבינו and they would consider.
30 כי that — Sam. omitted.
32 their clusters — Sam. ואשכלי and their clusters.
35 לי to me — Sam. ליום in the day; Sept. *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ*.
37 and he shall say — Sam. ואמרו and they shall say.
38 they drank — Sam. וישתו and they drank; Sept. *καί*.
let it be — Sam. ידוי let them be; Sept. *γενηθήτωσαν*; Chald., Syr., St. Jerome.
43 his land, his people — Sam. ארמת עמו the land of his people; Sept. *τὴν γῆν τοῦ λαοῦ αὐτοῦ*; Vulg. *terrae populi sui*.
44 Hoshea — Sam. יהושע Joshua.
45 all these words — Sam. את הדברים האלה these words,
46 to do — Sam. ולעשות and to do; Sept. *καὶ ποιεῖν*; Vulg. *et facere*; Syr.

CHAP. XXXIII.

2 and he came — Sam. ואתו and with him.
8 אף yea — Sam. אב a father.
all — Sam. וכל and all; Sept. *καί*.
thy foot — Sam. לרגליך thy feet.
6 and not — Sam. אל not.
מתיו his men — Sam. מאתו from him.
7 רב sufficient — Sam. ריב fight; Targ. Onkelos יהודאי יעבדון ליה; Sept. *διακρινοῦσιν αὐτῷ*; Aquila *δικάσονται*; Symm. *ὑπερμαχήσουσιν*; Vulg. *pugnabunt pro eo*.
8 didst strive — Sam. ותריבהו and didst strive.
9 not seen him — Sam. ראיתי not seen.
11 his hands — Sam. his hand.
12 of Benjamin — Sam. and of Benjamin.
the beloved — Sam. יד יד the hand, the hand.
עליו by him — Sam. omitted.
he covers — Sam. ודגמה and he covers.
14 גרש thrust forth — Sam. גרושי of the fruits.
17 of his bullock — Sam. שור of a bullock; Sept. *ταύρου*; Vulg. *tauri*; Syr.
ותם and they are — Sam. תם they are; Sept., Vulg., Syr.
19 unto the mountain — Sam. unto my mountain.
there — Sam. ושם and there.
they shall suck — Sam. יינק he shall suck.
20 and teareth — Sam. טרף he teareth.

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20 אף also — Sam. ינם and also.
22 he shall leap — Sam. וירוץ and he shall leap.
23 with favor — Sam. ורצון and accepted.
possess thou — Sam. יירש he shall possess.
24 let him be — Sam. וירי and let him be.
his foot — Sam. רגליו his feet.
25 thy shoe — Sam. מנעליך thy shoes.
26 thy strength — Sam. רביך thy greatness.
28 also his heavens — Sam. ואף שמיך and also thy heavens.

CHAP. XXXIV.

1, 2 all the land of Gilead unto Dan; and all Naphtali and the land of Ephraim and Manasseh, and all the land of Judah — Sam. כל ארץ מנחר מצרים עד נחר הגדול נחר פרת all the land from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates.
2 unto — Sam. ועד and unto.
3 omitted in the Sam.
4 I sware — Sam. לאבתיך I sware unto the fathers.
9 his hands — Sam. ידו his hand.
12 the terror — Sam. המראת the vision.

[זה ספר החמישי : קנין ק וסו this is the fifth book (with) one hundred and sixty-six Kazzin.]

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ARTICLE V.

THE EXTENT OF INSPIRATION.

BY PROF. EZRA P. GOULD, NEWTON THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION.

MR. SANDAY, in his generally admirable book on the Gospels in the Second Century, speaks of the demand for a restatement of the doctrine of revelation or inspiration, inductive in its nature, and bringing out what inspiration is, not what it ought to be. I suppose that he means by this a theory based on a careful observation of the facts of Scripture, and such as to comprehend all these facts, as far as they can be ascertained, instead of a theory reasoned out from the nature of things, real or supposed. If we analyze the popular theory of inspiration, we shall see, I think, what Mr. Sanday has in his mind when he speaks of what inspiration ought to be. We have, first, the underlying fact assumed by all believers in inspiration, that the Bible is a revelation from God. Following this assumption, we have next the idea that it must therefore be perfect, like everything else proceeding from God's hands. And finally, perfection is made to mean infallibility — the absence of all errors of whatever kind. This is the popular idea of inspiration, and the short-hand method for its proof, which involves infallibility in inspiration, proving the one from the other in the nature of things.

If we examine, now, the modification of this view generally adopted by scholars, we find that they make a distinction between the substance and the form of revelation, holding that the former is divine and the latter human, and that inspiration and infallibility belong to the former only. This distinction is partly deductive, proceeding from the general law of economy in the use of the supernatural; the minor premise being that this is all that is necessary for the

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accomplishment of God's purpose in revelation. But it is also partly inductive, being forced upon scholars by a consideration of the facts in regard to the manifest human character of the books of the Bible as a whole, in their literary form, and the individuality of the several parts. A modification of this view supposes that the elevated mental state of the writers communicates itself to their style; and this, too, proceeds partly from what is seen to be natural in the circumstances, and partly from observation of the otherwise unaccountable excellence of the literary quality of these books.

But we are witnessing a still further modification of the common view of inspiration, which separates not only between the substance and the form, but also between different classes of things included in the substance itself. We may make a distinction here, in order to show the general line of division adopted, between facts and ideas — between historical and scientific facts, for instance, and their moral, religious, or doctrinal import. Now, the view is gaining ground that inspiration and infallibility belong exclusively or specially to the latter, and are either wholly or mostly wanting in the former. Here, again, we have a partly deductive, partly inductive, view. Deductive in its assumption that the Bible is designed to teach only moral and religious truth, and that its narration of facts is not intended as a contribution to history and science, but simply to convey moral and religious truth, and that infallibility is therefore required only with reference to the latter, not the former, standard. Really, then, in the minds of those holding the view, this would be a distinction not between different parts of the substance of Scripture, but between the real substance and what is only apparently substance, but is really part of the form. And inductive in this — that a comparison of different parts of the Bible has discovered supposed discrepancies, and a comparison with outside sources of knowledge has revealed supposed errors; so that as an authority in matters of science the book is sometimes entirely discarded, and in history only substantial

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accuracy is accorded to it, with a margin for errors such as any well-informed historian might make. Partly, too, there is no doubt that this theory is a matter of convenience, reducing the claims of the Bible to such a point as to make attack impossible, or at least certain of defeat. It seems to get rid of all the difficulties, and save all that is important. I do not mean that this view has just arisen. It has been held by some scholars for years. But it has until lately been regarded as a sceptical or rationalistic theory, and has not been supposed to be the view of evangelical scholars. But now a very considerable party among the latter is accepting it, and it is apparently becoming the received view of a certain school of theology, with an occasional statement that is certainly misleading — that it is the general view of orthodox scholarship.

Now, this review of the different theories of inspiration will show what is meant by a deductive and inductive theory of it, and to what extent the two methods of investigation and proof enter into the different views. At the same time, I think, it shows the necessity of a re-investigation of the subject. For it is evident that the scientific method has not been as yet carefully followed in the investigation. The induction of facts has not been sufficiently broad and careful. On this side, at least, the entire ground needs to be thoroughly canvassed. For while the several steps in the formation of opinion about it have been under the pressure of facts, some of them real, some of them supposed, and have been thus the correction or modification of the purely deductive theory by the results of a more or less perfect induction, and the progress has thus been toward the scientific method, it is evident that sufficient pains have not been taken to make the induction complete and thorough. I venture to say that the last view mentioned is, and can be shown to be, inconsistent with a large class of facts, and therefore inadequate. And, at the same time, I doubt if the defenders of the conservative view have taken sufficient account of the present state of the facts, or are making sufficient preparations

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to defend their theory against the accumulated and carefully prepared assault that is certain to be made on it. For it is evident that the speculative defences behind which they have taken their position are not going to be sufficient, and that the point at which they have got to strengthen their line is in a careful re-examination of the facts.

The painful result of all this is a vagueness and uncertainty hanging over the entire subject of the extent of inspiration. The first step away from the extreme orthodox view seems to have been taken with some deliberation, and in view of indubitable facts. And the reasons were generally known, so as to give opportunity for intelligent choice between conflicting views. But we seem to find ourselves — and here I am speaking of the state of things in this country mainly — suddenly confronted with the third theory, scarcely knowing whence it came, what are its grounds, nor how largely it is held. And as yet scarcely any one has challenged it. So that this seems to be one of the questions in regard to which men's minds are drifting into a state of flux and uncertainty, scholars recognizing the apparent weight of the objections to the old view, and yet unwilling to attempt a new solution of the problem.

The position of the biblical scholar in such a state of things is certainly embarrassing. He encounters these apparent discrepancies, errors of statement, and misquotations, which a fair interpretation of the passages, in themselves considered, does not remove. But, on the other side, is a theory of inspiration quite generally held, and, on the whole, by himself, which excludes errors of any kind from the Scriptures, which leads him either to explain away the difficulty, or to claim, in case of the present impossibility of explanation, that it is due to insufficient knowledge. And yet the question is in such an unsettled condition that he does not feel quite sure; every new difficulty increases his perplexity, and he begins to wonder how long it will be before these apparently exceptional cases will force him to modify his view. For it is sure that there has been as yet

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no adequate statement nor proof of that theory, and specially none proceeding on the scientific method, which examines and weighs all facts pro and con. Evidently, I repeat, this question has yet to be decided on adequate grounds. And by this statement I do not mean as yet to question either of the existing theories, but simply to deny the adequacy of any proof yet presented to establish either of them securely. And this mainly because the inductive proof has not been sufficiently tested and applied to them. In the successive steps that have been taken the occasion has been, as we have seen, not a speculative difficulty, but the apparent inconsistency of the facts with the existing theory. But the result has been to too great a degree the formation of new theories on new speculative grounds, and not a re-examination of the facts in various directions in order to a reconstruction of the doctrine on scientific grounds. But I do not propose to myself any such task, for obvious reasons. I only wish to discuss tentatively some of the points involved with special reference to the third theory; that which claims inspiration for the Bible only in the region of moral and religious truth, and either expressly disclaims it elsewhere, or leaves it in doubt.

But before proceeding with this discussion let us notice briefly this alternation between denial and doubt of inspiration, outside of the moral and religious sphere, which is certainly significant. The assumption is that either of these two positions, either denial or doubt, may be adopted, it makes little difference which; the important point being in the positive claim made. The general position of the indifference of this part of the question of inspiration rests on the assumption, which is certainly plausible, that the whole purpose of the Scriptures lies within the sphere for which alone the claim of inspiration is made, and that everything else is means to this end. Of course substantial historical accuracy is, or ought to be, thereby pledged; for here is the vital distinction between the Bible and the part that modern fiction and the drama play in the enforcement of moral truths, that it presents actual facts

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in individual life and in history with their lessons, instead of creating characters and scenes to illustrate real or supposed truth. And it is to be noticed, moreover, that the doctrines of Scripture, most of them, have a historical basis; and of course the doctrines stand or fall with the substantial truth of the history. Both these points need to be borne in mind, for they have an important bearing on our discussion. But apparently minute accuracy in detail is not demanded by this theory. A great truth is taught by the fall of Jericho, and the manner of its capture; but it does not seem to be essential to this that the exact number of priests or of trumpets or of days be given; nor, if there were two accounts of this, that they should exactly agree in such points. And it must probably be admitted that this is a sufficient answer to the objection that history and instruction, facts and truths, are inextricably interwoven in the pattern of Scripture, and that you cannot separate them, as is proposed in this theory. They are thus interwoven, but not co-ordinate. They stand to each other in the relation of means to ends; and while the Scripture, being God's work, must infallibly reach its ends and accomplish its purpose in the exact inculcation of exact moral and religious truth, this standard of exact truth applies to the means used only so far as it is essential to their object. And for that, apparently, substantial historical accuracy is necessary, but not minute correctness of detail. Now what I wish to say is that all this depends, in the first place, on the truth of the underlying assumption that the only purpose of Scripture is the inculcation of moral and religious truth. Then, on the validity of the inference that only those parts will be inspired which bear directly on this object, and that general accuracy in the narration of facts is all that is necessary. And, finally, that to insure even this, inspiration is not sometimes needed. And here the facts come in to play an important part. Theoretically the assumption in regard to the object of the Scriptures is certainly plausible. But will the facts support it? It seems a valid inference that minute accuracy of detail in the narra-

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tion of the facts used to convey truth, and forming the basis of doctrine, is not required on this assumption. But do we find such accuracy, and if so, is the premise wrong, or the inference incorrectly drawn? And, finally, are there not some facts which imply inspiration, even on the ground of general accuracy? These two things must be thoroughly tested by the facts — first, the soundness of the principle, and, second, the validity of the several steps leading from that to the conclusion that inspiration is confined to the moral and religious element in the Scriptures. Now the alternative, which either disclaims or doubts inspiration elsewhere, is open to this difficulty. If there may be other things in Scripture inspired, then it follows either that the supposed object may not be broad enough, or that the accomplishment of this purpose may require a wider range of inspiration than the one supposed. The admission of the possibility of such an alternative, which those who hold this theory seem to feel may be forced on them by the facts, is an admission that the Scriptures may take precautions to secure what is not postulated in their theory of its purpose, which manifestly weakens their entire position.

We are now prepared to take up our inquiry as to the bearing of certain facts on this theory. What has been said in regard to the theory itself will enable us to enter somewhat intelligently upon this inquiry. And first there is the somewhat wide range of prediction or prophecy in the Scripture. What is the exact relation of this to the theory under consideration? If the theory be taken in its extreme form of denial of inspiration outside of the moral and religious element in the Bible, then prophecy is certainly included in this denial. For prophecy, no more than history, is itself moral and religious, but it has moral and religious bearings. And this of course invalidates the theory by making it prove too much. For there can be no doubt in the nature of things, or as a fact, that Scripture prophecy is inspired. For certainly if history must be substantially true in order to accomplish the enforcement of moral truth, the same is true

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of prediction in an enhanced degree. Otherwise God could be accused of procuring things under false pretences, and the trick would soon fail of its effect. And while to secure this general truthfulness in history only natural means are necessary, the same quality in prediction requires revelation. So that there is here revelation or inspiration outside of moral and religious truth in the Scriptures. On the other hand, if the theory is that inspiration is required not only in the moral and religious element, but also where the proper enforcement of these truths is not attainable by human means, then prophecy comes in under the latter head. But on the same principle, possibly unexpected parts of the Bible will come in in the company of prophecy. It needs to be clearly understood which of these forms of the theory is adopted. For if the former, that inspiration is confined to the moral and religious element in the Bible, we need not go any further. That is clearly disproved by the single case of prophecy, which as such, not as moral or religious, is plainly inspired; and as such is yet not included in this scheme of inspiration. And if the latter, that inspiration extends to that which is necessary to secure moral and religious ends of Scripture, but does not go further, then the terms on which it admits the inspiration of prophecy need to be remembered in the following discussion. Furthermore, one theory or the other must be consistently held in regard to prophecy itself. For it presents, at least, one serious difficulty to the defenders of inspiration, which there is a temptation to obviate by the exclusion of all except strictly moral and religious truth from its sphere. Prophecy in the Old Testament is largely occupied with one fact, the coming of the Messiah; and in the New Testament with his second coming to judgment. And it is in this theme of New Testament prophecy that the difficulty arises to which I refer. Of course I mean the time of this second coming, which is represented in the New Testament to all appearances as near at hand. Now it is obvious that this very grave difficulty is not obviated by the tenable form of our

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theory. For this is certainly prediction; and the only way to obviate the difficulty presented in it is on the broader ground which would exclude all prediction from the range of inspiration, and thereby destroy itself. I repeat it, that one form of the theory or the other must be consistently held; either that which involves this difficulty, or that which obviates this difficulty and involves the greater one of excluding all prophecy from the sphere of inspiration. And so prophecy leaves us with a very serious difficulty which the moderate and only tenable form of this theory does not obviate, and we are called upon to guard against the adoption of the other under the pressure of this fact.

Possibly the bearing of this theory on prediction is not generally recognized by its defenders. But history and science are expressly included within its range, inspiration being denied in regard to both, either absolutely, or else in all cases in which inspiration is not necessary to the enforcement by means of them of moral and religious truth. In discussing this part of our subject we will begin at the beginning, since here, if anywhere, the battle rages most fiercely. The account of creation in Genesis is a crucial passage in this discussion. It is one of the things which have forced many to take this limited view of inspiration. And we do not feel sure but that it will force some of them to retract it. To my mind there is a marvellous interest attaching to this history. For here is an account of the creation certainly not written by an eye-witness, and certainly not the product of scientific investigation, written ages after the events, and ages before science had come to discover anything about the events. Of course, then, on ordinary, natural grounds, it is a myth, like the other guesses at the same thing belonging to the same time. But on the ground of infallible inspiration of the entire Bible, even on the ground of general truthfulness of its narration of events, it is a true account. And such it was supposed to be till the science of geology began its investigations, with results at first, apparently, widely different from the Mosaic record.

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Then came, first, conflict, then attempts to reconcile the two accounts on the part of wise men who believed in both. But in the midst of the discussion, when nothing had been fairly decided, but when things were looking favorably for the establishment of at least general harmony, we find a change in the theory of inspiration proposed, to make room for this and other supposed difficulties. It looks very much, as far as this account is concerned, like the Battle of Bull Run, in which the Federals are said to have retreated when the battle was going quite favorably.

In discussing the bearings of this on our general subject we need to keep in mind again the two forms of the theory which we are discussing. On the more moderate form of it, which admits inspiration where it is necessary to secure the moral and religious ends of Scripture, this passage can be plainly shown to be inspired. And the other, which admits it only within the moral and religious sphere, by its exclusion of this account from the sphere of inspiration, can be clearly proved untenable. And yet we find the latter applied to this very passage. Professor Fisher, in the New Englander, Jan. 1877, makes the following statement:

"Another pretext for atheism is the alleged contrariety of the teaching of the Bible to the discoveries of natural and physical science. ..... But there is no discrepancy. ..... The Bible is our guide in morals and religion; it does not anticipate the discoveries of science. ..... The biblical writers take the science of their time, or the ordinary conceptions of men respecting the material world, and proceed on that basis. ..... As for geology, there was none. ..... We know not when or by whom the story of creation in its present form was first received. But that sublime passage is plainly the old Semitic tradition, cleansed of polytheistic error, and made the vehicle of conveying the loftiest moral and religious truth. ..... There is no inconsistency, then, between the Bible taken as the teacher of moral and religious truth and the results of scientific study."

And in a foot-note he adds: "In the first three chapters

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of Genesis we find asserted the truths that the universe owes its being to the creative agency of one personal God; that man is like God in his spiritual faculties; that sin is not a physical or metaphysical necessity, but has its origin and seat in the will of the creature; that guilt brings shame and separation from communion with God; that immorality is the natural fruit of impiety." This latter statement suggests the first difficulty in the application of the theory stated to this passage. For, according to this, the moral and religious truth taught in the account of creation is simply this: "That the universe owes its being to the creative agency of one personal God. All the other points in the enumeration belong to succeeding chapters and to another subject. And this being the object for which the account is given, there is certainly a large amount of extraneous matter, and therefore a lack of adaptation of means to ends, — a sad want of proportion, — in this "sublime passage." If we are to judge by the narrative itself, aside from any theory of its object drawn from the supposed general purpose of Scripture, we should surely say that it was intended to teach something else than the general truth that God is the personal Creator; that it goes beyond this into the statement of the manner and order of creation; and that this, if not a part of the purpose of the account, certainly contributes nothing to the supposed object. And this extraneous matter is so disproportionately large as to nearly cover up the supposed real design. An analogous case may help us see the strength of this objection. Suppose a book giving an account of the building of Cologne Cathedral. It is generally accepted as a true account, until some architect, comparing it with the cathedral itself, finds mistakes in it. There is, to be sure, general correctness, but errors of some importance in detail. The defenders of the book try to overcome these difficulties, but at last give up that; and then, in order to save the book, they set up the story that it was intended only to give the builder's name, and that, inasmuch as this was its sole object, it must be judged by that standard. Imagine the situation.

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But in another way this passage presents a still more anomalous aspect on the theory that it is uninspired, and therefore untrue. Wherever else we look into the Bible we find that it employs historical facts, substantially corresponding to the truth, to convey moral and religious truth. And we have seen that this degree of truth is certainly essential to its purpose. But on this theory we have here a "Semitic tradition," "the science of the time," "a poem, a product of the imagination" used for the purpose, i.e. since the science of the time was false in regard to this subject, a mythical account of the manner and order of creation, given merely as the vehicle of the fact that God is the Creator. This is radically different from the Book of Job, in which a drama is supposed to be used as the vehicle of religious truth. For the supposition in that case is that no such events ever occurred, whereas in this case we are supposed to have a false account of actual events. There is the difference between fiction, in which only ideal truth is expected, and false history. The former we do find in Scripture; the latter, — well, we certainly ought to give ourselves long pause before admitting it. For notice that we should have, in this case, not errors in detail, but substantial untruth. There was no scientific knowledge of the subject. Men do not guess at stupendous facts like these with any degree of success; and so, on the assumption that this is the science of the time, it must be substantially untrue — there can be only an infinitesimal amount of truth in it. Once admit that here is substantial truth, and only error of detail, and the entire position is overthrown. Substantial truth here must be the product of revelation, and we have thus the revelation of scientific truth — the Bible a teacher of science, and its writers using not the science of their time, but anticipating the science of six thousand years later. On any other supposition, we could expect truth here as little as we might hope to take the requisite letters of the alphabet, shake them up in a hat, and take them out in the order of a poem of Tennyson.

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But notice, again, what it is that we are asked to believe in regard to this. We want above all here clear thought and exact statement, so that we may know what it is that we are pledged to by this theory that the Bible does not teach science, but uses the science of the time to convey religious truth. According to this, we have in this statement the science of the time — atheism, pantheism, dualism, and polytheism, and + monotheism. Let any one try this sum in addition on any of the old cosmogonies outside and independent of the Bible, and see if the result is the story of Genesis. It would be an interesting sight to stand by and see any of the advocates of this theory working out the problem. Success would have to depend on a process similar to that by which Mr. Mill thought, or pretended to think, that in some other world two and two might make five.

But there is one thing involved in this theory that gives it a positively startling aspect. One feels as if he would like to try the Socratic method on one of its advocates, and cross-question him somewhat as follows:

"What is the principle in regard to the biblical history when it is made the basis of doctrine? Is it probable, do you think, that the Scripture would employ anything except the truth in this way?" — "I think not."

"As a matter of fact, does the Bible ever depart from this rule?" — "No; I believe not."

"Suppose, then, that there is some important religious truth or duty based on this account of creation, — the part of it, I mean, which is supposed to be the science of the time, — would not this force us to accept it as true?" — "I suppose that it would. But do you mean that it is the foundation of this truth, or simply the vehicle of it?"

"I mean the former; and I am glad that you have suggested the distinction, as it is fundamental here. I mean founded on it as the doctrine of the atonement is based on the fact of Christ's death." — "In that case, we should certainly have to suppose that the narrative is true."

"Well, then, on what is the law of the Sabbath founded?"

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— "It is certainly said to be based on the six days of creation followed by the rest of the seventh day."

"Then, according to the principle which you have just admitted, the account is true, — is it not? There must have been six creative days; for an important law like this cannot, certainly, be founded on a myth. — "What you assert seems, at least, conclusive."

"I delight in your candor. But let us be sure of our position. What do you understand, now, to be the distinction between science and revelation?" — "Why, by science I understand that which man discovers by the use of his faculties; while revelation is what he is told in some way by God."

"I think that your distinction is correct. Now, assuming the account of the creation to be true, do you think that it is science or revelation?" — "I suppose that it must be the latter, i.e. I do not see how any one could have discovered it except from the unknown science of geology."

"But is this fact a moral or religious, or a physical, truth?" — "The latter, of course. There is no moral or religious truth in it; though, as we have seen, such a truth is based on it."

"Then, unless you have made an unnecessary concession somewhere, if our premises and processes are correct, we have established at least the probability that the Scriptures do contain something else than religious truth."

We have thus advanced from the probable evidence of the preceding argument to what seems the almost certain proof of this. In the former we saw that it is probable from the analogy of other Scripture that when historical events are used in the Scriptures to convey religious truth, the account of these is probably substantially true. But when these events are made the basis of religious truth or of moral law, then the connection between the truth of the one and the other becomes so close as to make it certain and necessary that the account be substantially true.

There is one more step to be taken in this investigation, and that the most important of all. Our inquiry has pro-

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ceeded so far largely on the nature of things. We have seen what the apparent purport of the narrative itself is, and what, in the nature of things, reasoning from the analogy of Scripture, we should expect from an account purporting to be of this character. Our argument has thus been not entirely theoretical, for we have examined the account itself, and compared it with others of the same kind in Scripture with a view to its probable truth. Of course, however, while this differs from the purely theoretical process, on the one hand, it differs from the purely inductive, on the other, which must always begin, if it does not end, with an interrogation of the account in regard to its facts, and a comparison of this with other records of the same thing. We have found that our witness generally tells the truth. But is there rebutting testimony? Does he tell the truth here?

But first we must consider an important element in the testimony of the witnesses whom we have to question, viz. that the nature of their testimony is not yet fully determined, which of course prevents an entirely conclusive settlement of their relations to each other. As regards the biblical narrative, any such statement of facts may have light thrown on it by comparison with the facts themselves. Especially is this the case when the statement is excessively condensed. Still more so, if the language is at once concise and popular. And, again, if the statement is of facts unknown in themselves, outside of revelation, to the writer, not only individually, but as a class. Now we find all these elements in the Mosaic account of creation. What God did in creation is evidently compressed into a very small space, even in the most limited view of it. Evidently, too, the language is not exact, but popular. And the facts stated were in themselves absolutely unknown. That the language should be, therefore, to a certain extent, flexible is no surprise, but what we should expect in the nature of things. Nor is it improbable, but probable, that it will accommodate itself to different theories. For instance, the flexibility of the word "day" in the account may be regarded as now definitely established. So the state-

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ment that God said "Let there be light" determines nothing as to the nature of the process by which the light was produced. And the same may he said of the manner in which the waters and the lands were separated. Clearly here are immense natural processes presented in the barest outline, and the possible developments of this are various.

But the same is true to a degree of the science of geology, with whose discoveries this record has to be compared. It is not chaotic nor insecure, as some rigid interpreters would have us believe. But it is not, any more than any other science, possibly not so much as some, complete; and further discoveries may modify, more or less, some of its conclusions. It seems strange that such obvious facts should be left out of the account, as they certainly have been, by many who have pronounced on the inconsistency of the two records. For it is quite evident that until all the facts are known on both sides, we cannot pronounce certainly on their agreement or disagreement in detail. If there is substantial disagreement in the great outlines presented by each, then we may say that reconciliation is probably, almost certainly, impossible. For instance, if it should be shown that creation was in the inverse order, proceeding from man to vegetation, that would certainly invalidate the Mosaic account. Or if it should be proved that any two of the days really belong together, and are one day, and the separated events thus shown to be contemporaneous, the same would follow. Now this margin for doubt and further investigation has been too hastily overlooked by those who give up inspiration here, and say that this is not science, and that it is therefore absurd and unwise to attempt its reconciliation with recent discoveries, and who have narrowed the range of inspiration to accommodate it to this supposed state of things.

Now with this reservation as to the incompleteness of our knowledge of either of these records, let us see what their relations are as they stand. I say, without any fear of successful contradiction, that of substantial agreement. Professor Dana says, Bib. Sac., 1856: "The first thing that

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strikes the scientific reader is the evidence of divinity; not merely in the first verse and the successive fiats, but in the whole order of creation. There is so much that the most recent readings of science have for the first time explained, that the idea of man as the author becomes utterly incomprehensible. By proving the record true science pronounces it divine; for who could have correctly narrated the secrets of eternity but God himself?" He then proceeds to show the special points which God's testimonies in nature have made clear. Among these, as germane to our purpose, we will cite the following:

First, that "light was necessarily the work of the first day, the signal of creation begun." Second, that the next step was "the earth gradually brought to a condition in which dry land and seas existed." Third, "the introduction of vegetation on the third day," which Professor Dana says "was one of the mysterious facts of creation until the recent revelations of science." Fourth, "the creation or unveiling of the sun on the fourth day." Fifth, the creation of "the invertebrates, fishes, reptiles, and birds, the earlier animal creations," in regard to which he says, "the harmony of geology with Genesis could not be more exact." Sixth, "the creation of mammals, introducing a new element into the world." And, seventh, "man, the last creation. Science has no evidence that any living species have been created since his appearance." It is not my intention here to dwell on these details. But I must notice, in passing, one thing which greatly enhances the difficulty of making this a mere human philosophy of the order of things. In such a work, proceeding merely on the supposed nature of things, we certainly expect antecedently probable statements, not those which become probable or certain only after the discovery of things absolutely hidden at the time. But we have such antecedently improbable things in this account, the most obvious of which is the place of the creation of the sun in the series of events. This is represented as created only on the fourth day. Whereas we should certainly expect that it

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would precede the introduction of light and the creation of vegetation. I do not mean that we should expect a perfect ideal order of creation in this infancy of human intelligence. But if a person is constructing such an order, we should expect that so obvious things as these would not be the exceptions. Indeed, the marvel is just here: that the general order should be exactly conformed to the ideal, and that the only exceptions should be exactly those justified by scientific discovery.

I have spent a long time over this; but it is because it is the conclusive test of the theory which we are examining, as far as regards the science in the Bible. There are allusions to scientific matters elsewhere, in which accuracy may, or may not, be expected or discovered. But here is a detailed account of the origin of things, lying at the very foundation of science, which can be made, in fact must be, a test of the validity of the theory. The issue cannot be avoided; one side or the other must ground its arms here at this very point. And I claim in view of all the facts that it must be the side whose theory we have been examining. Whether for moral and religious, or other purposes, there is inspiration here, and if not here, then nowhere in the Bible. There is no other place in the book where it can be proved more demonstratively than here. And yet this, nearly the strongest point in our whole line of defence, is the one that we are called on to give up, to satisfy a theory intended to remove other difficulties. To rehearse the argument in brief, here is a record which, if it is substantially true, certainly cannot be a myth, i.e. substantially false; it cannot be in any case the result of scientific discovery, for there was absolutely no scientific knowledge of these things; if it is true, it cannot be the result of speculation on the order of creation; that would imply an inconceivably profound and prophetic insight; and besides there are antecedently improbable elements in the records which would make this supposition untenable; if it is substantially true, there is only one explanation of it, that the one Being then cognizant of the facts must have

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revealed them in some way. And that it is substantially true, Professor Hitchcock says, is generally admitted among scientific men.

It must be remembered, as we showed at the beginning, that this substantial truth is all that is necessary for our purpose. In the history of events within the range of human knowledge only unusual or unnatural precision could be used to prove inspiration. But if the events are without that range, any knowledge is presumptive proof of revelation or inspiration, and substantial truth is proof positive. Possibly the failure to notice this peculiarity in the requisite argument has produced the unfavorable judgment of some on the question of inspiration here. And it must also be borne in mind that this substantial truth, considering the imperfect knowledge that we have, of the exact purport of the scientific and biblical records, furnishes strong presumptive proof of the complete harmony between the two.

In considering, now, the question of the inspiration of the Bible history, we need to remark, first, the nature of the argument necessary to its proof. In this case merely general accuracy is mostly inadequate, since this is attainable by natural means. On the other hand, neither is infallibility demanded, since it is not necessarily implied in inspiration, and it would thus be a separate question, regarding the degree, rather than the fact, of inspiration. But, as we have already seen, unusual and unnatural exactness is generally necessary to prove this.

In order to understand, further, the exact state of the case, we must consider two general facts. First, that we have in the Bible not one book, nor one author, but a number and variety of both. This fact is one that has been considered in various aspects; but its bearing on this subject needs more careful consideration. A very high degree of historical accuracy, such as it must be admitted that we have in the Bible, would be singular in any one book or author, even of the latest period assigned to any of the books of the Bible. But it might be explained, on natural grounds, as

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due to the extraordinary natural endowments of the man. But the same thing in so many books and authors multiplies the wonder, and the difficulty of the explanation by the number of these. Now, if we add to this the second fact, that these books under consideration are admitted in certain things to be inspired, we have right at hand an explanation of the phenomenon, which certainly takes precedence of all others, and claims our first consideration.

When we come, now, to examine the earliest historical records of the Bible, we are called on to notice, first, the crucial nature of many of the facts narrated. We have, first, the statement of the unity of man, his descent from a single pair. And this fact is made the basis of the whole doctrine of man. Then the record of the equally important and fundamental fact of the fall. Then, carefully preserved, the account of the age of man. Then the history of the flood, which was local, to be sure, but for the race universal. Then the repeopling of the earth by the sons of Noah, and the division of the race into three great families. And finally, the account of the dispersion and distribution of the different families of man, and of the confusion of tongues.

Now, these accounts of the origins of things are derived from tradition, and a very remote tradition at that, i.e. if they are to be attributed to natural sources at all. They are not contemporaneous history, nor derived from written records, but a remote oral tradition — one of the most unreliable sources from which history can be drawn. We can scarcely suppose, then, that any respectable degree of historical truth or probability would be reached in these, except under supernatural guidance. In fact, we have, in this case, other traditions of the same things with which to compare the biblical records; and an examination of these makes it seem incredible, on natural grounds, that we should have such an account as the Bible gives.

Now, keeping these things in mind, let us examine a little in detail these brief, but immensely important records. In regard to the unity of the race, it is, first, theologically cer-

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tain, for it is made the basis of the biblical doctrine of man. This argument, of course, has no weight with sceptics; but, of course, it must weigh with those who admit inspiration as far as religious and moral truth are involved. And it certainly seems in a fair way to be proved by linguistic science. The account of the fall is also theologically certain; it is philosophically probable, as accounting for the moral condition of the race; and it is confirmed by the concurrent traditions of numerous races. The age of man, which is almost inextricably interwoven with the two preceding statements, and therefore with their doctrinal implications, is of course liable to attack and overthrow at any time by geological and antiquarian discoveries. But it is not overthrown yet, though it has been subjected to fierce attack. The account of the flood, though subjected to relentless scrutiny and assault, is now regarded as a historically certain event; and its universality, as far as the race is concerned — a crucial element in it, — is sustained by the concurrent traditions of all the chief divisions of the human family. And, at the same time, the biblical account sifts and combines and supplements these traditional accounts in a remarkable manner. In regard to the repeopling of the earth by the sons of Noah, ethnology confirms the principal features of the Mosaic account in a remarkable manner. First, the triple division of mankind is the one adopted by ethnologists after an independent examination of the facts. And secondly, the families named correspond remarkably with the classification of races by the same science on physical and linguistic grounds. The accuracy of this genealogy of the sons of Noah as a representation of the race-divisions of the human family is generally admitted. And the importance of this fact in our discussion can be scarcely overestimated. In regard to the dispersion and the confusion of tongues, the traditions of Babylon itself, where the event is located, confirm it. And a remarkable coincidence with the Scripture narrative, to say the least, is afforded by the character of the early monumental language of Babylon, which has in it distinctly

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marked Turanian, Semitic, and Aryan elements, while all other early languages known to us are distinct and unmixed.

Now all this seems to me as remarkable as anything in Scripture. We see how tradition and science come in to test these records of the origins of things at every point; how they fail to overthrow them at any one, and, on the other hand, confirm them minutely and remarkably at many, if not most points; and how unique is the excellence and accuracy of the biblical account, wherever there is a chance for comparison. And when we think that a remote oral tradition is the only natural source that the writer had to draw from, the principle of adequate cause forces us to assume supernatural guidance, if not revelation, to account for it. This part of the Scripture narrative, then, does not present exactly the same appearance as the account of creation, where revelation was absolutely necessary to account for any real knowledge of the facts; neither is it the same as the remainder of the Bible history, which is largely contemporaneous, so that a considerable degree of accuracy is to be expected on purely natural grounds. But it is a case in which the ordinary accuracy of history cannot be accounted for naturally, and where, therefore, this at least being found, calls for other explanation. And this, as we have seen, lies at hand in the admitted inspiration of large parts of the volume in which these records are found.

We have left ourselves little space in which to consider the other historical parts of the Bible. But if we have established our position in the cases already considered, the purpose of this Article is accomplished. One well-established case of inspiration within the range from which this theory excludes it overthrows the theory. And we have examined not one, but many cases, with this probable result. But it will be well for us to consider the general facts in regard to the rest of the Bible history. As we have seen, these accounts deal largely with contemporaneous history, and therefore general accuracy is not sufficient for our purpose. Then we have to consider that they are exposed to, and have been

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actually subjected to, extremely severe tests. When we take into account the long periods of time covered by these histories, the constant contact with profane history, the numerous allusions to the customs of different lands; the opportunities for error, judging by ordinary standards, are certainly very great. And on the other hand, the facilities for a fair judgment of their trustworthiness are correspondingly large. The Christian centuries have been gathering the materials for this judgment, and a great collection has been made. For the opportunity given to our opponents in this preponderance of the historical element in our sacred books has been improved by them; the challenge has been accepted, and on the other hand, its defenders have been equally busy. No other books were ever subjected to a tithe of the historical criticism encountered by the Bible. Every available source has been ransacked for the weapons of attack and defence. And with what results? Such that it seems to me any careful, candid, and thorough student of the subject must say "no weapon formed against thee shall prosper." Such as to make it seem a probable, if not, indeed, a necessary conclusion, that supernatural guidance is to be found in the historical, as well as the moral and religious element in Scripture. The number of unexplained difficulties is almost ridiculously small compared with the vast and continually multiplying proofs of the minute historical accuracy of these books. And the amount of probable error is very much less. I repeat it, and am willing to go into the detailed proof which this space will not admit, any books that can go through such an ordeal, and come out with scarcely the smell of fire on their garments, cannot be accounted for on natural grounds, if we admit the principle of sufficient cause. And to these results so far, it must be added that ancient records and monuments throwing light on biblical history are from time to time discovered, and that these almost invariably strengthen the hands of its defenders, and weaken the position of its opponents. Moreover, the Scriptures can be compared not only with other records, but also the different books with each

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other. In regard to the period of the Kings in Jewish history and of the nation's captivity, we have three independent sources of information in the Bible itself, viz. the books of Kings and of Chronicles, and the prophetic books. And in the New Testament we have the four Gospels, giving independent records of the life of Christ, and the Acts, Epistles, and speeches of Paul in regard to the life of the Apostle to the Gentiles. These have been all thoroughly compared, and minutely scrutinized, to detect possible inconsistencies; but so far with inappreciable results in this direction, but with most gratifying results in the confirmation of even minute accuracy. Of course this concurrence of independent writers is a very strong proof of the truthfulness of the story in which they all agree. And when we consider the difficulties in the way of exact agreement between two persons telling the same story, even if both are eye-witnesses, a difficulty which increases always with the lapse of time, such agreement as we certainly find in the several accounts of the same thing in the Bible, seems at least inexplicable on natural grounds. Indeed, this is only another form of the general argument from the unusual accuracy of the Scriptures. The difficulty of explaining this mutual agreement of the records is really due to the difficulty of obtaining anything more than general accuracy in any history. We do not expect it. Human memory is not sufficiently reliable. In general it can be trusted; but the particulars it does not hold with sufficient exactness. And yet, we find this minute accuracy in all the many historical parts of the Bible, which would be strange in one, and is simply unaccountable in all.

We need to remember again, here, that infallibility is not claimed. It is very probable that this is the snare into which many who deny the inspiration of the historical parts of the Bible have fallen. Having been accustomed to associate inspiration and infallibility as inseparably connected, they are taken unawares as they find one case after another of supposed error, and too hastily give up the whole case. Whereas, it is almost certain that unusual accuracy uniformly characterizing so many books in a single collection, the in-

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spiration of which in other parts is acknowledged, involves inspiration as its adequate and natural cause, and proves it beyond the power of occasional errors to overthrow. Indeed, it creates the presumption against error, so that it can be admitted only after incontestable proof. This has been seen and used in defending inspiration by those with whom it meant infallibility. But it needs to be combined with this other view of inspiration in order to produce its full effect. For while the presumption is strong, starting from the unusual accuracy in itself, it is greatly increased, when the latter is seen to involve inspiration.

On the whole then, if this theory that the Scriptures are intended to teach only moral and religious truth, and that inspiration is, therefore, for the same purpose, be taken in its extreme form, so as to exclude all except these elements from the sphere of inspiration, and especially its science and history, we shall have to reject it. Not on deductive grounds, for in itself it is plausible. But on inductive grounds, since it is not borne out by the facts. There may be individual errors in these parts of the Bible, but neither of them as a whole, can be excluded from the range of inspiration. We may take the most unfavorable statement of the case, regarding as errors all unexplained difficulties, and, leaving out of view the presumption in favor of explaining many of these in time, and still we have a state of things which will not allow us to deny inspiration of these parts of the Bible. For, if we do, let us remember that we must be prepared to give up for the same reason the inspiration of its moral and religious truths. It seems to me a mistake to suppose that apparent weakness and vulnerability belong entirely to the historical parts of the book. There are difficulties just as great, we think, if not so numerous, in the system of truth which it presents — and not in the outskirts of doctrine either, but in its fundamental teachings. The difference has been that the danger of touching this part of the structure has been so fully realized, that these difficulties have been treated cautiously and conservatively; while the inspiration of these other parts which we have been consider-

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ing, have been felt to be a matter of comparative unimportance, and difficulties no way greater have been given hastily all the weight that could possibly be claimed for them, and have been allowed to invalidate the claims not only of the passages in which they occur, but of the entire class of passages to which these belong. And it is in the spirit with which the former class of difficulties has been treated by the wisest leaders of Christian thought, that the rule should be found for the treatment of the other difficulties under consideration. We all of us recognize the force of the internal argument for the inspiration and authority of the Bible, and its necessity. And in this argument the character of its teachings, their conformity to reason and to the moral sense, is the most important consideration. And yet we all feel that if the system of truth which it presents, fulfils this demand as a whole, this makes so strong a claim on our faith, that we may attribute the difficulties to deficiencies in us rather than in the Bible. Now we claim that if the difficulties in the Scripture history are only equally great, and the only difference is in the comparative importance of the history and the doctrine, the same principle should be observed.

But if, on the other hand, this theory be held not in the extreme form, but simply as a statement of the exclusively or predominantly moral and religious purpose of the Scriptures, and therefore of their inspiration, I should accept it as probably true. But I think that the above discussion has shown how careful we need to be in reasoning from this to the nature and extent of inspiration. It seems to me quite evident that we cannot decide with any certainty, *a priori*, what means will be necessary to accomplish these purposes. The only thing possible to us is to study the means that have been used, and then adjust these actual methods to the supposed purpose of the book. This question of the relation of the above facts in regard to the extent of inspiration to the assumed scope of inspiration is too large and difficult to be discussed in the limited space left to us. We can only glance at it. We have to do, not with the question what is the object of the history itself, but what is the object of its in-

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spiration, not in its moral and religious aspects, but in its historical character. In regard to some of these histories the question has already been answered. For we have seen that, when the Scriptures employ history as the vehicle of moral and religious truth, and especially when it is made the basis of doctrine, its substantial truth is necessary to the accomplishment of its object. And in the earlier records of Scripture this substantial truth could have been secured only through inspiration. On the other hand we have also seen that probably only this degree of truth was necessary for the immediate purpose assumed. How, then, are we to account for the greater exactness which certainly characterizes Scripture? Evidently only by admitting some one or more secondary objects subordinate to the main purpose, and contributing indirectly to its accomplishment. And one such secondary object will be readily suggested to one who has become familiar with the history of the discussion. The evidential value of this extraordinary accuracy of the biblical records is certainly great and indisputable. The moral and religious impression may not be produced, nor directly increased by this, but indirectly it may and does heighten it. I do not mean to say that this is demanded on first principles by the exigences of the theory; but inasmuch as we find this degree of minute accuracy, here is one great purpose subserved by it. If a witness has in view simply the establishment of the truth, the greater and more detailed the consistency of his account with itself and with other accounts, the more surely he accomplishes his object. And if he is trying to make a religious impression or teach a religious truth by means of his story, the same thing will indirectly further his object. And if we wish to convince men that we are speaking divine truth under divine direction, the principle applies with multiplied force. The history of religious controversy is almost a demonstration of this fact. We have only to see how largely the question of the evidences has turned on this very thing, to be convinced of its importance, human nature being what it is.

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ARTICLE VI.

"IS ETERNAL PUNISHMENT ENDLESS?"

BY REV. FRANK H. FOSTER, NORTH READING, MASS.

Two years ago there appeared, anonymously, a little book with the title, Is "Eternal" Punishment Endless? It was noticed variously by different publications, and then apparently sunk out of sight. Recent events have shown, however, that it had a wider influence than was supposed. One respectable edition of the book has been exhausted, and a second is now put forth.[1] The new edition has a new preface, at the close of which the author signs his name, and an appendix containing some critical remarks, and some congratulatory extracts from private letters to the author; but the text stands unaltered. It is unfortunate that some alterations could not have been made, for the book would do more credit to its author were it cleared of certain unnecessary convolutions in the argument. The argument is defective in method. It proceeds in a series of whirls, rather than in the straight line of a logical discussion. Such phrases as, "Of this more at another stage of our inquiry";[2] and, "We shall presently make a strong objection to the traditional preference,"[3] etc., are of too frequent occurrence. Such anticipation of the argument has an appearance which a candid writer should be

[1] Is "Eternal" Punishment Endless? Answered by a Re-statement of the Original Scriptural Doctrine, by an Orthodox Minister of the Gospel. Second edition. Boston: Lockwood, Brooks, and Co. 1878. The Preface is signed, James Morris Whiton, Williston Seminary, Easthampton.—A recent English work is noticed in the British and Foreign Evangelical Review: Future Punishment; Some current Theories concerning it Stated and Estimated; to which is added a View that is something more than a Theory. By Clement Clemance, B.A., Camberwell. London: John Swan and Co. 1877. The position of this book seems to be substantially that of Mr. Whiton. The present Article is devoted to a review of Mr. Whiton's book.

[2] p. 2.

[3] p. 17.

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careful to avoid, when it can be so easily avoided as here. The anticipated arguments, when they come, may sometimes be criticised, also, as not adding enough to what has already been said to justify repetition.

There are more serious errors of method than this. The argument does not begin at the right point. *αἰώνιος* is discussed by itself, and then its primitive *αἰών*, after which return is made to the derivative. The derivative should be discussed in the light of the primitive, and not *vice versa*. There is an improper change of base in the discussion. The author first discusses the meaning of *αἰώνιος* upon the supposition that it is quantitative, and then declares that it is qualitative. Certainly it is one or the other, and it is no more than proper to demand that the author should discover which, and then conduct his argument upon that supposition alone.

While, therefore, we follow our author's general order of discussion, and consider first the explicit and secondly the implicit teachings of Scripture, we shall pay little regard to the order of his subordinate arguments. Let us begin with *the explicit teachings of Scripture*.

In the investigation of this subject, as well as of all other subjects, the student should proceed from the simple to the more complex. What is plain may then be used to elucidate what is more obscure. Upon this principle we shall begin with the plainest of the texts, Matt. xxv. 46; with the plainest of the words used, *αἰώνιος*; and with the simplest element in the meaning of this word, the meaning of its primitive *αἰών*.

Upon the derivation of *αἰών* the lexicographers are now agreed.[1] It is derived from the root *AIF*, which appears in Greek in *ἀεί*, *always*, and in our own language, which is a member of the same family as the Greek, in *ever*. It is true that no case has been found in extant Greek where the

[1] Curtius, 585; Fick, vergl. Wörterb. s.v. ἁγυ; Benfrey, Wurzellex.; Ebeling, Lex. Hom.; Lid. and Sc. s.v. *ἀεί* (6th Eng. ed.), connect with *ἀεί*, *aevum*, *aeternus*, Germ. *ewig*, Eng. *ever*. It is significant that Cremer, who formerly followed Grimm in deriving it from *ἄω*, *ἄημι*, has now given this derivation in his *second* edition (bibl. theol. Wörterb. 2te aufl. s.v.)

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existence of the digamma in *αἰών* is indisputably evident; but analogy, and the Latin *aevum*, destroy the force of this objection.[1]

The word *ἀεί* in Greek has exactly the meaning of the word *always* in English. This meaning is definite and exact, and yet the word is very frequently used aside from that exact meaning. When strictly used it denotes endlessness, but when freely used it denotes perpetual duration under evident limitations. It might be expected that confusion and uncertainty would follow if the meaning of the word might vary as it really does from strict eternity to the duration of a few hours; but there is no confusion or uncertainty. The canon to determine the meaning of the word is simple, and capable of instant application by the youngest child. The word is to be interpreted according to its strict meaning unless there is evidence to the contrary. We say, The truth will always stand; there is no evidence that the word *always* is to be restricted, and accordingly we give it its full force. But when we say, This house has always stood here; there is evidence that the word *always* is to be limited. If we knew nothing about the nature of houses, and if there were nothing in any other circumstance of the case to give positive evidence of the restricted application of the word *always*, we should be obliged on the authority of this sentence to number houses among the imperishable things. It is not enough, therefore, to say, as our author does,[2] that the connection of this word settles its meaning, for this is but half the truth. The word has a meaning of its own, and this is a large element in the decision of any particular case. The connection shows whether this meaning is to be restricted, or not, and how much restricted, but does not supply, as it cannot destroy, the word's original and positive meaning.

The connection of *αἰών* with *ἀεί* proves at least that it is a time-word. From usage is derived the conclusive argument as to its meaning. It properly means strict eternity, and is thus used in classic as well as New Testament Greek. But

[1] Ibid., Curtius, 585.

[2] pp. 3, 4, 5.

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it is subject to the same kind of variations as its primitive *ἀεί*, and is to be interpreted upon the same principle. In classic Greek it is often much restricted in meaning. It is used of man, the utmost of whose earthly course is his life, and accordingly becomes *lifetime*. The range of its meanings short of strict eternity is very wide. In the New Testament it is often found in these lower meanings, but it also rises into its full and proper significance, especially in the phrase *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*, which means just what the English phrase *forever* means. Like *forever*, *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα* is sometimes used of strict eternity, as in such passages as Rom. ix. 5, "God blessed forever." But it is very often used in a popular sense; our author refers to the following examples: John viii. 35, "The son abideth for ever"; or 1 Cor. viii. 13, "I will eat no flesh forever." Admit that these and other cases of the restricted application of the phrase may be found, yet no case has been found in which this meaning of *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*, if allowed the same latitude of application with our English phrase, does not perfectly satisfy the requirements of text and context.

From the meaning of *αἰών* found in this example comes the word *αἰώνιος*. It therefore means *eternal*. That this is its meaning in *many* cases all must confess.[1] Careful examination will exhibit more than this. It will be found that the requirements of *every* case will be satisfied by this meaning, but that any other meaning will fall short of the requirements of some passages. With this meaning, and with the method of interpretation above explained, the sacred writers are found to speak with the greatest plainness; every other method leaves their meaning often in obscurity. It is but a fair presumption that they intended to speak plainly, and if we are to believe that they did not have this intention, a great deal of evidence will be required to warrant such a

[1] p. 4. "The Epithet *aeonian* may denote the eternity of God." The elaborate concordance found at the close of another Article in this number (vid. pp. 305, 306), will enable any one easily to satisfy himself as to the truth of these representations. The usage of the LXX, which is very important in this discussion, is also illustrated in that Article (pp. 305, 306).

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belief. Until such evidence is furnished, it is our place, in accordance with all sound principles of interpretation, to follow the presumption in the case, and while we accept the Bible as our authoritative guide in matters of religion, to believe the doctrines thus educed from it. Accordingly upon the authority of Matt. xxv. 46, unrebutted as it is by any other passage of Scripture, we must accept the doctrine of the eternity of future punishment as those words are commonly and properly understood.

The method of our author is the reverse of all this. He examines the word *αἰώνιος*, and declares that it sometimes refers to limited time. He then affirms that, in the text before us, it cannot be *known* that it is used in the strict sense. He discovers that *αἰώνιος* is qualitative in meaning, and then declares that we *cannot say* that the qualitative force in this passage does not exclude the quantitative. Here is the fundamental error of the book. The author is guilty of the grave logical fallacy called mistaking the *onus probandi*. If *αἰώνιος* is not used in this passage in its most extensive meaning, it is for him to prove it. We should believe that it was so used if the text stood alone. Much more, with the present positive arguments derived from the context, have we reason to believe it. Vastly greater is the reason for believing it when the accumulated evidence, of countless passages of Scripture[1] is presented to us, and when they give us but one impression, and this that punishment is eternal. Here is a presumption created in reference to the word *αἰώνιος* which calls for the most careful attention. We have begun with the explicit teaching of Scripture, but in actual study we do not, and cannot, and have no right to ignore the anterior presumption created by the Bible as a whole. The presumption of the case is the

[1] They are really "countless," for in every exhortation to the impenitent, and every reference to their condition, the endlessness of their punishment seems to appear, as the background of a picture is seen in every part of it. See especially such passages as: Dan. xii. 2; Matt. v. 25 and 26; xviii. 23–35; xxvi. 24; Luke xvi. 26; John v. 29; viii. 21; Heb. x. 26; Jude 6; Rev. xiv. 11; xix. 3; xx. 10; xxii. 11.

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key-note of the argument. This presumption our author must rebut, and these positive arguments answer. Instead of this, he throws the burden of proof upon us. He presents reasons why it is *possible* that, in this text and other texts, strict eternity is not meant, and then calls upon us to prove that it is meant. His argument is negative, when it should be positive.[1] This is a grave logical fallacy, and a logical fallacy is never committed without destroying the trustworthiness of the result. Exegetics cannot escape the demands of logic. Logic is not a science for the benefit of advocates in court, but one upon which all sound reasoning must proceed. The reasoning of this book does not proceed upon logical principles, and it is not sound.

It is from the logical stand-point that we make our objection against the author's change of base in the discussion of the word *αἰώνιος*. Such reasoning would be perfectly proper for the advocates of the eternity of punishment, for the presumption is upon their side, and they have only to answer objections to prevail. They have simply to criticise the arguments presented by their opponents, and rebut them if they can. They are like the defendants in court, and the prosecution must prove its case. In a trial for murder the defendant may demand proof, 1. that he killed the man; 2. that he killed him in *malice prepense*, and not in self-defence. The prosecutor's duty is different; he has to present the truth as it is. Our author is the prosecutor; but

[1] This is true of the argument as a whole. A semblance of a positive argument is presented upon pp. 47–49. The adjective *aiónios* is declared to be qualitative and therefore "aeonian punishment" is punishment of a certain *kind*. But evidently this does not exclude the quantitative force of the adjective, and Mr. Whiton does not pretend that it does. Now, here we say, the presumption is, that this adjective in this passage is used of time, and of time without end. What is your proof that it does not? To this question no answer is given. Another apparently positive argument is found in the attempt to limit the meaning of *aión*, and then to diminish the meaning of *aiónios*. The final result of this attempt is given on p. 17, and it is that all which the definition "aeonian" gives with any certainty is this, "that the punishment belongs to or occurs in the aeon or the aeons to come." Granting so much, the presumption in this passage that the punishment will never cease remains, and the burden of proof rests upon Mr. Whiton, a burden which he does not take up.

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he argues like the defendant. He says, 1. that *αἰώνιος* is limited in duration; 2. that it does not refer to duration. His arguments destroy each other; for such a style of reasoning is out of place.

Let us now examine this argument more in detail. The method pursued by our author is essentially one of minimizing. It is first shown that *αἰώνιος* is applied to temporary and finite objects, like a land-mark or the hills. It is said to have a more or less extensive meaning, according to the word joined with it. This is an unfair statement; because it leaves out of account the intrinsic meaning of the word. Our author then comes to what should logically be the first step in his process, and attacks the phrase *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*. This he translates, "for the aeon." In such a passage as Mark iii. 29, which is, translated literally, "hath not forgiveness forever," the bearing of our author's change upon the subject of future punishment is very evident. "Hath not forgiveness for the aeon" certainly leaves the impression that the sinner may, at least, obtain forgiveness in some succeeding aeon. This translation has, apparently, the advantage of superior accuracy; but we maintain that it is inaccurate. It rests upon the idea, advanced by Dr. Tayler Lewis,[1] that the Hebrews conceived of time under the form of a succession of finite aeons. The argument in support of this idea may be summarized thus: 'The plural of עוֹלָם shows that the proper meaning of this word is not eternity, but a cycle. It is a great indefinite period, seemingly independent of outward phenomenal measurement. These indefinite cycles, occurring one after another, make up the grand progress of eternity. This conception will harmonize with many passages of the Old Testament, and with certain indications in other ancient writings. In the New Testament *αἰών* has the same meaning. It denotes a vast cycle, in the future or the past, and eternity is represented as made up of a succession of these cycles. This

[1] Excursus on Olamic Words, Lange on Eccl. i. 4. Dr. Lewis is not to be held responsible for the theory which Mr. Whiton builds upon his remarks.

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succession is denoted by the plural *αἰῶνες*. By the same mode of speech the present course of things is spoken of as *this aeon*, and past duration is represented as a course or courses of things, succeeding one another under the form of *the aeon*, or *the aeons*, or simply *aeons*.'

This view lacks evidence in its favor. The *onus probandi* is not fairly taken up. It is true that the meaning *cycle* can be derived from the original meaning of the word עוֹלָם, which is, "hidden time, i.e. obscure and long, of which the beginning or end is uncertain or indefinite";[1] but it is less readily derived than the meaning commonly accepted. It is true that the plural form, and especially the use to which this plural is put, favors the view advocated; but these peculiarities are easily explained upon the common theory. It is true that repetitions occur, like מֵעוֹלָם עַד־עוֹלָם (Ps. xc. 2), and, when translated "from world to world," seem to favor the new explanation; but so, if these principles of interpretation are correct, do repetitions familiar in English, such as *forever and ever*, favor the theory that the English-speaking nations conceive of time under the form of a succession of aeons. The truth is, the language is laboring to express a transcendent idea, and we hear, as it were, the straining of the ship's cordage and the creaking of her timbers under the effort; but this is not her ordinary condition. Let any one examine the passages in the Old Testament containing the word עוֹלָם, and he will find that the meaning *eternity* cannot be reasonably doubted. It gives the most perfect rendering possible for the passage (Eccl. i. 4) upon which Dr. Lewis has chosen to found his theory, if the Hebrew be permitted to use language as the English and all other nations use it, and restrict the meaning of the phrase *forever* by the subject in hand. The contrast is between the transitory condition of man and the permanence of his abode: "*Men* pass away, but the *earth* abideth forever." Even in the solitary instance in which our English Bible has

[1] Robinson's Gesenius, s. v. First (Davidson) s. v.: "Properly the veiled, concealed, dark, distant; of unlimited time whether past or future."

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ventured to render עוֹלָם by *world* (Eccl. iii. 11), the meaning eternity is perfectly satisfactory, and no other meaning is.[1]

But the great objection to Dr. Lewis's theory is, that it exalts to the rank of a consistent and metaphysical theory what was at most a poetical and imaginative conception. Such a conception there was, and it is found in the New Testament. Now it appears in a two-fold division of time between this world and the world to come.[2] Now it appears in reference to the past as ages.[3] Quite common are

[1] "Hath set עוֹלָם in their heart, so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end." Dr. Lewis in his comment upon this passage rejects the meaning of *worldliness* in his interpretation of עוֹלָם. He acknowledges that *eternity* would give a good meaning; but he applies here his new theory, and in order to do so is obliged to change the meaning of עוֹלָם from merely *world* to *world-problem*. Man ponders upon this world, this grand cycle in which events are taking place, and finds that the true explanation of events is not to be gathered in so short a space as his earthly life. "His angle of vision, even with the mightiest aid it has ever had, or may expect to have, is too small to take in more than a few degrees, or a few seconds of a degree in the mighty arc we are traversing." But why not say *eternity-problem*? As far as the point under consideration is concerned, Dr. Lewis's *world-problem* does not differ from *eternity-problem*. If *world* is a great epoch of immeasurable extent so is *eternity*. A man in view of *eternity* may see that this life gives him too short a space to find the explanation of God's dealings, as well as in view of the *world*. What is gained in the idea implied in the word "arc"? If Dr. Lewis has made any contribution to the interpretation of this passage, does it consist in the element indicated in his words, "as things go round?" Let the reader ask himself this question as he runs through the comment, and he will see the unsubstantial character of this theory. But interpret עוֹלָם *eternity*, and Dr. Lewis's principle of explanation makes the passage perfectly plain.

[2] Matt. xii. 32. Our author makes this passage tributary to his views by translating it: It shall not be forgiven him either in this aeon or in the one to be. This may imply that in some succeeding aeon it will be forgiven. But this rendering, and the validity of this implication, depend upon the theory above presented, and not the theory upon this passage. Without the theory the passage is perfectly plain. The two-fold division of time is as evident as need be, and the parallel passage, Mark iii. 29, makes it, if possible, plainer. But postulate the theory, and this passage and others may be interpreted in accordance with it.

[3] p. 5. "In such connections certainly if the word denotes duration at all, it is duration end*ed* rather than end*less*." Ended *and* endless, we should say; ended at *this* end, to be sure, but endless as proceeding from an origin infinitely, or when restricted by the context, indefinitely distant. In the foot-note, p. 5, Tit. i. 2 ("In hope of eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, promised before the world began") is said to refer to certain *definite* periods of the past. This

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the intensive forms, like *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων*. But this is poetry, and poetry it is when found in other languages. The biblical writers had no idea of setting up a theory of time; they are not speaking mathematically, nor does any one in our day under similar circumstances. If there were any evidence that this was a philosophical theory soberly held, if the passages quoted to sustain it were philosophical in character, and not rhetorical, if they were not abundantly explained upon the common theory, the new theory would have more in its favor. But it is supported by no valid arguments. It has its origin in the mysticism of those who propound it. The method of criticism upon which it depends would make ridiculous nonsense of every highly impassioned passage in oratory. A speaker wishes to impress upon the United States Senate the ruinous effects of a false financial policy, and closes his speech with the words: "Senators of this Republic, it is the voice of History, sounding through the ages, that if we pass this bill its evil effects will endure forever, and *ever*, and EVER." The critic says: "Forever and ever and ever," — that is a curious expression. What can it mean? "Ever," — that can't mean strict eternity; for then he wouldn't use a second *ever*. The first would cover the whole ground. "Ages," — O yes! evidently there is a succession in his mind, — yes, a succession of ages. He means by the first *ever* one period or cycle; by the second *ever*, another; by the third, another. Of course he means more than he says; for we are not to tie him down to strict accuracy. He means that one age may roll away, and then another, and then another, and perhaps one or two more, before the evil will cease. Evidently his idea is cyclical.

The really accurate translation of *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα* is, therefore, *forever*. The effort to break down this meaning rests upon

is, at least, not beyond dispute. Alford says that it refers to eternity. God had purposes which he formed in eternity, and hence this form of expression. This eternal purpose was the origin of the promise made in time. So Rom. xvi. 25 ("The revelation of the mystery which was kept secret since the world began.") The idea is, "never before known."

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an untenable theory. Derivation and usage both favor this meaning. It satisfies all the requirements of the case. When the Bible declares of those guilty of a certain sin that they shall not have forgiveness forever,[1] it means what it says, and not only takes away the warrant of all hope, by neglecting to promise forgiveness at some future time, but shuts out all hope, by definitely proclaiming that there shall never be forgiveness.[2]

The attack upon the word *αἰών* was designed to show "that there is no single word that regularly carries the meaning of our word eternity."[3] If this could be shown, obviously the meaning of *αἰώνιος* would be greatly weakened. But there is a separate attack upon *αἰώνιος*, and to that we now turn. The minimizing method of the book is somewhat differently applied to this word. As we have seen, the meaning of strict eternity is conceded to it in certain cases; but because it is sometimes used of such objects as the hills, which are not strictly eternal, it is argued that when it is used of punishment we cannot say but that it means *very long*, instead of strictly *eternal*. If the word is used of strict eternity, the context or the nature of the subject must clearly show this to be the case.

This method of reasoning, as we have already remarked, involves the logical fallacy of mistaking the *onus probandi*. But there is another fallacy involved in it. It makes a demand for more evidence as to the meaning of a word than the nature of the case allows. Against such reasoning no word could retain its proper signification. To discover the least extensive meaning of a word, and then say that it can never be positively affirmed to mean more than this least extensive meaning, is absurd. Our author remarks that the word "everlasting itself has this variable meaning, according

[1] Mark iii. 29.

[2] Mr. Whiton brings forward certain passages to prove a limited use of the phrase *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα* independently of this argument. The method is the same pursued with the word *αἰώνιος*, and does not need special attention. The passages are: John xiv. 16; 1 Cor. viii. 13; Heb. v. 6; 1 Pet. i. 25; vid. p. 13 sq.

[3] p. 13.

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to the connection in which it stands..... No one is misled by the varied use of the word, because the connection in each case defines it."[1] Does he not see that to quote an English word is to supply materials for his own refutation? The word "everlasting" sometimes has a meaning of very limited extension; and yet it may be positively affirmed, at times, that it is infinite in extension, because, through and in all its uses, it has a meaning of its own. It is not like some animals, to take its color from its surroundings; it has individuality. We restrict it when circumstances call for its restriction; but otherwise we do not. Applied to God, it takes its full meaning; because there is no evidence that it should not. Applied to future punishment, it takes its full meaning; because there is no evidence that it should not. In the face of the phenomena of language occurring in the every-day speech of millions, to demand that whenever the various words for eternity are used in their fullest signification there should be some positive evidence that it is so, is to make a demand beyond all reason. It is a demand leading to strange results. Should ever a dispute arise as to the proper eternity of God, the method of argument which our author employs might be successfully used to prove that the Bible does not teach the doctrine! On such principles the Bible is really no longer the standard of appeal. It becomes a book unable to furnish evidence enough to answer our doubts.

I have said that no word is secure against this kind of assault. The very word which our author puts upon the title-page of his book is as variable in meaning as *αἰώνιος*. Endless trouble may be very transient trouble. Our author quotes certain words which he says are the "appropriate Greek words to express the idea of endlessness with precision." It is a significant fact, in his estimation, that the writers of the New Testament never used these words, but employed one so "elastic and ambiguous" as *αἰώνιος*.[2] But any word would become elastic and ambiguous if subjected

[1] p. 4. [2] p. 8.

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to our author's processes. Our author specifies *ἀκατάλυτος*, *ἀτελεύτητος*, and *ἀπέραντος*. But *ἀκατάλυτος* is applied, by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, to the power of a human institution.[1] *Ἀτελεύτητος* will hardly be able to maintain its character as a precise word with our author, when he looks at Luke i. 33, where of the mediatorial kingdom of Christ, which he himself says will end,[2] it is said: *οὐκ ἔσται τέλος*.[3] *Ἀπέραντος* has little enough claim to precision, in face of the example which our author himself quotes (1 Tim. i. 4), "endless genealogies," which, of course, were not strictly endless; but still less claim has it when we hear Strepsiadès, in The Clouds,[4] impatient for the morning, exclaim: *τὸ χρῆμα τῶν νυκτῶν ὅσον ἀπέραντον*. The "appropriate word to express with precision the idea of endlessness" here denotes so endless a thing as one night.[5] If precision is in question, the precise meaning of these words is often nothing more nor less than uninterrupted, continuous — as we say: the ever flowing river; meaning: the uninterruptedly flowing river.[6] It is an old remark, — but elaborate research only makes it more evident, — that of all the words used to express the idea of eternity, *αἰώνιος* is the most precise.

[1] Dion, H. A. R. 10 c. 31, *τὸ τῆς δημαρχίας ἀκατάλυτον ἴσεσθαι κράτος*. Cf. Niceph. Blemm., p. 617 Mai, *βασιλείαν μούνιμόν τε καὶ ἀκατάλυτον*. Phot. Epist., 128, p. 170 *ἀποθήκας ἀκαταλύτους*.

[2] p. 14.

[3] Mr. Whiton asks (p. 8) why in the church creed of the sixth century "endless" was added to define "eternal." We reply that a new term may be used merely for clearness in a disputed case without implying that the old term was incorrectly used in the same sense. When a Baptist says that baptism should be by immersion, he does not mean to admit that the word baptism does not in itself mean immersion.

[4] line 3.

[5] Vid. Pind. N. 8, 38, *πεδίον ἀπέραντον*. Eur. Med. 212, *ἀφ' ἁλμυρὰν πόντου κλῄδ' ἀπέρ.*

[6] Cleoricius, *αἵματος ἀποβροὴ ἀπέραντα φερομένου*. The phrase *εἰς τὸ διηνεκές* illustrates the use of such expressions. It is used of the strictly eternal perfection of the saints, Heb. x. 14; of the sacrifice of Christ which will never be repeated, Heb. x. 12; of the uninterrupted course of the Jewish sacrifices, Heb. x. 1; and of the priesthood of Melchisedec (which will end when Christ's does), Heb. vii. 3. On p. 27 Mr. Whiton asks why the word *ἀΐδιος* is never used instead of *αἰάνιος*? But if *αἰάνιος* is unintelligible, *ἀΐδιος* would have been also.

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We come now to the change of this argument from one base to another. It is now said that *αἰώνιος*, when applied to future punishment, in Matt. xxv. 46, is not quantitative, but qualitative. The argument for this statement may be briefly summed up in what can be said upon a single text: "This is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent" (John xvii. 3). From this text the principle is deduced that *eternal life* denotes *primarily*[1] not life of a certain *length*, but life of a certain *kind;* that the idea of perpetuity inheres in it *not primarily*, but "only so far as the qualities themselves which characterize that life are vital, progressive, and enduring."

To this argument the reply is simply this: *αἰώνιος*, in such expressions, has a qualitative meaning, but this qualitative meaning is not *primary*, as our author says, but secondary and metaphorical. The primary meaning is quantitative, and even in the text quoted is not excluded by the more prominent qualitative force of the word. Eternal life means primarily, life without end. This is what is strictly denoted by the words; but they connote much more. The English word *eternity* itself, which indisputably denotes endless time, connotes much more. The high employments, the sacred joys, the peace, and the holiness of heaven are all suggested by the word. *Eternal life*, in the same way, becomes a rich phrase, laden with meaning to every Christian heart. It becomes almost a compound noun, in which the word *eternal* falls into the background. It signifies, most certainly, a peculiar kind of life; for it expresses that communion with God which is referred to in the context. But under all this is felt, like the deep bass of an organ, the primary meaning, in that these joys are promised by the very word *αἰώνιος* to be never ending.

That this is the primary meaning of the phrase a short examination will show. Lay aside all prepossessions, and run through the examples as given in the concordance, simply

[1] pp. 47–49.

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asking the question in each case whether *αἰώνιος* is quantitative or qualitative. Not a single example will be found where the quantitative meaning is inadmissible as the primary meaning. Some examples will be found where the qualitative meaning will satisfy the requirements of the context. Some will be found where both meanings are applicable. And some will be found where the quantitative meaning is absolutely demanded; e.g. John vi. 54, "Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day." It is the most natural explanation of this phrase to say that Christ speaks of a life which shall continue forever. But when we compare vs. 58, we see that this is in fact the idea had in mind: "This is that bread which came down from heaven; not as your fathers did eat manna and are dead; he that eateth of this bread shall live forever." John x. 28 is equally conclusive: "I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand." The same idea is twice repeated for the sake of giving strength to the statement. If any one should say that "eternal life" cannot mean endless life because Christ goes on to add that they shall never perish, which would be an unnecessary addition if such was the meaning, the reply is, that as the second and third members refer to the same thing, so do the first and second. The repetitions are not made for the sake of making distinctions, but for the purpose of adding strength. John vi. 47, "He that believeth on me hath everlasting life," may be compared with vs. 51: "If any man eat of this bread he shall live forever."[1] The primary meaning of a word is

[1] Other passages are John iii. 16 and 36; v. 24; Rom. ii. 7; "Whosoever believeth shall have everlasting life." Of course this means much *more* than mere duration; but that does not prove that it does *not* mean duration. — "To them who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, eternal life." In this passage certainly "immortality" implies more than it expresses; but its implications do not destroy its expressions. So it is with "eternal life." It is a common use of language to give great depth of meaning to expressions denoting duration. Thus we say: Old age is a blessing. We do not mean that mere duration is *a blessing*, for it may be passed in misery. Our principal thought is engaged upon the comforts and rewards that attend it. Still the idea of duration lies at the basis of the whole.

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sometimes completely lost in its tropical uses; but surely when, as in this case, a meaning is never absent in the various uses of a word, the argument that it is the primary meaning is as strong as need be; and when it can be shown to be the meaning given by the word's derivation, the argument becomes too strong to be overthrown.

All these attacks are directed against the common interpretation of Matt. xxv. 46, for this text is most justly regarded as deciding the contest one way or the other. If it is to be left as it has previously been understood the ancient doctrine stands. The attempt is therefore made to weaken its force, and make it seem to give an uncertain sound. This attempt must be pronounced a failure. The word *αἰώνιος* is not originally qualitative, but quantitative; and here the whole context makes the quantitative force the more prominent. In its proper quantitative force it signifies eternal, and can only be restricted by the limitations of the circumstances of the case. In this passage no limitations can be made. We cannot limit it by the nature of punishment, for until we have read this passage we know nothing about the actual length of punishment. We cannot limit it by the context, for the whole force of this is overwhelmingly against limiting it. But standing unlimited it teaches eternal future punishment.[1]

Turning now from the *explicit* let us come to the *implicit* teachings of Scripture, or, in other words, to the impression which the Bible makes upon the candid reader.[2]

[1] Mr. Whiton's remarks upon some of the other explicit texts are unworthy of him. "Unquenchable fire" (*ἀσβεστος* p. 19) is clearly explained by the parallel expression: "Where the worm dieth not." John iii. 36 must mean that the sinner will be punished for ever. If he "*shall not* see life," when *will* he see it? *Never!* Mr. Whiton calls this an "assumption" (p. 21), and "wresting the Scriptures" (p. 22). If this is wresting, what is interpreting? Our author's method of interpretation seems to be "to shake the head, and pass on." The expression, "He that believeth not the Son," must be understood according to the general tenor of Scripture. It means believeth while the offer of the gospel is held out. That offer will at length be withdrawn, and then the sinner will be irrecoverably lost.

[2] We should note in this connection the impression which Christ's words must

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The importance of this argument has often been overlooked. It is evident that the Bible is made for the people. It is written in the popular language, and is adapted to the popular mind. Men in general are not to be reached or impressed by single texts here and there, but they are very quick to take the general impression of a book, and to gather its teachings as a whole. Their "Greek instinct" is not highly developed, but they will gather the plain truth of the Bible in spite of the slight mistranslations which disfigure the pages of our excellent English version, and which are so misleading to scholars. How often does the scholar present in a sermon an idea to him wholly new, elaborately developed, and derived from authorities in Latin and Greek and Hebrew and Arabic and Coptic, to find, to his confusion, that some plain Christian in his congregation had become familiar with that very idea from his English Bible years before. It is the glory of the Christian religion, and a truth upon which scholars should ponder before they venture upon novel interpretations, that the spiritual insight of faith affords the truest source of sound exegesis. It is the gift of the Holy Spirit which makes a man a competent expounder of the Bible. This gift has been promised to lead us into the knowledge of divine things. It is promised to the lowliest as well as to the most learned; and often the humblest obtains it when the proud loses it. The Bible has been constructed so as to favor a spiritual interpretation. In all languages its great truths are equally plain, but in no language are they to be discerned except spiritually. Give me the judgment of the great majority of plain, honest, candid, patient, and laborious readers of the Bible, and I will bow before it with more reverence than before the most learned prelections of an unsubmissive mind. Let me know the im-

have made upon the Jews with their ideas as to future punishment. They believed the punishment to be eternal. Christ did not oppose their belief, as he opposed their belief on many subjects. They must have understood him as sanctioning their belief. He used their words for expressing it. — Compare Josephus, Bel. Jud. ii. 8, 14; Antiq. xviii. 1, 3.

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pression made by the Bible upon the great mass of Christians, and I will test the productions of scholarship by it.

Upon the doctrine of future punishment the impression made by the Bible is perfectly plain. It stands, and always has stood, in favor of the doctrine of the eternal conscious suffering of the lost.[1] Over the vision of the judgment-day there is a dread aspect of finality. This is admitted even by our author, who cites a number of passages in illustration of it. The verdict of the common sense upon these passages has always been, and always will be, the same: The sinner's case is hopeless.[2]

But here our author asks a strange question. "A finality, no doubt," he says, "but how much of one?"[3] *How much* of a finality? Can finality be divided? If a thing is done, it is done. True, a thing may be done in one aspect and not in another. The question may be asked, A finality, but in what respect? But this is not the case in hand. Our author has asked his question correctly. The finality suggested by the Bible is a finality in respect to time, and in the same respect our author asks, "How much of one?" This is playing fast and loose with language. Upon such principles of criticism the Bible can never mean anything. Either there is an aspect of finality or there is not. Both the negative and the affirmative cannot be true. If the aspect of finality does exist, are we to rest entirely upon it, or is there evidence to contradict our first impressions? If those impressions are permitted to remain, finality is finality, and hope is shut out.

This attempt to parry what is acknowledged to be the impression of the Bible must be pronounced a failure. Yet this attempt must succeed, or our author's book must fail as a whole. The impression of the Bible that the sinner's case is hopeless is admitted, and, indeed, seems to form in part the groundwork of the book. Very solemn passages

[1] It is interesting to note how many texts Mr. Whiton is obliged to explain away in order to bring the Scriptures into harmony with his view. Vid. note p. 357, for the texts which he takes up.

[2] p. 21. [3] p. 35.

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occur, enforcing the fact that the Bible excludes every ray of hope.[1] But this is in total contradiction of the conclusion to which the whole argument is directed, that the punishment of the sinner is not declared to be endless. If it is not declared to be endless, then we may hope that it is not endless. The sinner's case is not hopeless, for he may be full of hope. In fact it is evident that the writer of this book hopes that the sinner will be relieved of punishment, either by restoration or by annihilation, and that this hope of his is a very strong one. The common doctrine is "fraught with horror" to him,[2] and rests upon him as a "tremendous burden."[3] To dispel this horror, to relieve this burden, that is, to open the door of hope, was this book written. Yet he dwells upon the fact that the impression of the Bible is that the sinner's condition is hopeless. Contradiction is thus found in the very marrow of the argument. The author does know exactly how he is drifting, or exactly what it is incumbent upon him to prove. To the two fundamental fallacies already pointed out, this adds a third, a kind of *ignoratio elenchi.*

The reasonableness of the inquiry, how much of a finality, is supported by reference to the case of Adam.[4] God threatened him with death if he should eat of the forbidden tree. He knew of death only as he saw it in the brutes about him, and it must have seemed a finality in their case. Yet it would have been an error for him to have argued to a speculative doctrine of extinction based upon that threat.

This argument is inconclusive, because it is not plain that the case is in point. The author forgets upon whom rests the *onus probandi.* We do not know that the threat seemed to Adam to portend such a death as the animal died, or that it did not seem to portend eternal death. The writer of Genesis has not given us, it may be, the exact language used by God, or all that God said. He knew that his readers, having possession of the facts of the case, would know that God did not mean immediate physical death, because it was

[1] pp. 21, 50, 60, 81, 87, 98. [2] p. 61. [3] p. 22. [4] p. 36.

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not inflicted; and for the same reason that they would understand that more than an ultimate physical death was threatened, although they could not understand fully what. With the far clearer light of the New Testament we are as really ignorant as Adam of the full significance of what the Bible calls death, though we know enough to say that the sentence will be such as we shall approve, and that it will be terrible in the extreme. So it probably seemed to Adam. There is no evidence that he was surprised at the punishment inflicted, whether filled with joy at a milder sentence than he expected, or cast down by a more terrible one. He was surprised and confounded by God's immediate discovery of his sin, as guilty consciences are surprised to-day; but there is no evidence that he had formed any idea of God's meaning which the result did not justify.

A deeper argument is presented in a half sentence upon the same page as the above. Even if there were any absolute finality in the sentence of future punishment as pronounced in the Bible, God would not be bound to execute it. God does not "by the terms of his threat preclude himself from acting as emergency" may arise.[1] Some have put the argument thus: God is not bound by a threat as he is by a promise. A promise gives a right to the recipient of it from which he who makes it cannot free himself merely by his own act. But a threat gives no such right. If any right is conferred it is the right of punishing conferred upon the threatener. This he may freely resign without referring to any other being, because no other being has a share in the conferred right. Accordingly the threat of future punishment might be perfectly clear, and yet God, if he chose, might disregard the threat and annul the penalty.

Upon the speculative question underlying this argument we have little to say. It is true that in human affairs veracity is not pledged by a threat. Yet this seems to us to be one of the results of the imperfection of man. Pardon is provided for in our systems of government, but it is to remedy

[1] p. 36.

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evils that arise from their imperfection. It seems equally clear that God's veracity is pledged by his threats, except in cases where a change in the circumstances introduces such modifications that it is evident the threat was never intended to apply there. Thus the threat of eternal punishment need not be executed upon all sinners because of the atonement, and because of the trust of some therein. The threat was evidently never intended to apply in such a case. Eternal punishment was threatened to sinners, *things remaining as they were*. But this is not the place for the discussion of such questions. We are discussing the argument from the Bible. It is enough, in order to answer the argument now presented, to point out the fact that the Bible does not leave the question merely in the realm of law. The threatening of the law is as plain as need be, but the Bible rises into the higher realm of *prophecy*. It does not merely declare the law, open the condition of pardon, and utter the threat for the future, but assumes the task of telling us what will actually take place. This is the impression which the Bible has always made upon Christians. The eschatological revelations are not merely minatory, but prophetic. It is prophesied that not all men will repent in this life. That prophecy is certainly fulfilled. It is prophesied that there will be a day of general judgment, and that the wicked and the righteous will be gathered before Christ the judge. This we believe will take place. The prophecy is then added that as an actual fact there will be a division, and some will go away into everlasting punishment and some into everlasting life. These words have been shown to mean what they say. Other expressions are added in great numbers to deepen the impression here made. Explicitly and implicitly God has indicated *what he will do*, and no distinctions about the difference between threat and promise, however applicable elsewhere, can release him from executing his declared intentions, or excuse us from expecting him so to do. Prophecy must be fulfilled.

Our author goes on from this point to examine particular

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passages relating to this branch of the subject. Here he insists upon strict construction.[1] So do we. He makes objections to the use made of Christ's remark about Judas (Matt. xxvi. 24): "It had been good for that man if he had not been born." Some of these objections we are prepared to re-echo. To distil rhetoric in the retort of logic is a gross exegetical error on either side of this discussion. But to deprive the rhetoric of all its force is to commit an equal error. The rhetoric was meant to leave some impression, and it is fair to ask what impression? When Christ wept over Jerusalem the fate of that city was settled. The same aspect of finality belongs to his lament over Judas. The air of hopelessness with which Judas is spoken of in this passage is like that in the Acts, where it is said that he has gone to his own place. Hopelessness leaves no hope. If there is no hope there will be no change.

We would strain no passage. We would make no unwarrantable inferences from passages which are not intended to speak exactly to the point in question. But it is an equal error to refuse to make any inferences. We should make every proper allowance; but it is neither common sense nor good exegesis to say that language is to mean nothing more than the most restricted interpretation forces upon us. Such a process would make the most eloquent passages of literature dumb. It would convert the tropical exuberance of Bengal into the tropical aridity of Sahara. If Rev. xxii. 11[2] calls to "an immediate and present decision of a future state,"[3] what is the natural inference as to the alterability of that future state? True, it cannot be affirmed with the positiveness that belongs to a mathematical demonstration that such a decision will be forever unchanged, and if a man insist — as our author would — upon demonstrative evidence for everything, he may call such an inference a "jump"[4]; but if, under similar conditions, a man were offered a bargain in our public marts, and refused it, he would expect to find that it had gone completely out of his control, and would

[1] p. 40. [2] "He that is unjust let him be unjust still," etc. [3] p. 44. [4] p. 44.

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dismiss it from his mind. Such would be the impression made upon him, and upon that impression he would act. We are to follow the same principles in securing for ourselves heavenly good which we follow in securing earthly good. The method of reasoning in both is the same. Religion is not removed from the operation of the laws of common life. These laws are the laws of inductive logic, and upon them is founded our argument for the Bible. If they are not substantial enough to furnish us with a system for the interpretation of the Bible when given, they are not substantial enough to give us the Bible to interpret.

It is at this point that we see the logical results of the method which this book employs. We have already seen that it destroys any doctrine of the Bible — such as even the eternity of God — which the reader has not previous reasons for believing. It is now evident that it destroys the Bible itself. Nothing will satisfy our author but the most explicit statements; and when he finds what purport to be explicit statements he subjects them to an examination before which no statements in the power of human language to frame would be able to maintain their place. He never asks, What is it, on the whole, probable that they mean? or, What is logically involved in what they evidently mean? but always, What is the least possible meaning to which they can be reduced? This least meaning is all that he will admit in proof of a doctrine.[1] This is to demand demonstration, and not proof. The discussion is not formally transferred to the domain of deductive logic; but a degree of evidence is

[1] On such a principle of interpretation there is no promise of the Holy Spirit to Christians to-day. Such passages as John xvi. 7–11 do not make the promise. These passages refer to the twelve disciples gathered before Christ. "I will send him unto *you*. "He will reprove the world of sin," etc., i.e. under *your* ministry. There is no demonstration that he had in mind any but the apostles. He may have had in mind also the *immediate* successors of the apostles as he did in his prayer, John xvii. 20, "I pray for them also which shall believe on me through *their* word," — but we do not *know*, whatever we may *think*, that he referred to any one else, and so we cannot be sure that he promised the Spirit to any one but the apostles! Now the church will never be imposed upon by that style of reasoning.

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asked which the inductive sciences can never give. It is upon arguments none of which are demonstrative that the proof of the Bible is founded. The number of these arguments, their character, the harmony with which they coincide in one result form a body of proof which is properly regarded as unanswerable, but which is not demonstrative. If our author should apply the same style of criticism to the arguments for the Bible, they could not stand before it. The argument for the existence of God, the argument for his attributes, the argument for the truth of the sacred writers, for the credibility of the miracles, and for the inspiration of the Bible, would all disappear. Our author has not followed his reasoning to its logical results, and is unconscious of its real character; but, however unconsciously, he has used a criticism as destructive as the most malignant rationalism. It has begun by making the speech of the inspired authors unintelligible; it will close by shutting their mouths. Its true drift cannot fail ere long to be perceived, and upon such a tide the evangelical church will not be content to float. The sea of atheism is before it.

One more topic in this book, and one only, we shall at present notice.[1] Speaking of the aspect of finality which the Scriptures cast upon the fate of the wicked, our author says: "We are obliged to acknowledge that the theory of the endlessness of future punishment is not the only theory that will agree with the language of despair which the texts before us employ. If the wicked were ultimately to be annihilated as the result of 'aeonian punishment,' that pros-

[1] I pass over the historical argument for lack of space. In any argument from the fathers one fact should be borne in mind: Theology has been a growth. The most fundamental doctrines of the Christian scheme are found in a very rudimentary condition in the early writings. The doctrine of the Atonement was not developed till a very late period. The doctrine of Justification by Faith waited for its Luther. Yet the drift of things in the early centuries was toward these doctrines, and the fact that they were not found in clear and complete statements is no argument against them. The fathers held the doctrines of religion as they are contained in the Bible, in the solution of practical forms. Scientific theology is like a precipitate which falls upon the addition of the proper reagent. This reagent was long unapplied.

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pect would agree equally well with the hopelessness of tone in which their punishment is foretold."[1] The goal of the argument of the whole book is here revealed. The writer believes, with more or less firmness, in the ultimate annihilation of the wicked. This doctrine is not presented as the teaching of Scripture; but the design of the book is to furnish a basis for it in a negative exegesis. The hope of restoration is discussed somewhat at length; and, while not positively excluding it, the author's argument tends to discourage it. Somewhat more at length ultimate annihilation is discussed, and the slight possibility hinted at in the above extract is expanded into a somewhat faint probability. To this discussion we now turn.

The basis of whatever argument is presented for ultimate annihilation is, as we have said, the negative exegesis of the book. The punishment of the future world, according to this book, is "aeonian," that is, *existing* in eternity, not *eternal*. A sinner must therefore be punished after death; but that the punishment should end is not inconsistent with the biblical representation; because these represent it merely as *occurring* in eternity. It may be continued no one knows how long, and yet finally cease, without contradiction of the biblical language. With the ruin of this exegesis the whole subsequent argument falls. Future punishment is represented in the Bible as eternal, and this proves that it will never end. This will finally be found to be the conclusive answer to all forms of the argument for annihilation. The cruder forms, which depend professedly upon the Bible for their support, but are based upon a quibble about the word *death*, and these more refined forms as well, which dismiss the Bible from the witness-stand to put upon it their own notions about the effects of sin, are unable to answer the straightforward presentation of the biblical doctrine. They are all stranded upon the word *αἰώνιος*, especially as that word is explained by the general drift of the Bible; and however they may seem to endure for a while, they will never per-

[1] p. 34.

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manently satisfy the mind of any candid reader of the Bible. The foundation of our author's argument is therefore destroyed by the true interpretation of the passages already examined. It may be well, though unnecessary, to consider the subsidiary arguments urged by our author in favor of what degree of probability he chooses to attach to this view.

Sin is represented under the form of a disease, which grows worse and worse, and may finally wear the sufferer out. The figure is a good one, perhaps, for popular instruction, but a poor one for theological discussion. It is understood by our author in a sense which renders it positively erroneous. The choice of sin has no such effect upon the sinner as disease has upon the human body. It does, to be sure, cripple the power of the will to *resist* evil, but it strengthens its power to *choose* evil. Resistance to truth produces insensibility to truth; but it produces sensibility to error. "The moral instincts" do "become benumbed"[1]; but the immoral instincts, if I may so say, become excited. The moral momentum downward must be considered in two aspects; for it is at the same time away from good and towards evil. It is possible that our release from our earthly bodies may increase the spiritual capacities of the lost, as well as those of the redeemed. If so, their capacity for evil may grow and grow with their hourly malignant evil choices, as the capacity of the righteous will be increased by their choice of God. May this not be "constantly progressive, and yet never complete"?[2] This does not look towards annihilation so much as towards the final permanence of moral character. The most natural inference from such considerations is, that as the wicked will always be voluntarily sinning, so they will always deserve and receive the disapproval of God; and as they will always be increasing in sin, so their punishment, instead of growing less and less, will grow greater and greater. Thus the rational argument is seen to be insufficient, as our author suggests,[3] to prove the doctrine of annihilation.

[1] p. 53. [2] p. 53. [3] pp. 53 and 60.

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A subsidiary thought in respect to the nature of punishment as consisting "primarily in a deeper and deeper involvement in sin"[1] requires a passing notice. If this were so, it might support somewhat the theory of annihilation. It might appear that God had put within us certain forces, tending finally to destroy us, and then left us to the outworking of those forces. But the impression of the Bible is that the punishment of the future world is inflicted by God, and has an objective character. It is a voluntary act on God's part, and immediately so. It is an expression of something on the part of God, and is of such a character that, whether external or internal to the soul, it must be felt as coming directly from him. Pain, — if that word be used quite generally, — pain inflicted by God as an expression of his disapproval of the sinner is the proper definition of punishment. As God's rewards are not the mere outworking of natural laws, but he *smiles* upon his children; so his punishments are not the mere outworking of natural laws, but he *frowns* upon his enemies. The biblical images of the gnawing worm and burning fire are not meaningless, but refer to the positive character of punishment. If it were enough to interpret these figures as referring to remorse, it must be a remorse which could not wear itself out. Even if remorse of itself would tend to die away, God must, according to these representations, so afflict the lost that their remorse will ever be excited afresh. If the redeemed will look upon Christ, and reflecting upon his grace be filled with wonder and praise, the lost, in contemplation of him whom they have pierced, must be filled with confusion and despair. Much of the deadening effect of constant feeling in our present state arises from our bodies. It may be that the spiritual body will be fitted to promote all spiritual exercises, whether in heaven or in hell. Punishment, therefore, instead of tending to a close, may increase with the increase of sin. Here, again, the rational argument, when properly conceived, fails to support annihilationism.

[1] p. 52.

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One or two feeble attempts are made to bring exegesis to the support of this part of the essay. An argument is derived[1] from 1 John v. 16, "sin unto death." Death is the *result* of sin. Therefore it cannot be that death which is sin, as men are said to be dead in trespasses and sins. Therefore it refers to extinction. The last is too great a leap. The argument is sufficiently refuted by pointing out the fact that our author has fallen into a confusion of ideas in comparing death in sins with the death spoken of in this passage. Death in trespasses and sins has nothing to do with it one way or the other. Such a death is not referred to in the context, and in fact the phrase is not Johannean. The word "death" is used, here as elsewhere, of punishment; and the only possible argument for annihilationism which can be derived from this text is from the word "death" itself. Our author does not present this, knowing how valueless it is. The teaching of the text is perfectly plain. If the Christian falls away after conversion his case is beyond the reach of prayer.

Another argument, still more feeble, is derived from the fact that the Bible never joins *αἰώνιος* with *θάνατος*. Death itself is not said to be eternal. But if it had been, how easy for our author to interpret such a phrase in perfect accordance with his own views! It would be simply death in a coming aeon. Thus there would have been no force in the phrase if it had been used.

[1] p. 57.

[An unexpected want of space compels us to omit a paragraph which was designed to close this Article. The paragraph acknowledges that Mr. Whiton intends to be perfectly candid, and to hold the balance with judicial equity. Still he seems to have been warped by his feelings more than he is aware. This appears in such expressions as p. ix, "God as distinct from some of his expositors"; p. 61, "doctrine fraught with horror"; p. 22, "tremendous burden;" in the general implication throughout the book that the defenders of the orthodox doctrine are laboring under prepossessions; vid. pp. 28, 34, 37, 38, 43, 66, 72; in his treatment of Prof. (President) Bartlett, vid. spec. pp. 6, 27, 72; in the quotation made upon p. 66 from a Roman Catholic author.]

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ARTICLE VII.

MR. JOSEPH COOK'S LECTURES ON BIOLOGY AND TRANSCENDENTALISM.

[The following notice of the work on Biology was prepared by a scientist especially interested in the subject of the work; and the notice of the volume on Transcendentalism was prepared by a scholar who, having listened to Mr. Cook's words as spoken, is so much the better qualified to speak of them as written].

1. BIOLOGY; with Preludes on Current Events. By Joseph Cook. With three colored Plates, after Beale and Frey. Fifteenth Edition. 12mo. pp. 325. Boston: James R. Osgood and Co. 1878.

The scientific portion of this work is embraced under two heads: the facts of recent biology, and the endeavor to prove therefrom, by the scientific method of reasoning, the existence of a soul in man.

In order to form an estimate of these lectures that shall be at once clear and just, it is needful to keep before the mind these general considerations:

1. The novelty of their scope and method. The literature of apologetics would make a library of vast proportions; but through it all, one would vainly look for a work like this. An attempt to hold large popular audiences, by the discussion of the relations of modern science to theology, on the avowed basis of the scientific method, has never before been made; indeed, from the nature of the subject, could not, until these latter days, have been made; and even now the number of those who combine sufficient knowledge of the various sciences, of theology, of metaphysics, and of logic, with the power of popularizing such knowledge in public discourse, before the learned and the unlearned alike, to even essay such a task, must be very limited. On every man of genius, who has a new thought, or a new method of expressing thought, to give to the world, these three burdens are laid: he must prepare for his work, he must do it, and, what is hardest and most wearying of all, he must educate his audience, develop the standard by which he is to be measured, preside over the school in which his critics are to be trained, charge the jury who are to pass upon his claims. Upon this latter task, in the accomplishment of which time, together with the infinite and interacting forces of society, must co-operate, Mr. Cook, by the publication of this volume, now enters. There is no other work on biology, there is no other work on theology with which this volume of lectures can well be compared; it is a book that

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no biologist, whether an originator or a mere middle man in science, would ever have written. Traversing a very wide field, cutting right across the territories of rival specialists, it contains not one *important* scientific misstatement, either of fact or theory; not only the propositions, but the dates, the references, the names, and the histories of scientific discoveries and speculations are presented as they are found in the sources whence they are taken, or at least with only verbal and minor changes. But while Mr. Cook does not state the biological facts erroneously, he does not always state them well; he dys-states rather than *misstates;* that is, he presents facts out of due relation and proportion to each other, and to the reasonings derived from them, magnifying some, minifying others, and sometimes, in the revolution of his arguments, allowing one to eclipse another. Every year, almost, the committee for arranging the pictures at our art exhibitions is censured, justly or unjustly, for not classing these pictures with wisdom and taste and impartiality: the leading positions are given to inferior pictures, while the corners and out-of-the-way spaces are assigned to works of solid merit; and thus while each artist may have done his best, the average impression may be unfortunate. Some such charge as this may rightly be made on these lectures, which, with all their phenomenal excellences, yet, from the scientific point of view, are extraordinarily unsystematic in their arrangement. Scientific enthusiasm and the scientific sense are not identical, and do not always co-exist. Mr. Cook will cross the continent for a fresh discovery in science, which, when obtained, he may not always use scientifically; in the laboratory of the specialist, and in the theories of the scientific philosopher, in chemistry, in the microscope, in electricity, from sources the most recent and out of the way, he gathers the family of facts which, from the antagonism of their natures, cannot dwell together in perfect unity. It would not be a hard task for one whose mind is under the rigid control of the scientific sense — by which is meant the faculty of seeing things as they are, and in their just proportion and relation, without reference to real or fancied tendencies — to take this work, and by various transpositions and elisions and changes in phraseology comparatively slight, but without extensive addition or subtraction, to prepare therefrom a systematic compend of the central facts and problems of modern biology.

This analysis is not censorious, nor even critical; but rather descriptive and explanatory of the difficulty that friends and foes alike encounter in this volume. As a master in painting may get satisfaction from an exhibition, and be able to assign proper credit to each artist, however unwisely the pictures may have been arranged, so one fully versed by experiment and research and practical experience with biological science can from the present work obtain correct views on the matters involved, while a non-expert may misinterpret both its science and its philosophy.

To reduce these lectures from their fragmentary, poetical, and conversa-

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tional form to a systematic epitome of biology would, however, be to destroy their popularity and their usefulness with the class to whom they are chiefly addressed. Neither in this country nor in any other country are there at present any considerable number of experts in all the branches of science here touched upon. Mr. Cook's listeners are learners, not critics, receiving for the first time the facts and speculations of science as he brings them fresh from the closet and the laboratory. It is a result, as well as a sign and proof, of the limitations of the human mind that it sooner receives and better retains new ideas in science when they are presented unsystematically, incidentally, even accidentally. A systematic teaching of science implies and involves on the student's part a triple task: reception, rumination, and anticipation — an understanding of each thought as given, a carrying in the memory of what has already been given, a foreboding of what is to come; under these combined burdens even the disciplined intellect often bends and breaks; such is the psychological elucidation of the admitted evils of cramming. On the other hand, science unsystematically taught avoids the stress of recollection, and the pain of responsibility for what is yet to be imposed, and requires only that each fact be considered as it rises to view; the combining, the co-ordinating, the adjusting of the facts, the building of the edifice out of the materials thus gathered, must take place subsequently, perhaps unconsciously, in the learner's mind at a later stage of its development. Hence it is that from the perusal of even the lightest and flimsiest novel, where a plot is to be traced and characters are to be watched, we find rest and relief in the tit-bits and gossip of an ordinary newspaper, where we can read what and when and as much as we please, and stop at any moment. Hence it is that in the study of medicine it is proved more and more that clinical lectures are better for the student, in many respects, and on subjects where they are admissible, than didactic instruction; and more and more they are assuming prominence in hospitals and colleges. Hence it is, also, that the self-taught scholar, despite all the defects of self-teaching, outstrips, for a time, in compass, if not exactness, of learning the favored scholar of the university.

In this work, from the opening chapter on bathybius to the closing remarks on the enswathement speculations of Ulrici, very little can be anticipated by the reader, or probably was fully anticipated by the lecturer; everything is unexpected, abrupt, sometimes precipitous; a series of constant surprises, which are much more delightful to the common mind than a logical setting forth of facts would be, as oftentimes a glance at a shop picture, on suddenly turning a corner, causes intenser aesthetic pleasure than a wearisome march through the noblest galleries. From all this it follows that to read these lectures as one would read a systematic treatise on science by a scientific man is to caricature their purpose; to criticise them by the conventional standards for works of science would be a satire on criticism.

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2. The recent and difficult and unsettled character of the scientific topics discussed. Biology is a generic term, including whatever relates to the science of life, and variously, and not always logically or consistently, subdivided into physiology and psychology, in their many departments, and requiring, also, the re-enforcing aid of electrology, microscopy, geology, palaeontology, and chemistry. Many of these sciences are but of yesterday, if not of to-day; everything connected with them suggests incertitude, changefulness, fluidity; to study them even in their very latest discoveries, is more like walking on the water than on firm soil. Before this huge, whirling mass of gaseous crudities and contradictions shall have become consolidated, how vast the amount of waste material to be thrown off into infinite space. All human science, or systematized knowledge, must pass, or has passed, through three stages, the pre-exploratory, the territorial, and the organized. Some of the sciences included under, or relating to, biology are but just passing out of the territorial into the organized stage, where only experts are expected to occupy and cultivate them. The last word of such sciences may or may not be a solid foundation on which to build a new philosophy, but is more likely to be a shifting sand-bar, which the next tidal wave shall sweep utterly away. Scientific truth is, indeed, not a matter of time, but of demonstration; for time crowns error as well as truth; the latest claim and the oldest may be alike true or untrue; but, after knowledge has once become organized, all the confirming voices of experts, every year of endurance, and every survival of hard assault, and, above all, each surrender of skilled opponents gives it added strength, and makes it worthy of increasing reverence. But these are tests which many of the claims of biology are too young to have successfully passed. The monographs from which Mr. Cook obtains his facts have mostly appeared during the past five or ten years; some of them the very year in which the lectures were delivered.

3. This work has no preface, which it imperatively needs. The spoken style is so different from the written, and Mr. Cook's arrangement is so unsystematic, that these lectures nowhere distinctly and formally state the author's philosophy. The topics of the individual lectures are chosen, in some instances, on the occasion of local and transient excitements; are adapted — as in public discourse they must be — for the day, the hour, the moment, and, with their artistic interruption of logical continuity by anecdote, poetry, rhetorical, and personal statements, are in a measure commanded by the audience. The method of treatment could not be radically changed on publication; but the ideal spoken style never reads well, never should read well; and in this case its defects could have been fitly supplemented by a preface composed in the literary style, and prepared with the finest care, — as Paley in the leisure of invalidism worked out his Natural Theology, and Butler labored during twenty years on his Analogy, — with scientific and logical exactness of plan and choice selection of

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language, and, with the highest and severest standard always in view, addressed only to science, scholarship, and philosophic culture. Such a preface would have made clear these three distinctive features of Mr. Cook's philosophy:

First, that it can be scientifically proved, both in general and in detail, that the *arguments of scientific materialists against the existence of a soul are worthless.* Thus the special purpose of this work on biology is mainly a negative one.

Secondly, that the battle-ground between science and religion is at present in the brain and nervous system. The question of all questions for the future is, whether naturalism or supernaturalism shall carry the human brain.

Thirdly, that reasoning on religious subjects should be followed to its logical conclusions under the guidance of the scientific method, wherever it may lead us.

Although none of these propositions are stated formally and exactly in these words, yet adumbrations of them appear constantly, here and there, throughout the lectures. Such a preface as is here proposed, by crystallizing these scattered hints, would have made clear to the reader what is now obscure and unsuspected, would have been as a light on the prow, so illumining in advance the unfamiliar pathway as to lessen the risk of colliding opinions, would have taken the arms from hostile critics and guided the search of friendly inquirers, and — in ways too subtile for words, but fully obvious to the man of science or letters — have simplified and aided the process by which the philosophy of this Lectureship is to grow into scholastic and popular esteem.

The permanency of this work, also, would have been better insured by such a preparatory treatment of its central doctrines; since in literature nothing can long survive that does not take root in the needs of the choicest intellects; the thoughts that live do so because the minds of the few leaders of each generation provide for them nutritious and congenial soil. The law of nature in this regard is imperious and cruel; on this seething ocean of time a book must keep on the very crest of the wave, or be swamped, and sink out of sight forever.

These general considerations — by which, as it is hoped, the key-note to a right criticism has been struck — leave little space or need for details. These lectures, in their scientific relations, are divided — though not formally by the author — into just four sections: the first treating of evolution; the second, of bioplasm as seen under the microscope; the third, of the automatic movements of decapitated animals, and the distinction between automatic and influential arcs; and the last, of the electrical irritation of the brain.

The lecture on bathybius, with which the course opens, is, in some respects, the most vulnerable and tempting to critics of any in the book.

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It is an instance of the disarrangement — not *mis*-statement, but *dys*-statement, disproportionate statement — of which I have spoken (p. 382); the poorest picture has the best place in the gallery. The bathybius controversy is simply a part or phase of a preliminary exploration that a few scholars are making in the dark and far away border-land between the living and non-living. Of its possible future the most learned man is the most ignorant. The facts of its history up to date are given by Mr. Cook with substantial correctness, but in language that is not always wise, and which to the non-expert class — of which his audience, in its relation to that subject, must be almost entirely composed — is liable to be misguiding. It is very true that Strauss, — one of the most inconsistent of reasoners, — in his work, The New Faith, hurriedly seized the bathybius claim, overestimating almost ludicrously its magnitude; but in this respect he is not to be imitated, but avoided, by those who would oppose him.

The other chapters on evolution contain, in a very compact shape, the crucial questions now at issue on this stupendous theme. What Mr. Cook's own creed may be he nowhere positively avows; but after the recurring showers of imagery have passed by, there appears this one central, shining truth, that through universal nature the tendency of all things that live is to grow and develop after the manner of a tree of the field. To this general doctrine, that leaves the ultimate mystery of things where it found them, — the philosophy of the school of Mivart, as opposed to that of Haeckel, — Mr. Cook undoubtedly subscribes, and if he had written a preface would probably have so stated. The general principle of evolution is now opposed only by those who wish to be behind the age.

The section on bioplasm is, perhaps, the strongest in the book. It is probable that no specialist could state the facts, on the whole, more correctly; and it is certain that no one could popularize them with even approximate brilliancy or power. The experiments on frogs and fish deprived of brain are also given accurately and interestingly; as are also the facts and theories of cerebral localization, as developed by the epoch-making researches of Fritsch and Hitzig. It should be said that these lectures contain the first, and, I believe, the only, popular account of the electrical experiments on the brain that has appeared; and, although not essential to the general argument, they are very interesting; and the facts, although derived from the writings of a partizan, are accurately stated. Among cerebro-physiologists no experiments in recent years have excited so much attention as these. They have furnished the basis of several scientific reputations, and are yet a theme of constant discussion. Mr. Cook rightly says that the preponderance of physiological opinion is not on the side of some of the French authorities, but of the conclusions of Hitzig and Fèrrier and of the American experimenters who have revised their researches; but he must be a man of supreme courage or supreme wisdom who could surely predict what the twentieth century may have

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to say on this question. At present the doubt and division of sentiment among cerebro-physiologists is not in reference to the facts, which are precisely as stated by Mr. Cook, but to the interpretation of the facts.

While, however, the scientific portion of this volume is, in the main, correct, there are a number of minor errors of taste and arrangement that can be and should be corrected in subsequent editions.

In his deference to German authority Mr. Cook, so far forth, is wise; for in science and philosophy Germany does the original thinking for both continents. The three greatest scientific advances of the century are, unquestionably, the evolution hypothesis, the theory of the conservation of force, and spectroscopic analysis; and all three are of German birth. Germany originates, England combines, America popularizes. The combining genius of the English Mr. Cook does not always appreciate. Besides Bain and Beale and Darwin and Carpenter, the Psychology of Spencer, the Physiology of Mind by Maudsley (first edition), the fruitful suggestions of Hughlings Jackson, and the lectures of Brown-Sequard might properly have been considered in this volume.

The phrase "scientific method" often appears in these lectures, as also in the Principles of Science of Jevons, the last, and in many respects the best, of all our writers on logic; but in neither work do I find a satisfactory definition, without which the phrase may be useless or deceptive. The scientific method I would define as that method of reasoning that consists in fixing the boundaries between the probable and the possible, between the absolutely known and the absolutely unknown. This is the method which, without defining, all the physical sciences, so far as they have made any solid advances, have instinctively followed. It is not exclusively inductive, as some have fancied, but includes both deduction and induction.

Tested by the scientific method, what advances do the biological facts contained in this work make in the department of natural theology? To what extent is Paley's watch superseded? How much wiser is modern science, with all its instruments of exact research, and discoveries ever increasing in splendor, than was the emperor Napoleon, when to his atheistical crowd of officers he put this silencing question, as he waved his hand toward the stars, "But who made all these?" The answer must be that there has been an advance in natural theology, but in degree, rather than in kind. The microscope brings us nearer to nature; the telescope brings nature nearer to us; but not the one nor the other, nor both combined, nor the spectroscope, — even though it make the distant stars our near neighbors, — have done aught, or can do aught, more than simply to extend the range of the normal vision, thereby immensely increasing the quantity, but not radically changing the quality, of the evidence by which we have been wont to infer the existence of an intelligent Evolver behind the things evolved.

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Mr. Cook claims, and with scientific justice, that spontaneous generation has never been proved. Yet farther he might have gone, and predicted, with entire assurance that the future would sustain him, that on account of the limitations of the human senses, even with all conceivable appliances, it never could be experimentally proved, and that — whatever deduction may yet accomplish — the chasm between the living and non-living state never can be inductively bridged. If, however, we infer that because the ultimate phenomena of life are out of the reach of known or conceivable law, therefore it is absolutely and scientifically demonstrated that they can only take place through the intervention of soul, we take a long, if not an infinite leap, and leave science and the scientific method behind us. Life I would define as the power of inherent renewal. All that we know as living or organic has this power of renewing itself from within, or *subjectively;* while all that we know as non-living or inorganic can only renew itself from without, or *objectively.* But the ultimate phenomena of the inorganic world present problems that are as hopelessly unanswerable as those of the organic. Why does one mode of molecular motion make light; another, heat; another, electricity? Why should one rate of vibration of the luminiferous ether make the color of violet, and another the red? Why should the combined spectrum make white light? Why should it not? Not toward, but away from, the solution of these great problems modern science, on all its lines, is now advancing. Beneath the trees of Athens, in the courts of the Temple at Jerusalem, in the philosophic villas of ancient Rome, these elementary questions could be answered as well as at this hour. Man, indeed, with all this patchwork of the senses, — his telescopes and microscopes and spectroscopes, his delicate tests of chemistry, his barometers, his electrometers, and dynamometers, and endless measurers and detectives of natural forces, — is yet practically shut out from nature — a prisoner in an infinite palace, to whose treasures, after much groping, he finds now and then a key, which to every door that it grudgingly opens reveals numbers more that seem to be eternally closed.

When now we bring all these facts of biology into the focus of the scientific method, what do we clearly see?

1. It is absolutely, scientifically proved that no law known to man, or now conceivable by man, can account for the phenomena of life and mind. This is the leading idea of the book; and a preface, such as we have suggested, would have so stated, and thus have saved an enormous amount of misconception.

2. It is shown conclusively and indisputably, that the claims of those who have assumed that recent researches in science, and particularly in microscopy, have made it possible to explain the phenomena of life and mind by known laws of molecular action are of no scientific worth.

3. It is shown, therefore, that the latest science has no positive deduction against the existence of a soul.

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4. The objection of materialists on the physiological side being thus removed, Mr. Cook would contend that the psychological argument for the existence of a soul — that which is based on our intuitons and instinctive beliefs — should be accepted as valid.

The argument of this work, although not prominently so stated, is precisely the argument of Butler's Analogy, modernized, popularized, and brought down to the last discoveries in the domain of organic nature. Its theological value consists in this: it shows that the argument of probability as developed by Butler is as good now, after all the advances of science, as it ever was. This argument, Mr. Cook holds, is made more complete by Revelation, for which the biological argument merely prepares the way, by removing the objections of materialists.

The scientific portion of this work has suffered not a little from one-sided criticism. The complaint of Goethe, "few Germans, perhaps few men of any modern nation, have a proper sense of an aesthetic whole; they praise and blame by passages," may be made of Americans even more justly than of Goethe's countrymen. Books, like men, should be judged not by special defects or special excellences, but by the general impression of the whole, the average of the good and evil that is in them; and the instincts of men, that so far transcend the reason, do in time thus judge all books and their authors, and will so judge these lectures. Over the mass of people, to whom religion is a matter of emotion, the influence of this work must be not direct, as a scientific proof of the existence of a soul, but indirect, as an intellectual and moral inspiration. But through all nature the seemingly indirect is more universal and more useful than the direct operation of all the great forces. The forest as it lifts itself toward the sky both fills our streams and saves the earth from drought; as it were by accident the revolving moon floods the world with silvery light, and carries to and fro the necessary tides of the sea. This work, whatever its faults may be, must, for the religious world in this country, make an era in the popular discussion of these themes; borne on the wings of poetry and oratory it will carry the truths of science — or the record of the earnest efforts of science to find the truth — to thousands of homes where hitherto all modern science, certainly all biology, has been but a dreaded and unknown wonder. It will be found in the scholar's library and lie upon the ploughman's table; and wherever it goes it cannot fail to enforce, on the dullest as on the ablest, at least the one constantly forgotten lesson of humility, always derived from the contemplation of the infinite littleness of man when brought face to face with the majesty and mystery of nature.

2. TRANSCENDENTALISM; with Preludes on Current Events. Tenth Edition. 12mo. pp. 305. Boston: James R. Osgood and Co. 1878.

Any one who undertakes to review Mr. Cook, ought, first of all, to

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assure himself that he has laid aside small technicalities, and has prepared himself to look at things generously and comprehensively. An address given without manuscript, taken down by a short-hand reporter, and afterward published without essential reconstruction, must, of necessity, be estimated differently from one carefully reduced to writing before delivery. Then, again, an address before a large audience will materially be quite unlike a talk upon the same topic, before a few individuals, in a small room. In the presence of a great assembly, the extemporaneous speaker, if he is judged fairly, must be judged by the conditions under which he speaks. If he is to hold his audience, and bring it back again to the same place, he cannot busy himself very much upon a thousand unessential details. His speech must move on rapidly, boldly, without losing time on the niceties of his connectives. The transitions must often be abrupt. The wide-awake listener will fill up the little gaps out of his own common-sense, and will like the speaker all the more, in that he compliments his hearers by supposing that they know something, and are able to move in the drift of his own thought. The volumes which have grown out of the Monday Lectures, ought all to be weighed by the above-mentioned circumstances. Many a man can sit down in the quiet of his study and find fault with these books who would empty Tremont Temple very speedily if he were to mount upon the platform and attempt to deliver lectures, written or unwritten, upon similar themes. Nothing is more wearisome in public, or even in private speech, than merely technical propriety. The orator in a great assembly must abandon himself to his theme, — not speaking carelessly and at random, but with well-considered aim. Certain niceties, however, which belong naturally enough to the *essay*, must be left out of the *oration*.

The eleven lectures which compose this volume were given in Tremont Temple, Boston, during the winter of 1876–77. It would be impossible to find any single word which could accurately measure and describe a course of lectures having such breadth, compass, and variety as these. The word *Transcendentalism* may serve perhaps as well as any other, but is, at the best, only an approximate title. As it was our privilege to be present at most of these lectures, we prefer to estimate them as a *hearer*, rather than as a simple *reader* of the published book. Besides, in the space allotted for this notice it would be impossible to enter upon any large and critical survey of the volume in hand.

Every one who has attended Mr. Cook's lectures for any length of time, cannot but confess that he has passed through a remarkable experience, and such as he could not, beforehand, have anticipated. To find himself one, in an audience of two thousand persons, assembled week after week, at midday, listening with fixed and profound attention to discourses upon philosophy, is, in itself, an evidence of some kind of power in the speaker, which, to say the least, is very unusual. Few are the men who could

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hold an audience under like conditions, to such themes. Undoubtedly, philosophy can be taught, and is taught more carefully and connectedly in the recitation-room of the University than it can be before the great audiences in Tremont Temple. But in the University it can also be made very dry and technical, and often is made so. Here it is lifted into light and air, and goes out upon the broad ranges of practical use. It speaks directly to the souls of men with all the solemnity of a sermon. In the rapid sweep of the discourse little faults of manner, little infelicities of thought or expression, little inaccuracies of statement are hardly to be noticed, so grand and elevating is the aim of the speaker, and so strongly is he bearing the hearer forward toward the end he has in view. The very charm of these lectures, as one listens to them, is, that philosophy is here wedded with a vivid ideality, — that the resources of literature are brought to its illustration, — that history, art, poetry, are all made ministering spirits in the unfolding of the deepest workings of the soul. Something of all this must be lost when one sits down, in the distance, calmly to read the published volume. But he who reads, though he may discover some things to criticize, will find himself in converse with a man who has an aim high and noble, and a philosophy which bears men toward the good, and ministers to the highest interests of human society.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE ORGANIC REUNION OF CHURCHES.

BY PROF. J. P. LACROIX, DELAWARE, OHIO.

WILL such a reunion ever take place? Have we good grounds to anticipate that churches which have once become confessionally distinct will ever, to any considerable extent, be merged again into organic unity? What has been the lesson of history thus far? Is it not of very discouraging purport? Has it not been the fate of the church from the very first century of its existence to the present day to suffer one after another of its members to break off into independence and isolation? And has she ever, to any considerable extent, had the fortune to re-absorb any of the very prominent of these revolted members?

A very interesting discussion of this subject is found in a prize Essay on the Reunion of Churches, by Rev. G. Joss, of Saanen in Switzerland.[1] The book begins with a general statement of the whole series of influences that are at play in the general subject of separation and reunion; thereupon follows a careful historical review of the circumstances of the several

[1] Die Vereinigung Christlicher Kirchen. Leiden: E. J. Brill. 1877.

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secessions, and of the various efforts that have been made at reunion; and finally, there is presented a judicious survey of the unionistic tendencies that are so widely prevalent in the present day, together with suggestions as to how much and what kind of church reunion may reasonably be expected in the church of the future. Mr. Joss writes in an admirably Christian spirit. In theology he is of the earnest, but mild, orthodoxy of the Rothean type.

In his historical retrospect Mr. Joss has made large use of the two thorough histories of all former reunion efforts, viz. that of A. Pichler (1865) and that of C. W. Hering (1838). Let us cursorily follow him.

First, what are the chief forms of reunion that are practicable? There are several. Where a church assumes that it alone holds to the whole and pure truth, as is the case with the Roman Catholic, then there can be no thought of any other union than an *absorptive* union (*unio absorptiva*), the other church being required to give up absolutely its entire individuality. The chief example of this form of reunion is the submission of the Gothic Arians at the synod of Toledo, in 589. This can hardly be called, however, a union at all. It is rather simply the annihilation of one of the parties. A real union can take place only thus: Either both of the parties must *give up* such of their peculiarities as distinguish them from each other, until finally they shall become identical (which is a *unio temporativa*), or each is permitted to *retain* its peculiarities, and yet both agree to hearty intercommunion (which is called a *unio conservativa*). The former of these is more strictly a reunion; the latter is more like a mere alliance.

As preparatory to a glance at the various efforts at reunion, let us notice the successive secessions in the order of their occurrence. The church of the apostolic age was undoubtedly an organic unit. It held to the one faith; it recognized its several members; it intercommuned. It was only in the first half of the third century (Cyprian, *ob.* 258) that the genuineness of the church was made to depend on its having a regularly ordained episcopate. Henceforth the watchword was: "None can have God for his Father who has not the church for his mother. No salvation outside of this church."

It was this church that attained to universal dominion in the age of Constantine, and that set upon itself at Nice the seal of exclusive orthodoxy. The first secession from this compact world-church was that of the Nestorians, in 431. Nestorius held to two distinct natures in Christ. His excommunication drew a large part of the church of Syria out of Catholic unity. Nestorianism retired to the distant East, and continues to exist to the present day.

Opposition to Nestorius led to the second schism, in 451. Eutyches identified the two natures in Christ. Hence sprang the Monophysites, who perpetuated themselves in the Coptic and Abyssinian churches, as

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also in the Armenian and Jacobite (of Mesopotamia) churches. Thus orthodoxy, in its effort to hold the true mean between two separate natures in Christ and two identified natures, saw itself forced to strike off from its communion *five* vital members, which have persisted in asserting themselves to the present day.

The next great schism was that between the Roman and Greek churches — between the West and the East. It grew out of the expression *filioque*. This the Western church had added to the creed at the Synod of Toledo, in 589. It had been seriously protested against by the Greeks in 867. The quarrel culminated in 1054, when the papal church completed the schism by excommunicating the Greeks. By this act the one great Christian Catholic church was severed into two nearly equal hostile sections.

The next secession from the Latin branch was that of the Protestants, which was accomplished by the decrees of Trent in the middle of the sixteenth century. A century and a half later followed the expulsion from Rome of the church of Holland. And our own day has witnessed the Döllinger movement, which has led to the organization of an anti-Romanist Catholic church in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria.

Since its exclusion from Rome the great Oriental church has remained practically a unit, holding fast to the primitive and earlier faith and organization. But the more positive life of Protestantism has led to several principal organic divisions, and to almost innumerable minor subdivisions or sects. Now, what have been the fruits of the very many and very earnest endeavors that have from time to time been made to heal these various breaches, and to effect a reunion of the dissevered members? It is needless to say that, on the whole, they have been absolute failures.

The early popes and the Byzantine emperors, especially Justinian (527–565) and Heraclius (611–641), made the most sincere efforts to win back the early seceding bodies, the Mŏnophysites. But in vain. In the age of the Crusades, the most sincere and protracted efforts were made by the Western and the Eastern churches towards a mutual reunion. And these efforts were seconded by the most urgent political considerations. But all in vain. The friends of the movement were doomed to the bitterest disappointment. Everything went to wreck upon the shoals of Rome's absolutely unyielding pretensions. She would hear to no union but an *absorptive* union, in which the other party simply gave up its existence. And such has been Rome's attitude in all subsequent efforts at reunion, both with the Greeks, the Lutherans, and the Holland Catholics at Utrecht. She has persistently and obstinately held fast to the church ideal of Cyprian of Carthage, that there is and can be but one salvatory church organism, with the addition that she herself is that organism. Holding that outside of herself there is no salvation, her attitude is necessarily absolutely intolerant.

Nor have the persistent and serious efforts that have been made toward

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reunion between the chief sections of Protestantism met with a much more successful issue. The Lutheran and the Reformed types of ecclesiasticism received from their founders such a crystalized "bent," such a rigid self-consistency, that they could not be made to melt into one. Having once become confessionally distinct, they had each such a positive individuality that no union could take place between them which would not be simply the death of one of the parties. So also with the Anglican church. All the overtures which it has made, both a century ago and in the present, toward a reunion of its Methodist branch with the parent trunk, have been simply propositions toward *absorption*. They have necessarily failed.

But what of the quite recent efforts of the old Catholics? What is the probable significance of the efforts at Bonn towards the establishment of intercommunion between the Anglican church and the great Oriental church by the mediation of the old Catholics? According to Dr. Joss these efforts, these negotiations, have a higher significance than some Protestants are inclined to give them. In the first place, they are efforts of a peculiar kind. They aim not at organic union, but simply at inter-recognition, culminating in *intercommunion*. They look simply toward the concession and admission of the Catholic Christian *churchhood* of each by the others. Each church is to preserve its confessional identity, but it is to rise above its excommunicating self-seclusion, and to extend to the other the hand of fraternal recognition. But what is the anticipated benefit from this? It is only a vague benefit, but yet a very positive one. It is this: the gradual reawakening of the slumbering Oriental church to a vitally Christian life. Now if this end can only be realized even in the least degree, all will admit the momentousness of the good thereby accomplished. For the existence of the Oriental church is in itself a stupendous fact. And it will, apparently, continue to be such a momentous fact for ages and ages to come. For weal or for woe, the Oriental church has held its place in the past, and will do so in the future. It is thoroughly seated in the heart, in the habits, and national prejudices of compact millions of population. No evangelistic tide will suddenly sweep through it, regenerating it in the Protestant sense, or overturning it as an effete and dead scaffolding. If, therefore, the old Catholics can attain to orthodox recognition from the Orientals, and can serve as a medium to bring zealous, wide-awake, high-church Anglicans into inter-communion with them also, certainly all friends of humanity will bid them God-speed. For thus the cold heart of the great Orient will, to some extent, be brought under the influence of unquestionably evangelical influence. And what if the eastern half of Catholicism should thus become at last thoroughly regenerated!

But, as a non-episcopal clergyman, Dr. Joss does not find the main hope of the church of the future in this approximation towards *organic* reunion between old churches once confessionally dissevered. He does not hope for organic reunion, nor even think it desirable. He rather

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inclines to the opinion that even as each nation, each tribe, each class of peculiar temperaments in society, form severally so many legitimate and even desirable phases in the one common humanity, so there may and should be a particular church corresponding to the several national and social peculiarities of the various groups of mankind.

But are we, then, to give up all hope of Christian unity in the millenial future? By no means. There will be unity. But it will be a *unity amid diversity*. It will be a fraternal unity that concedes to the brother the right to differ. It will be a unity of love; hence it will be a unity that *intercommunes*. Before this Christian love, the bars of sacerdotal excommunication will fall away; the narrowness of close communion and of mutual rivalry and jealousy will be swept away as darkness before light.

In a word, the true reunion of churches in the future will not be an organic reunion, but a union of hearts in the sense of a liberally and wisely-guided *Evangelical Alliance*. The several churches now existing, and perhaps others yet to be formed, will heartily give to each other the hand of Christian recognition, will join each other at the Lord's table, and will turn a united front against the kingdom of darkness; but will, at the same time, be permitted to retain, unmolested, their several peculiarities of ritual and creed, of forms and ceremonies. Such is the author's ideal of church union in the future. Is it not the true one?

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE ORIGIN OF NATIONS. In Two Parts: on Early Civilisations; on Ethnic Affinities, etc. By George Rawlinson, M.A., Camden Professor of Ancient History, Oxford, and Canon of Canterbury; Author of the "Four Great Monarchies," etc. 12mo. pp. 272. New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. 1878.

Canon Rawlinson stated, in the "Aids to Faith," sixteen years ago: "There is really not a pretence for saying that recent discoveries in the field of history, monumental or other, have made the acceptance of the Mosaic narrative in its plain and literal sense any more difficult now than in the days of Bossuet or Stillingfleet" (Preface, p. iv). In opposition to this statement it has been confidently said that there was a settled monarchy in Egypt at least five thousand years before Christ. Mr. Rawlinson attempts to prove, in the first part of the present volume, that there is no sufficient evidence of a settled monarchy in Egypt until B.C. 2450, nor in Babylon until B.C. 2300; that the earliest traces of civilization in Asia Minor are found in B.C. 2000. It has been said also in reply to Canon

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Rawlinson, that man was originally an absolute savage, and a hundred thousand years must have elapsed from the commencement of his existence until his development into his present civilized condition. Canon Rawlinson here endeavors to show that the primitive state of man was "very remote indeed from savagery," and contained "many of the elements of what are now termed civilization."

In the second part of the volume the author comments on the tenth chapter of Genesis, and, after elaborately considering the genealogical statements in the chapter, he says: "It has been shown that in no respect is there any contradiction between the teaching of the modern science of ethnology and this venerable record. On the contrary, the record, rightly interpreted, completely harmonizes with the science, and not only so, but even anticipates many of the most curious and remarkable of the discoveries which ethnology has made in comparatively recent times" (p. 252). These essays on the ethnology of Genesis are designed to disprove the theory "that while the writers of Scripture are to be held as infallible guides in whatever relates to religion and morality, in all other matters they are to be considered as simply on a par with other men, equally limited in their knowledge, equally liable to error, not a whit superior to their contemporaries, or in advance of their age" (Preface, p. v). The author strives to refute this theory, and to defend a higher and (as he believes) "a truer theory of inspiration — the theory most in accordance with the apostle's words, 'All Scripture is given by inspiration of God.' Origen's argument has always seemed to him sound — that if in the material world God has wrought every minutest part to a finish and a perfection the highest that it is possible to conceive, *much more* is it to be believed that in the far more important treasure of his word he has left nothing incomplete, but has given to every jot and tittle his full care, the utmost perfection of which it was capable, so that the whole is designed, and is the utterance to man of absolute wisdom" (Preface, pp. v, vi). While we think that some of the author's statements are over confident, we regard the work as rich in historical statements and remarkably ingenious in reasoning.

History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America. By Henry Wilson. 3 Vols. 8vo. pp. 670, 720, 774. Fifth Edition. Boston: James R. Osgood and Company. 1878.

The original plan of Vice-President Wilson, in giving to the world a history of the slave power in America, was to present little more than a Congressional History of the Rebellion and the Civil War. This history was to be founded on two previous volumes which he had published, entitled "Anti-slavery Measures of Congress," and "Reconstruction Acts." The history was to be preceded by an essay on slavery, its connection with, and bearing upon, the government. It was to be comprised in two

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volumes of moderate size; the essay occupying the first half of the first volume. This plan was afterward so far modified that the work has reached three massive volumes; and the subject of American slavery, instead of being a prefix to a mere chronicle of events and congressional proceedings, has been made the controlling topic of the whole work.

Mr. Wilson had some remarkable qualifications for preparing the history of slavery in the United States. His knowledge of the facts and *personnel* of American history was very extensive; he was familiar with the current politics and statesmanship of the country; he took an early and long continued interest in the "Irrepressible Conflict" between slavery and freedom. He was emphatically a man of affairs; he had sound sense and an honest heart. His own character and history qualified him to make the present narrative both accurate and life-like.

Mr. Wilson was aided in the preparation of these volumes by the Rev. Samuel Hunt, a successor of the celebrated Dr. Emmons in the pastorate at Franklin, Mass., and afterward the Congregational pastor at Natick. Here he became intimately connected with Mr. Wilson, thoroughly acquainted with his habits of thought, his political and literary plans. Mr. Hunt has enjoyed a high reputation as a faithful pastor, a diligent student of history, and a careful writer. Engaged as Mr. Wilson was in the multifarious duties of a Senator, Vice-President, and acknowledged leader of the republican party, he needed a coadjutor whom he could trust as a man of acute mind, patient in research, and painstaking in literary composition.

Every sentence in the first two volumes of the work was read to Mr. Wilson, and received his full sanction. The third volume, however, was not finished when the Vice-President was called from life. The final revision of it was committed to Mr. Hunt, and may doubtless be regarded as a fair representative of the views of Mr. Wilson even in the minutest particulars. We have reason to rejoice that the opinions of the Vice-President, his feelings and purposes, had been so fully and frequently expressed to Mr. Hunt, that the last volume of the work may command as much confidence as the preceding volumes.

The entire work contains two thousand one hundred and sixty-four pages; it abounds in interesting details, and vivid statements of political and ethical principles. It contains many passages of thrilling eloquence. It is the eloquence of facts, of strong convictions, of Christian sentiment. Clergymen ought to be familiar with the work. They will find in it numerous illustrations of biblical truth. It ought to be in the library of every American scholar and patriot.

No historian can always avoid the improper use of the definite article. Mr. Wilson says that "the Professors of Harvard College and Andover Theological Seminary headed a paper" — thanking Mr. Webster "with fulsome flattery for" his speech of March 7, 1850. The first word of the above quotation makes the sentence inaccurate.

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THE LEVITICAL PRIESTS: A Contribution to the Criticism of the Pentateuch. By Samuel Ives Curtiss, Jr., Doctor of Philosophy, Leipzig. With a Preface by Professor Franz Delitzsch, D.D. 12mo, pp. xxix, 254. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. 1877.

The latest form of criticism on the Pentateuch maintains that the elevation of the Aaronic priesthood above the Levites in general, was the work of the Elohistic legislation, of which Ezra was the probable author, or Ezekiel and Ezra were the co-authors; that accordingly "the Elohistic Thorah which comprises the main portion of the middle books of the Pentateuch is post-exilic"; that "the claim that God revealed these laws to Moses is only made to give them an authentic character, and is a fiction, as well as the history of the consecration of Aaron (Lev. viii.) and of the Levites (Num. viii.), and entirely without historical worth." Dr. Kuenen supposes that the Book of Deuteronomy was written as late as the year 625 B.C., perhaps by Hilkiah, "as a reform programme, and was foisted upon Moses, although he was in no respect the author of it; nor does the material rest upon a reliable Mosaic tradition."

In opposition to this theory of Dr. Kuenen and others, the aim of this volume is to show that the biblical history of the Israelites presupposes such a distinction between the priests and the Levites as reached back to the times of Moses; the post-exilic books give no evidence that the priestly hierarchy was introduced in the time of Ezra; the Book of Deuteronomy, while assigning certain religious privileges to the whole tribe of Levi, yet assigns peculiar and distinguished privileges to the Aaronic priests; the arguments against the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch are inconclusive and fallacious.

Dr. Curtiss deserves much praise for his original investigations of ancient manuscripts, and for his zeal in defending the authenticity of the Pentateuch. His zeal leads him to make incautious remarks here and there. He speaks of Christians as those "who have experienced the miracle of the new birth" (p. 5). He occasionally betrays a degree of feeling which tends to excite a suspicion in regard to his logic even when the logic is sound. He has been very wise in selecting the present as the time of publishing his work; for it has intimate relations with the controversies now pending in the Free Church of Scotland.

THE FINAL PHILOSOPHY; or, System of Perfectible Knowledge issuing from the Harmony of Science and Religion. By Charles Woodruff Shields, D.D., Professor in Princeton College, Member of the American Philosophical Society. 8vo. pp. 609. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Company. 1877.

The aim of this work is a good one, the execution not so good. The volume states various divergences of science from religion, but fails to

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state the true method of harmonizing the one with the other. It contains many fruitful suggestions, and gives a promise of richer treatises yet to come from the same source. The style of the volume is elaborate, and, with here and there an exception, the sentences are well formed. The general criticism to be made upon it is, that it is not sufficiently condensed nor diversified. The first sentence of the Introduction prescribes one rule for the execution of a work like the present. The rule is: "In the treatment of a vast theme it will be necessary to sacrifice details for the sake of principles." This rule seems to be violated throughout the volume. A clear statement of principles is sacrificed to details. The index of authors whose opinions have been cited in the volume fills eight pages; the names being arranged in double columns. The opinions of this host of writers have been expressed in very few words, and no references are given to the volumes from which the statements of these opinions are derived. One result of this multiplicity of details is, that the opinions are often stated indefinitely or obscurely. It could not well have been otherwise. Another result is, that the opinions are sometimes stated incorrectly. Still another result is, that it is impossible for the reader to verify the statements. Had fewer authors been cited, their opinions might have been expressed with greater fulness and accuracy. If references had been made to the volumes in which the authors expressed their own opinions, the present work would have had more authority than it can have now. The work, however, is a meritorious one, and will tend to exalt philosophy to its proper place, and to emphasize the importance of theology. A sad mistake of theologians has been to depreciate philosophy for the sake of exalting theology, which they make either superficial or absurd. We think that Dr. Shield's estimate of science will become, in the process of his investigations, higher than it is now, and that his philosophy will become more definite.

CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL HANDBOOK TO THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. By Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer, Th. D., Oberconsistorialrath, Hannover. Translated from the Fourth Edition of the German, by Rev. Paton J. Gloag, D.D. The Translation revised and edited by William P. Dickson, D.D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Glasgow. Vol. II. 8vo. pp. 325. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1877.

CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL HANDBOOK TO THE GOSPEL OF MATTHEW. By Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer, Th. D., Oberconsistorialrath, Hannover. Translated from the Sixth Edition of the German, by Rev. Peter Christie. The Translation revised and edited by Frederick Crombie, D.D., Professor of Biblical Criticism, St. Mary's College, St. Andrew's. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. xliv, 451. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1877.

These two volumes of the well-known series need no commendation. The Commentary on Matthew devotes seventeen pages to a biographical

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notice of Dr. Meyer, by his son, Dr. Gustav Meyer, Ph. D. Dr. H. A. W. Meyer was born January 10, 1800, in Gotha; his father was shoemaker to the ducal court. Bretschneider was his religious instructor at the Gymnasium. He entered the University of Jena in 1818. The annual expense of his education here was one hundred and twenty dollars. In January 1823, he was installed as pastor at Osthausen. In 1829 he published his "first portion of his work on the New Testament containing the Greek text and the German translation." In 1830 he published his "Libri symbolici Ecclesiae Lutheranae." He was soon after appointed pastor at Harste. In 1832 "appeared the second part of his work on the New Testament, containing the commentary." This commentary was designed to be included in two divisions. It was extended so as to include sixteen divisions. He continued to labor on the commentary about forty years. In 1837 he was called to Hoya as superintendent; and in 1844 was still farther promoted, being called to Hannover as Consistorialrath, Superintendent, and chief pastor of the Neustädter St. Johannis-kirche. In May 1861 he became Oberconsistorialrath. He died on the twenty-first of June, 1873, in the seventy-fourth year of his age. This biographical sketch by the son of the exegete details many instances which are typical of German student life, and in this view is quite interesting.

ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL, Described and Explained according to its Peculiar Character. By Christoph. Ernst Luthardt, Professor of Theology at Leipzig. Translated by Caspar René Gregory, Doctor of Philosophy, Leipzig. Vol. II. 8vo. pp. x, 452. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1877.

The present volume brings the Commentary to the beginning of the twelfth chapter. In the main this Commentary, like the other works of Luthardt, is rigidly orthodox. In interpreting some passages, however, he is independent. Thus, in John iii. 13: ὁ ὢν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, Luthardt does not translate by the words "who *is* in heaven," but by the words "who *was* in heaven." Moreover, he does not regard the words as belonging to the text. They are not in B, L, nor in the Sinaitic manuscript, and therefore Luthardt rejects them.

COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL OF ST. JOHN; with a Critical Introduction. Translated from the French Edition of F. Godet, D.D., Professor of Theology, Neuchatel, by M. D. Cusin and S. Taylor. Vol. II. 8vo. pp. 414. Vol. III. 8vo. pp. 366. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong.

The first one hundred and ninety-eight pages of the second volume are translated by Mrs. Cusin; the remainder by Miss Taylor. The volume contains Professor Godet's Commentary from the beginning of the second to the end of the tenth chapter. Of the third volume the first two hundred and thirty-five pages are translated by Miss Taylor, and the remainder by Mrs. Cusin. This completes the Commentary. We have already expressed our opinion of its great excellence.

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THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

ISOCRATES.

BY PROFESSOR R. D. C. ROBBINS, NEWTON HIGHLANDS, MASS.

The Early Years of Isocrates, and the Influences that Moulded his Character.

The birth of Isocrates, 436 B.C., was in the midst of the most brilliant period of the history of Athens. Eight years before, Pericles had acquired the sole direction of public affairs by the ostracism of Thucydides, the leader of the aristocratical party. At peace abroad and at home, he devoted himself to the planting of colonies dependent upon and tributary to the mother city, to the erection of magnificent and tasteful public buildings, the construction of other works, fitted to minister to the wants and contribute to the aggrandizement of Athens. The Parthenon, "the most perfect production of Grecian architecture," of the purest Doric order, with the most exquisite refinement in details, executed under the direction of Phidias, had been completed a year or two before.

The drama, which took the precedence of the other arts in its origin and development, attained its highest perfection about this time. Aeschylus had died several years before, but Sophocles, between fifty and sixty years old, was just at the height of his popularity, and but a little past the meridian of his long life. Euripides, too, about twenty years younger, had a few years before gained the first tragic prize. It was

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during Isocrates' youth and early manhood that most of the plays of Euripides and Sophocles were exhibited. Aristophanes' "Acharnians," "Knights," "Clouds," "Wasps," and "Peace" were brought out between 425–419 B.C., when Isocrates was from eleven to seventeen years old.

In philosophy Socrates, thirty-three years old, had doubtless begun to frequent the gymnasia and the public walks and the market-place, to converse with and exert an influence over all whom he might meet. Plato was born seven years later than Isocrates, and it is said was intimately associated with him as he came to years of maturity. The historian Herodotus was fifty-three years old and Thucydides forty at the birth of Isocrates. The orator Lysias, too, was then twenty-two years old.

Erchia, a deme, or borough, of Athens, the birth-place of Isocrates, was the same where Xenophon, nine years earlier, first saw the light. His father, Theodorus, was a maker of musical instruments, and seems to have carried on his trade successfully, as he is said to have had other artisans under him, and acquired sufficient wealth to cause his election as, and to enable him to perform the duties of, Aedile[1] with benefit to the state.[2] From the occupation of his father, Aristophanes and other comic poets taunt the orator as a fiddle-maker, although there is no proof that his father ever intended him to follow his own trade. He, with his three brothers, seem to have been educated in a manner far superior to the youth of his own rank in that day.[3] "My father," he says, "caused us to be so carefully educated that I was then more an object of admiration and respect among my school-fellows of my own age than I now (at eighty-two) am among my fellow-citizens.[4] His brothers were Telesippus,

[1] See Antid., § 161: Τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἡμῖν ἀφ' ὧν ὁ πατὴρ ἅμα τῇ τε πόλει χρήσιμον αὐτόν, κ.τ.λ.

[2] See Plutarch's Life of Isocrates prefixed to Wolf's edition of Is. Orat.

[3] Παῖς μὲν ὢν ἐπαιδεύετο οὐδενὸς ἧττον Ἀθηναίων. — Plutarch's Life, as above.

[4] Antid., § 161: Ὁ πατὴρ . . . . . ἡμᾶς θ' οὕτως ἐπιμελῶς ἐπαίδευσεν ὥστ' ἐπιφανέστερον εἶναί, με τότε καὶ γνωριμώτερον ἐν τοῖς ἡλικιώταις καὶ συμπαιδευομένοις ἢ νῦν ἐν τοῖς συμπολιτευομένοις.

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Theodorus, and Diomnestus. His mother was called Hedyto, and he had one sister. But little, however, is known of the course of his life until he arrived at an age to show the bent of his mind for philosophical and rhetorical studies. To aid him in these he had the best teachers of the time; Prodicus of Ceos, who was also the teacher of Socrates, Euripides, and others; Gorgias, of Leontini, the most distinguished teacher of his age, immortalized by the Dialogue of Plato; Tisias of Syracuse, and Theramenes, Protagoras, and others. He was also, doubtless, sometimes found among those who listened to the dialectics of Socrates, since his code of morals and his political teachings are decidedly tinged by the Socratic dogmas. In order that he might receive the advantages of the training of Gorgias, his father is said to have sent him to Thessaly when about twenty years old. His studies should seem to have been pursued from a genuine love of knowledge, though doubtless youthful aspiration for influence over others as a public orator, and especially for moulding by oratory the public institutions of his own beloved Athens, were not without their effect upon his student life. Still, he soon found himself disqualified for distinction as a public speaker. His voice was too weak, and his natural timidity too strong to be overcome. Thus in his Philippus[1] he says: "I am by nature most unfit of all the citizens for political life, for I have neither sufficient voice or confidence to sway the multitude, or visit with merited rebuke those who prate before public assemblies." The disappointment felt by the young aspirant for public favor can hardly be appreciated without a knowledge of the favor in which public speakers were beginning at that time to be held at Athens. It was only the orator that could count upon a pervading influence in the councils of state; and hence not ambition only, but patriotism, incited the ingenuous youth to the best attainments in oratory.[2] He says, too, with some asperity, that

[1] *Ἐγὼ γὰρ πρὸς μὲν τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι πάντων ἀφυέστατος ἐγενόμην τῶν πολιτῶν, οὔτε γὰρ φωνὴν ἔσχον ἱκανὴν οὔτε τόλμαν δυναμένην ὄχλῳ χρῆσθαι καὶ μολύνεσθαι καὶ λοιδορεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος καλινδουμένοις.* See also Panath. § 10.

[2] "In that country [Greece] the rhetorical art was not confined to the choice

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he who is wanting in the two gifts which he the most of all the citizens is without, is more despised and utterly shut out from public life than he who is unable to pay a fine that has been imposed upon him by the state, since the latter may hope to retrieve his fortune, but the former cannot change his nature.[1]

Such were some of the quieter influences which surrounded Isocrates, and moulded his earlier literary life. But there were other circumstances which had not less power in forming his character and giving coloring to his trains of thought and directing his course of life. The Peloponnesian war commenced when he was five years old, 431 B.C. Before the end of the year Archidamus had made a descent upon Attica and again retired, and Pericles had made his powerful discourse in honor of those who had fallen in battle, so inspiriting to the Athenians from the glowing panegyric which it contained of their civil constitution and life and genius, and the stirring appeals to the citizens not to do dishonor to and fall below the achievements of their ancestors. The next year the Athenians were again invaded and their country ravaged, while a pestilence wasted them, crowded within their own walls. The seige of Plataea commenced in B.C. 429, and in the two following years were the third and fourth invasions of Attica by the Peloponnesians, and the latter year the final surrender and destruction of Plataea.

When Isocrates was ten years old the battle of Delium was fought, the most disastrous to Athenians of any in the earlier periods of the war. In this battle it will be remembered that Socrates exhibited great bravery, and rescued Xenophon, who had fallen, wounded, by bearing him away on his shoulders. Aristophanes during this same year first exhibited his "Knights." The varied fortunes of Athens in the subsequent years of the war could not fail to make a deep

and arrangement of words, or to the vain ornaments of oratory, but was supposed to include the principles of such practical knowledge as is necessary in conducting the affairs of nations. The title of orator was synonymous with that of statesman." — Gillies, Life and Writings of Isocrates.

[1] Panath., § 4.

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impression upon the youth in his early training. In the nineteenth year of the Peloponnesian war came the destruction of the Athenian army and fleet in Syracuse, and two years after, the conspiracy of the four hundred, which ended the democracy at Athens. This revolution called forth the talents of those who were able to influence public opinion, and not improbably Isocrates about this time began to exert an influence through his writings as well as through his pupils.

But Isocrates was not only trained up amid the events of the Peloponnesian war, as in a school of adversity, but he also suffered pecuniarily,[1] with so many other Athenian citizens, and seems to have found it necessary, in order to retrieve the fortune of himself and family, to devote himself to some lucrative pursuit. He probably at first wrote defenses for those who were arraigned before courts of justice, for which he received compensation in money. But this was not congenial to the tastes of one who loved the truth, and wished ever to be found on the side of right, and was soon abandoned. Not improbably he, in connection with this work, commenced, in an informal way, the instruction of others in the art to which he was devoted.

Isocrates as Teacher: his Aims.

There are, however, no records to show at what age Isocrates first became a teacher of rhetoric. But he probably came gradually to the execution of this his life-work. When he found that nature had not fitted him to exert the influence that he so much desired as a public orator, he did not sit down in despair, but turned his attention to the influencing, in private, of those who where to be the moulders of public opinion, and to the preparation of discourses to be pronounced by others. His first formal school seems to have been at Chios, but at what time it was opened is not certainly known. Perhaps when Critias, a leading spirit among the Thirty Tyrants, had introduced a law (404 B.C.) that the art of

[1] See Antid., § 61.

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speaking should not be taught at all at Athens;[1] though others place his journey to and abode in Chios ten or twelve years later.[2]

At that place he is reputed to have had at first nine pupils.[3] But these were not sufficient to occupy his whole time or thoughts. The political affairs of this island were in a confused state, and he interested himself in forming a government after the model of Athens.[4] But he soon found the little island too strait for him to exert such an influence as he desired, and felt himself capable of. He accordingly returned to Athens, where the youth, ere long, flocked to his school in great numbers, and at great expense; and some of the most distinguished orators were there trained. Not improbably Demosthenes was for a time an attendant upon the instruction of Isocrates, though his chief training was by Isaeus the distinguished pupil of Lysias.[5] Lycurgus, Hyperides, and many others, were distinguished examples of the result of his training in oratory, and Theopompus, Ephorus, and others, in other departments of learning. Cicero's testimony is explicit, if not entirely discriminating. "Then Isocrates arose, the superior of all these (i.e. Critias, Theramenes, Lysias, and others whom he has just mentioned), from whose school, as from the Trojan horse, went forth only great men, some of whom aspired to become distinguished in the more quiet walks of literature, and others in

[1] See Xen. Memorab., i. 2. 31.

[2] See Rauchenstein Einl., S. 4.

[3] Plutarch, in his Life, says: *σχολῆς δὲ ἡγεῖτο, ὅς τινες φασὶ, πρῶτον ἐπὶ Χίου, μαθητὰς ἔχων ἐννέα.*

[4] *Καὶ ἀρχὰς δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν Χίον καθέστησε, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ πατρίδα πολιτείαν.* — Plutarch's Life.

[5] The current report of an interview between Isocrates and Demosthenes as teacher and aspirant to discipleship is characteristic, if not literally true. "Demosthenes," they say, "also came full of enthusiasm to the teacher of rhetoric, and said that he could not pay the fee of 100 drachms, but that he had twenty, which he would give if he might learn a fifth part of the art." Isocrates replied, "we do not, Demosthenes, cut up our art into parts, but we sell it whole, as the beautiful fishes are sold; so if you wish to become a learner, we will impart it to you as a complete whole." — Plutarch's Life (Auger's ed.), p. xxiv.

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the more public contests of genius."[1] The influence of the teacher was exhibited in all these. "So," he says, "these, such as Theopompus, Ephorus, Philistus, Nuncrates, and many others, differing in nature, were, in character and feeling like one another and their master."[2] So also Demosthenes, Hyperides, Lycurgus, Aeschines, Dinarchus, and many others, although they were not all equally eminent, yet they all followed the same method of exhibiting the truth. In his Brutus, too, Cicero speaks of the house of Isocrates as the school of all Greece and the laboratory of orators, and himself as the "perfect master" of his school.[3]

The popularity of the school of Isocrates, and its reputation as a place of culture for all classes, cannot be questioned. In a speech written in his eighty-second year (353 B.C.), he says: "My accuser [Lysimachus] says that not only private people are my pupils, but also orators and generals and kings and rulers, and that I not only have received, but am still receiving, immense sums of money from them"; and the reply that Isocrates makes is, that this is an exaggerated statement.[4] Aristotle, too, pays him the highest compliment by conforming his own manner of teaching to that of his senior; "because," as Cicero says, "he saw the success which Isocrates met with by having his school full of men of quality, ... of a sudden he entirely altered his form of teaching, and pronounced, with a little variation, that line concerning Philoctetes which says 'that it was scandalous to be silent and hear barbarians speak.' Aristotle said, 'and hear Isocrates speak.' He therefore embellished and enlightened his whole system, and joined the knowledge of theory to the practice of speaking." And he received his reward; for Cicero adds: "Philip, that wise prince, was not insensible

[1] Ecce tibi exortus est Isocrates, magister istorum omnium, cujus e ludo, tanquam ex equo Trojano, meri principes exierunt; sed eorum partim in pompa, partim in acie, illustres esse voluerunt. — De Orat., B. ii. 22.

[2] See B. ii. 23.

[3] See B. ii. c. 23: Isocrates, cujus domus cunctae Graeciae quasi ludus quidam potuit, atque officina dicendi. ..... perfectus magister, etc.

[4] Antid., § 30.

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of this; he sent for and appointed him tutor to his son Alexander, who by his instructions improved in the exercise both of acting and speaking."[1] Neither were his pupils confined to his own country; but many came to him from Pontus and Sicily and other of the neighboring regions,[2] and remained often three or four years, and then left their teacher with profound sorrow and tears.[3] These pupils, it should seem, received not only stimulus and culture in the art of oratory, but carried away from their teacher distinct precepts of the art, which they not only applied to their own practical use, but communicated to others.[4]

Dionysius of Halicarnassus says that he was the most renowned of any man of his age, and that he taught the best young men both of Athens and the rest of Greece; some of whom distinguished themselves in the courts of justice, some in public life and in the government of the state, and others wrote the history of Greece and other nations.[5]

Quintilian also frequently refers with the highest approbation to the teachings of Isocrates, "the most renowned teacher, whose books are no better proof that he wrote well than his scholars of his ability in teaching."[6] His school sent forth the most distinguished orators,[7] and those, too, "eminent in all kinds of learning."[8]

At first he seems to have had very much the same feeling that Socrates so often expressed in reference to taking pay for his instruction. For when his first pupils brought their money to him, he says, according to Plutarch: "Soon I per-

[1] De Orat. B. iii. § 35 (Guthrie's Translation). [2] Cf. Antid., § 224.

[3] Antid., § 88: *καὶ τῶν μὲν ἔτη τρία, τῶν δὲ τέτταρα συνδιαιτηθέντων. . . . . ἐπὶ, τελευτῆς, δτ' ἤδη μέλλοιεν ἀποπλεῖν ὡς τοὺς γονέας καὶ τοὺς φίλους τοὺς αὐτῶν, οὕτως ἠγάπων τὴν διατριβὴν ὥστε μετὰ πόθου καὶ δακρύων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀπαλλαγήν.*

[4] Itaque ipse Aristoteles cum florere Isocratem nobilitate discipulorum videret, ... mutavit repente totam formam prope disciplinae suae, etc. — De Orat. 35.

[5] Vita Isoc., prefixed to Auger's edition of his works.

[6] Annon clarissimus ille praeceptor Isocrates, quem non magis libri bene dixisse, quam discipuli bene docuisse testantur, etc. — Instit. Orat. B. ii. c. 9.

[7] Isocratis schola principes oratorum dedit. — Instit. Orat., B. xii.

[8] Isocratis praestantissimi discipuli fuerunt in omni studiorum genere. — Instit., B. iii. c. 1.

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ceive that I have sold myself to them."[1] But he doubtless soon lost the idea of servility, as students rushed to his school, anxious to exchange their money for the more coveted treasures which he had to give. He very soon began to amass property, and with it the envy of his fellow-citizens[2] came, who had exaggerated notions of his accumulations. He was accordingly, twice at least,[3] perhaps three times, designated as hierarch, but was at first able, by the aid of his adopted son (he himself being sick at the time), to excuse himself as not having the requisite means;[4] but he finally executed the office, without unnecessary display, but with a suitable expenditure."[5]

His aim as a teacher is, perhaps, as well as anywhere, exhibited in the Introduction to Demonicus, and what he would teach practically illustrated in that discourse. "You, I see," he says, "have a longing for instruction, and my business is to teach others; you are at the proper time of life for the attainment of knowledge,[6] and I point the way to those who devote themselves to it. Those who incite their friends to the study of eloquence undertake a good work, but do not employ themselves upon the highest objects of study. Not those who give the youth instruction in reference to the attainment of the highest influence through eloquence, but those who urge them on to the formation of characters of high excellence, profit them most; inasmuch as a good character is a far higher attainment than the simple ability to speak.

[1] Ὅθεν καὶ ἰδὼν τὸν μισθὸν ἀριθμούμενον, εἶπε δακρύσας, ὡς ἐπέγνων ἐμαυτὸν νῦν τούτοις πεπραμένον. — Vita. p. xxii.

[2] Φθονοῦντας δὲ καὶ ταὐτὸν πεπονθότας τοῖς σοφισταῖς καὶ χαίροντας ἐπὶ τοῖς ψευδῆ περί μου δόξαν ἔχουσιν. — Antid.

[3] Plutarch says three times: τρὶς προεβλήθη τριπαρχεῖν, and was twice plead off by his son: δὶς ἀσθένειαν σκηψάμενος, διὰ τοῦ παιδὸς παρῃτήσατο. — Vita, p. xxv.

[4] Πρότερος μὲν, εἰς ἀντίδοσιν, προκαλεσαμένου αὐτὸν Μεγακλείδου, πρὸς ὃν ἀπῄντησε διὰ νόσον, τὸν δὲ υἱὸν πέμψας Ἀφαρέα ἐνίκησε. — Plutarch, Vita, p. xxxv.

[5] Τὴν μὲν οὖν δαπάνην οὕτως ἠνέγκαμεν, ὥστερ προσῆκει τοὺς μήτε λίαν ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων ἐκταραττομένους μήτε παντάπασιν ἀσώτους μηδ' ὀλιγάρους πρὸς χρήματα διακειμένους. — Antid.

[6] Σοὶ μὲν ἀχμὴ φιλοσοφεῖν.

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We, therefore, omitting precepts for the latter, propose to give encouragement for the former attainment, and point out what things the young should seek after, and what avoid, with whom they should associate, and in what manner order their lives; for only those who give attention to such things can truly attain to virtue, than which no possession is more honorable and permanent. For beauty either fades with age or wastes by disease; riches rather minister to vice than virtue, by inducing sloth or inciting the young to sensuous indulgence; strength, guided by wisdom is desirable, but without, it rather injures than benefits its possessor by obstructing the cultivation of the mind whilst it adorns the body; but the possession of virtue alone abides with those in whose thought it has grown up in purity, even in age. It is better than wealth, more useful than high birth; since it makes things, impossible to others, possible; it endures with fortitude what others shrink from with terror, counts idleness a disgrace, and labor worthy of praise."[1]

In urging Demonicus to imitate his father's virtues, he further shows that the drift of his instruction was to induce his pupils to exert themselves for the attainment of intellectual and moral worth, rather than mere physical superiority, so much prized in that age in Greece. "We have given," he says, "a glimpse of the character of Hipponicus,[2] who ought to be kept before you as an example for imitation, so that you may have his life as the law of your life, and be an imitator and emulous of your father's virtues. For it is disgraceful that painters should depict the most beautiful of animals, and that children should not imitate their parents who are pre-eminent in excellence. And be assured that it does not behoove the pugilist to use so great exertions against his opponent as it does for you that you may not fall behind your father in virtue. But the mind cannot attain to this, unless it is the recipient of much and varied instruction. For, as in accordance with the laws of nature the body gains in force with suitable exercises, so the mind by good learning. I

[1] Demonicus, § 2.

[2] The Father of Demonicus.

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will therefore briefly indicate to you by what course of training you will make the greatest attainments in virtue and secure the highest praise among men." [1]

Isocrates endeavored to make his school a sort of miniature model of his native Athens, sending forth colonies not only to other parts of his own, but also to other lands.[2] So his scholars not only made a figure at home in the public assemblies, but distinguished themselves as ambassadors; they were honored by republics and princes on account of their talents, and wherever the Greek language extended they spread the glory of their country and master." [3]

The high estimation in which Isocrates held the art which he taught is exhibited in the Panegyricus, when he is setting forth the praises which belong to Athens, especially in the founding and sustaining her public assemblies: "Athens, too, is the home of philosophy which has contrived and executed all these things, which has trained us to action, softened our manners, and so distinguished between evils that come from ignorance and from necessity that we can guard against the former and bear manfully the latter. She also has fostered eloquence, in which all desire to make proficiency, and envy those who have it at their command; since she understands that man alone of living beings has the gift of speech, which gives him superiority over them in all things. She also perceives that fortune is fickle in reference to everything else, so that wise men make failures in them, and fools prosper; whilst in the art of speaking with force and beauty none but the gifted can succeed, and the learned men and the ignorant are especially distinguished by their ability to use language. Those liberally educated from their earliest years become conspicuous not from valor or wealth or any other such advantage, but from their eloquence, which is referred to as the most certain indication of the culture of

[1] Demonicus, § 3.

[2] See Dion. Halicarnassus, Vita Isoc.: Τὴς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως εἰκόνα ποιήσας τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σχολὴν κατὰ τὰς ἀποικίας τῶν λόγων, κ.τ.λ.

[3] Gillies, Lysias and Isocrates, p. 30.

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each one of us. Those, too, who have the best command of language not only have influence in their own private affairs, but are honored among others.[1]

This, as well as many other passages, shows that Isocrates did not limit his instruction to the simple rules for the rhetorical construction of sentences, but strove to awaken in his pupils a love of all valuable learning. The philosophy (φιλοσοφία) and philosophizing (φιλοσοφεῖν), which he often claims as a designation of his pursuit and that of his scholars, is not, of course, philosophy in its technical sense, but all that knowledge which fitted his pupils by a ready utterance of good thoughts to engage with honor in practical, and especially in political, life.

That he was skilful in adapting his instruction to the character and capacity of his pupils Cicero's testimony is explicit. "The most remarkable instance of this [adaptation] — to confine myself to the art of eloquence — is what was said by the incomparable Isocrates, 'that Ephorus required a spur, and Theopompus a rein'; for he checked the one, who was quite wanton by his command of language; and he pushed on the other, who had a hesitancy and bashfulness in his nature. At the same time, he did not render them similar; but what he added to the one he filed off from the other, so as to accommodate both to as much excellence as the nature of each would admit."[2] Had he confined his labors entirely to the training of orators his success would, in his own estimation, be pitiably small; for he says that the best schools send forth scarcely two or three good orators.

Neither would he have his pupils confine themselves to his instructions merely, or to one kind of learning, as his final injunction to Demonicus shows. After enjoining upon him to have regard to the teaching of the gods as shown in their treatment of those most dear to them, as that of Jupiter to Hercules and to Tantalus, he says: "Taught by such

[1] See below, p. 429.

[2] Cic. de Orat, B. iii. § 9 (Guthrie), and also Quintil. Instit., § 9.

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examples, it is necessary to strive for the honorable and the good, and you should not only give heed to my instructions, but also make yourself familiar with the best things of the poets, and read the writings of the sophists whenever they have said anything good."[1]

In his *Antidosis*, after giving his idea of philosophy as he taught it, he says: "I suppose you will still better learn its power, if I recount to you the promises which we make to those who wish to become our pupils. We tell them that it is necessary that those who will distinguish themselves in oratory, or in a life of action in any department of labor, should, first, be well endowed by nature for that particular course which each may choose to pursue; and secondly, they must be trained for and receive the requisite instruction in it; and thirdly, they must have practice,[2] so as to become familiar with and gain facility in it. By this means they will become perfected in their calling, and distinguished among their fellow-men. And whilst it is incumbent on the learner to bring a nature and character such as is demanded, and on the teacher to have ability to instruct, both must have practice in what they know. For it is necessary that the teacher carefully instruct, whilst the pupil must lay strong hold on what is taught. This applies to all the arts. If any one, individualizing, asks which of these things is the most important in training for oratory, I should say that natural endowments are indispensable and fundamental in their influence. For he who has a mind that can originate, learn, work, and remember, and strength of voice, and such clearness and sweetness of utterance that the hearers will be convinced not by what is spoken merely, but the pleasantness of the words; and, furthermore, has that confidence which is not indicative of impudence, but that which brings with it such control that the mind is as much at ease when

[1] Demonicus, § 5.

[2] He enjoined upon his pupils to go into the gatherings of citizens and recite what they had heard in his school. *Προσέττατε δὲ τοῖς γνωρίμοις, εἰς τὰς ἐκκλησίας ἀπαντῶσιν ἀναφέρειν αὐτῷ τὰ εἰρημένα.* — Vita, Plutarch.

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addressing assemblages of citizens as when studying out a subject in solitude — who does not know that such a one, without accurate instruction, but such as is commonplace and within the reach of all, will be such an orator as I do not know as any one of the Greeks has been? But we also know that those who have less natural ability, but who devote themselves to diligent study and practice, will become not only better than they were by nature, but superior to those who, with distinguished ability, neglect to cultivate themselves. Hence either of these things — natural ability or practice — will make a man capable of speaking and action; but when both are united in the same individual he will far surpass others. Such is my view of these things; but of the influence of instruction in eloquence I cannot say so much. For it has not such nor so great power; since if one should hear all the instruction that can be given, and become more familiar with it than others, he may perchance write a discourse more eloquent than many others, but if placed before the multitude if he has not confidence he will not be able to utter a sentence." [1]

Isocrates as an Author — what he would Accomplish, and how — his Style.

Isocrates was not satisfied with the influence exerted through his pupils only; but he had recourse to the best substitute for the popular address which nature had denied to him. His appreciation of the superiority of spoken language over written for immediate influence he often expressed. "I am well aware," he says, "of the greater influence of things spoken than those written; and that all suppose that men speak upon matters of urgent importance, and write for the sake of display and for gain. This is not unnatural; for when language is separated from the prestige of the speaker, from the sound of the voice, and the various changes which are employed in speaking, and also from the immediate occasion and zeal for the accomplishment of the

[1] Antid., § 186 sq.

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thing in hand, and when there is nothing present to give power to the words, and aid in persuading, — when all these things are utterly wanting, and the words are read as if merely strung together without a persuasive accent, as a single utterance of articulate sounds, who can wonder that the discourse falls powerless upon the hearers." [1]

Still he did not despair in reference to exerting an influence with his pen in favor of his country, which he always placed uppermost in his labors, and for his own reputation at home and abroad, which he valued especially as a means of bringing him into contact with leading men who swayed the public mind. Indeed, his training with his teachers and by himself was mainly in the formation of finished style of composition. It was for this purpose that he went even to Thessaly and paid the high price demanded by the new and much admired teacher, Gorgias of Leontini.[2] His labors in his own school in correcting the faults of others, would also have a reflex influence upon his own style.

Although in earlier years, as has been said, he occasionally wrote defences for individuals to be used in courts of justice; he soon gave up this practice as requiring him to exert an influence contrary to strict justice, and confined his labors to themes of more public interest.[3]

Since not only his personal peculiarities, and probably his taste too, debarred him from political life, he determined to exert an influence upon those holding office, which should be even more beneficent and extended than his own direct influence as magistrate could possibly be.

[1] Philip., § 10.

[2] Benseler, in Life of Isocrates, prefixed to his edition of Isocrates' Works, says: "Mochte ein Gorgias aus Leontinoi in Sicilien, der neue, vielbewunderte Kunstredner, gleich hundert Minen, d. h. 2291; Thlr. 16 gr. für seinen Unterricht fordern, Isocrates eilte dennoch zu ihm nach Thessalien um hier die Kunst zu lernen, die prosaische Rede," etc.

[3] Cicero, in his Brutus, well says: "Isocratem, scribere, aliis solitum orationes, quibus in judiciis uterentur; sed, cum ex eo (quia quasi committeret contra legem, quo quis judicio circumveniretur).saepe ipse in judicium vocaretur, orationes aliis destitisse scribere, totumque se ad artes componendas transtulisse, § 12."

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So in his Panathenaicus after bemoaning his want of endowment for public speaking, he says: "I did not, disheartened by these things, consign myself to a life entirely inglorious and obscure; but as the qualifications necessary to a successful political career were denied me, I devoted myself to the careful study of wisdom, and to the writing out of the results of thought. Neither did I turn my attention to trivial matters of private import, about which others declaim, but to the interests of Greece, of kings, and governments. Thus I supposed that I deserved so much the more honor than those who frequent the orator's stand, as the themes upon which I wrote were higher and more important."[1]

Although Isocrates could not but acknowledge the advantages of spoken over written discourse, still he could not quite forgive the people for not appreciating better the superiority of his thoughts and the themes which he made prominent in his writings, especially as they so nearly concerned the public weal, whilst the orator's declamations were of so private and personal a character. He says: "Whilst their style of thought differs so much from mine, and my purpose in writing is so far superior to theirs, the judgments of the people are not just, but confused and wholly devoid of reason. For, although they disapprove of the conduct of the orators, they make them leaders in the government and tyrants over themselves; but while they praise my discourses they envy me for no other than the very things which they approve. So my relation to them is not in accordance with right and justice."[2]

In his Philip, after enumerating his defects as above, he says: "Where soundness of mind and ability to teach come into requisition (although I may seem to speak arrogantly) I claim to be ranked among those who have the preeminence; and so, in the manner to which I am accustomed, and in which I have ability, I attempt to give counsel to my own country, to Greece, and to men of rank and authority."[3]

[1] Panath., § 10 sq. [2] Ibid., § 15. [3] Phil., § 82.

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Still, no feeling of want of appreciation or timidity kept him from giving the advice and admonition that was suggested to a wise observer, to those even in the highest authority at home and abroad, if he could but aid in retrieving the fortunes of his country. The king is no more an object of terror to him, with his pen in his hand, in his study, than his most familiar friend. To Philip of Macedon, or Archidamus of Sparta, or Nicocles, king of Salamis in Cyprus, he speaks with the utmost freedom, though always with respect. To the latter he says: "Others, O Nicocles, accustomed to bring to you, rings, garments, or objects wrought in silver and gold, or other such like possessions, of which they have few and you many, manifestly do not make a gift, but sell these things far more adroitly and profitably than those who profess to traffic in them; but I thought that I should make you the most honorable gift, and the most profitable and the most becoming for me to give and you to receive, if I could prescribe to you, by engaging in what duties and abstaining from what deeds, you can best rule your state and administer your government. There are many things that hedge the way of private citizens, especially the absence of the allurements of wealth and luxury, and the necessity of gaining by labor daily sustenance; and then the laws of the state in which each lives; and besides the freedom which is allowed to friends for mutual and open admonition, and to enemies for reproof, when one falls into error or wrong-doing. ..... But to rulers there are no such guards; but when established in authority, although most of all needing it, no monitor is found; for only the few have access to them, and these few speak what alone will please." [1]

To Archidamus, king of the Lacedemonians, he writes with the utmost fearlessness, combined with the respect due one in authority: "Since, O Archidamus, many have eagerly taken upon themselves to praise you and your father and your lineage, I have given up to them this topic, but have

[1] Ad. Nicoc., § 1 sq.

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myself chosen to exhort you to undertake labors far different from those now engaged in, and such as shall make you the cause of the greatest good to your own state as well as to all Greece, ... than which no more honorable work can offer itself." He did not shrink from a criticism of the father of the king. "Agesilaus always was influenced by the greatest desire of vindicating the liberty of the Greeks and waging war with the barbarians ..... but do not be surprised if I point out to you one matter in which he was in the wrong, ... i.e. in not striving to reconcile the Grecian states with one another before he engaged in an expedition against Persia. ..... I hesitate not to say, then, that it is incumbent on you, laying aside all other interests, to give your attention to the freeing of the Greeks from wars and other internal evil, and to restraining the insolence of the barbarians, and reducing their unjustly acquired good fortune to proper bounds."[1] Similar admonitions are scattered through his discourse addressed to Philip of Macedon.

The plainness with which he deals with his own fellow citizens shows no less fearlessness in dealing with their faults than confidence in his own rectitude and expectation that his words will not, notwithstanding the injurious and enervating flatteries of the demagogues with which Athens abounded, fall powerless upon the hearts of his readers.[2]

The high aims that Isocrates had as a writer are well set forth in his Antidosis, written when he was eighty-two years old. "First, then," he says, "it is fitting that you should understand that the kinds of prose writing are as various as those of verses written in measure. For some pass their lives in inquiring into the genealogies of the gods; others in learned disquisitions upon the poets; others are fond of collecting and portraying deeds of valor in war; and still others employ themselves in reasoning in dialogue, which they call disputation [dialectics]. If any one should attempt to describe all these kinds of writing, it would be a long labor. ..... I will

[1] Epist. 8th to Archidamus.

[2] See especially the Discourse upon Peace and the Areopagitica.

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then designate that only with which I have now any concern; I omit others. There are some who, although they are not without skill in these kinds of writing enumerated, yet have applied themselves to writing discourses not pertaining to the petty affairs of your every-day life, but to Greece and matters of interest to the state and fitted to be communicated to the larger assemblages of the people, which all will confess to be more like verses written in rhythm and measure than those orations employed in courts of justice. For they express, in language more poetical and varied, thoughts more elevated and new, and also adorn their compositions with figures of speech both more frequent and more striking. All who hear them are as much pleased as if they had listened to a poem; and many wish to become their pupils, because they suppose that those who excel in this kind of writing are far wiser and better and more able to aid others than those who excel in courts of justice. For the latter become skilled in suits by a bustling meddlesomeness in others' affairs; whilst the former gain influence by a careful study of such kinds of writing as I have before indicated. And whilst those versed in courts of justice seem to be, if they appear but rarely, tolerable for that day only in which they are engaged in suits, the others are welcome in all assemblies and at all times, and are constantly adding to their reputation. They, too, can, if they choose, make speeches at the bar; whilst the others have not the requisite ability for finished discourse. Thus, judging and considering this pursuit of literature to be far more desirable, others wish to avail themselves of instruction in it. In this kind of writing I have the reputation of not being without skill, and, indeed, have obtained favor and distinction.

"In reference to my activity, — whether you call it ability, or accurate study, or labor, — you have heard the whole truth. But for myself I wish to establish a law more severe than I do for others, and to make a claim more bold than comports with my age. For I count myself worthy not only not to receive pardon if I use injurious words, but to bear the most

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severe penalty if I do not use such forms of speech as you find in no other writer." [1]

The style of Isocrates has been the subject of high praise from some and moderate criticism from others. Even those most appreciative of his excellences are ready to grant imperfections in style, though claiming that even these lean to virtue's side, so based are they upon, and so plainly the outgrowth of, highly meritorious qualities.

Dionysius says of him that " his style is not less pure than that of Lysias. He never uses a word heedlessly, but bestows the highest care upon those which are common and familiar. He avoids the inelegance of obsolete or harsh language. He arranges his words with equal symmetry and clearness and perspicuity; and his style, too, is of a moral tone, and fitted to persuade. In respect to the use of tropical language, he is somewhat inferior to Lysias; since his figures are less terse and compact, and not so well adapted to forensic use, but too full and extended, without sufficient progress (the reason I will give subsequently). His style, too, is less simple and natural and energetic than that of Lysias, but more stately and varied, with more show, and so sometimes of a higher cast, and sometimes too labored. He sought for eloquence of language in every way, and thus strove more for beauty than simplicity of speech. He carefully avoided too great a concurrence of vowels as marring the harmony of sound and ease of utterance. He labored to express his thoughts in rounded sentences and in rhythmical language too nearly akin to poetry, and more adapted to reading than speaking. His orations especially court exhibition in celebrating public games, or perusal in retirement, but shrink from the strife of forensic use and judicial assemblies. The reason is, that the latter require more impassioned discourse, which belongs not to measured and rounded periods. For rhythmical endings, comparisons, antitheses, and such like ornamentation are made prominent by Isocrates to such an extent as to weary the ear, and injure the structure of his sentences." [2]

[1] Antid., § 45 sq. [2] Isoc. Vita, prefixed to Auger's edition, pp. 50, 51.

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After dwelling at some length upon the greater simplicity and naturalness of Lysias, Dionysius proceeds to say that Isocrates excels Lysias in dignity and sublimity of style. "Admirable," he says, "is the majesty indicated in the writings of Isocrates, rather appropriate to heroic than to prosaic human life. Therefore, if any one should compare the style of Isocrates, on account of its majestic fulness and dignity, to the works of Polycletus and Phidias, and that of Lysias, on account of simple elegance and grace, to the productions of Calamidis and Callimachus, he would seem to me not to go far astray."

Whilst Dionysius is doubtless right in his general criticism upon the style of Isocrates as compared with Lysias, — since in simple, graceful flow of words, such as would fall easily from the mouth of the orator and glide quietly and soothingly into the minds of the hearers, Lysias excels, — yet it should be taken into account that Isocrates wrote rather for private perusal, even where in form his compositions were addressed to assemblages of men; and, of course, a more studied style is entirely in place. One can easily feel, in reading Isocrates, that there is occasionally an air of artificiality and elaboration; but even in these cases the real artist shines forth so conspicuously as to incline one to excuse the defect of style, if it be one, in admiring the perfect artistic eloquence of the elaboration. The words with which he would forestall the critics of his own day, near the beginning of the Panegyricus, might well be addressed to those of subsequent ages. "Some men," he says, "are inclined to find fault with all writings elaborated beyond the common capacity and highly finished, and have not the sense to understand that such works should not be compared with the unlabored pleadings of courts of justice; since the latter are designed merely to confirm or set aside private contracts, whilst the former are intended to give an honorable reputation to their author. Do not such critics know that he who can array his thoughts in an elaborate and highly finished dress can, if occasion require it, write with the utmost simplicity and

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plainness? They do not escape detection that they make the limit of their own capacity the law of praise for others."[1]

In respect to high-toned, cultured sentiment, it cannot be doubted that Isocrates stands nearly or quite unrivalled in his age. In the grouping of his thoughts and graceful introduction of matters accessory to his main design, too, he excels. And, as Dionysius says, "he especially merits praise in the choice of the subjects of his speeches and in fairness of the arguments [in general, though he sometimes descended to special pleading] that he employs in accomplishing his purpose. And in this way he was able to influence those who studied his works, whether they were orators, or men of superior character in the relation of the family, of the state, or all of Greece; for the most excellent precepts of virtue are found in Isocrates' works."[2]

There cannot be the least doubt that all the educated men of his and the immediate subsequent ages set a high value upon the writings of Isocrates, as well as respected his character. Although there was some difference of opinion whether Isocrates or Lysias were the superior writer, according to the taste of different individuals, and the opportunity in his own age of personal intercourse, still, the preference was generally given to Isocrates. Socrates was decided in his judgment. Phaedrus introduces him in his conversation with Socrates as one who is his friend, and should not be forgotten in messages sent to different literary friends.

"Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus," Socrates says; "but I am willing to risk a prophecy concerning him." "What would you prophecy?" Phaedrus asks.

"I think that he has a genius which soars above the orations of Lysias, and he has a character of a finer mould. My impression of him is that he will marvellously improve as he grows older, and that all former rhetoricians will be as children in comparison of him. And I believe that he will not be satisfied with this, but that some divine impulse

[1] Panegyricus, § 11.

[2] See Dionysius, Vita, p. 55.

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will lead him to things higher still. For there is an element of philosophy in his nature. This is the message which comes from the gods dwelling in this place, and which I will myself deliver to Isocrates, who is my delight; and do you give the other to Lysias, who is yours." [1]

This sentiment of Socrates was adduced by Plato when Isocrates had advanced in life, and if, in the estimation of Plato, he had failed to fulfil the prediction, he would probably have indicated it. So Cicero says, in quoting this passage, that "Isocrates, with the testimony of Plato in his favor, need not care for the opinion of others." [2] "These are the auguries of Socrates concerning the youth; and these things Plato writes of the old man, and writes as a contemporary, and as a despiser of all the rhetoricians. This one only he admires." [3]

Cicero often speaks of Isocrates, and always with the highest approbation. His opinion of him as a teacher we have previously sufficiently portrayed. As a writer, too, he commends him variously, and not merely as approving the testimony of Socrates and Plato in the passage above quoted. He gives as the special characteristis of Isocrates, *sweetness;* of Lysias, *delicacy;* of Hyperides, *pointedness;* of Aeschines, *pomp;* of Demosthenes, *energy*." [4] Isocrates' sweetness was especially based upon his employment in prose of measure and rhythm without the number which constitutes poetic form.[5] In this way he contrived to soften the harshness of the style of his predecessors, and throw some of the charms of poetry about it.

[1] Plato, Phaedrus (Jowett's translation), p. 584.

[2] Sic Isocrates videtur testimonio Platonis aliorum judicia debere contemnere. — Orator, § 13.

[3] Haec de adolescente Socrates auguratur, ea de seniore scribit Plato, et scribit equalis, et quidem exagitator omnium rhetorum. Hunc miratur unum. — Orator, § 13.

[4] De Orat., iii. § 7.

[5] Nam qui Isocratem maximi mirantur, hoc in ejus summis laudibus ferunt, quod verbis solutis numeros primus adjunxerit, etc. — Orator. So in Brutus, § 8: Cum cetera melius, quam superiores, tum primus intellexit, etiam in soluta oratione, dum versum effugeres, modum tamen, et numeram quendum oportere servari.

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Quintilian, too, is not sparing of his praise of the writings of Isocrates, although he thinks that elaboration is carried too far in them. He says: "Isocrates, polished and artistic in all kinds of writing, and adapted rather to the schools than to actual life, exhibits all the charms of speech; and with reason, too, for he wrote for the public assembly, rather than the judges. He is ready in invention, studious of honor and honesty, and so painstaking in style that it becomes faulty." [1]

[1] See Instit. Lib. 10, and cf. also Lib. 2. c. 9; Lib. 3. 1; Lib. 9, etc.; Hremog.; Πολὺ τὸ καθαρὸν τῆς λέξεως παρ' Ἰσοκράτει.; Plin. Ep. Lib. 6: Nec vero Isocrati, quominas haberetur summus orator effecit, quod infirmitate vocis et mollitia frontis, quominus in publico diceret, impediebatur.

(To be continued.)

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ARTICLE II.

CHRIST AND PAUL.

BY REV. J. H. McILVAINE, D.D., NEWARK, N.J.

It is evident, even to a cursory reader of the New Testament, that there are differences between our Lord Jesus Christ and his apostle Paul with respect to the verbal and intellectual forms in which they set forth the truths of the gospel. These differences are regarded by all Christians, of course, not as involving anything of the nature of inconsistency, but as pertaining merely to forms of presentation; yet the more they are contemplated the more striking and significant they become. We propose, therefore, to examine them with some attention, in order to elicit their meaning, if they have any which can help us to a better understanding of revealed truth.

The general characteristics of the Lord's teaching to which we refer are the following: He reveals the truths of the spiritual world on his own absolute authority, as intuitively perceived by himself, with the least possible resort to logical processes, in concrete forms, and highly figurative language: "Never man spake like this man. . . . For he taught them as one having authority, and not as the Scribes." He seldom refers to the preceding Scriptures, and then, as it would seem, quite as much for the purpose of confirming the truth of their declarations as that of his own. He does not hesitate to supersede their deliverances, upon occasion, by new revelations, as in the case of the Mosaic laws of marriage and divorce. He seems carefully to avoid abstractions and definitions. Figures and symbols of various kinds and great boldness abound in his discourses, which he seldom interprets, and then evidently without aiming at exactness or precision. He never explains how far his similitudes are to be carried.

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The sublime truths which he throws out with almost every breath he leaves, without precise boundaries and necessary qualifications, to work as vital principles their own effects and consequences in human life. Such are the parables of the unjust steward, the unjust judge, the friend of whom one came to borrow bread at midnight, and the following words: "Whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." Evidently he feels no solicitude or concern for the systematic harmony of the truths which he delivers, although they are often so remote from each other that they have the appearance of being inconsistent or contradictory. The following are examples: "I and my Father are one. ... My Father is greater than I. ... There is none good but one, that is God. ... Which of you convinceth me of sin? ... Ye will not come to me that ye might have life. ... No man can come to me except the Father which hath sent me draw him. ... All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. ... To sit on my right hand and on my left is not mine to give. ... No man hath ascended up to heaven but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of Man which is in heaven." Hence these and similar antinomies in our Lord's teaching have proved the fruitful germs of vast and hostile systems of theology. But so rigorously does he himself abstain from all attempts at systematization that even such words as regeneration, justification, and sanctification, together with their verbal forms, he hardly ever uses, and never, as it would seem, to express those defined theological ideas which they commonly represent in the writings of Paul. In his mouth they have a free and popular sense, as in the following quotations: "By thy words thou shalt be justified. ... I sanctify myself. ... Ye which have followed me in the regeneration." In the place of justification by faith, or being accepted as righteous, as this form of doctrine stands in Paul, he everywhere insists upon the forgiveness of sins and the more comprehensive form of salvation by faith: "Forgive, and ye shall be forgiven. ... He that believeth on me hath everlasting life. ... If ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die

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in your sins." In fine, he rather assumes by implication than enunciates the doctrines of the divine decrees, fore-ordination, and election, which, in the writings of Paul are carefully stated, copiously developed, and variously applied.

In all these and many other particulars of form, the teaching of the Master differs from that of his great apostle. For Paul appeals to the preceding Scriptures, and to Christ himself, as ultimate authorities, not only for his readers, but also for his own mind. He delivers the truth in abstract, rather than in concrete forms. His language is hardly more figurative or symbolical than was unavoidable. He interprets and applies the types and symbols of the Old Testament; but he does not teach by parables or allegories of his own. He is eminently systematic, argumentative, and logical. He delights in abstruse processes of reasoning, and canvasses with great rigor the objections which arise against his doctrines. He strongly insists upon the harmony of the whole scheme of revealed truth, both in itself and with the providential history of the people of God from Abraham to his own time; and he takes special pains to reconcile the legal dispensation under Moses with the doctrines of salvation by grace and faith as revealed in germ to Abraham, taught by Christ, and elaborated by himself. But above all, he lays the greatest stress upon the divine decrees, predestination, election, and justification by faith; which last he evidently regards as the most important form of truth for the object which he has in view, since it is the theme of his most labored epistles, and the substratum itself of all his writings.

Such, in general, without taking into account the qualifications which these statements may require, are the most obvious differences in form between the teaching of Christ and that of Paul, as represented in the reported words of the one and in the extant writings of the other. How are we to understand them? And how do they help us to a better appreciation of revealed truth? These are the questions which we have now to consider.

For our present purpose, however, it is hardly necessary

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to observe that the absolute authority claimed by our Lord Jesus Christ is sufficiently accounted for by the orthodox doctrine of his divinity; whilst Paul, as his disciple and apostle, could not do otherwise than recognize the authority of his Master, and of the Scriptures as inspired by his Spirit — all the more, indeed, as he himself was under the same inspiration. Perhaps, also, some of these differences may be explained by the peculiarities of Paul's mental constitution and education, which, as in the case of the other sacred writers, his inspiration certainly did not obliterate. But most of those which have been indicated cannot be disposed of in this summary way, but must be regarded as having a deeper significance. Accordingly, some sceptical authors have maintained that they are not merely differences of form, but of essential doctrine; moreover, that in the history of the church the doctrinal system of the disciple has prevailed over, or thrown into the shade, the unsystematic teaching of the Master. Hence what we call Christianity they call Paulinism. We may find hereafter that this error, as in most other cases, is not without a shadow of truth. Others, who cannot be classed with sceptics, would account for these differences by the statement that Christ was the originator of Christianity, and Paul was its first great philosophical expounder. Among Christians, however, it seems to be the most received explanation that there is a progress of revelation in the New Testament, such that what Christ delivered in germ or principle Paul develops, formulates, and systematizes. In confirmation of this view, which differs but little from the preceding, the following declarations of the Lord are cited: "I have many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now; howbeit when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth. . . . He will show you things to come. . . . He shall bring all things to your remembrance whatsoever I have said unto you." It is claimed that these and similar passages contain a promise of a more full and complete revelation than was given by the Lord himself, which, accordingly, we are supposed to have in the subsequent writings of his apostles.

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We are constrained to reject all these explanations — the first, as sceptical and false, having but a single grain of truth to render it plausible; the second, as savoring of rationalism, and, together with the third, as inadequate to account for the facts, and as otherwise objectionable. For they supply us with no good reason why those particular doctrines to which Christ only alludes should have been so treated by him, nor why the same doctrines should have been so strenuously insisted on by Paul. Justification by faith can hardly be conceived of as among those things which the disciples could not receive from the lips of the Divine Master; since all the difficulties which it involves are quite as palpable in the doctrine of salvation by faith, upon which he everywhere insists. Nor is there anything hard to be received in Paul's treatment of the decrees, foreordination, and election, which is not contained in the teaching of Christ wherever he assumes or alludes to these mysterious doctrines. Still less satisfactory, if possible, are these views as an explanation of the Lord's unsystematic and figurative presentation of the truth, and of those startling antinomies with which it abounds; for we find in these much greater difficulties than any which Paul has left us in his systematic and harmonized scheme of doctrine. But the strongest objection to such progress of revelation in the New Testament is, that it represents the highest — in fact, the only absolute and final — forms of the truth as delivered to us not in the words of the Master himself, but in those of his disciples; so that we are dependent upon them, rather than upon him, for our last and best instruction in the knowledge of God and divine things. Now this, which might be accepted in the case of a merely human teacher, — Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle, for example, — is totally inadmissible in that of the incarnate Word and Wisdom of God, to whom, in teaching as in everything else, pre-eminence ought to be ascribed. Moreover, it seems to be inconsistent with that relation of personal trust and dependence upon him for salvation from error, as well as from all the other evils of sin, by which we become partakers of

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his fulness, and in which none of his disciples, howsoever plenarily inspired, can stand in his place. Nor do his words which are cited in proof of such progress require to be so interpreted. For evidently the principal truth which they were intended to declare is, that the Holy Spirit should open the minds of the disciples to a more full reception and realization of the revelations which Christ had communicated to them, and which hitherto they had but very imperfectly comprehended. The declaration, "He shall .... bring all things to your remembrance whatsoever I have said unto you," may properly be understood to qualify and explain whatever stands in the same connection. Moreover, the interpretation of these promises in the sense of a progressive revelation requires that they should be limited to the inspired apostles and writers of the subsequent Scriptures; otherwise they give assurance of divine inspiration extending beyond the apostles, and, for aught that appears, to the whole church in all subsequent ages. But no one has ever dared to maintain that they admit of any such limitation; for that would be inconsistent with the account which is given us of their fulfilment on the Day of Pentecost, and with the gift of the Spirit as enjoyed by all Christians. Consequently the interpretation which requires that they should be so limited cannot be maintained. We shall see hereafter what a disastrous influence this notion has exerted upon theology and the whole life of the church, by which, among other things, it has rendered colorable the charge of her enemies, that her actual faith is Paulinism, rather than Christianity.

These and similar errors upon this subject seem to be connected with false or inadequate views of the nature of spiritual truth, especially with respect to its higher and lower, its more or less symbolical forms, in which, for different purposes, it is capable of being, and often requires to be expressed. But their principal source is the failure to discriminate the object of Christ's teaching from that which Paul had in view, especially in his elaborate discussions with his countrymen. For it has been commonly assumed that

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these objects were the same, not only in their general character, but also in their more special aspects, in which it will devolve upon us to show that they were very different. Hence, in order to refute these errors, and to disclose what seems to be the true significance of these differences, we shall endeavor to evince that the object of the Lord's teaching was of a paramount nature, according to the pre-eminence of his person and character, namely, to reveal the truths of the spiritual world in their highest and most adequate forms, for the satisfaction of the spiritual wants of mankind; and that the object which Paul had in view, in his principal writings, was of a subordinate and limited nature, suitably to his position and character as the disciple of a Master, namely, to present these truths in forms specially adapted to meet Jewish difficulties, and to convince the Jewish mind.

We proceed, then, to consider the evidence that this was the special object of the Apostle's principal writings, and that to it the differential characteristics of his mode of presenting the truth are chiefly due.

But here, at the outset, we are met with the objection, which immediately occurs to every one, that Paul was the great Apostle of the Gentiles, and the actual founder of nearly all the first Gentile churches. How, then, is it possible that he should have been so powerfully influenced by any peculiar relation to his countrymen? But this objection, which seems at first sight as if it might be insuperable, will be found, upon closer scrutiny, to confirm what we have undertaken to prove. For the people of the Jews at that time, just as they are now, were dispersed abroad throughout the civilized world. It has been estimated that there were forty thousand of them in Antioch, two hundred and fifty thousand in Alexandria, upwards of a million in the whole of Egypt, and an unknown multitude in Rome. There was hardly a Gentile city of any importance which had not its Jewish synagogue. Hence, wherever the Apostle of the Gentiles was led in his missionary travels he found there a colony of his countrymen and co-religionists, among whom it was his

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custom, as it was evidently a dictate of wisdom and common sense, to commence his missionary labors. For in preaching to them he had the immense advantages of a common descent and nationality, a common acquaintance with the Hebrew language and history, and a common appeal to the Old Testament Scriptures. But above all these, that long course of divine training and preparation for the advent of their Messiah and the gospel dispensation, to which the children of Israel had been subjected, under their ritual and moral laws, the ministry of their prophets, their civil and religious institutions, and their providential history, was now finished, and its fruit was ripe. In so far, therefore, as this divine scheme of national education had proved a success, were they better prepared to understand and appreciate the gospel than were the Gentiles among whom they dwelt, and who had enjoyed no such training. Hence the first thing which Paul in his work of planting the Gentile churches had to do, was to adapt his teaching to meet the difficulties and win the faith of his countrymen. Nor does the character of his principal writings differ materially from that of his preaching. For in this way it came to pass that the first churches among the Gentiles were chiefly composed of Jewish converts. The proof of this, which will be more fully unfolded in the sequel, is, that they manifested a constant tendency or proneness to lose their hold upon the distinctive truths of the gospel, and to relapse into Judaism. For this acknowledged fact is not sufficiently accounted for by the hypothesis of Judaizing teachers having crept in among them. Such teachers would never have been able to persuade Gentiles, with all their inveterate contempt for Jewish rites, to be circumcised. Hence, as from this point of view we might anticipate, the longest and most elaborate of Paul's epistles to these churches, namely, those to the Romans, the Galatians, and the Hebrews — if this last is to be ascribed to him — consist, in whole or in great part, of arguments to refute Judaizing errors, and of such presentations of the gospel as were evidently intended, as they were eminently

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adapted, to meet the objections and win the faith of the Jewish mind.

We proceed now to consider the evidence in these three epistles — though such evidence is by no means confined to them — that it was a special object with Paul to present the truths of the gospel in forms adapted to the spiritual wants of those who had been trained under the Mosaic law, rather than of those upon whom it had never exerted its all-moulding influence. For in this object we shall find the source of those peculiarities in his teaching which have been indicated, by which it differs from that of Christ, as also, though in a less degree, from that of all the other inspired writers. Nor need we be surprised if it should appear that these Pauline forms of truth, the object of which was of a subordinate and limited nature, have not that universal adaptation to the spiritual wants of mankind which has been commonly ascribed to them, and which, as we shall see, is eminently characteristic of the gospel as delivered by the Lord himself.

The Epistle to the Hebrews, as we might anticipate, affords us the clearest and most palpable evidence. For even upon the supposition of some eminent authorities that it was not written by Paul, it yet evinces, in the most striking manner, how fully the necessity of commending the gospel to the Jews was recognized, and how deeply some other inspired author sympathised with him, and shared in his labors for the accomplishment of this object. Accordingly it is addressed to the Hebrews, in distinction from the Gentiles, and is wholly occupied with arguments and exhortations adapted to meet their difficulties, and to settle their minds in the faith of the gospel. With this object ever in view the author discusses a number of subjects which were of vital importance to them, but of secondary or no interest at all for others. Among these is the question whether Christ was the Messiah of the Old Testament Scriptures, which was one for those who had been educated Jews, rather than for others, because the authority of these Scriptures could not

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be assumed with the heathen, and because the form under which Christ could be most fitly offered to the Gentiles was not that of the Jewish Messiah, but that of Jesus, the Saviour of mankind, who had been crucified and raised from the dead. Hence we see that Paul himself, in his sermon to an Athenian audience in the hall of the Areopagus, assumed nothing from the Scriptures, and said nothing about the Messiah as such, but "preached unto them Jesus and the resurrection."

Another question which is argued at great length in this Epistle is, whether the priesthood of Christ was superior to that of Aaron and the house of Levi, which also was one in which none but Jews, or Jewish converts, could feel any direct or vital interest. For whatever might be the errors to which the rest of mankind were liable, they could never fall into this, that the Levitical priesthood was superior to that of Christ. What they needed was to be convinced that the mediation and sacrifices of their own heathen priests had no validity or efficacy to atone for their sins, or to reconcile them to God. A third question, though inseparable from the preceding, which occupies a great part of this Epistle, leads to the following conclusions, namely, that the ritual law, with its tabernacle and temple worship, its priesthood and sacrifices, was not of permanent obligation, but was typical and temporary in its nature and design — "a shadow of good things to come"; that it had now been fulfilled and superseded by the mediation and sacrifice of Christ, which alone had an eternal efficacy "to finish the transgression, and to make an end of sins, and to bring in everlasting righteousness." Now, although this presentation contains what is of fundamental importance for all men — for how could it express the truth of the gospel in any form if it did not? — yet, in its immediate design and adaptation, it concerned the Jews only, and was directed against errors to which they alone were liable. For the rest of mankind had never believed in the Mosaic ritual or sacrifices, and no obstacle to their faith in Christ could possibly arise from this source.

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The same view is to be taken of all the Jewish errors which are controverted throughout this Epistle; they could present no temptation to the Gentiles, who had not been trained under the law of Moses. Consequently these elaborate arguments and eloquent exhortations against apostasy to Judaism, and the Epistle itself, in so far as it is occupied with such questions as these, can have little more than an historical and secondary interest for mankind at large. It is not here, then, that we are to look for those forms of gospel truth which are best adapted to satisfy the spiritual wants of the human race.

The evidence in the Epistle to the Galatians, unquestionably written by Paul, though not so obvious, is of still greater importance and weight. For these churches of Galatia had been established in the midst of a colony of Gauls or Celts, who had been settled for several centuries in Asia Minor, whose ethnic character and modes of thought were as remote as possible from those of the Jews, and where least of all we should have anticipated that a tendency to Jewish errors would have manifested itself. But even these churches, as it appears, were chiefly composed of converts from Judaism, in whom this tendency was so strong that it threatened to subvert their faith in the very principles of the gospel. For this Epistle is one elaborate argument from beginning to end against Judaism, which it represents as having "bewitched" the Galatian Christians. And the principal error against which the apostle here directs his battery is, that circumcision and the observance of the Mosaic law were still necessary to acceptance with God. In order to drive this obstinate delusion out of their minds, he labors to convince them that they had been once and forever emancipated from the yoke of the law by the mediation and sacrifice of Christ; that by faith in him alone they were justified from all their offences against the law; and he solemnly warns them that if they continued to depend upon their ritual observances now that these were abolished, they would frustrate, in so far as they themselves were concerned, all the promises and blessings

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of the gospel: "O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you, that ye should not obey the truth, before whose eyes Jesus Christ hath been evidently set forth crucified among you? ... Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us. ... Stand fast, therefore, in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again in the yoke of bondage. Behold, I Paul say unto you that if ye be circumcised Christ shall profit you nothing. ... Christ has become of no effect unto you." Now, it is true that errors are here represented to which human nature itself is ever liable, and there are profound gospel truths here set forth which can never lose their interest or importance; yet is it abundantly evident that in this whole discussion it was Paul's direct and immediate aim to refute these errors under peculiar forms to which his countrymen alone were exposed, and to exhibit these truths in special adaptation to meet their difficulties and to establish their faith. For who else but Jews could ever have fallen into the error that circumcision and the observance of the Mosaic law were necessary to salvation? Consequently we are not obliged to accept these special forms of the truth as those which are best adapted to the spiritual wants of mankind at large.

We have touched lightly, however, upon this Epistle to the Galatians, because in its theme and object it is identical with the Epistle to the Romans, and many of its arguments are substantially the same. This latter we shall examine more particularly, because it is the longest, most elaborate, and every way most important of all the apostle's extant writings; in which, therefore, we may expect to find the clearest evidence of the degree of prominence given in his teachings to the special object which has been indicated, and of the influence which this object exerted to mould and shape the forms in which he presents the gospel.

We observe, then, that although this Epistle was written by Paul in his character of the Apostle to the Gentiles, to a church which had been established in the centre and capital

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of the Gentile world, yet, like that to the Galatians, it consists chiefly of arguments to refute Judaizing errors, and of such presentations of gospel truth as were evidently intended and adapted to win and establish the faith of those who had Jewish difficulties to overcome. These arguments with his countrymen he commences about the middle of the second chapter, and carries them on, with more or less of interruption, nearly to the close of the eleventh; so that they run through the whole Epistle, except the introduction and the exhortations and greetings with which it concludes. It is true, he sometimes turns aside from the main drift of his discourse to address and instruct the Gentiles, who must have constituted some portion at least of the church at Rome, yet what he says in such passages is evidently intended quite as much for the edification of his countrymen. Such, for example, are his declarations that the rest of the world were included in the object and promises of the gospel together with the covenant people, and that blindness in part had happened unto Israel until the fulness of the Gentiles should come in. For the latter of these statements was one of interest chiefly for those who stood in danger of perishing from this blindness. Throughout the Epistle his special object — the instruction and salvation of his countrymen — is never lost sight of for a moment; his direct address is preferably to them; and the deepest and most tender interest which he represents himself as having at heart is that they might be saved. We have sufficient evidence of this in the following quotations, which might be almost indefinitely multiplied:

"Behold, thou art called a Jew, and restest in the law, and makest thy boast in God, and approvest the things that are more excellent, being instructed out of the law. . . . Know ye not, brethren, for I speak to them that know the law, how that the law hath dominion over a man as long as he liveth? . . . I say, then, hath God cast away his people? God forbid. . . . What shall we say, then, that Abraham our father . . . hath found? . . . What advantage, then, hath the

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Jew? and what profit is there of circumcision? Much every way: chiefly, because unto them were committed the oracles of God. . . . Brethren, my heart's desire and prayer to God for Israel is that they might be saved. . . . For I could wish myself accursed from Christ for my kinsmen according to the flesh, who are Israelites, to whom pertaineth the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises; whose are the fathers, and of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came."

Thus he proceeds through the body of the Epistle, with his direct address preferably to his own countrymen, expressing his deepest interest in their welfare, and making it a special object to refute their errors and to present the gospel in adaptation to their peculiar states of mind which had resulted from their training under the law. For here, also, as in the Epistle to the Galatians, the principal error against which he has to contend is that of reliance upon the law as the ground of acceptance with God. In order to undermine and overthrow this legality, he proves that the Jews, from the imperfection of their obedience and their many grievous violations of the law, which thundered its penalties against every transgression, had no claim whatever to its righteousness, but were necessarily under its condemnation, and as hopelessly lost as the Gentiles themselves: "What then? Are we better than they? No, in nowise; for we have before proved both Jews and Gentiles, that they are all under sin." Consequently there rested upon them an overwhelming necessity to find some other way of attaining to righteousness, since that of their own obedience was forever closed against them. Here, then, as also in the Epistle to the Galatians, in formal argument with his countrymen, in his efforts to reach and convince their minds, Paul lays himself out to establish the doctrine of justification by faith; in other words, that of the attainment of righteousness without the works of the law by faith alone in Christ: "Even the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ."

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Accordingly, one of his strongest arguments, which must have had overwhelming force with Jews, is, that Abraham himself, their great forefather and covenant head, had been justified without the works of "the law, which was four hundred and thirty years after," and before he was circumcised, thus becoming the father of all the faithful: "Faith was reckoned unto Abraham for righteousness, ... being uncircumcised, that he might be the father of all them that believe." Consequently they were no longer under the law, but were forever delivered from its claims as a condition of their acceptance and peace with God: "Being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ. ... Ye are not under the law, but under grace."

But, now, this great truth of their deliverance from the law which had been ordained by God himself with prodigious signs and wonders, because it was one which the Jews, after their fifteen hundred years' training under legal ordinances, must find extremely difficult to comprehend or receive, the apostle goes on to elaborate at great length, and with all his unrivalled force of argument and illustration. Their relation to the law he compares with that of a woman to her husband, and labors to convince them that by the sacrifice of Christ they were as completely emancipated from its claims as the woman is from the authority of her husband by his death: "For the woman which hath an husband is bound by the law of her husband so long as he liveth; but if her husband be dead she is loosed from the law of her husband. ... Wherefore, my brethren, ye also are become dead to the law by the body of Christ. ... Now we are delivered from the law, that being dead wherein we were held."

Such is a meagre sketch of the main drift of the apostle's argument throughout this Epistle. In the course of the discussion, however, and in answer to an objection which had been raised at an early stage of it, that comparatively few of God's covenant people could be persuaded to renounce their hope of attaining to righteousness under the law and to accept Christ, so that as a body they seemed to have been

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cast away, — in answer to this pressing objection, Paul sets forth and insists upon the doctrines of fore-ordination and election: "I say, then, hath God cast away his people? God forbid. . . . God hath not cast away his people whom he foreknew. . . . Israel hath not obtained that which he seeketh for; but the election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded. . . . For they are not all Israel which are of Israel. . . . There is a remnant according to the election of grace. . . . For whom he did foreknow he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate them he also called; and whom he called them he also justified; and whom he justified them he also glorified."

Thus we see how great and controlling an object it was with Paul to refute the errors, meet the objections, and present the truths of the gospel so as to convince the minds of his countrymen; also, that it is in his arguments with them that he develops and applies these special forms of truth by the prominence of which his teaching is so remarkably distinguished from that of Christ. Nor can we conceive of a more effectual method to convince them of the insufficiency of Judaism, and to fix their faith and their hope of salvation upon Christ alone, than that which is here adopted. For the need of justification, or of righteousness, or of being accepted of God as righteous, was that form of spiritual want in the Jew which, from his thirty generations of training under the law, was paramount. In fact, after his sensibility to all others had been well nigh lost, this one, as is evident from the prodigious development of his pharisaic self-righteousness, continued to press upon his soul. The Jew could never do without some way of attaining to righteousness. No offer of salvation which did not include this could ever, by any possibility, be made acceptable or credible to him. Hence, as soon as it had been proved to him that righteousness under the law was forever precluded, and that Abraham himself had been justified without it, his understanding would be

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opened, if by any means this were possible, to appreciate the evidence of that new and living way of attaining to righteousness which the gospel provided. Nothing, indeed, remained for him but to seek it in this way, or to remain forever under the soul-destroying condemnation and penalties of the violated law.

But it is evident, when we come to consider it, that this peculiar form in which the truth was presented by Paul to his countrymen, although it contains implicitly the very heart and marrow of the gospel, consequently, what is indispensable to the spiritual wants of all mankind, could not have had any such attractions for the Gentiles, and was not equally adapted to their necessities. For they could not feel, as did the Jew, this need of being accepted as righteous, because that training under the law out of which it grew had never been brought to bear upon them. In fact, it may be gravely questioned whether this peculiar form of spiritual want is ever felt, except by those who have been educated into it, either as Jews or under Judaizing systems of theology; for if any plain man, who has not been so educated, be asked now whether he feels the need of being accepted of God as righteous, he will hardly understand what is meant; and if it be explained to him, probably he will answer: I am not conscious of any such need; for I do not think that I am righteous, and what good could it do me to be accepted for what I am not? But if such a man be asked: Do you feel any need of the forgiveness of your sins, or of being reconciled to God? and if he have any seriousness of mind, or feeling of spiritual want in any form, he can hardly fail to answer: I certainly do; for I acknowledge that I am a sinner, and have become alienated from God by my erring and worldly life. Consequently the doctrine of justification by faith, although it implicitly contains a fundamental truth of the gospel, upon which, as Luther rightly discerned, the church of Christ must stand, or must fall, does not present this truth in that form in which the want of it is universally felt.

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The universal form of this spiritual want is that of the forgiveness of sins, reconciliation and peace with God. This is evident, in part, from the experience of mankind, but more abundantly from the fact that the gospel as delivered by our Lord Jesus Christ, whilst it contains no formal statement of the doctrine of justification by faith, is always or preferably directed and adapted to meet and satisfy the want of the forgiveness of sins. For the publican who went up into the temple to pray, and, standing afar off, would not lift up his eyes to heaven, but smote upon his breast, saying, "God be merciful to me a sinner," — this truly penitent soul does not seem to have felt any need of being accepted as righteous. Certainly he expresses no such feeling. It is for mercy — the forgiveness of his sins — that he bows his head, and smites upon his breast, and cries to God; whilst it is the Pharisee with whom he is contrasted who feels the need of being accepted as righteous, and who must convince himself that he is righteous, or he cannot live. It is true, this publican "went down to his house justified"; but here, as everywhere else in the Lord's use of it, this word is not to be taken in its strict Pauline sense of being accepted as righteous, but rather as expressing that the man obtained that for which he had prayed, which was mercy for his sinful soul, or the forgiveness of his sins. Again, in "the parable of parables," — that of the prodigal son, — which exhibits the Lord's own map or chart of the wandering soul's return to God, and of the manner in which it is received, not a word is said about justification or righteousness; but the soul returns from its wanderings and alienation, and is received again to its Father's house and its Father's table as a reconciled and forgiven sinner, whose transgressions shall never more be remembered. Also, in the case of the penitent woman who anointed the Lord's feet, having washed them with her tears and wiped them with her hair, he said, "Her sins, which are many, are forgiven, for she loved much," and, "Thy sins are forgiven." In like manner, to the paralytic who had been let down through the roof of a house

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into his presence, he said, "Son, be of good cheer; thy sins are forgiven thee." And when the Scribes charged him with blasphemy for these words, he added, "For whether is easier to say, Thy sins be forgiven thee? or to say, Arise and walk? But that ye may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins,— then saith he to the sick of the palsy,— Arise, take up thy bed, and go to thine house." In fine,— for we must limit ourselves to a few out of innumerable examples,— we have the same presentation of the gospel in the case of the judicially blinded: "That seeing they might see and not perceive, and hearing they might hear and not understand; lest at any time they might be converted, and their sins should be forgiven them."

Thus it is that the universal form of this great truth of the gospel is set forth by the Lord, in distinction from that peculiar adaptation of it which we find in the writings of Paul. Nor ought we to be surprised at this or other differences. For it could not reasonably be expected that the Master, with the paramount aim to satisfy the spiritual wants of human nature, without specific reference to that small section of it with which he came into personal contact, should deliver the truths of the spiritual world in precisely the same forms in which they might be subsequently formulated by his inspired apostle for the subordinate and limited purpose of convincing and persuading his countrymen, who had been peculiarly trained for so many generations under the law. But we must ever bear in mind that this difference, together with all others, is one of mere form and adaptation. For it is evident that the forgiveness of sins, in the teaching of Christ, is not the bare remittance of legal penalties, but it includes, also, complete restoration to the favor and love of God; in fact, all that Paul so earnestly presses upon his countrymen under the form of justification by faith.

A precisely similar view is to be taken of the doctrines of predestination and election, to which the apostle gives prominence and systematic development, in contrast with the fact that they are only alluded to, though certainly implied

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and assumed in the teaching of Christ. For not only did these doctrines answer the objection, that comparatively few of the covenant people actually embraced the gospel, but also they were eminently adapted to commend it to their faith. In order to appreciate this we must observe that these truths embodied a principle of the divine government and providence which had been familiar to the children of Israel throughout their whole history, and which had uniformly operated in their favor. For it had been exemplified in the original calling of Abraham out of his country and kindred to become their national founder and covenant head. Thus, also, Ishmael had been rejected, and Isaac had been chosen, so that all the covenant promises and blessings should be transmitted in the line of his posterity. In the same way Jacob had been preferred before Esau, to whom, according to the patriarchal institutions and customs, the birthright and headship of the family belonged: "That the purpose of God according to election might stand. .... As it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated." David, moreover, had thus been selected out of the eight goodly sons of Jesse, though the youngest of them all, and exalted from the sheepfolds to become the royal shepherd and sweet psalmist of Israel, their greatest national hero, from whose loins the Messiah himself should descend. And, passing over innumerable other examples, it was in the exercise of God's electing grace that they themselves had been selected from all the rest of mankind to be his covenant people, to whom his sacred oracles should be committed, together with the glory of the shekinah, the temple service, and all the other privileges and blessings of their high vocation. These doctrines, therefore, must have been peculiarly dear, and admirably adapted to commend the gospel in which they were embosomed, to every Jewish heart. But the principle of the divine government which they represent could have had no such attraction, — no such adaptation to win the faith or to awaken the hopes of the rest of mankind, because they had enjoyed no such training under the electing grace of

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God. On the contrary, it could not fail to discourage and repel them, for the reason that hitherto it had always discriminated against them, had operated to their disadvantage and exclusion from the covenant blessings and privileges. And this, doubtless, is one reason why in the teaching of Christ it is not brought forward into that prominence which it has in the writings of Paul, but, in comparison with other gospel truths, is left in abeyance.

In fine, this special object which Paul had so much at heart will go far to explain his logical and systematic presentation of the truths of the gospel. It is true, indeed, as has been suggested, that this may be due in part to his peculiar mental constitution and education; but it cannot be adequately comprehended without taking into view the necessity under which he was placed, to refute by logical processes the objections of his countrymen, and to harmonize, in a rational manner, the sweeping changes introduced by the new dispensation with all that had gone before in their wonderful providential history. For during forty generations of mankind they had been the elect people of God, to the exclusion of all other nations; and now they could be such no longer; but the Gentiles, who had been their eternal enemies, yea, the uncircumcised and unclean, were to stand on an equality with them before the God of Israel. For thirty generations they had been rigorously trained under that vast system of legal ordinances and ritual observances which God himself, by Moses, had enjoined upon them as "an everlasting statute .... an ordinance forever"; and now all this was to be swept away as with a besom. Also the moral law itself, which had been proclaimed to their fathers by the voice of God in thunder-words from the summit of Mount Sinai — what could Paul mean when he talked to them about this law's having been fulfilled by another for them, and of their being delivered from its claims? Why did he not try to convince them that they were delivered from the laws that fire would burn and water drown? It is not possible for us at this day to appreciate the peculiar

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difficulties and almost insuperable obstacles which these changes must have placed in the way of their acceptance of the gospel. Hence a most pressing necessity rested upon Paul in his labors for their salvation, to show and convince them that all these new and astonishing developments were contained as germs in, and consequently were in perfect harmony with, all their preceding revelations and history. But this he could not do without applying to the whole subject his great powers of analysis, and treating it in a more or less systematic manner. On the other hand, there was no such necessity for a harmonized scheme of truth to commend the gospel to the Gentiles, because they had not been trained under these preceding revelations, and had no such providential history. This, however, is only a partial explanation of the fact, which will require to be more fully treated in the sequel, that the gospel as presented by the Lord has nothing of a systematic form.

We come now to exhibit the evidence of the pre-eminent object and character of Christ's teaching; in other words, that it was to reveal the truths of the spiritual world in their highest and most adequate forms, as adapted to satisfy the spiritual wants of all mankind alike; and, consequently, without specific reference to states of mind which were peculiar to the Jews.

We observe, then, paradoxical as it may be, that Christ was no Jew. Though of the seed of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, of the tribe of Judah, and of the royal line of David, as concerning the flesh, we cannot even imagine him with the distinctive type of Jewish features. The church has never been able so to conceive or represent his personal appearance. The earliest representation of it which has come down to us, and which, however short it may fall of being a correct likeness, certainly gives us the idea of him which was impressed upon the minds of the primitive Christians, is as far as possible from being that of a Jew. The writer once had the fortune to see a fancy portrait of Christ with strongly marked Jewish features, and he hopes never to see another;

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for it was revolting and disgusting in the extreme, and such, he is well assured, it would have been to all Christians. Nor is there anything more wonderful or miraculous, when we consider how he was born and brought up, than his sublime exaltation above the prejudices and peculiar forms of thought, the character and whole life, of his countrymen and kindred. For he did not take upon himself in his incarnation the nature of the Jew, in distinction from the rest of mankind, but the nature of man as such,—our common humanity. Consequently he never speaks of himself as a Jew, nor of his brethren or kindred according to the flesh, after the manner of Paul. On the contrary, he disclaims, in some sort, his own relations. For when, on a certain occasion, it was said to him, "Thy mother and thy brethren stand without desiring to speak with thee, . . . he answered, Who is my mother? and who are my brethren? . . . For whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven the same is my brother and sister and mother." Even his mother he never addresses by this dear and sacred name, but always simply as woman: "Woman, what have I to do with thee?" Even when she stood by the cross, with the prophetic sword in her heart, he committed her to the care of his beloved disciple, saying, "Woman, behold thy son." Of himself he always speaks as "the Son of God" and "Son of Man," thereby signifying, doubtless, that he was the perfect embodiment and only adequate manifestation of God, and that he represented our common humanity as no other man ever did, or could do.

Now, with these views of the incarnation, person, and character of Christ, it awakens no surprise in us that his teaching gives no special prominence to doctrinal forms which had any peculiar relation to Jewish states of mind, such as those of predestination, election, and justification by faith. Here, also, we have one reason why his personal ministry found so little acceptance with his countrymen, when "he came to his own, and his own received him not." For although there were other causes of their fierce and ran-

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corous hatred against him, which could be satisfied with nothing short of his ignominious and cruel death, yet it did not lie in "the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God" that they should receive the gospel until it had been commended to them by that peculiar adaptation which Paul was raised up and inspired to give it. From these views, moreover, we might anticipate that the truths of the gospel, as delivered by the Lord, would have the largest and most perfect adaptation to the spiritual wants of mankind, irrespective of the distinction between Jew and Gentile, as we have seen that they have in the case of the forgiveness of sins; also that they would be clothed in the highest and most adequate forms of which they are capable in human words, which forms are given them, as it now remains for us to show, in the Lord's unsystematic and highly figurative teaching.

In order, then, that this may become evident, it is necessary that we should here take into consideration an old common-place, the significance of which, however, has not yet been exhausted, namely, that all great truths are manifold and many-sided. Hence it seldom occurs that any one definite expression can give more than a single aspect of such a truth, leaving out many others, perhaps, of equal or greater importance. Again, the highest, not to say all truths of the spiritual world, are transcendent and ineffable; in other words, they cannot be adequately conceived of by the human faculties, much less expressed in human language. The reason of this is, that they belong to the realm of the infinite, whilst our faculties are finite, and all our words have necessarily a defining or limiting power. Such truths are God in his being, attributes, purposes, and providence; the human soul in its self-consciousness, freedom, morality, and immortality; holiness and sin, mediation and redemption, heaven and hell — what are all these but unfathomable mysteries to the finite intellect? Our most perfect comprehension of them can be nothing better than an infant's conception of the solar system. It is not possible to understand the

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revelation which God has given us without the recognition of this truth. For even the parallelisms of Hebrew poetry, representing the same truth in two balanced clauses, of which the former is felt to be unsatisfactory, and the latter is an effort to supplement it. This mode of expression evidently sprang from the deep feeling in the sacred writers, that their words were inadequate to their conceptions of spiritual truths, and their conceptions to the truths themselves. Hence, also, in the attempt to express such truths, they instinctively lay hold upon metaphor, similitude, analogy, — all the various forms of symbolization, — in which their immediate aim is to touch the sensibilities, stimulate the imagination, exalt and quicken all the intellectual powers, in order to a more enlarged receptivity of the truths which they reveal.

In consequence of this manifold, transcendent and ineffable nature of the truth, it cannot be fully expressed even in the words of inspiration itself. These words are not to be interpreted as complete revelations, but they are to be regarded rather as index fingers pointing upwards, and directing us where to look in order that we may see for ourselves as much as we have capacity for seeing of the things which they can only indicate. For the Scriptures, in all their fulness, give us nothing more than glimpses into the infinite. That which is revealed, and is capable of being known by us, bears no proportion to that which is unrevealed, and incapable of being known. At the same time we know that all truth is one, and, consequently, that every particular truth which has been revealed bears relations to, and is necessarily conditioned and modified by every other truth of the great whole which remains unknown. We have the most striking examples of such modification in the revelations of the Old Testament as affected by the more full disclosures of the New, especially where the Lord, by his own teaching, completes, or even supersedes, what had been "said to them of old time."

Now from all this it seems abundantly evident that the

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truths of the spiritual world which have been revealed to us, are incapable of being adequately systematized. For these glimpses into the infinite are comparatively so few and far between that the logical connections between them cannot be traced out. They constitute so small a part of the great whole to which they belong; they must be conceived of as bearing so many and such vital, yet such indeterminate, relations to the infinite unknown; and the forms in which they are expressed are necessarily so inadequate to the reality, that every systematic view of them which can be taken by the finite mind, if it be regarded as absolute, or other than incomplete and provisional, cannot fail to misinterpret and distort them, nor to prove the source of innumerable errors and practical evils. A partial system, so constructed, and taken for no more than what it is, may, indeed, have its uses for the accomplishment of subordinate objects, as in the case of Paul's writings to convince his countrymen; but it can never give to these truths of the spiritual world their highest forms and most adequate expression. We might as well attempt to construct the map or chart of a coast from the lighthouses alone which beam from its headlands, leaving out the bays, mouths of rivers, and other indentations and projections which lie between. Such an imperfect sketch, regarded in its true character, might have its uses; but taken as a representation of the whole coast, it could lead to nothing but shipwreck and disaster.

Here, then, we have a good and sufficient reason why our Lord adopted and consistently followed his highly figurative and unsystematic method of teaching. In fact, no other was possible to him, as the revealer of the spiritual world in the highest forms in which it could be made known to us. For if he had undertaken to define and systematize the truth, to eliminate its antinomies, to harmonize its apparently conflicting aspects by tracing out the logical connections between them, it would have been necessary for him either to reveal the whole truth, which was impossible, or to clothe these glimpses or fragments of it in lower and less adequate forms;

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in which case he must have renounced the pre-eminent character and object in and for which, as "a teacher sent from God," he had come into the world.

We come now to inquire how it came to pass that this discrimination between the object of Christ's teaching and that of Paul in his controversies with his countrymen was not made at the Reformation, and to what extent the history of the Protestant church has been affected by regarding these objects as identical, or on a par with each other. Nor need we be surprised if we should find that from this cause alone the church's understanding of the nature of spiritual truth, her appreciation of the importance of catholic unity, her systems of theology, confessions of faith, creeds, and preaching, are all very different from what they would otherwise have been.

It seems evident, then, that the great Reformers of the sixteenth century were prevented from making this discrimination by the relations which the Protestant movement bore to the papacy. For at that time, as is well known, the church of Rome had reached her utmost development, both in her priestly hierarchy and in the Arminian character of her theology. What were called the Augustinian, and subsequently the Calvinistic, but which are properly the Pauline forms of doctrine, had well nigh or quite disappeared from her teaching. Her theologians no longer perceived, as Augustine and Ambrose and Anselm had done, that the forms of truth upon which Paul had so strenuously insisted, though specially adapted to meet the difficulties and convince the minds of his countrymen, did yet contain the very marrow of the gospel as taught by the Master. In fact, the Scriptures themselves, from a variety of causes, had become a sealed book to the people, and were but little known to the clergy themselves. In this state of things the Reformers appeared, and the first thing they did was to throw open the Bible, study it for themselves, and teach it to the people. Thus commenced the great struggle and conflict in which the most vital and paramount interest of Protestantism was

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that of succesful resistance against the overshadowing authority and power of Rome. For to fail here was to fail in everything else. But it is hardly possible for us, at this day, to imagine how great was the delight of the Reformers, when, in their study of the Bible, they discovered in the Pauline Epistles a perfect thesaurus of arguments against the papacy; not only against its Arminian theology, in Paul's systematic presentation of the doctrines of the decrees, foreordination, election, and justification by faith, but also against its priestly hierarchy, founded upon and modelled after that of the Jewish church, which the great apostle had overthrown. In consequence of this, and inevitably, these Epistles, in which the Reformers found their keenest weapons for the conflict in which success was everything to them, came to exert a greater influence upon their minds — to mould their faith and shape their doctrines — than all the other Scriptures. It was under this peculiar influence that they were led to adopt and imitate Paul's logical, argumentative, and systematic presentation of the truth, as the highest form of which it was capable, in preference to the alogical, unsystematic, figurative, and symbolical forms in which it had been clothed by the other sacred writers in general, and by the Master himself. In the all-controlling interest of making good their protest against Rome, they constructed their systems of theology, confessions of faith and creeds bodily out of Paul's writings, rather than as an unbiassed expression of the truth gathered from, and representing the whole word of God. It could not have been otherwise, and yet it is wonderful, when we consider what is generally acknowledged, and which, indeed, is evident of itself, that they made the doctrine of the decrees of God — his secret and eternal purpose of foreordination and election — the germinal and governing principle of their whole system of doctrine, and all other truths of the revelation to centre in it, revolve around it, and take their place, shape, and color from it, instead of assigning to this post of honor the person and work of Christ, which, beyond a question, at this day is the centre and heart of the gospel.

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The consequences of this systematizing spirit or tendency which was thus developed in the church of the Reformation beyond all that had ever before been known, even among the scholastic theologians, could not fail to prove disastrous. For although this tendency springs from an innate striving after unity in our knowledge which is common to human nature, and has many important uses, yet it requires to be held under severe restraint, because it is naturally impatient, and the love of system is ever liable to become stronger than the love of truth, than which there is no more copious source of human errors. For under its influence we are sorely tempted to misunderstand, or to explain away, or even to deny, the most obvious facts and truths, whenever they prove refractory, and refuse to take their places quietly in the speculative systems which we construct for their accomodation. But these consequences are most disastrous in the domain of religion and theology. For since, as we have seen, it requires the knowledge of the whole truth to construct the true system, and all our revelations amount to no more than glimpses into the infinite, it is impossible to concentrate these scattered rays in a focus of logical unity without deflecting and distorting them. Moreover, each separate truth of the gospel is so vast in itself, and involves such all-absorbing human interests, that it can easily come to fill the most capacious mind, to the exclusion of other truths of equal importance, and no less clearly revealed. In this way, one class of minds, filled with the revelations which God has given of his goodness and love, and not being able to harmonize them systematically with other attributes in the infinitude of the divine nature, are led to deny his justice, and, with their utmost diligence and ingenuity, to explain away all those innumerable passages of Scripture in which it is affirmed. These become what are called Universalists. Another class, taking the freedom of the human will, which is matter of consciousness no less than of revelation, as the governing principle of their theological speculations, and not being able to bring this great truth into logical consistency

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with the decrees of God, do not hesitate to impugn the divine sovereignty, nor even, in some cases, to deny the divine foreknowledge. Thus we have Arminianism. Conversely, yet by a precisely similar process, the absoluteness of the decrees is made to rule out the freedom of the will and man's responsibility, the result of which is Antinomianism. In like manner, they who insist exclusively upon the humanity of Christ are led to the denial of his divinity, and thus become Unitarians. Whilst the Orthodox, who are most strenuous in affirming and maintaining his divinity, often lose the practical significance and benefit of the doctrine of his humanity, even when they would be shocked at the thought of denying it in words.

Here, now, we have the explanation of those vast and hostile systems of theology, and of all the schisms, conflicting sects, and sectarian strifes and controversies to which Protestantism has given prodigious birth. They have all sprung from failure to recognize in the unsystematic teaching of Christ the highest and most adequate forms of which the truths of the spiritual world are capable in human words, and from adopting in place of these Paul's method of presentation, which was employed by him for a special and subordinate object, and which was never intended to supersede, as it has been made to do, the higher and only adequate method of Paul's Master. It is this which has shivered the Protestant church into a thousand disjointed and angular fragments, such that they can no longer fit together as the "living stones" of that "spiritual house" which God is building for his own everlasting inhabitation. It is this which has well nigh obliterated from the bosoms of her people and clergy even the sentiment of catholic unity, together with the knowledge of that vital and indissoluble connection which subsists between this unity and the conversion of the world. For nothing less than such a connection can be fairly understood from the words of that last prayer which the Lord offered with his disciples before he suffered: "Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which

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shall believe on me through their word, that they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us, that the world may believe that thou hast sent me. And the glory which thou hast given me [of being one with thee] I have given them, that they may be one even as we are one: I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one, and that the world may know that thou hast sent me." Hence, also, that which is otherwise the most inexplicable fact in the whole history of the church, namely, that whilst she was thus occupied in rending the body of her Lord, and scattering the bleeding members as far apart as possible from each other, she lost, together with the sentiment of catholic unity, all consciousness of her character as Christ's missionary society, of her relation to the conversion of the world — the very object of her existence. For two hundred years the Protestant church never sent a missionary to the heathen. When it was proposed to do so, her leading minds scouted the idea. And now it is quite evident that the re-awakening of this sentiment, and the nascent striving after the restoration of catholic unity of which she is becoming conscious, are chiefly due to the influence of the missionary spirit and work.

We have yet to consider the character of the preaching which has prevailed in the church of the Reformation, and which, of course, has been moulded and governed by her theology, confessions, and creeds. Hence, as evidently in fact, it has presented the truth in the forms of Paul, rather than in those of Christ. It has been eminently systematic, logical, and argumentative, rather than figurative, authoritative, and practical. It has dwelt more upon the doctrines of foreordination, election, and justification by faith than upon the person and work of Christ, the forgiveness of sins, reconciliation with God, and salvation by faith. These statements, however, require to be qualified in certain respects, especially by the rise and spread of Methodism, which must be understood as a protest and reaction against some of these prevailing tendencies. That this is its character is evident from other

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and better things besides the notorious undervaluation which this denomination places upon the writings of Paul. Yet through this error it has been led to a higher appreciation than otherwise it might have attained of the forms of truth in the teaching of Christ as peculiarly adapted to the wants of the masses of mankind. Hence that vast influence which it exerts upon the less cultivated classes, and the unparalleled growth of the denomination.

Meanwhile, the doctrinal preaching which has prevailed in most of the Protestant churches has continued to represent Paul's discussions with his countrymen, rather than Christ's proclamation of the gospel to mankind. It still continues to address the Gentiles in those forms of truth which were originally intended and adapted to meet Jewish difficulties, and to commend the gospel to the Jewish mind, precisely as if they had been born and educated Jews. It warns them against Judaizing errors, to which they have never had any temptation, whilst their real dangers often lie in the opposite direction. It takes no less pains to convince them that they are delivered from legal ordinances than if they had the same difficulties upon this point with those who for thirty generations had been "kept under the law, shut up unto the faith which should afterwards be revealed." It offers them salvation under the form of being accepted as righteous, and spends itself in abstruse and endless discussions, after the manner of Paul, to render it acceptable in this form, when they have never felt the need of any such righteousness; but their souls, it may be, are crying out for the pardon of their sins and reconciliation with God. And if it were not that common sense has some little influence to neutralize speculative absurdities, this preaching would be laboring still to convince the people that the priesthood of Christ is superior to that of Levi; that the ritual law was of temporary obligation; that it has been fulfilled and superseded by the mediation and sacrifice of Christ; and that circumcision is no longer necessary — of all which, in so far as they believe anything, they have never had a doubt, and which never had a particle of interest for any but Jews.

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Yet it must be acknowledged that this preaching once had enormous and well nigh irresistible power; but this was due to the peculiar circumstances in which the church was placed, and which are very different now. For whilst the paramount interest with all Protestant Christians was that of success in their life-and-death struggle with Rome, they recognized in this preaching which gave distinguished prominence to the Pauline forms of doctrine, justification by faith, election, and predestination, their battle-cries in defence of their dearest liberties, and against their deadliest enemy. Hence their interest in sermons of which these doctrines were the staple arguments and themes of declamation could be sustained hour after hour, on each occasion; and they went away from them rejoicing and triumphing in the victories which, through the valiant leadership of their favorite ministers, they had gained over Antichrist himself. This was the secret of that enormous power which this preaching undeniably possessed whilst the battle raged, with doubtful results, through the civilized world.

But as soon as the ultimate triumph of the Protestant cause was no longer doubtful, then it began to lose its power. When success in this conflict ceased to be the paramount Protestant interest; when Rome had been shorn of her temporal and persecuting power; when the great currents of human thought and advancing civilization had all set in against the Vatican; when it began to be felt that indifference, scepticism, infidelity, and immorality were enemies more to be feared than the effete papacy, then this preaching in the manner and forms of Paul's Epistles, rather than in those of Christ's teaching, lost all interest for the people — an interest which it can nevermore regain. For it is self-evident that Paul's logical and abstruse discussions cannot be intelligently comprehended by any but well-educated and trained minds; nor could it have been anticipated by the apostle himself that they would be intelligible to the common people among the Gentiles. For, as we have seen, they were not originally addressed to them, but to those who had inherited

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the results of fifteen hundred years' education and training in the ideas which constituted the staple of his arguments. To his countrymen these ideas were as familiar as household words. Such preaching could not fail to lose its power, because it did not, and does not, feed the souls of the people. When they ask for bread, it offers them, not, indeed, a stone, but spiritual food prepared and seasoned for Jewish palates, for which they can have no genuine relish or appetite. Hence it is that the churches which were formerly crowded are now so thinly attended, and that the great masses of the people have fallen out from under the influence of the gospel, become hopelessly alienated from the Christian religion, and are living in a state of godlessness which is worse than heathenism. For it has been estimated that of the three millions of inhabitants of the city of London not more than one in six has ever seen the inside of a church. Our own large cities are hardly in a better condition; whilst of those who continue to attend the worship of the sanctuary there are multitudes who prefer any kind of sensational exhibitions in the pulpit to this "doctrinal preaching." And not unreasonably do they prefer that which produces some sort of emotion to this which produces none at all.

If, now, we have rightly discerned the significance of these differences between Christ and Paul, with respect to forms of truth, it would seem that we have need of another reformation hardly inferior to that of the sixteenth century. The man to head such a movement is the great want of our time — another Luther, who shall be able to liberate his mind from the authority of the last three hundred years of the church's history, to think himself out of the errors in which he must be born and educated, as the great men of that day had to do — a man with Luther's pen for the intelligent and cultivated, and Luther's voice for the masses of the people — the times in which we live cry out for such a man, nor does it seem that his advent can be much longer delayed.

What, then, from the preceding discussion, may we humbly

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and reverently anticipate will probably be the burden of his message? If we have not erred altogether, he can hardly fail to treat with some of Luther's scorn the notion of a progress of revelation by means of disciples and subordinates, beyond and above that which was delivered by the Master himself. He will recognize in the unsystematic and authoritative teaching of Christ the highest, most adequate, and every way most perfect forms of which the truths of the spiritual world are capable in human words. He will brand with some of Luther's contempt that systematizing spirit which presumes to exhibit a more symmetrical and harmonious scheme of doctrine, for the spiritual wants of mankind, than that which Christ has revealed; which perverts and distorts the revelations of the gospel; which misunderstands one truth, explains away another, and denies everything which cannot be successfully manipulated; in order that the miserable remnants may be made to fit and dovetail together in logical connections. In the schism of Jeroboam the son of Nebat, who made Israel to sin by the worship of the golden calves, in consequence of which the people of God were involved in long and bloody civil wars, so that they could no longer make successful resistance against the heathen, but were all carried away into captivity and bondage to the world, from which a few only returned — in all this some future Luther will find prefigured, in graphic details, the schisms, sectarianism, and theological wars of the church during the last three hundred years, in which she lost the consciousness of her high calling to subdue the heathen nations unto Christ, set up the idolatry of material wealth, and sold herself for nought into captivity and bondage to the world. He will recall the remnant of God's people out of this worse than Babylonish captivity and Egyptian bondage, from this slavery to the world, and lead them back into spiritual freedom and true holiness, so that the church will be enabled to exhibit, in the restoration of her catholic unity, that sign from God upon which Christ has covenanted that the world shall believe and be saved. He

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will trample under his feet, or burn in the market-place, as Luther burned the pope's bull, all sectarian creeds and symbols, as not conformed to the deliverances of Christ, and which make no due allowances for those differences of opinion in non-essentials which are inseparable from various degrees of intellectual ability and culture and spiritual enlightenment, and which are essential to all healthy growth and progress. He will believe and trust to the promise of the gift of the Spirit of God to all true believers to guide them into all necessary truth, so that they cannot be left to go fatally astray. He will understand that which is essential to a true and living faith as it was understood when the Apostles' Creed was the only symbol of the church, with which inscribed upon her banners she fought the great battle of the ages, and the ancient towers and bulwarks of paganism went down in flaming ruins before the strength of her faith and the fervor of her zeal.

Finally, our coming Luther, we venture to forecast, will set us a new example of preaching in the manner of Christ in the Gospels, rather than of Paul in his abstruse discussions with his countrymen. He will not preach to Gentiles as if they were Jews, and had Jewish prejudices and difficulties to overcome. The staple of his sermons will not be the secret purposes of God, but things revealed; not predestination, nor election, nor justification by faith, but the person and work of Christ, the forgiveness of sins, reconciliation with God, and salvation by faith. He will address his preaching to those spiritual wants which all men feel, rather than to those into which they must be laboriously educated before they can feel them. And the common people will hear him gladly, as they heard Christ. They will no longer run to the Circean swine-troughs of sensationalism, when the bread of life is offered them as Christ offered it. And then, not before, the vast multitudes who now seem to be hopelessly alienated from the church will return to her sacred pale.

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ARTICLE III.

ERASMUS DARWIN.

BY REV. THOMAS HILL, D.D., LL.D., FORMERLY PRESIDENT OF HARVARD COLLEGE.

ERASMUS DARWIN was born in Nottinghamshire, England, in 1731. Educated at Cambridge, and pursuing medical studies at Edinburgh, he began the practice of medicine at Lichfield, in Staffordshire, in 1756. Married in 1757, he was left a widower in 1770, with three sons. The eldest, Charles, gave great promise of brilliant talent, but died early in life from a wound received in dissecting; the second, Erasmus, Jr., showed no taste for science, and died a bachelor; the third, Robert Darwin, became a distinguished physician. Eight years after the death of his wife, Dr. Darwin fell greatly in love, at first meeting, with Mrs. Pole; but as Colonel Pole was living the passion was only allowed to exhale in gallant verses to one whom he called "doomed forever to another's arms." The "forever" lasted, however, only about two years, when the Colonel died, and Darwin laid suit in earnest. Mrs. Pole consented, but on one stern condition: the doctor must leave Lichfield. He married her in 1781, and moved to Derby, where he remained happily with her until his death in 1802. During the twenty-five years' residence in Lichfield he drew about him some distinguished admirers and friends; among them Thomas Day, the author of Sanford and Merton, and Richard Edgeworth, the father of his more celebrated daughter Maria.

His fame and skill as a practising physician were very great; and his treatment of diseases is, I understand, acknowledged by the best physicians of to-day to have been judicious and energetic. It was only in the reasons he gave for his action that he failed. He placed the greatest re-

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liance upon diet and regimen. Good beef, mutton, and poultry, milk and fruits; great abstemiousness in fermented liquors, and total abstinence from distilled; plenty of out-door exercise, and well ventilated rooms within; these were his very sensible hobbies. Undoubtedly some of his fame was due to the personal attractions of his character. Although inclined to be somewhat sceptical in religious matters, he was always decorous and respectful in speaking of the opinions of others; and he showed many of the best virtues of a Christian character. His omnivorous appetite for knowledge, the fruitfulness of his fancy, the playfulness of his irony, made him an agreeable companion; his great taste for botany and landscape gardening were indulged upon his grounds; and the hospitality of his house increased the attraction. Naturally somewhat clumsy in his appearance and movement, his awkwardness was increased by his breaking his knee-pan on occasion of one of his tumbles from a grotesque sulky of his own contrivance. But neither his lameness, nor the deep pits left by the small-pox, nor his inveterate stuttering created any repulsion that could long weigh against the attraction of his kindness, his learning, and his wit, the solidity of his sense, and the playfulness of his nonsense.

During many years, from 1771 to 1794, he labored upon a work called "Zoönomia; or, the Laws of Life." Before he gave it to the press, however, he wrote a poem called the "Botanic Garden." It was begun, Miss Seward tells us, about the year 1779, that is, soon after the time when he first met Mrs. Pole. He had purchased a fine location near Lichfield, and laid it out as a garden. This gives the title to the poem, which consists of two parts—first, the economy of vegetation; second, the loves of the plants. This second part, which is lighter and more playful, was published first. The plot is exceedingly simple. The Goddess of Botany (described in the first part) having retired, the Muse of Botany steps forward, and enumerates to the listening sylphs and gnomes various plants and flowers; describing each plant as a beautiful woman, attended by as many adoring

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lovers as the flower has stamens; or (if the plant has more pistils than one) as two or more females, attended by their appropriate number of males. The description by the muse being ended, the sylphs and gnomes retired; and Night, creeping up on tiptoe, bade the nightingale repeat the strains.

The plot of the first part — the economy of vegetation — is equally simple. The Goddess of Botany descends to the garden; and the gnomes, nymphs, and sylphs receive from her their orders, in what way to bring forth the flowers and fruits in their season. Having given the commissions, the goddess takes to her chariot, and is borne by the zephyrs to the clouds.

Each of the two parts is divided into four cantos, and the whole poem comprises four thousand four hundred and twenty-two verses. The versification is smooth — in fact, too smooth; its melody becomes monotonous. It contains very numerous short passages of great beauty; but the want of plot or connection makes the poem, as a whole, more unreadable than the Paradise Lost. It is rather a collection of exquisite passages than a poem. Its main use, evidently, was to give an opportunity for the notes, which are full and rich beyond description; embracing curious dissertations and observations on almost every possible subject of physical science, with not a few on metaphysics, aesthetics, and theology. It is evident, from contemporaneous writers, that the notes did much toward giving the volume its high popularity immediately upon its publication.

The subsequent volumes in prose, upon Zoönomia and upon Phytologia, have the same character as the notes to the Botanic Garden; they are a thesaurus of curious observations, experiments, and speculations upon the higher regions of physical science — the regions where it borders upon psychology and metaphysics. The doctor's style is very clear, both in the prose and in the poetry; he could be understood by all readers; and as his reputed scepticism nowhere appeared in his writings, he was offensive to none.

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William Cowper and Maria Edgeworth joined in his praise. In the first American, from the fourth London, edition of the Botanic Garden, are several poems, both in English and in Latin, bearing tribute to him. He was compared to Newton in science, and to Milton in the poetic art; and the Zoönomia and the Botanic Garden were presumed to be about to become in future times among the great sources of English honor.

My father's copy of all these volumes has recently come into my possession, and as I look over the pages I not only find his pencilled annotations, but recall my own childish judgments upon various passages. I clearly remember standing analyzing the beauties of a landscape, and comparing it with Darwin's theory of beauty; and I know that I never stood on that spot after entering my thirteenth year. On re-reading the volumes, I am convinced that I must have read the whole several times before that date, else I had never held the contents so clearly in my memory these eight and forty years. I am surprised to find how large a portion of my general information I had thus gained in my childhood, through the clear and attractive style of this physician at Lichfield.

This re-reading of the grandfather's books has also explained to me why Charles Darwin's recent speculations have had so much less interest and less fascination for me than for many of my contemporaries. The fact is, I had had Darwinism so thoroughly in my boyhood that it is difficult for any amount of exposure to induce a second attack. The writings of Darwin and of De Maillet, with both of which I was familiar at that time, contain the fully formed germs of all the modern theory.

In the first volume of the Zoönomia the author endeavors to discover a few general laws ruling in vegetable and animal bodies, as attraction, cohesion, repulsion, etc., rule in physics. He does not, however, do this in any materialistic or atheistic spirit. On the contrary, he expressly recognizes, and that repeatedly, the necessity of attributing to organized beings

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some immaterial entity governing them; the necessity, also, of assigning wisdom and love to the First Cause of the Universe. He asserts that his view of the reign of law in the development of organized beings gives us a higher conception both of the wisdom and power of God.

First of all, he endeavors by a great variety of ingenious experiments, as well as arguments, to show that every sensation is a movement of the nerves, or of the nervous system; and secondly, that all ideas and volitions are a reproduction of the same or similar movements. In this reproduction two great laws operate — the law of imitation and the law of catenation. The irritation of the nerve produces contraction; the contraction, sensation; the sensation, desire; the desire, volition; volition produces muscular contraction; but all these links are either successive imitations of motions, or else reproductions of motions through association.

"All diseases," says he, "originate in the exuberance, deficiency, or retrograde action of the faculties of the sensorium as their proximate cause, and consist in the disordered motions of the fibres of the body as the proximate effect of the exertions of those disordered faculties. The sensorium possesses four distinct powers or faculties, which are occasionally exerted, and produce all the motions of the fibrous parts of the body. These are, the faculties of producing fibrous motions in consequence of irritation, which is excited by external bodies; in consequence of sensation, which is excited by pleasure or pain; in consequence of volition, which is excited by desire or aversion; and in consequence of association, which is excited by other fibrous motions. We are hence supplied with four natural classes of diseases, derived from their proximate causes, which we shall term those of irritation, those of sensation, those of volition, and those of association."

Such is the simple basis of Darwin's Zoönomia. In elaborating and defending this classification his method is not so simple. Occasionally he speaks like a transcendentalist; generally, like an empiricist. But his definitions are

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so peculiar that it is hard to decide whether his thought was clear or not. For example, he says: "The word 'sensorium' in the following pages is designed to express not only the medullary part of the brain, spinal marrow, nerves, organs of sense, and of the muscles, but also, at the same time, that living principle or spirit of animation which resides throughout the body, without being cognizable to our senses, except by its effects." He goes on to intimate that perhaps the brain is a gland, separating from the blood a fluid more subtile than the electric aura, to be used in thought and sensation, but does not intimate any hypothesis as to the manner in which this fluid is used. Consciousness, he tells us, is a voluntary attention to remembered sensations; identity is a memory of past consciousness; free-will is a voluntary attention to particular links of catenated motions, which have arisen to recollection independently of our volition.

He argues at length, out of the affluence of his knowledge of natural history, to show that instinct, whether in man or animals, differs only in degree, not in kind, from acts of deliberate will and forethought. In the course of this argument he takes up the natural language of the passions, and endeavors to show that the natural signs of emotion are the result of association with the earliest actions accompanied by such emotions. Tears, for example, spring from intense feelings of pleasure, gratitude, or love; and the cause is gravely stated to be that the titillation of the olfactories of a new-born babe by the odor of the mother's milk excites tears and produces pleasure, thus associating the two forever. Again, when the baby is satisfied, the sphincter of the mouth, fatigued by sucking, is thoroughly relaxed, and the antagonist muscles mechanically produce a smile; whence smiling is forever associated with satisfaction and serene pleasure. These two examples, out of nearly a score, are sufficient to show the manner in which he reduces mental and aesthetic phenomena to the association of ideas in infancy. Even the first action of the new-born animal he explains by pre-natal

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associations. The expression of music or the beauty of proportion in architecture he regards as wholly conventional — the result of purely arbitrary associations. Abstract ideas he declares to have no existence, even in the mind of a metaphysician, who mistakes an imperfect idea of an individual for a general idea.

Motions are declared to have a propensity to repeat themselves, and to awaken imitations of themselves in other parts of the body. This point is illustrated by small-pox. When variolous matter is introduced under the skin by a lancet, there is no virus introduced into the blood, nor anything analogous to the introduction of spores into a seed-bed; the introduced matter simply excites peculiar motions in the skin about the wound, and these motions are repeated by morbid imitation in other parts of the system. We must not, however, suppose that Darwin had risen to the conception that all phenomena of matter are simply modes of motion. Had he done so he would not have argued, as he does, to prove that in inoculation there is no conveyance of virus.

The section upon the circulatory system contains several highly characteristic speculations. All secretion of glands, he thinks, probably produces pleasure to the embryo; and it is not until after birth that part of them begin to act without our consciousness. In speaking of digestion he narrates a case in which the patient had eaten game that was too "high," and the system ejected it with such vigor that the action of the whole system was inverted; the skin rapidly absorbed moisture from the air, whence it passed into the stomach, and so came out of the mouth; and this state of retroverted motion continued until several pints of water had been thus absorbed from the air and ejected by vomiting.

He defines temperaments to be permanent predispositions to certain classes of disease. The temperaments are four — decreased irritability, increased sensibility, increased voluntarity, and increased association.

The basis of his classification of diseases has already been

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given in his own words. His first class consists of diseases of irritation. In his preliminary discussion he advances the opinion that the varying solar and lunar attractions which cause the diurnal and monthly variation of the tides cause also more or less distinct tendencies to periodicity in every animal function, whether in health or in disease. In discussing his second class — diseases of sensation, he renews his thesis that in some kinds of contagion the disease consists in morbid motions of "the fine extremities of the capillaries or glands," which are propagated by morbid imitations of the motion. One of his arguments to prove this is the occasional suspension of one such disease by another. He argues that if the contagion was a virus the two diseases would proceed *pari passu*. The fact that one waits for the other proves to him that each is but a morbid habit of motion. The third class of diseases are those of volition — meaning by volition or voluntary motion not only movements of conscious volition, but involuntary motions whenever they arise as if it were from a motive. His fourth class is diseases of association, that is, from sympathy or consent with parts; as a chill of the skin producing cholera; diseased liver, the gout; or wetting the feet, coryza.

The closing section of his first volume is upon generation; and it introduces all the main doctrines which by their expansion have rendered his grandson so famous in our days. The variation of species under cultivation is dwelt upon with emphasis, as also the survival of the fittest, and the consequent improvement of the species; and it is asserted that all the great variety of creatures has been produced by the perpetual endeavor of the animals through so many generations to adapt themselves to their surroundings. The whole of his argument is, however, based upon the doctrine that the embryo is at first a living filament, secreted from the blood of the male parent. This living filament has the four fundamental capacities of organic matter, viz. capabilities of irritation, sensation, volition, and association; and it also has acquired habits of motion or thought derived from the

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life of its immediate male ancestor, and perhaps from millions of antecedent generations. These habits modify, to a certain extent, its growth and development. Moreover, the movements of the brain going on in the thought and imagination of the male parent at the moment when the filament is secreted from the blood are imitated in the filament, and farther modify its development. By this differentiation in the act of generation the living organism has gradually assumed new forms in multiplied variety.

"Would it be too bold," he asks, "to imagine that in the great length of time since the earth began to exist, perhaps millions of ages before the commencement of the history of mankind, — would it be too bold to imagine that all warm-blooded animals have arisen from one living filament, which the great First Cause endued with animality, with the power of acquiring new parts, attended with new propensities, directed by irritations, sensations, volitions, and associations; and thus possessing the faculty of continuing to improve by its own inherent activity, and of delivering down those improvements by generation to its posterity, world without end?"

After this passage, he further argues that all the lower orders — fishes, reptiles, insects, worms, sponges — may have sprung from the same filament. Finally, he declares that vegetables are also to be enumerated among the lower orders of animals, and that they have produced all their own variety by the survival of the fittest in their perpetual contest for light and air, food and moisture. These ideas he ascribes to ancient philosophers, and also to David Hume. "Shall we conjecture," he asks, "that one and the same kind of living filament is, and has been, the cause of all organic life?" This he thinks the grandest conception of the creative act. "For," he remarks, "if we may compare infinities, it would seem to require a greater infinity to cause the causes of effects than to cause the effects themselves." And again, "As every cause is superior in power to the effect, so our idea of the power of the Almighty Creator becomes more elevated and sublime as we trace the operations of nature

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from cause to cause, climbing up the links of these chains of being, till we ascend to the great source of all things."

Doctor Darwin closes his first volume with a paragraph containing these words: "Had those ancient philosophers who contended that the world was formed from atoms ascribed their combinations to certain immutable properties received from the hand of the Creator (such as general gravitation, chemical affinity, and animal appetency), instead of ascribing them to a blind chance, the doctrine of atoms, as constructing or composing the material world by the variety of their combinations, so far from leading the mind to atheism, would strengthen the demonstration of the existence of a deity. 'The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork. Manifold are thy works, O Lord; in wisdom hast thou made them all.'"

The second part of the Zoönomia is occupied with an enumeration of diseases, classified on the above principles, illustrated by brief reports of cases, and with suggestions as to their medical treatment. All diseases are morbid motions, and are divided into four classes, as those motions are irritative, sensitive, voluntary, or associative. The four classes are divided into eleven orders, founded on the increase, diminution, or inversion of the motion. The eleven orders are divided into forty-one genera, thirty-seven of which are founded on the part of the system affected, the other four on the fundamental classification. Nothing could have a more admirable simplicity upon paper; and we must pardon those who hailed it with the enthusiastic faith that the Newton of morbid physiology had appeared in Erasmus Darwin.

But why has it now been forgotten? In answering this question, I can speak only as a layman, without special medical education. A true system of classification, in any subject whatever, may be attained, by carefully following either one of two roads. The first and surest groups carefully the individuals into species, then the allied species into genera, and so on ascending. This is the surest method, because the mind while travelling in it has only need of surveying

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carefully the ground immediately before it; and there is comparatively little danger of overlooking essential facts. It corresponds to the synthetic method in geometry; it is the inductive method of Bacon. The other method begins by taking a sweeping bird's-eye view of the whole field; from that rapid and extensive glance makes first the larger divisions, then the smaller ones, and finally separates the species. This method is more rapid, but is less sure. It requires a much wider grasp of mind. It is Bacon's deduction, and is very apt to fail, unless it is performed by a man of rarest genius, or else has been silently preceded by the labor of the first method.

Now the classification of the Zoönomia seems to me to have proceeded by this second method. It looks precisely as though Darwin had determined, on *a priori* grounds, that the laws of organic life must have a simplicity like that which Lavoisier had just introduced into chemistry, and that therefore he had evolved this system of forty-one genera "out of the depths of his inner consciousness," and then arranged his diseases under it. I do not say that this was Darwin's mode of procedure; nor will I deny that the mode, if adopted, might, in the hands of a man of rare genius, be successful; but the test of the system is to be found in the examination of the species. Can the varieties of disease be naturally arranged as species under these genera? Will the system be found, as Darwin evidently believed, a guide to a natural therapeutic treatment? These questions can be answered very readily.

Look, for example, at diseases which consist in retrograde irritative motions of the alimentary canal. Nothing can be simpler and more natural than that definition of a genus. It is one of Darwin's best. He divides it into eleven species; but it appears to a lay reader that they are not eleven species of one genus, but simply eleven cases of a similarity in one symptom. Three of the eleven are cholera-morbus, hysteria, and hydrophobia, which surely are not to be considered related simply because in each there is a sort of retrograde motion of a part of the alimentary canal.

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In his preface the doctor adopts the words of Cullen, that "the essential characteristic of a disease consists in its proximate cause." He declares that his classes are founded on the proximate causes, the orders on the measure of the cause, the genera upon the proximate effects, the species upon the locality. That is to say, then, the proximate cause of hydrophobia is the irritability of the human system; the order under which it falls is determined by the irritation producing inverted motion; the genus is decided by that inversion of motion being in the alimentary canal; and the specific mark of hydrophobia is that the inverted motion is in the oesophagus only. Very ingenious, but not peculiarly satisfactory; it would scarcely enable a young practitioner to identify a case of that terrible disease; and an unlearned man, listening to the discussion of the causes and symptoms of hydrophobia, might be excused for asking what part is played by the bite of the mad dog, and of what is the shuddering at water a symptom. Another genus in the Zoönomia contains fifteen species of diseases, beginning with winking and ending with external parasites. Again, the genus of decreased irritative action of the sanguiferous system includes, among its seventeen species, fainting, menorrhagia, and scurvy.

It must be acknowledged that objections may be raised against every truth; but, on the other hand, an ingenious man can bring facts to sustain any theory. Cicero affirms that no proposition can be invented so absurd that some philosopher has not already seriously maintained it. It does not follow that mankind is incapable of attaining truth; but it does follow that we should examine both sides, and examine with care; we must not suffer "the gaps in our knowledge to be filled with loose and unfounded speculations." This appears to me to be the fault of Erasmus Darwin and of that school of writers with which he is naturally affiliated. It would not be at all strange if his classification of diseases should be revived and made the foundation of a new school of medical practice. The great *éclat* with which his grandson has revived and expanded the speculations of the grandfather

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upon evolution would be a valuable advertisement for such a medical school. Nor would this revival of the erroneous theories of the Zoönomia be an unmixed evil; for there are many important truths and fruitful suggestions in the volumes. Moreover, the revival of Dr. Darwin's manifestly erroneous nosology and therapeutics might lead some enthusiastic admirers of his doctrines of evolution to look more narrowly at the evidence, and see whether there also some loose and unfounded speculations may not have crept in. It is undoubtedly true that Darwin's nosology may be wrong, and his view of evolution correct; yet in the Zoönomia the fundamental principles of his classification of diseases are so closely interwoven with his views of the gradual transformation of species, that we cannot help suspecting the latter to have also errors in its foundation.

The great *a priori* argument of the elder Darwin is ignored by the younger; and indignantly repudiated by many of his followers. Yet that argument remains to-day the strongest argument in favor of evolution; it is analogous, if not identical, with Maupertuis's grand theological dogma of the least action. It is more consonant with our conceptions of infinite wisdom and infinite power to suppose that the first race of creatures were made capable of evolving all subsequent races. The law of parsimony requires us to make that hypothesis; provided that hypothesis is possible, and is sufficient to account for the facts. But even if evolution is possible, there may be various modes of effecting the evolution. Different scientific romancers have imagined different ways — some natural, some miraculous, some very slow, some very rapid. The debates of modern scientific associations in their sections of natural history remind one, by the fertility and wildness of imagination displayed, of the debates of the schoolmen in the Middle Ages. Dr. Darwin and Charles Darwin suppose the forces of evolution to have been exceedingly gradual, occupying countless millions of ages. Both these writers are men of wonderful learning, of evidently attractive personal character, and express themselves in a clear and taking style. The

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one created a furor at the close of the last century; the other, a wider and wilder furor now. Yet their doctrine that the transformation of one species into another has been by an exceedingly slow and gradual process is encompassed with many difficulties; and the two facts relied upon as its principal supports seem to me completely illusory. The first of these facts is the variability of species. By domestication and culture and by variation in natural surroundings the offspring of one original parent are observed to become very different in character. The second fact is, that the species and genera frequently appear to shade into each other; between any two forms, however closely adjacent, we can, if we have a sufficient number of specimens, find intermediate forms. This is the second of the cardinal facts on which the superstructure of Darwinism rests. Now, I do not deny the possibility of the truth of Darwinism; but I say that these two facts are not conclusive, even as proof of the transformation of species, much less, of their gradual transformation.

Organic beings are primarily distinguished from each other by their forms in space; the classification of them by naturalists depends upon their variations of form. The classification of organic beings is a question, therefore, of geometry, and is to be criticised by geometric canons. All physical investigations, indeed, must ultimately be brought under mathematical law; since they all investigate phenomena of space and time, and are to be dealt with only by virtue of our ability to reduce them to symmetrical conceptions of space and time, that is, to treat them as the embodiment of mathematical functions. Whatever be the efficient cause acting to determine the form of a nascent embryo, and however much its action may be modified by circumstances, it shows to the careful observer at least a tendency to act according to precise geometric law; and had we sufficient knowledge and sufficient analytic skill, the mathematical equations of vegetable and animal forms could be given precisely as the equations of crystalline forms have been given. Instances of this have already been shown in the law of

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phyllotaxis, and in the reduction of the earliest forms of embryos to analytic equations.

I am not, therefore, about to be illogical nor unreasonable, in taking a geometrical illustration to show the fallacy of arguing for evolution from the variation of species and from the insensible gradation of forms. It will not be arguing from analogy, but only taking a simpler example in the very same problem. Geometry and morphology are alike a classification of forms in space. Let us consider, therefore, the possible variations of an ellipse. It may vary *ad libitum* as to the scale on which it is drawn — from the stellar orbit to that of a vibrating atom. It may also vary without limit in regard to eccentricity — even inverting itself, and becoming a hyperbola. But, start with the conception of an ellipse, and you cannot make it become anything else whatever than a conic section. Its variations seem, in certain directions, unlimited; but in other directions it has no power whatever to vary. The same is true of every other curve. All curves have a great flexibility or power of variation in certain directions; while in other directions they are absolutely fixed. It is, therefore, probable, *a priori*, that species and genera, which like curves are to be defined by laws of space, have the like elasticity in some directions, the like rigidity in others. We have no right to assume that any species may vary into any and every other species. We have no right to assume that a genetic connection with a common ancestry can be traced, even in thought, between two species taken at random; for such connection cannot be traced between two curves taken at random.

Now, let us take any other curve than the ellipse — an elastic curve, for example. The elastic curve may simply wave, or its waves may rise until they interlap; they may all be compressed into a figure eight; they may revert into kinks; they may revert into one single loop or kink; they may roll like epitrochoids; the rolls may tighten into a circle; and this circle is perhaps indistinguishable by the microscope from the circle formed when the eccentricity of the ellipse becomes zero. Darwinism might say, Here the ellipse runs

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into the form of a circle, there the elastic curve runs into the form of a circle, and the highest power of the microscope shows no difference in those circles; the ellipse and the elastic curve are therefore one. But the geometer replies that it does not follow. I apply the microscope of the calculus, infinitely more powerful than your best Tolles, and find the circle of the ellipse to be a single line, while that of the elastic curve is an infinitely multiple one; the one form cannot pass into the other.

It appears to me that, in like manner, one who has an intimate knowledge of organic life might answer the argument for the common descent of two genera based on the occurrence of intermediate forms insensibly bridging the chasm between them. The future botanist may point out distinctions between species and genera which now seem to run together. Even at present, common sense and common knowledge distinguish infallibly between things which no scientific investigation can distinguish. For example, no man in common life is at a loss to decide whether a given fruit is a plum or a cherry; yet no botanist can define the difference between the two. Nor can the botanist readily describe the difference between oaks and chestnuts, and yet every woodman knows it. If there is really a difference between them to-day, surely the difficulty of defining it does not show that it formerly did not exist.

The value of Darwinism as a mnemonic and as a guide to the investigation of the affiliations of organic beings is acknowledged. But the value arises from its assumption of evolution, much more than from its assumption of that evolution having been through insensible variations; and this peculiarity, which distinguishes Darwinism from other forms of the doctrine of evolution, seems to me a source of very serious danger to one who is seeking the truth, and who wishes to see the highest and the widest truths. The discrimination of differences is really the most important function of intellect, and is to be jealously guarded against any usurpation on the part of its companion power — the

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power to perceive likenesses. The mode in which Dr. Darwin's philosophy leads to this danger will be seen by considering his treatment of beauty. That he had the sense of beauty is shown by many of his writings; but when he undertook to set forth an explanation of our sense of beauty, he was so eager to reduce all the phenomena of consciousness to his four laws of irritation, sensation, volition, and association, that he made beauty wholly subjective, wholly dependent on association. He denied the existence of harmony or proportion either in space or time. All the pleasure which we feel in hearing music, or in looking at buildings, statues, pictures, landscapes, he resolved into the pleasure of association with the earliest gratifications of the senses.

Yet it has been securely established, by experiments and investigations made with the utmost care, that the sense of beauty does not arise from arbitrary associations in the mind of the percipient, but from what paradoxically may be called an unconscious perception of something in the object itself. In beautiful colors, beautiful tones, beautiful harmonies, beautiful figures, it is discovered that the predominant ratios of times and spaces generally involve only the four first prime numbers 2, 3, 5, and 7. The beauty of an object is in proportion to the simplicity of the law governing the combinations of these four numbers, and also to the multiplicity of the results arising from that combination. In phyllotaxis, for example, we have this exceedingly simple law, that the space between two successive leaves divides the whole space around the stem in extreme and mean ratio. The law involves numerically only the primes 2, 3, and 5, but involves them in such a form that it is not cognizable by human senses. In the actual embodiments, however, of the law in the vegetable world, both the angle of successive leaves and our sight of it are subject to interferences — interferences which make the law cognizable by the sense of beauty in all the endless variety of the forms of sea-weeds, lichens, mosses, flowers, shrubs, and trees.

Another example may be found in music, which Erasmus

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Darwin distinctly says pleases only by arbitrary association. Yet the mathematical analysis of music is complete. In its rhythm the simplicity is so great that no other prime numbers are introduced from the division of measures up to the arrangement of movements than 2 and 3; and yet the variety of rhythms is innumerable. In the harmony of chords two additional primes, 5 and 7, are introduced. Now, the harmony of different ages and of different nations varies; but in the most cultivated and musical nations there has been a steadily growing inclination toward a certain style of harmony; and on a careful analysis of the numerical relations in the various styles, it is discovered that the musical instinct has not been at fault; it has steadily gone on, dropping that which can be shown to be arithmetically less perfect and clinging to that which is arithmetically more perfect, to that which keeps in prominence the simplest primes, 2, 3, 5, and 7, but combines them in the greatest variety of combination. Alexander Pope thought it

> "Strange that such difference there should be
> 'Twixt Tweedle-dum and Tweedle-dee!"

And Erasmus Darwin said there was no difference; but modern physics and modern music show that the difference between styles of music is as real and immutable as the difference between an ellipse and an elastic curve.

Charles Darwin seems to me to be saying to botany and zoölogy precisely what his grandfather said to music and architecture, and to be just as deeply in error in saying it. If music depends for its expression, as Dr. Darwin thought, simply upon accidental association of ideas, — so that "Batti, batti," may just as well be called and sung "Gently, Lord, oh gently lead us," in a community ignorant of its origin, — then music is unworthy of the high devotion paid to it by those who, with Wagner, esteem it the most direct, truthful, and powerful of all the modes in which the human soul can utter its deepest self; nay, it is unworthy of study by any serious, earnest man. But in this case the mathematician has come to the aid of the musician, and

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demonstrated that the fashions which have gradually become antiquated in music have mathematically deserved their failure; and that the modes which have increased in favor among earnest, cultivated people have a demonstrable mathematical superiority, which in all probability is the cause of their aesthetic conquests.

And if the species and genera, families, orders, and classes in the organic world have been produced as Charles Darwin says, through the gradual variation of the species, and survival of the fittest, — the whole being the present accidental and still slowly shifting result of an accidental balance of forces, — then the classifications of organic beings is unworthy the labor bestowed on it by such men as Aristotle, Linnaeus, Cuvier, De Candolle, and Agassiz. If the evolution of the species (granting there has been one) has taken place in the Darwinian method, then the labors of these naturalists become as worthless as the conversation between Polonius and Hamlet on the shifting form of a cloud. Fortunately, for the interests of truth and of man there are instinctive faiths in our intellect, which the sophistry of our reasoning never destroys. Could we, as modern Darwinism bids us do, destroy our faith in the real existence of order, symmetry, plan, in the universe, we should also destroy all interest in studying it; the study of nature would become then a mere amusement like the finding of profiles on mountain crags, or of faces in the crowded petals of a rose. The best students of natural science have believed that the distinctions in nature are real, and sharply defined, even where we fail to discover the line; and that their work was discovery, not invention; they have agreed with the Hebrew Psalmist, rather than with Comte concerning the language of the sky.

And as the mathematician has brought demonstration to the aid of aesthetics in music, so shall he in the future bring demonstration to the aid of the naturalist who reverently believes that in his essay at classification he is partly decypher-ing and reading a divine plan of infinite simplicity in its

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apparent complexity. As Erasmus Darwin was mistaken in supposing that harmony of proportions and tones is dependent on accidental associations of ideas, so Charles is mistaken in supposing that the harmony of organic forms is dependent on accidental associations of circumstances. The beautiful harmonies of music, and of coloring, and the beautiful proportions, not only of temples, but of plants and animals, arise from the fulfilment of simple numerical relations; in that particular modern investigations confirm the prophecies of Pythagoras.

The mathematical student believes that the organic worlds are built upon simple original formulae, which admit of an immense variety of definite changes. He looks for the day when the botanist and geologist, having drunk deeper draughts from the Darwinian spring and become sober again, shall discover and define more sharply distinctions between forms which they are now confusing. He trusts that the mathematician will finally be able to discover simple equations which will express by changes in the constants, the varieties of organic forms. The first steps towards such mathematical natural history have already been taken by Peirce in his Lectures on Analytical Morphology.

Dr. Darwin's theory of evolution was closely connected with his scheme of classifying diseases; the most signal defect of that scheme was its failure to recognize any other differences than differences of degree. There was no sharpness of definition anywhere. It is, I confess, patent to every eye that some disorders in the human system have this indefinite character. There seems to be no dividing line between the highest state of health and complete disorganization and prostration; the one runs into the other more gradually than the oaks into the chestnuts. But, on the other hand, there are, certainly, some diseases which are sharply defined. The modern microscope, modern chemical reagents, and the modern spirit of experimental science are producing indisputable results in this field. The revulsion from Darwin's method of classifying diseases will, we think, be followed by revulsion from its method of classifying organic beings.

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The first duty of every student, and of students of the natural sciences as well, is to seek for the truth, wherever it may lie. That the student may also be assured that the truth is always more likely to be found by one who seeks it with reverent awe; by one who, rejoicing in that which he has been permitted to unfold, remembers also that, in the words of Emerson, "Nature never became a toy to a wise spirit." The higher one's aim, the higher is likely to be his attainment; and no aim can be higher than the aim reverently to read, gratefully to obey, the teaching of the Infinite Spirit which framed the worlds.

ARTICLE IV.

SUCCOTH AND PENUEL NOT YET IDENTIFIED.

BY PROFESSOR J. A. PAINE, PH.D.

AN identification of Succoth and Penuel published in the Bibliotheca Sacra for October last ought not to pass without review. An obligation, perhaps, rests upon every one specially informed on the subject, to apprise biblical students whether the opinion therein expressed can be relied upon or not. Having thoroughly explored every portion of Eastern Palestine from the Arnon to Damascus two and three years before Dr. Merrill's observations, and now having given four years of study, aided by every work of reference that could be desired, to its geography and places in a biblical point of view, I might be expected to judge intelligently respecting the merits of this proposition. Though extremely reluctant to speak adversely to any proposal he may make, I am compelled to dissent from Dr. Merrill's view for many reasons, among others the following.

General Considerations.

1. The topographical character of the valley forbids it. From the point where the Zărqâ approaches the region of

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the Jordan, as far up as the ford of Jărăsh called Meshra' ez-Zublîyeh, its ravine is a profound chasm, comparable only to the abyss-like cañons in the territories and mountains of our far West. On the north a mountain rises directly upward, and scarcely pauses in ascent to its summit at an elevation of fully five thousand feet. On the south a wall of rock and earth lifts up from seven to twelve hundred feet in height, whose summit, by the wear of lateral wadies, takes the form of headlands or precipitous bluffs jutting out toward the stream. The bed is for the most part a wild, rugged cleft, ascending at the rate of two hundred feet per mile, either obstructed by rocks laid bare, or half closed by great blocks rolled down from the hill-sides. Here and there a level or a little opening may happen, but such gaps are extremely few. Aside from these rare places the depths of the gorge would never be visited by man, except for the necessity of drink in summer's drouth or of crossing from one mountain to the other. Far down in this narrow channel the stream of the Zărqâ flows with great swiftness, generally in rapids, often in cascades, always dashing noisily against the stones of its bed or sides, and in unceasing windings.

Now this valley was always practically uninhabitable. The bed of the stream is infested with the spiny zizyphus, thickets of oleander, now and then a dwarfed plane-tree, many reeds, and with them many wild boars, but the moment the limit of water is passed the mountain-sides afford nothing whatever beside thin, wiry broom or rœtam bushes. It never could support inhabitants, or their necessary flocks. Men may have dwelt on Tŭlûl edh-Dhăhăb, chosing it on account of the easily defensible character of the hill-tops, and finding partial subsistence on an opening lower down stream, but they were not many in number. People could not live in the depths of the valley on account of extreme aridity, intense heat, and want of air. Even as high up stream as Meshra' ez-Zublîyeh Captain Warren found 'the heat excessive.' It strikes one with surprise to find that men did not live in cities along the fertile banks of the Jordan, or even on its

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open plain, except quite close to the foot-hills on either side; far less, then, could and did men try to live in the barren, torrid, constricted gorge of the lower Zărqâ.

This valley, moreover, was practically impassable. Its sides were too steep for Jacob to cross with his live stock. On the south side the lateral ravines allow difficult ascension to the table-land running back with more or less rise to the summit Jebel 'Ausha', but on the north the mountain-side is too abrupt for the passage of any beast of burden.



To the present hour natives, as, for example, those of es-Sălt going to Jebel 'Ajlûn or those of Jebel 'Ajlûn travelling southward, do not attempt to cross with loaded animals this rapid torrent plunging at the bottom of its defile. Everything laden is invariably sent round by the way of the eastern Meshra' ez-Zublîyeh, above the beginning of this yawning gulf. In our expeditions our own muleteers always avoided

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this part of the Zărqâ, and took the circuitous route rather than force its passage. There are several meshra's between that of es-Zublîyeh, or the ford of Jărăsh, and the region of Tŭlûl edh-Dhăhăb, but they are watering rather than fording places, and both Arabs and inhabitants of Jebel 'Ajlûn assured me that they never ventured to cross them except in low water at the end of summer, and that even then it was a matter of extreme peril on account of the depth and swiftness of water. At the best ford of all, called Meshra' en-Năsrânîyeh, below Burmâ, on the path leading over to Jebel 'Ausha' and on to es-Sălt, the current was indeed so swift in the month of July that my horse was swept off his legs, and recovered them only after a great struggle. This was the only path and crossing Jacob could take. He was laden with all goods acquired in the land of Laban, and was encumbered with flocks of every kind. His wives and sons were set upon camels; but camels could by no means make their way down the northern mountain-side. Judging from my own experience—I was obliged to dismount and lead my horse down the greater part of the way, particularly the last, it was so abrupt and rocky, a regular break-neck descent; and harem-bearing camels, it will be seen, could not then make their way where lightly loaded horses or mules cannot go now. His present to Esau indicates an untold number of other camels with their young. Laban followed like-mounted in haste; much less would he have passed over this impracticable chasm. Besides, Jacob brought with him large droves of kine and bulls, asses and foals, goats, rams, and ewes so near the time of parturition that the slighest hardship would have caused the whole flock to die. All these flocks could not be forded across the lower Zărqâ at such a spot as Meshra' en-Nasrânîyeh, the only place where nature affords approach by a precarious foot-path. Add to this the fact that it was "that same night" that Jacob, lodged on the north side of the Jabbok, by night sent the present over before him, while he remained with the company until he rose up later in the night and sent his

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family over the ford, remaining himself on the north side till the dawn of day. Now there is no space whatever for encampment beside the stream Zărqâ at the above-named ford, the only one open to his choice, so that Jacob must have had his camp high on the mountain-side. This necessitates the sending of his entire flocks, herds of cattle, family-laden camels, etc., down that precipitous, dangerous, mountain-side in the depths and black obscurity of night. Such a thing was an utter impossibility. Jacob's crossing was made at no great distance from Penuel; and if it could not be done at the best fording-place of all, how much less at another! Farther down stream, near Tŭlûl edh-Dhăhăb, there is no descent to a passage, and were there any it would be a much worse one.

Not to be alone in this report of the Zărqâ's topography, let me call attention to facts reported by R. Doergens. From near Burmâ onward he reports: "Here we found ourselves on the high northern brink of the very considerable Wadi Zerka. Early the next morning we set out to pass this wadi; at first our path was not very steep, but the deeper we went down so much more considerable was the sinking, and so much more rocky was the ground. ... The place where we crossed the river I found lying one hundred feet below the Mediterranean Sea, while Burma from which we set out lay eighteen hundred feet above the same level, so that thus we had descended from Burma to the depth of nineteen hundred feet. In order to do it we had taken an hour and a half. When now we rode up out of the Wadi Zerka to the southern wall of the valley, we were engaged in considerable and prolonged climbing."[1] His place of crossing, below Burmâ, was Meshra' en-Nasrânîyeh. All altitudes or depressions observed by Doergens were taken not with aneroids, but by a barometer, which at the end of his circuit was found to be unharmed and unchanged.

2. This identification requires a course for Jacob, in his journey, directly opposite to the true necessary one. The

[1] Reise in das Ost-Jordan-Land, s. 417.

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narrative speaks of the passage of the Jâbbok as one, and as a single one. Had there been more the Bible would not have spoken of one. If the Scripture account implies anything more than it expressly says, it implies that Jacob came to the Jabbok for the first time and crossed it for the last time in the one ford spoken of so particularly. We are not allowed to suppose there was a second, or a third, or an indefinite number of crossings. But this proposition fixes Succoth, the place Jacob reached next after passing Penuel, on the north side of the Zărqâ or Jabbok; it thus causes Jacob to appear on the south side of the Jabbok and to cross over to the north side. Then Jacob did not meet Esau, who certainly came from Seir in the south; but Esau followed in the wake of Jacob and overtook him soon after leaving Penuel. This stands in plain conflict with the Scriptural statements, "And Jacob lifted up his eyes, and looked, and behold Esau came." "And Esau ran to meet him." "So Esau returned to Seir."

8. This identification is made independently of Mahanaim, and cannot be brought to agree with any possible site for it. Whoever undertakes to say where Penuel is must first show where Mahanaim was, in order that the Scriptural requirement may be seen to be satisfied. It is scarcely possible that Dr. Merrill would say that Burmâ used to be Mahanaim; at all events it would be vain for him to do so. Jărăsh, he thinks, "can be identified beyond dispute" with Ramoth-gilead. And Mahanaim he excludes from the valley of the Zărqâ by the declaration that his site seems to be indicated as Penuel by the fact that throughout the whole line of the Jabbok until Qăl'at Zărqâ is reached, fifty or sixty miles from the mouth of the river, there are no ruins except fallen mills here and there. And in this statement he is quite exact, in so far as it certainly is true there is no ruined site in the line of the Zărqâ that could have been Mahanaim of old. The Scripture conditions are these: Jacob lodged in Mahanaim, rose up that same night, and in the dead of night passed on to the bank of Jabbok, sent over his family, stayed

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behind till dawn, then passed over or onward and reached Penuel at sunrise. Now, then, Mahanaim stood quite nearly related to the Jabbok, so near that from it the latter could be reached between midnight and sometime prior to day-break. But Dr. Merrill does not name any such spot for Mahanaim, and for the reason that near his site for Penuel he knew of no such place for Mahanaim. From earlier, careful, and exhaustive research for these places in this very region I am able to say that within the required distance from Tŭlûl edh-Dhăhăb there is no locality or ruin in existence corresponding to Mahanaim. The two hills of Tŭlûl edh-Dhăhăb, with the duality of building upon them, would in this respect much better fit Mahanaim than Penuel; and yet Mahanaim was not there.

Considerations forbidding Penuel at Tŭlûl edh-Dhăhăb.

1. The name Tŭlûl edh-Dhăhăb is not a modern one. At least, the presumption is that the name is an old one, and as ancient as any in the country, not excepting Jĭl'âd or Ken'ân; and the burden of proof rests with Dr. Merrill to show that it is a new one as he alleges, before he proceeds to argue for a totally different name on the spot in biblical times. The truth is, Dhăhăb might be pronounced Zăhăb in Arabic, and whether sounded Dhăhăb or Zăhăb it is the very same word as the Hebrew Zahab, and dates without doubt from Hebrew times. Edh-Dhăhăb is precisely what the Scripture expresses by Dizahab, Where is Gold, though the places may not be identical.

It is altogether probable that in earliest times men called these hills Zahab, and that this name has clung to them ever since, unmodified in passing from one tongue to another. And what might have been the origin of the term Zahab? The occasion of the name lies simply either in the color or in the metalliferous nature of the ground, or both combined. The root zahab signifies *to shine*, *to glitter*, *to be yellow*, as gold; whence it is applied to any metal yellow or resembling gold, even to anything yellow like gold, as to olive-oil

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from its golden color, and to the golden brightness of a sunset sky. Now the color of these two mounds called Tŭlûl edh-Dhăhăb is yellowish, uniform and clear, thus conspicuous as far from the heights above as the configuration of the cañon permits them to be seen. Nay more than this. The sandstone rock of the region is metalliferous, abundantly bearing metallic ores, in structure resembling native metal. On weather-worn surfaces of the rock all over the northern mountain-side little sharp spurs up to irregular masses stand out like studs, which may be knocked off by a kick of the toe and brought away. These projecting specimens similar to native metal afford a yellow surface when broken or cut, and as an ore resembling that of gold in all likelihood would receive the term Zahab from primitive people. In ancient times, no doubt, the very rock of Tŭlûl edh-Dhăhăb shared this metalliferous deposit, and perhaps for a more than usual amount gathered there received the name The Hills of Gold pre-eminently. Quite likely a remarkable opening on one side of one of the mounds is the mouth of an abandoned mine. Until late years, in the same sandstone rock, mines of iron and other metals, copper the people add, have been worked near Burmâ, above on the mountain-side.

2. A change of name from Penuel to another entirely Semitic, and capable of being as old, is illogical and contrary to custom. There is reason for supposing that very few ancient appellations have disappeared; nearly all of them remain; sometimes, however, in forms scarcely recognizable, quite rarely in shapes distorted beyond discovery. But never has one Hebrew term taken the place of another Hebrew name and come down to our own day instead of the original one.

3. The space between the stream and the top of either one of these hills is too short for Penuel. The Zărqâ flows at their very base, in fact between them. Dr. Merrill does not claim more than two hundred and fifty feet for their height, and this would indicate only little more than four hundred feet for their slopes. The hills did not strike me as being even two hundred feet in altitude. All this falls far

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too short of the requirement in the narrative. The angel of Jehovah left off wrestling with Jacob at the first breaking of day, and disappeared with the faintest light. "Let me go, for the day breaketh." Jacob then went on his way, and was passing by Penuel as the first beams of the sun fell upon him. The case is exactly parallel with that of Lot. Now the duration between early dawn and sunrise admits of exact timing any morning in Eastern Palestine, and that duration is about one hour; it may be slightly less, it may be more, if one begins with the first signs of morning in the eastern sky. Such a length of duration implies not less than two miles for the distance between the Jabbok-bank and Penuel. The requirement of this time or distance does not exist at Tŭlûl edh-Dhăhăb.

4. There is no highway through this part of the valley, and there never was any. Dr. Merrill speaks often and at length of this valley as a highway, but it is justifiable only in that general sense agreeably to which we look upon every valley as an avenue of travel. In this instance, however, such generalization fails. The narrow, rocky, rapidly falling chasm always has been totally unfit for a thoroughfare, and the remains of no old route exist within its limits. In my own exploration of the lower Zărqâ the chief pathway led me up and along on the southern face of the bluff, and this was so rocky and perilous at certain places that I had to dismount and walk; my horse would not take me over several points where he had hard work to keep on his feet, and, had I ridden, where we should have incurred imminent danger of being dashed down two or three hundred feet into the bottom of the Zărqâ. At Tŭlûl edh-Dhăhăb one might pick one's way along either shelving side of the valley. At Meshra' en-Năsrânîyeh there was no through route on either side. And from this point as far upward as Meshra' ez-Zublîyeh no highway is possible. An Arab might get through, no doubt, by dint of exertion and difficult scratching, but no Arab wants to, and so the thing is not attempted. At Meshra' ez-Zublîyeh, the ford of Jărăsh, I saw nothing in

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the line of a path leading down; a single footpath leads from this point upward. Far up this Zărqâ valley, in what may well be termed the upper Zărqâ, there is a thoroughfare, but it comes down from the eastern circuit only to turn off soon on the north and lead over the mountain to Damascus. No highway through the lower Zărqâ has ever been wanted. Dr. Merrill seems to have missed the real thoroughfare of this region, and so I will indicate the true route taken in olden times. It is a Roman road marked throughout by excavations in the hill-sides, causeways, pavements still intact, and from time to time groups of mile-stones. From the Jordan vale it enters the valley of the Zărqâ only immediately to turn out of it up one of the southern spurs, and to run along the inner side of Jebel Măslûbîyeh, passing the upper border of the large ruin called Khirbet el-Hafâyir, running on eastward over the terrace of the plateau, rounding the hills south of Khirbet Jîl'âd, seeking now the hamlet styled Rumaïmîn, passing through wâdî and over hill till it descends into the great Buq'ah, from whence it emerges at the south-eastern corner at the spring and ruin of Mûbis, and proceeds to make its way over the upland to 'Ammân. This well-built Roman road we may be sure followed the line of a time-honored highway from the Jordan and Baïsân, or even Shechem Nâbŭlŭs to the regions of the east. The Midianites were not accustomed to roads in their own country, did not require a highway to take them to Western Palestine, never would have reached there had they strung themselves along in single file, and in their flight certainly did not limit themselves to any narrow thoroughfare or valley. On the contrary, they were some powerful tribe or tribes from the great south-east coming up, just as powerful Bedăwî tribes do to the present hour, for food, and the rich harvests of both Eastern and Western Palestine, foraging as they moved, taking matters leisurely, and sweeping over a broad area of country. What they wanted was to eat up the land, and gather up the grain their hands had not sowed, on every side. In approaching, the straightened Zărqâ would neither

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have held them nor suited their purpose; in departing, it could have allowed them no avenue of escape. Dr. Merrill says: "South of the Jabbok, again, as far as the line of the Dead Sea and Hasban, there is no feasible route by which to descend from the eastern plains to the Jordan valley." There are fully a dozen such routes; on an average, one for every two miles of latitude.

5. The site of Tŭlûl edh-Dhăhăb affords no ruin commensurate with the requirements of Penuel. What remains exist to our day are of a rude character, intended merely to strengthen or fortify the heights of the hills. They are not ruins of a town in any age, much less relics of such a great city as Jeroboam rebuilt.

6. The ruins on the mounds of edh-Dhăhăb give no sign of ever having been provided with a tower. Gideon threatened the inhabitants of Penuel, "When I come again in peace I will break down this tower." This is not too much to expect in the proper region.

7. The site was not that of Penuel, because both inaccessible and insignificant. Its depression below the sea-level must be fully five hundred feet, perhaps more. The inhabitants of edh-Dhăhăb, though placed on low hill-tops, were sunken in a pit to which there was no easy access, and from which no ready egress. Shut in by hills on every side, they enjoyed no outlook except toward heaven. No one would care to disturb them; they would be able to trouble none but themselves. Had there been any to want their barren mounds, such could readily have looked down from the heights on them as ants of ant-hills, while they would have observed their enemies as birds in the air. Such a place was the last in Eastern Palestine Jeroboam would have selected for building up. He would not have chosen a worthless site for raising into the fort or the metropolis of his dominion beyond Jordan. Wherever his Penuel was, it was one of the most eligible sites of the country, one of the most important for a town, desirable and healthful as a place of residence, most central, of strategic power as a key to the country, and

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capable of being fortified into a large, populous city. The site called Tŭlûl edh-Dhăhăb has none of these advantages; on the contrary, it is one of the most out-of-the-way, hidden, isolated spots in Eastern Palestine, possessing no territory, and utterly destitute of both attraction or value.

In this connection, it should be added, there is nothing strange about the conformation of these two hills, nothing whatever peculiar in their features to impress either the original oriental inhabitants, or Jacob, had he arrived at their feet, or now a modern beholder, into a persuasion that they marked the site of some special manifestation of the Deity, or resembled the face of God and lead one to name them accordingly. They are nothing but a couple of common mounds, not even imposing in size, similar to hundreds of others in the Jordan system, through the valley of the Zărqâ, to and especially on the uplands of eastern Moab.

Considerations forbidding Succoth at Daïr 'Allâ.

1. The name selected is quite improperly written Der'ala, and has not even a Talmudic shadow of connection with Succoth. Properly recognized and written, the name of the place Dr. Merrill fixes upon is Daïr 'Allâ; not one word, but two; and of this the title Daïr means *monastery;* so that the two words signify the *Monastery* of 'Alla, just as in Tŭlûl edh-Dhăhăb the term Tŭlûl means *hills*, and in Jebel 'Ajlûn the word Jebel means *mountain*. According to the method of Dr. Eli Smith this word is usually written by Dr. Edward Robinson as Deir. When speaking it Dr. Merrill pronounces this name as Deir 'Alâ; and a reference to his chart of the Jordan valley, inserted with his report in the "Fourth Statement" of the Palestine Exploration Society, issued in January 1877, will reveal the name ingenuously written Tell Deir 'Alla, as three distinct words; also, the text of the Report (p. 86), rightly reads, "And Tell Deir 'Alla, which stands out in the broad plain west of Tell el Hamma." Dr. Merrill, therefore, once knew the value of his written syllable Der to be Deir or Daïr as a separate word, meaning *monas-*

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tery. Is it not, then, remarkable that in October of the same year, in the Bibliotheca Sacra, attempting to identify Succoth, he should omit from Deir or Daïr *i*, the Arabic letter *y* or *yâ'*, thus reducing an appellative to a syllable, and subjoin the only and true name of the place, 'Allâ, slightly abbreviated into 'ala so as to throw both words into a single proper name, Der'ala, or in his Bibliotheca sketch Der'ale, even more weakened? In this way a fictitious resemblance is created to a Talmudic word, noticed in Neubauer, Tar'alah, on which is hung the identification of Succoth entire! But every one would know such an appellative Daïr is no more an integral portion of the name for this place than are the common terms Tell, Jebel, Rŭjm, Qŭsr, Khirbet, in no case to be united with proper names they precede, and then considered component parts of them; and even without knowing the process of which Der'ala is the result, an Arabic scholar would detect the disguise and significance of an initial Der. The true, only name of this place is simply 'Allâ, the *l*, *lâm*, always carrying teshdîd, the sign of doubling; and this, doubtless, is a derivation of the Arabic root 'alâ, signifying *it was high, elevated, or lofty*. Manifestly 'Allâ alone possesses no parallelism with the Talmudic Tar'alah. There is no such word as Der'ala or Der'ale in existence on the ground or spoken among men. Even as far back as July 1867, Lieut. Warren heard, and recorded on his Reconnaissance-map of the Country between the Two Zŭrqâ's, this name as "T. Deir Ulla;" from which it passed into established recognition on Grove's map of Smith's Atlas as "T. Deir Ula" in three distinct terms for Tell Deir 'Ullâ or 'Allâ, settling the second as the Monastery Deir from earliest observation. Thus Dr. Merrill's Arabic name vanishes away.

The Talmudic name Tar'alah occurs only once, so far as authorities indicate, and then in the Jerusalem Talmud, in Shebî'ith, chapter ix.[1] It was the opinion of Dr. Zunz that this Tar'alah is beyond doubt the Tharsila, a village of Samaria

[1] Ed. Krotoszyn, p. 38, col. 2.

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mentioned by Eusebius;[1] and Dr. Zunz is high authority on such subjects. But Neubauer and Merrill allow their readers to infer that in the Talmud Succoth is generally or always defined by Tar'alah or spoken of under this name. Such is not the fact. "The Talmud states definitely that in its time Succoth was called Tar'alah," is a statement which would naturally be regarded as sweeping, and one which thus is liable to convey an erroneous impression. As the explanation making Tar'alah equivalent to Succoth is made only once in the Jerusalem Talmud, and not at all in the Babylonian Talmud, — for so I am informed by Dr. Adolph Huebsch, rabbi of the congregation Ahawath Hesed of New York, one of our most competent Jewish scholars, and familiar with the Talmuds, — the truth is really very different. A dozen places might be found, in either Talmud, speaking of Succoth under its own name alone. Neubauer himself quotes from the Jerusalem Talmud, Hagîgah I. 1, "The inhabitants of Sakûtha," etc. Though this form is singular and feminine, probably the same place as the plural Succoth is meant. This, according to Dr. Merrill's method of reasoning, would be quite sufficient for a counter-argument in the same style, 'The Talmud definitely states that in its time Succoth was called Sakûtha.' At most Tar'alah could have been no more than a vulgar name for the place among Hebrews at the time of a certain commentator on the Mishna. Buxtorf's great Chaldaic, Talmudic, and Rabbinic Lexicon knows neither Tar'alah nor any root from which it might be derived; neither is there any Chaldaic word Tar for comparison with Der or Daïr in form or signification. Besides, it should not be forgotten that the Talmud is the poorest authority in the whole range of biblical evidence; any identification resting on this alone is extremely uncertain.

Another statement will not bear investigation. We are told in respect to Der'ala *versus* Tar'alah: "The letters correspond to those of the Hebrew word, except that *t* in the Hebrew becomes *d* in Arabic — a change of very fre-

[1] Benjamin of Tudela (ed. Asher), ii. 408, note. Onomasticon, s.v.

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quent occurrence." On the contrary, let any reader take a list of biblical names beginning with Taw, or look through the entire letter of *T* in any Bible Dictionary, and he will find that out of the whole number of biblical places identified in either Eastern or Western Palestine there is not a single one whose modern Arabic name, derived from ancient Hebrew, begins with *D*. Now this department of proper names is the limit of our range, and one cannot go out of it for illustration or justification. But should a Semitic scholar take the Thesaurus of Gesenius, and patiently search through all the words under Taw, he would find only two Hebrew roots whose kindred verbs in Arabic begin with Dâl, namely, ta'ar, *to go about*, vs. da'âr, *it went round*, and tafaf, *to beat*, vs. dafa'a, *he impelled*, etc., including the derivative tof, a *drum*, vs. duf, a *tambourine*. So much for the initial radical in names or roots; into medial consonants we cannot follow the matter, but the change is not likely to happen among others more often than in initial letters as above shown. From the fact, therefore, that the permutation of the Hebrew *t* into the Arabic *d* when the first letter of a name, as is the case in hand, does not exist, and takes place only twice in the whole list of verbal roots, the reader is prepared to judge how well the statement "a change of very frequent occurrence" is borne out. Here, as elsewhere, the old principle holds good, What has not been, will not be: if in the whole number of biblical names the change described never has befallen an initial *t*, it doth not also in this. This principle would be equally relevant and peremptory should it be said the change occurred within the limits of the Hebrew language or period.

2. The style and age of scanty remains at Daïr 'Allâ are recent and clearly subsequent to Succoth of any period. Daïr 'Allâ is a name applied both to one of the many tells scattered over this wide, luxuriant plain, and to a small circuit of rich, cultivable, and meadow land styled the 'Ard surrounding the Tell. The open, bare Tell is in every way one of ordinary character, and is as to its summit destitute of everything to indicate more than a camping ground in

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modern or in ancient times. On a lower terrace, however, certain signs of habitation exist in the shape of rude, broken columns and a few clusters of building stones. These are, upon their face, of latest Christian type, and manifestly approaching nearest modern times among ruined places. Without a moment's study they class themselves with the neighboring ruins of Tell 'Ammeta, Amathus, of Făqâris, nearly three miles further up the valley, of Kûrkemâ, just south of Wâdî Yâbĭs, and of the well-known Tăbăqăt Fahl opposite Baïsân, all in the upper Jordan valley. They are similar to the monastery ruins Daïr on the summit of Mâr 'Ilyâs, the mountain close above Khirbet Lĭstĭb on Jebel 'Ajlûn. All of these belong to one age, the latest whose buildings now afford ruins, and pertain to that period when asceticism and anchoretic life raged over the western slope of Jebel 'Ajlûn, when Christians peopled the valley and built cloisters on the hill-tops, a period enduring till after the introduction and flourishing cultivation of sugar-cane. At some time in this period, when Christians prevailed, doubtless during the latter part, at most not above a thousand years ago, a pillared place of divine worship, with cloistered halls for priests and monks, rose on the elevated platform of this little hill; and perhaps the symbol of the cross shone out over the beautiful plains, calling the followers of the Master to service and prayer, on ground that had beheld him passing by. Perhaps, because perched on an isolated hill in the wide level land around, the Arabs when they became sole usurpers of the region gave it the name, the pillars of the nave and a few fallen walls bear to the present hour, Daïr 'Allâ, the Monastery of the Height or the Elevated Monastery. The place has not the first characteristic of Succoth; there was nothing about it that should draw Jacob to it.

3. Succoth was a town of Gad, and Daïr 'Allâ is not properly situated in the territory of that tribe. All agree that the Zărqâ is the Jabbok, and that the Jabbok separated the tribe of Gad from the half-tribe Manasseh.[1] But this

[1] Deut. iii. 16.

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spot lies at some distance north of the northern boundary line, north of the Jabbok, north of the Zărqâ. Then the ground of Daïr 'Allâ fell within the territory of half Manasseh, for the site rests under the shadow of the hills at the easterinmost depth of a great bay caused by the exit of the Zărqâ from the mountains and leading down to the Jordan plain. By its eastern position it belongs to the mountains rather than to the Jordan. So far as this new effort helps the matter, the site of Succoth might just as well remain on the western side of Jordan at Mezâr Dubbet es-Sâkût. I am well aware Dr. Merrill, atributing the entire surface of this grand Zărqâ-opening even in its deepest borders to the Jordan plain, will fall back on the supposed extension of the territory of Gad along the Jordan to the Lake of Gennesaret. And yet, in the end, the statement will prove strictly true that none of the towns of Gad mentioned in the Bible lay north of the Jabbok or the line of the Zărqâ.

In short, this attempted biblical identification is incompatible with topography, is founded on a perversion of Arabic names, and is opposed by many insurmountable objections.

Dr. Merrill is in error as to the location of Meshra' Ken'ân. While engaged in exploring this very region, more than two years before him, I was startled by the accents of this archaic name falling on my ears. Ken'ân, immemorial Canaan, as old as the Five Cities of the Plain, together with Lasha, retaining its form perfectly on the very ground where Canaanites began to dwell, perpetuating in actual, local usage our favorite expression, 'the Land of Canaan,' when all of us have been wont to think the name had wholly disappeared from Palestine, as I heard it pronounced, roused livelier emotions of surprise and pleasure of reward, than any other among ancient names recovered had done. At first the Arabs, for the sole reason they were too lazy to go as far as the real place, hoping to content me with a nearer ford, declared a higher crossing than the real one to be Meshra' Ken'ân; and it was not till I was putting into execution my business of following down the course of the Zărqâ to the Jordan

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itself, and they learned they had nothing to gain by falsehood, that the truth was ascertained. When the true Meshra' Ken'ân was reached, both superiority in size and greater resort demonstrated the right spot; and when the name was demanded the Bedwân of tribes living on the plains around the year through, affirmed this to be the true Meshra' Ken'ân, and confessed the other was not, giving the reason why they said so, viz. they did not want to go any further for it; "why should not one meshra' be as good as another to you?" Now this true Meshra' Ken'ân occurs a long way down the Zărqâ's course, nearer the Jordan. And when Dr. Merrill defines it to be "a ford or crossing of the Jabbok, some distance to the east of Tel Der'ala, but before the hills are reached," and on his sketch makes it the crossing of the road which leads out of the Zărqâ cañon up the Jordan plain to Baïsân, he appears to be misled by the Arabs, and to have rested with some upper minor crossing, wholly different and apart from the true one. With me the Arabs did not attempt to get it half so far up stream. So far from this, Meshra' Ken'ân is the chief place of passage across the Zărqâ in the plain where two roads meet for crossing; one the main route up and down the Jordan valley, and the other the thoroughfare from the ferry Dâmîyeh of the river Jordan to the various towns of Jebel 'Ajlûn. It lies so near the lowest terrace of the Jordan that the foliage of trees near the river can be seen from it by one looking down the Zărqâ's course. Relatively to Tell Daïr 'Allâ, disregarding latitude, it stands some distance to the west, instead of east, — it did not occur to me to take note of distance on the spot, but my impression now would be, a mile or more.

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ARTICLE V.

ON THE LATIN EQUIVALENT OF THE NAME IN LUKE II. 2, TRANSLATED CYRENIUS.

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OPINIONS have differed and fluctuated in regard to the Latin name corresponding to *Κυρήνιος*, in Luke ii. 2. For some time, at first, after the revival of classical study in Europe, it was held by most scholars to be Quirinius. Afterwards, especially after the dissertation of Perizonius de Augustea orbis terrarum descriptione (1682 and 1690, following his treatise de praetorio, Franeker, as well as subsequently reprinted), and after the publication of Ryck's Tacitus (Utrecht, 1687), the tide was turned, and Quirinus was regarded as the true name, although some learned men — and those the best acquainted with the results of archaeological investigation — remained true to the earlier tradition. But since the manuscripts have been examined more carefully, and new inscriptions have been brought to light, the editors of Tacitus almost in a body, all the learned antiquarians, and the best informed commentators have returned to Quirinius. It is my object in this Essay to show that this form alone has solid ground for its support.

We must, however, at the outset, remark that both names occur in Latin records and on inscriptions. Both, also, as names of men, are not earlier than the end of the Republic. Quirinius, both as a *nomen* and a *cognomen*, derived either from the name of the old Sabine god or from the tribe Quirina, one of the thirty-five Roman local divisions so-called, cannot be traced to an earlier age than the end of the Republic. The subject of this Essay was a new man of humble origin; and his *cognomen*, if he indeed bore that of

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Quirinius, began, as far as we know, with him. Quirinus is still later, but under the Empire occurs with greater frequency.

Quirinus, or the feminine Quirina, we have noticed twice among Muratori's Inscriptions (Nov. Thesaur. pp. 1173, 1735), and several times in Mommsen's Inscriptions of the Kingdom of Naples. Thus, in the latter collection, occur Q. Quirinus Hermes (No. 7202) and Sex. Julius Quirinus — "literis sequioris aevi," as the editor says — with Aureli Quirini Merodoti (No. 2992), where Aureli renders the nominative of Quirini uncertain. In Mommsen's Corpus of Latin inscriptions we find Gallia Quirina on a Spanish stone, and in the volume devoted to Britain there are three inscriptions relating to M. Aurelius Quirinus, a *praefectus cohortis*. Ryck, on Tac. ii. 30, cites from Reinesius the name of C. Sempronius C. f. Quirinus Lucretius Junianus. In Cent. III. Cyprian addressed two books of his "testimoniorum adv. Judaeos" to "Quirinus filius." In Cent. VI., near the end, we meet with a letter of Pope Gregory I. to an Irish bishop Quirinus. See Archbp. Usher's works (iv. 601, Dubl. 1864), who also mentions a Quirinus Comes.

An inscription in Muratori (p. 1395) speaks of a M. Quirinius Coeladus, and another mentions C. Quirinius. Both forms, then, are found as *nomina* and *cognomina;* and it is probable that all the examples come from the times of the Empire, after the old system of Roman names had begun to be undermined.

Confining ourselves, now, to the subject of this Article, whose full name is P. Sulpicius Quirinius, or Quirinus, we will look at the name as it stands in Greek writers, in Latin writers, and on inscriptions.

I. In Luke ii. 2, with some various readings; in six places of Josephus (Antiq. xvii. fin., xviii. 1 (*bis*), 2 (*bis*), Bell. Jud. vii. 8, 1); in Justin Martyr (Apol. i. § 35 § 46 Dial. cum Tryph. § 78); and in Eusebius (Hist. Eccles. i. 5, after Josephus, Antiq. xviii. init.) it is spelled Κυρήνιος; but in Strabo (xii. p. 569), Κυρίνιος.[1]

[1] The various readings ought to be noticed. In Luke ii. 2 the Alexandrian

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In the Chronicon Paschale (or Fasti Siculi) of L. Dindorf's ed. of 1832, followed by Migne, 1860, we find as consuls together, of the year 742 of Rome, *Μεσσάλα* and *Κυρινίου*. Mommsen (Corp. Lat. inscr. i. 546) prefers this to a various reading *Κυρίνου*, which Dindorf does not notice. In the chronological list of consuls prefixed to Dio Cassius, Book liv., we find the full name *Π. Σουλπίκιος Π. υἱ. Κυρίνιος*, which Mommsen and others receive without mentioning any various reading, and which Sturz also has in his text, although L. Dindorf, in the Teubner ed. of Dio Cass. (vol. v. p. xxiii.), has *Κυρῖνος*. Finally, George Syncellus (Chronograph. 316 B. ed. W. Dindorf i. 598) has *Κυρίνιος*, in an extract, it is probable, from the Chronicle of Eusebius (comp. Euseb. Chron. ed. Maii, 1833, under Olympiad 194, and the year of the world 5500). These are all the places in Greek, known to the present writer, which bear on the decision between the endings *-us* and *-ius* in Latin. Whether the argument from them can be set aside we shall presently consider. We add, in this place, that the *eta* in the penultimate of the name in Luke and Josephus finds analogies in the common form *Σκηπίων* for *Σκιπίων*, and *Μηνύκιος*, more frequent than *Μινύκιος*, in Dionys. Hal. This, however, has little or nothing to do with our present inquiry.

There are no genuine coins on which either name occurs, although one published by Goltz and accepted by Vaillant (Numism. Fam. Rom.) for some time imposed on the earlier scholars.[1] Nor are there any coins in existence which show

MS. has *κηρυνίου*, a few have *κηρηνίου*, the Vatican MS. pr. manu *κυρεῖνου*, tert. man. *κυρίνου*, but this reading does not deserve consideration in comparison with the vulgar text, although Lachmann was in favor of it. Tischendorf adopts the vulgar text, so do Tregelles and Westcott and Hort, (although with *κυρεῖνου* in the margin); and considering the support for that text in Josephus and Justin, it can hardly be doubted that they are in the right. In two MSS. of Strabo, x and z of Cramer, *κυρήνιος* is the reading, but *κυρίνιος* has far better manuscript support. Of Josephus there is no critical edition. In W. Dindorf's corrected reprint of Hudson's edition, the reading *κυρήνιος* remains; so too in Bekker. I find in Heinichen's Eusebius, Hist. Eccles. i. 5, a note of the author, citing a translation of Rufinus in which Cyrinus represents the *κυρήνιος* of his original.

[1] Marini says (Frati Arvali, ii. 786): "Della medaglia del Golzio con Quirino sanno gli antiquari qual conto debba farsi."

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that any Roman *gens* bore the *cognomen* of Quirinus. There is, indeed, a coin of the Memmii with the words "C. Memmii C. F." on the obverse, together with a head and the name Quirinus, and on the reverse, as Eckhel gives it (Doctr. Num. v. 252), "Memmius Aed. Cerialia (*sic*) preimus (*sic*) fecit," i.e. when Aedile first instituted the games in honor of Ceres. In Mommsen's Corpus inscr. i. 140, No. 490, the reverse appears with the legend "C. Memmius Imperator | Quirinus | Memmius Aed. Cerialia Preimus Fecit." But Quirinus here is the god, as Eckhel, Borghesi (Opere i. 94), and Mommsen regard it; just as the head of Roma appears on another coin struck by a magistrate of the mint of the same family, and as Brutus Libertas appears on another, probably struck by one of the Junii.

II. We come next to the third name of our P. Sulpicius as it appears in the manuscripts of the early Latin writers. These are Florus (iv. § 12, 41), Suetonius (Tib. 49), Tacitus (Ann. ii. 30; iii. 22, 23, 48).

Florus says of him that he could have returned from Africa with the title (or *agnomen*) Marmaricus, on account of his successful victories over the Marmaridae and Garamantes, "sed modestior in aestimanda victoria fuit." The MSS. differ greatly about his name. The best of them, the liber Nazarianus (comp. Mommsen, res gestae Augusti, p. 119), reads Qurinio (*sic*); the ancient editions, the second Palatine MS. and the MSS. used by Vinetus give Curinio; the first Palatine, Quirinio; others, Turmio, which may be for Turinio, and that for Quirinio; and Jordanes (Jornandes), with the third Palatine, Quirino (see Duker's note). On the whole, the evidence preponderates in favor of the longer ending *-io*.

Suetonius speaks of Lepida, a lady of very high family and the wife of this man, as condemned "in gratiam Quirini consularis praedivitis et orbi," who, Suetonius goes on to say, divorced her after a marriage of twenty years, on the charge that she had formerly tried to poison him. Tacitus makes the crimes adultery, poisoning, and consultation of the Chaldaean soothsayers to the prejudice of the emperor's

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house. The reading here is Quirini, which is ambiguous, and often occurs as ī for ĭī.

For Tacitus — i.e. for the six first books of the Annals — the only original manuscript is the Mediceus or Corbeiensis (Laurent. Plut. 68, 1). This was discovered at Corbei at Westphalia by an agent of Leo X., and after the pope's death was taken to Florence to be deposited in the Laurentine or Medicean library. An edition containing only these books, then called five, was published at Rome by Philipp Beroaldus, and was soon succeeded by the editions of Rhenanus(in 1519 and later), of Junta (Flor. 1527), by the Aldine (Ven. 1534), by the editions of Lipsius (1574 and later), by that of Curtius Pichena (Flor. 1607), by Ryck's (Utr. 1687), and by that of J. Gronovius (1721), — to mention none of more recent date. The text owes most to Pichena and J. Gronovius, and in modern times to Fr. Furia, whose collations were placed at the disposal of Immanuel Bekker for his edition of 1831. As for the reading of the name with which we are concerned, there seems to be some confusion in the statements of the earlier editors. Ryck, on Annal. ii. 30, has these words: "Beroaldus eumque secutus Rhenanus hic ediderunt P. Quirino: reliqui post hos editores (quos quidem vidi) P. Quirinio. Restitui primitivam lectionem," etc. J. Gronovius, as cited in Ernesti's edition, adds the Aldine also as reading Quirino, states it to be the manuscript reading, and adopts it himself. Bekker, in his brief way, after mentioning this, adds, "Si Furiae fides M. [the Medicean codex] et hic et infra iii. 22, et 48, Quirinium vocat hominem." There seems to be no doubt that this is true, as it has been verified since; and this reading, wherever the name occurs in the Annals, is now adopted by Ritter (second ed.), in Orelli's second ed., by Doederlein (1841), by Halm, by Nipperdey, and by a number of other editors. The disregard by Beroaldus of his manuscript — and that the only witness to the text — can be accounted for by his undertaking to judge over its testimony. For the mistake of Gronovius we cannot account; for he seems to have spent a long time in Tuscany, and he inspected the manuscript himself.

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The name Quirinius is found eight times in the Annals of Tacitus (ii. 30; iii. 22, 23, 48): twice in the nominative, and three times in the genitive and dative each. In regard to the genitive there is some doubt. Bekker and Doederlein give Quirinii; Nipperdey, Quirini. It would seem, from a note of the latter, that he had not fully conformed, in the two first books, to the spelling of the manuscript; and he there makes some words to conform to it, one of which is Quirinii. There is nothing strange in Quirini from a nominative in *-ius;* but it is strange that there should be this difference after the careful collations in Bekker's edition. It is worth remarking, also, that we find (in iii. 48) Sulpicii Quirini (with Nipperdey's text) together; for which we may account by the unpleasantness of four syllables ending in *i* in succession.[1]

Several lists of consuls existing in Latin manuscripts have the reading Quirinus to denote the consul of 742 A.U.C., or 12 B.C. The chronographer of A.D. 354, the *fasti Idatiani* of much later origin, and the *fasti* cited by Clinton (Fasti Hellenici iii., 742 A.U.C.) from Cardinal Noris, concur in giving that name to our Cyrenius.

The balance of good authorities thus far inclines towards Quirinius, and the weight of authority is on that side. But Perizonius, in the dissertation above referred to, turned the current of opinion.[2] Grotius had thought that the ending *-ius* was the true Latin one, and that all texts were to be amended accordingly. Perizonius, on the other hand, denies that a Roman gentile form or *cognomen* with this ending can be found before the age of Augustus. What are called *agnomina* — i.e. a third or fourth name, given to an individual, and having some significance — may be found; but

[1] The age of this MS. I find nowhere spoken of. But mistakes in it, such as the confusion of *c* and *t* before *i* (sedicio, justicium, tociens, quociens, promcius, pociebatur, and spetiem, pervicatia, contumatia, audatiae, pernitiem), point to the Langobardic period.

[2] I use the edition of this Dissertation which appears in the *Dis. septem* of our author, published in Leyden in 1740. It is the fourth of the seven. Dr. Ezra Abbot has kindly enabled me to use this and Ryck's Tacitus.

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such a third name as Quirinius, derived from Quirinus, and meaningless in itself, is without a parallel at this epoch. Furthermore, to meet the objection that the name in question repeatedly ends in *-ιος*, he lays down the following rule: "Solemne [est] illis [i.e. Graecis] dare istam terminationem nominibus propriis Romanorum, quia videbant eorum pleraque praenomina, omnia gentilitia, nonnulla etiam cognomina ita desinere." And thus he adds that Pupienus (or Maximus) on certain Greek coins is called *Πουπήνιος*, — which, however, does not quite suit his rule, as it would require *Πουπιήνιος*; and this, in matter of fact, is the real name, the Greek form being nearer right than the received Latin one.[1] So Nautes the companion of Aeneas is called Nautius, Caeles Vibenna, Caelius, by Dionysius of Halicarnassus. And in like manner some of the Roman names and appellatives often took this ending in Greek. "The same cause that led the Greeks to treat the Roman names this way led some scribes also to write this *cognomen* Quirinus after that form of the gentile name."

Theodore Ryck, in his edition of Tacitus, which is an excellent one on the whole, reaffirms the two rules of Perizonius (Annal. ii. 30), and adds other arguments in proof that Quirinus is the true name. As no one has added anything new to his arguments, unless the Venetian marble be thought such, we will here notice what he says with all possible brevity. 1. Qurinus is the reading of Beroaldus and the primitive reading. But we now know that he was in an error as to the last point. 2. Suetonius (Tib. 49) has Quirini. But this is, as we have seen, ambiguous. 3. *Κυρίνου* is in the Fasti Siculi (or Chronicon Paschale). But the approved ending is *Κυριν(ου*, as has already appeared. 4. The coin in Goltz's Fasti. But it is a forgery. 5. There are several examples of Quirinus. That is very true; and there are examples, though fewer in number, of Quirinius. In the

[1] The Fasti Sacerdotales found in the Basilica Julia, name, as the colleague of Maximin, Pupienus Africanus. See Henzen's note in Borghesi's Opere, iii. 455.

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lists of consuls, as that in Dion. Cass., and in the passage of Luke, he would alter the text.

The rule of Perizonius and Ryck was accepted by Deyling, an important theologian who was nearly their contemporary, and by a number of others whom he mentions (Obs. Sacrae, 1708 sqq. I use the ed. of 1735, Part ii. p. 432). From Deyling it passed down to later scholars. Schleusner has it in his lexicon, s.v. *Κυρήνιος*. Kuinoel repeats it on Luke ii. 2; and Alford, both in the Dictionary of the Bible and in his commentary, regards it as a settled fact that "*Κυρήνιος* is the Greek form of the Roman name Quirinus, not [of] Quirinius." Orelli, as we have seen, for some time took it for granted on Ryck's authority. It is a pity that Meyer's abandonment of his earlier opinion favoring Quirinus, which is seen in the fifth edition of his Luke, was not, as it would seem, known to Alford, although published in 1867, several years before Alford's death; for with his great respect to Meyer's opinion, he would not have failed to reconsider the question. Nor would Farrar, in his Life of Christ (i. 8), have relied on Orelli's first edition of Tacitus, as his only guide for Quirinus, when Quirinius had taken its place in the edition of 1859.

The rule of Perizonius, Ryck, and Deyling, if it were true, would not concern us much; for, as the Greeks certainly expressed *-ius* by *-ιος*, it would follow that *-ιος determined nothing in regard to a particular Latin name*, since both *-us* and *-ius* would then be represented by one Greek ending. We should have in every case to ask whether, as the Greek form is ambiguous, there are any clear arguments for one or the other of the two endings. But in regard to the rule of Perizonius we have to say that, although the Greek MSS. blunder between the two endings, and are likely to write *-ος* because of the great frequency of that ending in Latin proper names, we find no such rule; but, on the contrary, proof (as far as we can tell what the manuscript readings are) that no such rule existed. The Latin names of the New Testament ending in *-us* have *-ος* with no variation, we believe, except

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that for the best supported reading *Κυρήνιος* are found *Κυρεῖνος* and *Κυρῖνος*. But the Latin names Titus, Marcus, Paulus, Rufus, Urbanus, and others, always keep their Latin ending. In Josephus (Antiq. xiv. 10, § 20), however, we find Rabilius for the rarely occurring Rebilus, a *cognomen* in the *gens Caninia*. In the lists of consuls, as they are given by Mommsen in his collation of the *fasti*, according to the MSS. (Corp. Inscr. i. 483–531), the MSS. of Dionys. Hal., Diodor. Sic., and Dio Cass. are full of errors; and the confusion of *-ος* and *-ιος* is one of them, although not very common. In Dionysius, assisted by the collations above-mentioned, we find Geminius, Flavius, Laiinius (*sic*), represented by Greek forms instead of Geminus, Flavus, and Albinus. In Diodorus we find Rutilius, Cichorius (?) Pontinius, which are balanced by Romulus (for Romilius), Quintus for the family name Quinctius, Quintius. In Dio occur Calvinius for Calvinus, and both Alfenus and Alfenius. In the Chronicon Paschale the errors of this kind are more numerous. We have noticed the Greek names answering to Rutilius, Bolisius, Quintius, Lepedius (several times, while Lepidus appears, also, several times), Bruttius, Calvinius, Rusticius, for Rutilus, Volesus, Quintus, Lepidus, Brutus, Calvinus, Rusticus, and, per contra, Vatinus for Vatinius. The result is, that this is a mistake into which Greek copyists are apt to fall for a reason already given, but is not by any means a law of transliteration.

We may put this statement in another shape. Looking at the lists of consuls in Diodor. Sic., we find within a small compass ten *cognomina* ending in *-us* in Latin which are represented by *-ος* in Greek, in Dionys. Hal. fourteen in *-ος* answering to *-us*, with two mistakes, and in the Chron. Paschale twenty, and scarcely a mistake. The Greek transcribers did not, then, as a rule, transliterate *-us* by *-ιος*, but by *-ος*; and the other practice can by no means be called a rule, but rather an exception.

Another objection more worthy of notice connected with this point is the occurrence of two names ending in *-ius*, as *nomen* and *cognomen*. No doubt the Roman rule through

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the Republic was that the *nomen*, or gentile name, should always end in *-ius*, and the *cognomen*, or family name, should not end in *-ius*. But toward the end of the Republic a great change in family names began, of which we have many striking examples. (Compare Marquardt in Bekker-Marquardt V. pt. 1. 26.) Nipperdey calls attention to Sulpic*ius* Quirin*ius* as being perhaps the first known instance in which two gentile names occur, or, in other words, in which the third name, not being a personal name, ends in *-ius*. But examples of the practice became ere long not uncommon. Thus we find C. Appius Junius Silanus, Appius coming from his mother's house; and the emperor Galba's full name was L. Livius Servius Sulpicius Galba. The great Roman glutton (temp. Tiberii) had the name M. Gabius Apicius. In the *fasti consulares* we find T. Rustius Nummius Gallus, a *consul suffectus* of 26 A.D.; and in 37 A.D. C. Petronius Pontius Nigrinus. And so the full name of a praeses of Syria about 51 A.D. was C. Ummidius Durmius Quadratus, Durmius being discovered from an inscription. (Comp. Orelli's inscr. 3128, and Tac. Annal. xii. 45, ed. Nipperdey.) So the poet P. Papinius Statius (Cent. I.) and Roscius Caelius, Tac. Hist. i. 60. Whether our Cyrenius belonged to a family of clients of the *gens* Sulpicia, or took the name Sulpicius by adoption, or for some other reason, it is useless to inquire. Thus much appears, that about his time a practice grew up of having a third name ending in *-ius*. It is probably owing to this termination of the two names in *-ius* that errors were made by scribes who expected that the third should end in *-us*.

III. We turn now to the testimony given by inscriptions: and first to those fragments, called *fasti capitolini*, from which the ordinary *fasti consulares* are derived, as far as the first are extant. These ordinary *fasti* are the work of Onuphrius Panvinius and Sigonius, who, when their authorities failed them, supplied, sometimes successfully sometimes by unfortunate conjecture, the missing magistrates. In these *fasti consulares* (see them in Orelli's Cicero, Vol. viii. part 3), we find a Sulpicius Quirinus three times. 1. In the year 712

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(711) the censors are given as L. Antonius Pietas and P. Sulpicius Quirinus. The censors of this year are known only from the *fasti Colotiani*, so called as being found in the garden of one Angelo Coloti at Rome, and after several removals joined to the *Capitoline fasti* in the palace of the Conservatori. The names there are [L] Antonius, P. Sulpicius, *with no third name*. There is not the slightest proof that this was the P. Sulpicius of whom we treat. Henzen, the distinguished collaborator with Mommsen, regards this censor as P. Sulpicius Rufus, a trusted officer of Julius Caesar, to whom Cicero addressed a letter a year or two before this censorship (anno 709, ad fam. xiii. 77). It is also highly improbable that our Cyrenius could have been a censor thirty years before he was actually consul, and sixty-two years before his death.

2. In the ordinary *fasti consulares* we find a P. Sulpicius, P. f. Quirinus as a *consul suffectus* of the year 718 (717). For this there is not the slightest authority. A. W. Zumpt says, "*totus ex conjectura natus est, eaque parum probabili.*"

3. All agree that our Cyrenius was consul in 742 (741), but the bad condition of the stone (as may be seen in Piranesi's Fasti Capitol., where a chart of the fragments is given, and in Mommsen's faithful repetition of the *fasti*) hides from us everything about him, except P. S., the initials of his *praenomen* and *nomen;* even the S. is partially obliterated.[1]

Thus far we wander in the dark, but the *fasti Praenestini* bring us into the clear day. This is a testimony to which the earlier scholars had no access. Suetonius (de illustr. grammaticis) speaks of the author of these, Verrius Flaccus, the tutor of the grandsons of Augustus, as dying at an advanced age under Tiberius, and then adds: "Statuam habet Praeneste in inferiore fori parte, contra hemicyclium,

[1] H. Gerlach (die Röm. Statthalter in Syrien, etc., Berlin, 1865, p. 37), accepts the name Quirinius on the right grounds, but explains Quirinus in the *fasti consulares* by supposing an N, with the right-hand mark prolonged and capped (thus, N,) to have stood instead of N the ordinary letter. This is a common abbreviation on inscriptions for NI. But if he had looked at the Capitoline Fasti themselves, he would have found no Quirinus there at all. See below.

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in quo fastos a se ordinatos et marmoreo pariete incisos publicarat." The foundation of a building answering to this hemicyclium, or semicircular hall for gatherings of the learned, was discovered in 1770, and around it were found fragments of inscriptions on marble tablets, of the kind called *fasti* or *fasti minores*, which relate not to the annual magistrates, but to sacred days, to consecrations, and the like. These, it is agreed, are the tablets mentioned by Suetonius, and were probably inscribed before the death of our Cyrenius, — as Mommsen thinks, between the years 752 and 763 of Rome, or 2 B.C. and 10 A.D. They were published first at Rome in 1779; and in 1863, the year when the volume of Mommsen's Latin inscriptions relating to them came out, were in a house belonging to Cardinal Vidoni. Only the Calendars from January to April inclusive, and these not in an entire condition, were discovered. They may be found in F. A. Wolf's Suetonius, iv. 314–355, in Orelli's Delectus Inscr. ii. 379, and in Mommsen's often-mentioned work, with all necessary explanations. They are sometimes called *fasti Verriani* from their author.

One of the two places, where the name of Quirinius occurs in these *fasti* is in connection with the fourth day before the kalends of May (Apr. 28). With the missing words supplied in small letters the passage is as follows: LUDI FLORAE, FERIAE EX S. C. QUOD EO DIe aedicula ET | ara VESTAE IN DOMU IMP. CAESARIS AUGUsti PONTIF MAX | DEDICATA'ST, QUIRINIO ET VALGIO COS., etc. In the other passage, which pertains to the day before the nones of March, there is mention of *feriae* being instituted by the Senate because then Augustus was made Pontifex Maximus. Here the name of Quirinius is not complete, but happily the latter part of it is preserved, —NIO, as it stands in Wolf's Suetonius, — INIO, as Mommsen's more careful examination gives it.

Another inscription on bronze, now found in the museum at Cortona, and first made known by Marini (Atti dei Frat. Arvali ii. 782), begins with P. Sulpicio Quirinio, C. Valgio Cos., and makes known that a union of stipendiary towns

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in Africa enter into a relation of hospitality and clientel with a Roman of importance, one of the Domitii.

These are the only known genuine inscriptions which relate to the Cyrenius of Luke, with the exception of one found at Capua (No. 7041, in Orelli's Delectus ii. 416) where only Sulpicio Quirin. with C. Valgio is extant. They show beyond a question that his third name was Quirinius, and that Luke gives the true Latin ending in its Greek form. There is, however, one inscription, which would be of great importance if it were genuine, inasmuch as it relates to a census of Syria in which it declares Quirinius to be concerned. It was first made known by Orsato Sertorio, the author of some epigraphical works, as Marmi Eruditi (Parma, 1669 and 1719), and Monumenta Patavina (Padua, 1652). According to this writer the marble was preserved at Venice in the house of a certain Nicolaus Venerius (Monum. Patav. p. 276). Muratori published it in his Novus Thesaurus (ii. 670), and Orelli in his collection (i. No. 623). Marini condemned it as a forgery, and Orelli was of the same opinion; while A. W. Zumpt, giving well-considered reasons for a similar judgment, pronounces it to be a "magnum et turpe mendacium." Huschke in his treatise on the census in the time of Christ defends it in vain. It makes mention of a census taken by Q. Aemilius, Q. F. Pal. Secundus, under orders from P. Sulpitius (*sic*) Quirinus, of the civitas Apamena, or Apamaea in Coele-Syria (where he finds one hundred and seventeen thousand *homines cives*), and of a military expedition against the Ituraeans on Mt. Lebanon. The reason for Marini's and Orelli's suspicion of it, that it contains the name Quirinus, is by no means sufficient. It is the point to be proved; and, moreover, as Zumpt remarks, N might be really NI. For the rest we must refer to Zumpt's Comment. Epigraph., Vol. ii. p. 105 et seq.; adding that the marble has never been seen, and its existence cannot be proved.[1] A single argument additional to those of Zumpt,

[1] This inscription Ph. E. Huschke, a learned professor of law at Breslau, defends as genuine (in his treatise über den zur Zeit d. Geburt Jesu Christi gehaltenen Census. Breslau, 1840). On page sixty he stoutly defends the

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which Marini seems to hint at, may, perhaps, here deserve place. It is drawn from the spelling on the inscription of Sulpitius with a *t*. The name of this *gens* is always spelled with *c* in Latin, and with *Kappa* in Greek, until long after the times when the marble, if genuine, was set up. Diez, in his Roman. Gram. (i. 250, ed. 3), lays it down as proved, that during the continuance of the West-Roman empire *c* before *all* vowels sounded like the Greek *Kappa*. And he quotes Corssen (Lat. Ausspr. i. 48, ed. 2) as saying that *c* before *e* and *i* had this hard sound, even into the sixth and seventh century, until the time after the Lombards emigrated into Italy. *Ti* before a vowel seems to have been assibilated sooner than *ci* in the same place (Diez i. 229). And there are traces of the change of pronunciation in *ci* having begun here and there at an earlier period, (comp. Schneider's Lat. Gram. i. 241). Yet we may be sure that Sulpicius could not have been confounded with Sulpitius at the time demanded for the genuineness of this monument. It is for this reason, and for others mentioned before, nearly certain that the inscription was an Italian forger's work.

I close with saying that the modern Latin archaeologists, with many of the most eminent older scholars of great name, receive Quirinius as beyond question the true original of

name Quirinus, which his object scarcely renders necessary, by arguments some of which are really astonishing. We say nothing of his assertion that Quirinus is in the Capitoline Fasti, and the Sicilian (or Chron. Paschale), which is a mistake, nor of the coin mentioned by Goltz and the inscription in Orelli's coll. No. 623, both of which are forgeries, nor of a Calpurnius Quirinus in Gruter's thesaur. which might well be, as there are many Calpurnii among the Latin inscriptions of Spain, only that this is probably a fraud and is not even mentioned by Mommsen. Further, when he says that "the Greeks were wont to transform Latin names of persons regularly into such flexions sounding like gentile names," we can pass by this mistake which we hope that we have refuted. But when he adds that "the Greek flexion in the case of our Quirinius occurs in the Praenestine Kalendar also at the 5th of March and the 28th of April, and on an African inscription where the Greek "Sprachidiom" had had influence," we must wonder at the absurdity of conceiving that Verrius Flaccus, a leading Roman grammarian should put a graecised form of a Roman name, rather than the Latin one, on a monument set up twenty-three miles from Rome. The names of the consuls Drusus, Norbanus, Crispinus, in their Latin form occur on those marbles; why did not the 'Sprachidiom' of the Greeks alter these also?

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Κυρήνιος. Marini, in the last century, said, "pare certo che così [Quirinio] debba nominarsi et non Quirino; e così veramente il chiamarono il Lipsio (ad Tac. Ann. iii. 48), il Noris [Cardinal Noris in his Cenotaph. Pisan. Diss. 2, ch. 2, § 12] il Pagi ed altri, senza aver essi a favore loro si belli e si certi documenti, quali abbiam ora noi." To the older scholars we add only Archbp. Usher. Of those in quite recent times we add Eckhel, Marini himself, Borghese, Mommsen, A. W. Zumpt, and Henzen. Borghese speaks of Quirinius by no other name, and mentions the passage of the *fasti* where he appears as a *consul suffectus*, as a "mucchio d'errori." A. W. Zumpt speaks of his name and various particulars of his life in an extended passage to which we have referred and from which we have derived great benefit. Mommsen discusses the events of his life in the appendix to the "res gestae Augusti" (or Ancyra marbles), and shows that an inscription, from which the name has been broken off, which speaks of some one having gained a victory and having had peculiar honors conferred upon him at Rome, belongs, as had been suspected before, to this Quirinius. His name has returned to the possession of more rights than it had been stripped of by many of the earlier scholars, and stands now just as the *Κυρήνιος* of Luke's gospel ought to stand, according to the marbles and best manuscript readings.

NOTE. — In the MSS. of the Old Latin we find *Cyrinus* (Vercell., Veron., Colb., Corb., S. Gat.), *Cyrenus* (S. Germ. 1), *Cyrenius* (Cantabrig.). In the Vulgate *Cyrinus* is given by codd. Fuld., Amiat., Forojul., and the fragm. Perusin. In Ambrose, Augustine, Juvencus, the same reading is found (except that *Syrinus* is given in Aug. de cons. evang. l. ii. ch. v. § 17, col. 1082, ed. Migne), and this must have prevailed in the Latin church.

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ARTICLE VI.

FUTURE PUNISHMENT OF THE WICKED AS REVEALED IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.

BY PROF. HENRY COWLES, D.D., OBERLIN, OHIO.

THIS Article will assume that future punishment is taught clearly in the New Testament. It proposes to inquire whether it be taught also in the Old; and if so, how.

If taught by Christ and his apostles in the New Testament, it is certainly true, and therefore does not need the endorsement of the Old Testament to establish its truth. Yet our question has real interest and importance, notwithstanding. The opinion is somewhat current that future punishment is not taught in the Old Testament; and it is proposed to infer from this silence that the doctrine is not in any wise fundamental; that religion can be maintained without its aid; and perhaps that gospel ministers may do good work for truth and righteousness without preaching or even believing it. Hence one reason among many for our inquiry into the Old Testament teaching (or silence) as to future punishment.

Our question carries us back to the beginnings and the earlier stages of divine revelation. We may fitly suppose that the problem of making a written revelation to man lay before the divine mind in thought and plan before it became an act. 'In this problem the special point now before us — the future doom of the wicked — was included, and the question how to reveal it to any good moral purpose, must have involved two main points, viz. (1) How to make men understand it; (2) How to make them believe it.

A moment's thought will show that both these points are thoroughly vital; for unless it be understood, it could be no revelation at all, and could have no moral force. Moreover,

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if understood intellectually, yet if it were not so revealed as to enforce belief, it would be even worse than worthless, serving only to harden human hearts in their sin and madness. We shall need to hold these points well in mind throughout this discussion.

It may require some little reflection to suggest the real difficulties of this problem in both these aspects. Let it be considered that the doom to be revealed lies in another world, not in this; a world that none of the race has ever seen, and none are expected to see till the time of needing a written revelation of it shall have passed forever. The problem, then, is to get into the human mind some ideas pertaining to an unknown world — a world with which our present life may not be rich in helpful analogies. In so far as the revealing of this truth depends on written words, single terms — e.g. death, hell, Gehenna — it will be entirely essential that these words have an intelligible meaning. But any just apprehension of their meaning must start from and be built upon things known, not things unknown. That is to say, the case requires the framing of what may be called a new language, in the sense of old words with new meanings. It were of no use to import a language from the other world, i.e. to bring down to man the terms and phrases which the holy angels may use of the doom of the lost, or which Satan and his fellows may use in speaking of their prison-home and its torments. What could we learn from their vocabulary, supposing them to convey their thought in words of their own? The case is somewhat like giving the people of the great Sahara the ideas which the Laplanders readily express under the words *snow*, *ice*. The men of Sahara would need more help than these words. To comprehend and convey these ideas they must learn a new language; and this language must be built (as best it might be) upon analogies with things within their knowledge and experience.

A little attention to this will show the necessity (in a revelation of things in the other world) of taking up some word or words which have a meaning in our earthly experience,

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and applying them in a corresponding yet special sense, to the things God would teach men of the world to come.

Thus the necessary conditions of the great problem before the revealing mind will show why the progress of this revelation in the earlier stages was of necessity slow; and also why it was in many points imperfect. In the light of them we can appreciate the wisdom of the course God has in fact taken, both to make men *understand* and to make them *believe* the future doom of the wicked.

If that doom is exceedingly dreadful the only sensible way of revealing it in single words is to seize upon some one word or more, well known in human experience, expressing some fact or event most appalling and terrible, and make it the basis of the revelation. No word fills these conditions so well as the word "death." Before this experience all human hearts recoil as before no other. This word is therefore wisely put in the foreground of this revelation. Applied to the next world it must have a modified sense; but it will be a sense analogous. We need not look under it for *dissolution;* we must find under it pain, suffering; elements appalling and terrible. Other ideas may be brought in from other analogies; banishment, darkness, despair; the central word and idea still being *death*. "The soul that sinneth shall surely *die*."

This bears on the first point of the problem, viz. to make men *understand* proximately the real sense of the sinner's future doom. To make them *believe* this doom to be certain, we can think of nothing so pertinent and forcible as *analogous visitations of judgment on the wicked in this world*. Such great facts as the flood, the fire on Sodom, the swallowing up of Korah and his company, had a wonderfully startling and impressive power. They proclaimed to a sinful world: It is a fearful thing for the wicked to be in the hands of a holy God! To his incorrigible enemies, he is a consuming fire, even a jealous God! These visitations terribly justified the inference made by Peter: "If God spared not the angels that sinned..... if he spared not the old world,

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but saved Noah, bringing in a flood upon the world of the ungodly, ... if he turned the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah into ashes, making them an example to those who should after live ungodly, ... then the *Lord knoweth how* to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgment to be punished" (2 Pet. ii. 4–9). Ah, indeed, "*he knoweth how*"; there can be no lack of agencies and powers; and what is not less vital, there can be nothing in his pitying love which will forbid such inflictions of righteous judgment as the case may in his view require.

This, then, in general, meets the second great condition of a successful revelation of the sinner's future doom, viz. to make men *believe* it; to impress them with its absolute certainty. It will be noticed, moreover, that these foregoing examples of retributive judgment on the guilty, in time, answered to some extent a double purpose — not only compeling belief, but illustrating the nature of the doom. They helped to *explain*, as well as to *impress* and enforce conviction.

The Old Testament Doctrine of a Future Life.

We study the Old Testament doctrine of future punishment at great disadvantage to ourselves unless we first settle the question, *Did the writers and first readers of the New Testament believe in a future existence?* If not, there could have been to their thought, no future punishment for the wicked, and, indeed, no future retribution at all.

On the other hand, if they did believe in a future existence, their minds would be fully open to that tremendous inference,—A God who cuts down the outrageously wicked before their time in this world will have judgments for them far more terrible in the world to come! In the minds of both good men and bad, this inference would be simply inevitable, provided they thought of both good men and bad as still living on after death, and as having to do with the same great and holy God there as here.

We shall have occasion to notice how strongly this inference lay upon their souls; how manifestly it colors their language; how surely therefore it indicates their belief.

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One word on the general question before we open the Scriptures. Let it not be deemed a begging of the question to say — thinking men believe in a future existence *naturally*. It is one of their early, not to say instinctive, beliefs. This is, perhaps, partly due to a love of existence and dread of annihilation; partly to a natural sense of fitness that a being of such powers as man should be presumed to have been created to live on beyond this very short life, and to do more of the work he is so manifestly fitted for and to fill out the legitimate results of living far more perfectly; and more than all the rest, that the just rewards of living well or ill may have other and larger scope for their realization than this world affords. It *will* seem to thoughtful minds that better justice ought to be done to both the good and the bad than this earth provides for and awards. Therefore, men will say, and will feel it with almost resistless force,— There *ought* to be, there *must* be, a future life where retribution for the deeds of earth will level up the strange inequalities of this earthly state, and not leave our sense of justice outraged and bleeding over the otherwise never righted wrongs of earth. Whatever scepticism appears on this point may be put to the account of a personal dread of future retribution, often taking this peculiar form; Everybody else ought to have a future retribution, though for myself I greatly choose annihilation rather than the consequences of an after life, and shall hope for it.

Hence the history of the race shows that the masses have always believed in some sort of future existence. Their mythologies and superstitions show this, for heathen gods by thousands and myriads have been deified men. The worship and reverence paid to ancestors (as in China) bears the same testimony. Necromancy, almost if not quite universal through all the earlier ages (to say nothing of more recent times), rests on the nearly universal belief in future existence. It would be supreme folly to pretend to evoke the spirits of the dead if the dead had no spirits, if the universal belief were that "*death ends all.*" All these superstitions

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whose prevalence has been almost universal to our race, and whose power over the popular mind has been immense, are half-truths — else their power had been trifling instead of terrible. Half-truths, I say; the true part being the real existence of human souls after death; the false part, the mistaken assumption that those living souls can send back influences to plague or to bless the living here. A universal and very sensible belief in the true half has laid the human mind dangerously open to the mischiefs of the false half; and thus necromancy and its kindred superstitions have had prodigious power over peoples unblessed with divine revelation.

Moreover, ancient Egypt in the age of Moses represents the highest culture of the ancient world. It is now proved beyond question that Egypt held the doctrine of man's future existence. We are not left to infer this from her mausoleums for the dead, nor from her unparalleled art of embalming, to preserve the body for the soul's future use. These outgrowths of her doctrine of the soul's immortality are not our only proofs. Her "Book of the Dead," [1] an elaborate treatise on this subject, brought to light within the present generation, furnishes proofs against which there is no rebutting evidence, proofs that suffice to settle the historic fact beyond rational doubt.

What Egypt held, the great East (Arabia and Mesopotamia) must be presumed to have held also. The ablest philosophers of ancient Greece sat at the feet of Egyptian wisdom. This line of proofs might be extended indefinitely; so much must suffice.

Next, we notice briefly the salient points of the proof from the Scriptures that the writers and first readers of the Old Testament believed in a future existence.

Following in general the order of time, we meet first the

[1] "This contains the important doctrines of the immortality of the soul, the rehabilitation of the body, the judgment of both good and bad, the punishment of the wicked, the justification of the righteous, and their admission to the blessed state of the gods." — Rev. J. P. Thompson, in Smith's Bible Dict Art. "Egypt."

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record of Enoch (Gen. v. 24); "Enoch walked with God; and he was not, for God took him." The writer to the Hebrews (xi. 5) paraphrases these very brief words: "was translated that he should not see death, and was not found because God had translated him." We are not told whether any Elisha was present to see him taken up from earth in God's chariot of fire; but the testimony is that "God *took him*." Somebody knew the fact. Yet, be it noticed, the thing peculiar in his case was *not* that he and he only of all the race *lived* in another world after this, but only that he reached it without dying. He missed that dissolution of soul from body which we call death. The writer to the Hebrews does not make his case special in the point of *living* after he had passed away from earth, for in his view this was true of all those heroes of faith. "These all died in faith," their lives declaring plainly "that they seek a better country" beyond this.

Next, we meet the current phrase as to the patriarchs "gathered to their people," promised to Abraham by the Lord (Gen. xv. 15), affirmed of him (Gen. xxv. 8), and in the same words of Ishmael, Isaac, and Jacob. The promise to Abraham ran: "Thou shalt go to thy fathers in peace; thou shalt be buried in a good old age." Of course those fathers were in existence, not out of it. Note, also, what Jacob said of Joseph: "An evil beast hath devoured him; Joseph is without doubt rent in pieces"; yet he adds: "I will go down into the grave (Sheol) to my son, mourning." This was not the going of his lifeless body into the grave to lie there in company with Joseph's dead body; for he supposed that to have been devoured by some evil beast, its fragments nowhere to be found. He thought of an underworld (Sheol) where he should meet the real Joseph; not the mangled flesh, but the undying soul. To the same purport are the words of David, said of his dead babe: "Can I bring him back again? I shall go to him, but he shall not return to me" (2 Sam. xii. 23).

On this great question Moses is a first-class witness, repre-

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senting more wisdom, more public opinion, more weight of character than any other man of ancient times. Personally, Moses gave the strongest possible proof of his belief in future existence, in "choosing rather to suffer affliction with the people of God than to enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season [a short earthly life], esteeming reproach for Christ greater riches than all the treasures of Egypt, for he had respect to the recompense of the reward"; of course, in another life beyond this (Heb. xi. 24–26). This "Moses was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians" (says Stephen, Acts vii. 22), which, as shown above, included a belief in future existence and retributions.

To Moses God spake those memorable words upon which our divine Lord gave his not less memorable comment; viz. the words, "I am the God of thy fathers; the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob"; the comment being this: "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living" (Matt. xxii. 32). He is not the God of non-entities, mere nothings, but of living souls. To be the God of Abraham is a relationship which assumes Abraham's existence. For the Lord did not say to Moses, I *was* the God of Abraham, but I *am*. I have made promises to him which are yet to be fulfilled. He yet lives before me, and. if need were, might hold me to my covenant. It should be noticed, also, that this comment by our Lord was intended to refute the Sadducean doctrine of no spirit-existence after death. It was a perfect refutation. God meant to affirm something quite beyond friendship for Abraham during this short life, even all this: I am Abraham's God and Friend, both now and *forever*.

Further, it may be safely assumed that Moses wrote the Book of Job, and supposably during his forty years' life in Arabia.[1] This book gives the primitive ideas of the race in

[1] The decisive points of proof may be put thus: *Known capability*, which can be said of very few men in our world's history; *Proved poetic power*, seen in his song at the Red Sea (Ex. xv., and in Deut. xxxii., and xxxiii.); *Corresponding poetic power and sentiment*, seen by comparing Job xiv. with Ps. xc., and Job xxxviii. with Gen. i. and ii. Every original poet is a poet of *nature*, and deter-

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regard to real existence in Sheol, the future world (as may be seen in iii. 13–19 and x. 20–22 and xiv. 12–15). No one can read these passages intelligently without seeing that however dark in the gloomy thought of Job that future world might be, it was yet a world of living souls; not of defunct nonentities.

It cannot be necessary to cite in detail all the proofs of a future existence which appear in the later Old Testament writings. Yet let it be suggested: When Elijah went up living to heaven, nobody said, there are now two men of our race, just two, and no more, who are living in some other world; all the rest sunk into non-existence. We have not a whisper of this opinion. The point put in the case of Enoch and again of Elijah, was only this, that they missed the usual dissolution of soul and body. As to other Old Testament authorities, let it suffice to refer to David, saying, "As for me, I shall behold thy face in righteousness; I shall be satisfied when I awake with thy likeness" (Ps. xvii. 15); and to Solomon, "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return to God who gave it"; "For God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil" (Eccl. xii. 7, 14); and to Daniel, "Those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life and some to shame and everlasting contempt" (xii. 2). Inevitably the doctrine of resurrection carries with it a future existence as opposed to non-existence after death. Yet this doctrine was so well known and so universally held that both

mines his own location by his allusions to objects in the visible world about him. Under this law the writer of Job locates himself not in Palestine, but in Arabia; and moreover, shows himself about equally familiar with Egypt. At this writing he had lived in Egypt and in Arabia, but not in Palestine. Again, every religious Hebrew poet draws from Hebrew history, and cannot ignore it. The author of Job drew from the creation and the flood, but never from Hebrew life later than the residence of Moses in Arabia. Finally, the presence of this book in the Hebrew canon cannot be accounted for save through the agency of Moses. Written in Arabia it must have been; but imported from Arabia at any point later than Moses, it never could have been. [These points are more fully developed in the Introduction to the Author's volume on Job].

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Isaiah and Ezekiel use it as a figure to illustrate analogous changes in the political state of kingdoms. (See Isa. xxvi. 14, 19 and Ezek. xxxvii. 1–14.) Who does not know that sensible writers draw their figures for illustration from things known, and not from things unknown; from things believed, and not from things that nobody believes in?

We are therefore authorized to regard the proof as conclusive that the Old Testament writers assumed, and their first readers admitted, the *soul's future existence.*

Did they also assume, teach, and believe the *future misery of the wicked* as the doom threatened by the law of God? The evidence will fall chiefly under the following heads:

I. *Special Words;* e.g. die, death, hell, etc.

II. *Special Facts:* judgments from God upon guilty men in this world.

III. Some *Special Passages.*

IV. Light thrown back from the New Testament upon the Old.

V. The doctrine prevalent in the leading Jewish mind at and before the Christian era.

I. To simplify the discussion of *special words* we begin with the cardinal one *die.* In the sense of dissolution of soul from body everybody knows its meaning; all men naturally dread its presence and power. That this would be a very appropriate word for the future doom of the sinner, supposing that doom to be supremely dreadful, has been suggested already. We now come to the question of fact. Does it appear that God did in fact use this word to denote the sinner's future doom?

In his first announcement of precept and penalty, God said to Adam: "Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat; for in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die" (Gen. ii. 17). Did they die the bodily death on that day? By no means. Was this death physical dissolution, and nothing more? Something far more, most certainly. Mortality may have been in it, but did not exhaust it. The physical event supplied the word, and gave it its

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first and normal sense. The Lord took up this word (some word with an earthly sense he must take), and used it to represent a death beyond, far more dreadful.

The usage of this same word by Ezekiel (xxxiii. 9, 11) serves to interpret the word "die" in this primal precept. "If the wicked turn not from his way, he shall *die* in his iniquity. ..... As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live. Turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye *die?*" This death, be it noticed, does not befall the righteous; and the wicked man is delivered from it if he turns from his evil ways. Therefore it cannot have here the sense of dissolution. Hence we are shut up to the sense of *another* death beyond the present state of being — a *second death.*

This conclusion is fully sustained by the well-established usage of the Old Testament and of the Scriptures throughout; indeed, we might say, of all human language. Death and life are used figuratively; death to denote the worst of evils; life, the best of blessings. Thus Moses, solemnly laying before all Israel the consequences of obeying God, and of not obeying: "See," said he, "I have set before thee this day *life* and good, *death* and evil. ..... I call heaven and earth to record this day against you that I have set before you *life* and *death*, blessing and cursing" (Deut. xxx. 15, 19). Here life and good are synonymous; so are death and evil. Life means blessing; death means cursing. Life is over against death, as good is over against evil, blessing antithetic to cursing. Consequently death is far more and other than physical dissolution.

Throughout the Scriptures life is used often in this intensive and figurative sense for the best of blessings, e.g. "A man's *life* consisteth not in the abundance of the things he possesses" (Luke xii. 15). "In his favor is *life;* weeping may endure for a night, but joy cometh in the morning" (Ps. xxx. 5). "Wisdom is a tree of *life* to them that lay hold upon her; happy is every one that retaineth her"

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(Prov. iii. 18). "Shall we not be in subjection to the Father of spirits, and *live?*" (Heb. xii. 9). "Now we *live* if ye stand fast in the Lord" (1 Thess. iii. 8).

Correspondingly, death is used for the worst of evils. Pharaoh said of the locusts: "Entreat the Lord that he take away from me this *death* only" (Ex. x. 17). With a keen sense of the mischief and heart-pain wrought by slander, Solomon said: "*Death* and *life* are in the power of the tongue" (Prov. xviii. 21). The historian made a strong case as to the pressure of his Delilah upon Samson, by putting it thus: "She pressed him daily with her words, and urged him so that his soul was vexed unto *death*" (Judg. xvi. 16). The transition from a sinning to a godly life — from the vanity, emptiness, remorse, shame, of the former, to the rest, the peace, the joy unspeakable of the latter — is put briefly as a "passing from *death* unto *life*" (John v. 23; 1 John iii. 14). So, in common speech, what is worse than a living death? What is richer than real life, a life worth having?

The usual Hebrew word for the place of wicked souls after bodily death is Sheol, whose nearest Greek equivalent is Hades, and whose best English representative in the later Hebrew is hell; in the earlier, the under-world. In some cases *grave* translates it, sometimes, *the pit*. That the sacred writers were slow and late in developing definite ideas as to the place where human souls have their future destiny, indicates rather their good sense than any scepticism as to the fact of such future doom. They were too truthful and too wise to pretend to know what they knew not. It sufficed the earliest fathers to know the *fact* of a future life of real retribution, without knowing *where* in the unknown realms of the universe it might have its local habitation.[1]

Naturally the first step toward definite thought as to the future locality of the soul would regard the *direction* of its course. Which way does it go after death? Clearly their

[1] This mode of speaking of the sacred writers by no means ignores their true inspiration. I use it for the sake of brevity. The case does not require us to distinguish between the thought of God and the thought of his inspired servants. His mind was in them.

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first thought was *downward*, following the direction of the mortal body, which turned back to its mother dust, and found its normal home under ground. Therefore Sheol was in their thought an under-world, deeper than the grave for the body.

By etymology Sheol is from the verb שָׁאַל, with middle א, which means *to ask, demand;* and in this line of thought the noun should signify the insatiate, the insatiable — a sense which appears in such passages as Prov. xxx. 15, 16: "Four things never say *enough*," and Sheol heads the list; also Prov. xxviii. 20: "Sheol and destruction [Abaddon, its synonyme] are never *full*"; and Hab. ii. 5: "Who enlargeth his desire as Sheol, and is as death, and cannot be *satisfied*."

Another etymology, favored by Gesenius (yet not by Fuerst), supposes the primary sense of שָׁאַל to be that of שָׁאַל with middle ע, viz. *to dig*, or *to hollow out;* so that the word "Sheol" would mean *the hollowed receptacle* — the great excavated world beneath. Critical opinions are divided between these two etymological senses. Etymology, however, is of only secondary importance. Usage is the only point really vital.

Old Testament usage will justify the following threefold classification of its special senses: 1. The one home for all departed souls, with no particular reference to their moral character, or to their destiny to happiness or woe; 2. The home and doom of the lost; 3. Used figuratively, in regard to earthly things, for a state of great calamity and suffering.

1. In the first class stand the cases of its earliest use — Jacob going down to Sheol to his son Joseph (Gen. xxxvii. 35; xlii. 38; xliv. 31); also 1 Sam. ii. 6: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive; he bringeth down to the [borders of the] grave (Sheol), and bringeth up." Here, also some would assign Ps. xvi. 10: "Thou wilt not leave my soul in Sheol"; but it is better to personify Sheol as the ruling power of the under-world, and read: "wilt not leave me to the power of the under-world," — viz. corruption, — as the parallelism shows.

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2. Of the second class are the following: "The wicked shall be turned into Sheol, and all the nations that forget God" (Ps. ix. 17); "Her feet go down to death; her steps take hold on Sheol" (Prov. v. 15); "But he knoweth not that the dead are there, and that her guests are in the depths of Sheol" (Prov. ix. 18); "The way of life is above [upward] to the wise, that he may depart from Sheol beneath" (Prov. xv. 24); "Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and shalt deliver his soul from Sheol" (Prov. xxiii. 14); "For a fire is kindled in mine anger, and shall burn unto the lowest Sheol [unto Sheol below, underneath]" (Deut. xxxii. 22); "The earth opened her mouth and swallowed them up [Korah and his company], and they went down alive into Sheol, and the earth closed upon them" (Num. xvi. 30–33). So the Psalmist, with perhaps his eye upon this case of Korah, said: "Let death seize upon them; let them go down living into Sheol; for wickedness is in their dwellings" (Ps. lv. 15). Similar is the usage of Ezekiel (xxxi. 15, 16, 17).

3. Of the third class is Ps. lxxxvi. 13: "Great is thy mercy toward me; thou hast delivered my soul [life] from the lowest Sheol."

A careful examination of old Testament usage, later than the Pentateuch, will show that Sheol is the locality for the wicked under their doom of woe, but is not the name for the blessed home of the righteous. As to the wicked, the passages cited under the second head above will suffice. On the other hand, we find no case where Sheol is the name for the exclusive abode of the righteous after death. This abode is indicated variously; e.g. "Thou wilt show me the path of *life;* in thy presence is fulness of joy; at thy right hand are pleasures forevermore" (Ps. xvi. 11); "As for me, I shall behold thy face in righteousness; I shall be satisfied when I awake with thy likeness" (Ps. xvii. 15); "Thou wilt guide me with thy counsel, and afterward receive me to glory. Whom have I in heaven but thee?" (Ps. lxxiii. 24, 25). Putting the contrast between the wicked and the righteous, Ps. xlix. 14, 15 has it (in substance): "The wicked they

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drive into Sheol, as flocks to the slaughter; but God [and he only] will redeem my soul from the power of Sheol, for he will receive me [to himself]."

II. Under the head of *Special Facts* — great judgments from God upon guilty man in this world — we have first in order the Flood.

To estimate at their full value the moral bearings of this judgment we need to consider that the godly were reduced in number to a single family, for whose safety God, first of all, made ample provision; that the whole race outside of this household had "corrupted their way before God"; that "the earth was filled with violence"; that men were hopelessly apostate, the Lord solemnly declaring, "My Spirit shall not always strive [in vain]"; that though warned by righteous Noah, they went on, reckless and unbelieving, till the day of vengeance came and swept that godless generation from the earth.

What were the moral lessons of this deluge of death-bearing waters? What did it teach, and what did it resistlessly suggest as to the future life and doom of the wicked? The Apostle Peter leads the answer; that God knows how to discriminate between the righteous and the wicked; that he has both the heart and the power to make this discrimination; that such discrimination involves salvation for the righteous, but the reserving of the wicked unto the day of judgment to be yet more fearfully punished. No man could reasonably suppose that a few moments' death-struggle in those surging waters would exhaust the punishment justly due to such defiant rebels. Rather he must infer that such swift, consuming judgments in this world are the guarantee and pledge of analogous judgments far more fearful in the world to come. For it would be only madness to infer that when a holy God can endure rebels no longer here, he swoops them with one mighty avalanche of flood or flame into heaven.

Any ungodly man, reflecting upon the moral lessons of the the flood, must rationally say, When, like those ungodly men, I too shall have defied the Almighty as long as he can bear

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with me in this world of mercy, what must I look for in the world to come? In that awful flood he shows me the might of his arm and the energy of his indignant and righteous judgment; alas! how shall I escape the doom of the lost? Remembering that I can never cease to be, remembering that my spirit must return to God who gave it, and that every work of mine must come into judgment before him, what possible hope can I have of blessedness beyond this mortal life?

The same great moral lessons come from the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. The historic narrative, coupled with numerous subsequent allusions, makes every vital point stand out in most appalling vividness. The unspeakable moral rottenness, the hopelessness of reform, the pains taken to show that not a righteous man remained out of all the people of Sodom and her neighbor cities, the removal of righteous Lot, then the awful judgment coming from the very hand of the Almighty, for it is said "The Lord rained upon Sodom fire and brimstone *from the Lord* out of heaven," — every point in particular, and all combined, serve to make this a most impressive example of righteous and discriminating judgment from God upon incorrigible, unendurable sinners. Subsequent writers often refer to it as a destruction of the wicked and of their polluted homes, at once *total* and *final* — no vestige left; no rebuilding, no restoration. (Deut. xxix. 23.) All these circumstances, coupled with the fearful agencies of fire in their destruction, combine to make this the standard example of the doom of the wicked in the world to come. As said by Jude (vs. 7), "Set forth for an example [of what it is] to suffer the vengeance of eternal fire." The elements of this scene color the language of the Psalmist: "Upon the wicked God shall rain snares [better, *forked lightnings*], fire, and brimstone, and an horrible tempest; the portion of their cup" (xi. 6). Indeed, it is supposable that the very frequent imagery of *fire* in the later Scriptures to represent the sufferings inflicted on the wicked in the world of their woe, takes its rise in this illustrative example. Of analogous sort is the case of Korah and

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his party (Num. xvi.), and also of God's judgments on guilty cities and nations; e.g. Israel (Deut. xxviii.) and Idumea (Isa. xxxiv.). But the flood and Sodom suffice to reveal and illustrate the principles of God's moral administration. In the light of reason and conscience they must bear upon the doctrine of future punishment thus: The present is a state of only partial, not perfect, retribution; adjusted throughout to the purposes of probation and moral transformation; a sphere, therefore, of merciful endeavor on God's part to turn sinners to repentance. Therefore is his great patience and long-forbearance with rebels; therefore all the goodness and mercy he can safely indulge in; therefore these admonitions of future doom; therefore these illustrative cases to set forth its certainty and fearfulness.

Now our question is, do such events as the flood and Sodom reveal anything from God as to the future doom of sinners? Did the Lord intend by them to teach anything as to this doom? Would thinking men, of fair sagacity and average honesty, infer anything certainly from these judgments? Take into account that these reason-endowed men expect to live on after they leave this world; know they must carry with them the character and the deeds of their earthly life; know they must find there the same God against whom they have sinned here. Now, with these beliefs and with the certain knowledge of these facts, must they not not say in their hearts, All that God could do to turn me from my sins has proved unavailing. His patience, long-abused, is at last exhausted,—and I must die. Will he take me up into his home for the redeemed, or hurl me down to the abode of hardened rebels and hopeless apostates? Is it his nature to discriminate between the righteous and the wicked? Alas! this world is full of such testimonies; it were simple madness for me to ignore them. I have never turned out of my chosen way to please him here; I have no favor to hope for when I awake to meet him there.

Thus when men are compelled to believe in a future existence, their hearts are naturally open to that terrible infer-

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ence to which we have alluded: If God can no longer bear with my insults and rebellion in this world, but sends swift judgments down upon me here, will he not send more and swifter judgments there? I know I have done nothing but abuse him here; what but wrath and ruin can await me there!

The righteous have an entirely different inference to make; of this sort: My God has proved himself my refuge and friend a thousand times, all-along my earthly pilgrimage. I know, therefore, that I can trust him in the hour when flesh and heart shall fail me; can trust him to be then the strength of my heart and my portion forever.

III. Some *Special passages* should have particular attention.

"The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God" (Ps. ix. 17). Three considerations suffice to determine the meaning of this passage; viz. (1) "Hell" [Sheol] cannot be the grave, that so the death of the body may exhaust the meaning, for this would make it mean virtually nothing. To restrict its sense to mean mere bodily death makes it no revelation; for who does not know that in this sense, all nations die? (2) This doom is made to turn upon character, bad character. It is the wicked (not the righteous) who are "turned into hell"; those that "forget God"; not those who reverently, obediently, remember him. (3) Old Testament usage of the word Sheol, as shown above, compels its reference to the doom of the lost. If it be replied that this passage says nothing about suffering, punishment, in the hell of which it speaks, the answer is, the whole context of the Psalm makes this sufficiently definite: "Thou has destroyed the wicked; thou hast put out their name forever and ever. The Lord shall judge the world in righteousness. When he makes inquisition for blood he remembereth them. The Lord is known by the judgment which he executeth."

Prov. xiv. 32: "The wicked is driven away in his wickedness; but the righteous hath hope in his death." These

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words as to the wicked are at once telling and terrible. "*Driven* away" when he would fain resist if he could; forced along out of this world, despite of every struggling endeavor to withstand. "Driven away," not *from* his wickedness, but *in* it, with all his heart-depravity in full strength, and all his guilty deeds lying upon his unforgiven soul. Alas! how can he meet God in the world of retribution! "The righteous has hope in his death"; *he has none*. This is the very point made emphatic by this contrast.

Another passage from Solomon must be noticed — one fearfully fraught with the sentiment of dread retribution (Prov. i. 20–32). "Wisdom crieth all abroad [wheresoever there are mortal ears to hear], How long, ye simple, will ye love simplicity [folly], and ye scorners delight in your scorning? Turn ye at my reproof; Behold, I pour out my spirit upon you; I make known my words unto you." Then, assuming that they repel her loving entreaty, she takes up the strain of threatened retribution: "Because I have called and ye have refused; I have stretched out my hands and no man regarded; but ye have set at nought all my counsel and would not consent to my reproof; I also (as if stung by your insults and roused to retaliation) will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your fear cometh; when your fear cometh as desolation and your destruction cometh as a whirlwind; when distress and anguish come upon you; Then shall they call upon me, and I [in my turn] will not answer; they shall seek me most earnestly, but [too late] they shall not find me: Because they hated knowledge and chose not the fear of the Lord; they would not have my counsel; they despised all my reproof: Wherefore they shall eat the fruit of their own way and be filled with their own devices. For the turning away of the simple shall slay them."

Here is great plainness of speech. The words are all but too significant, as if with saddened heart and sternly honest purpose on the part of Wisdom to make herself understood, despite of dulness, dislike, and aversion. At some points she comes down even to anthropomorphism, using words after

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the manner of men, as when she says, "laugh at your calamity"; "mock when your fear cometh." But the dullest souls cannot help feeling in these words the breath of an awful solemnity — cannot resist the conviction that all this means terrible retribution.

If it be said that the writer's thought here is altogether upon things of time, and travels never beyond those laws of temporal retribution under which vice comes to grief and sin earns its wages of death, this helps not the sinner's case, for even so, it *proves a principle;* it *reveals a law* of God's universal empire — a law no less sure and terrible in the next world than in this. If God brings such retribution on sinners in this life, where mercy reigns and blesses all she can, how much more terribly must his retributions come down upon the incorrigible in that other world, where judgment reigns without mercy!

Perhaps the most fearful application of these terrible words is that which bears upon the hope, fondly cherished in many bosoms, of renewed probation in the next world, even though it be the world of doom. With that hope, the significance of these words has no sympathy; for the folly of it, the voice of Wisdom, speaking here assumes no responsibility! The ring of these awful words should be the deathknell of that vain hope forever!

Notice should next be taken of Isa. xxxiii. 14. "The sinners in Zion are afraid; fearfulness hath surprised the hypocrites" [hardened sinners]. "Who among us shall dwell with the devouring fire? Who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnings"?

The full force of these words will not be felt, their legitimate application will scarcely be apprehended, unless we have in mind the stupendous scene then passing before Isaiah's eye, viz. the sudden destruction in one eventful night of the invading hosts of Sennacherib. Isaiah was in the city (we must suppose); himself saw the encamped foe within striking distance, shaking his hand defiantly at the daughter of Zion (x. 32); was cognizant of the terror that

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shook so many strong men's hearts at night-fall (xvii. 14), and led off in the song of glad thanksgiving when at opening day the tidings came in that 185,000 of their foe lay strewn in death! The whole people were thrilled, but not with the same emotions. Upon every heart there fell, as if from heaven, *the sense of a present God* — to all his friends inspiring with a joy almost unspeakable; but alas! to the sinners in Zion, and to the hypocrites [hardened souls], it suggested a power they feared, a doom that filled them with horror. "Fearfulness surprised" them; they recoiled under an awful dread of such power in the hands of a holy God. The passage gives the words of their outcry: "Who of us shall dwell with the devouring fire? Who of us shall dwell with everlasting burnings"?

The "fire" and the "burnings" are here, perhaps, in symbol, because the prophet a moment before had used the same symbol for the destruction of the Assyrians. "Ye shall conceive chaff; your breath as fire shall devour you. The people shall be as the burnings of lime; as thorns cut up shall they be burned in the fire" (vs. 11, 12). Hence, to those sinners in Zion, the symbolic fires which consumed the Assyrians, suggested the everlasting fires and burnings which represented the sinner's future doom. This language certainly seems to imply that the elements of that future doom (suggested possibly by the case of Sodom) were currently thought and spoken of as *fire*. It is common in Scripture that the New Testament symbols have their root and rise in the Old Testament.

As to the legitimate sense of the Hebrew עוֹלָם, applied here to "burnings," both etymology and usage conspire to put it entirely beyond question; for (1) By etymology it comes from the verb עָלַם, to hide, conceal; giving, therefore, when applied to time, the sense — that which lies in the dim, dark distance, too remote to be visible; (2) By usage, the time it indicates is as long as the nature of the case admits; the longest possible. Thus "a servant forever" serves during life; "everlasting mountains" stand while the world stands;

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"the everlasting God" (Gen. xxi. 33; Isa. xl. 28), exists without end, or beginning (Ps. xc. 2). Hence, to "live forever," said of man (Gen. iii. 22; Dan. xii. 2) must be to live eternally; and burnings that are "everlasting" must be without end. This being the well established sense, by what right do we tamper with God's own words? On what authority can we take out of them the sense which God has put in?

IV. Light *thrown back* from the New Testament upon the Old.

It is legitimate to learn all we can from the New Testament of the true sense of the Old, and of the amount of divine truth then extant.

I shall not exhaust this field. Suffice it to refer to two passages. The first (Jude 14) preserves to us a short sermon preached by Enoch, "the seventh from Adam," i.e. in the age before the flood. We know little as to the preaching in those days, and perhaps have been wont to assume that there was none. Yet Peter said, incidentally, that Noah was "a preacher of righteousness" (2 Pet. ii. 5); and Jude tells us that Enoch preached, "Behold, the Lord cometh with ten thousand of his saints, to execute judgment upon all, and to convince all that are ungodly among them of all their ungodly deeds which they have ungodly committed, and of all their hard speeches which ungodly sinners have spoken against him." This coming of the Lord in judgment with ten thousand of his holy ones must be the same which Jesus portrays more fully (Matt. xxv. 31–46). Its supreme purpose is put, here as there, with unmistakable clearness, viz. to convict ungodly men of their ungodly deeds, — a process of investigation and proof legitimately antecedent to the infliction of their final sentence. This preaching, therefore, proves beyond dispute that sinners in that age were by no means left in darkness as to the fact of a future life, nor as to the *certain doom* of the finally impenitent.

The second passage bears upon the doctrines taught by Moses and the prophets as to the future doom of the wicked.

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In Luke xvi. 27–31 our Lord represents a rich but godless Jew as having passed at death into the "place of torment," and as crying from thence to father Abraham to send Lazarus to his five living brethren to testify to them as to the awful realities of the future world, "lest they also come to that place of torment." But Abraham replied, "They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them." The suppliant still pressed his plea: "Nay, father Abraham" [put me not off so], for if one went unto them from the dead, they will repent." Note the final answer: "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead." Moses and the prophets have said enough *as to the future torments of the lost* to persuade men to repent. The prayer is denied on the sole ground that the Jews have already in their Old Testament Scriptures all they need to know of the sinner's future doom. For it were an unpardonable hardihood and affront to say back to the very face of the Lord Jesus, No future punishment is taught in Moses and the prophets; you quite mistake the teachings of the Old Testament if you suppose any clear revelation of that punishment is made there.

V. The doctrine of the leading Jewish mind as to future punishment, at and before the Christian era.

In opposition to the Sadducees the Pharisees held strenuously the doctrines of the soul's existence after death and of the resurrection. This fact lies upon the face of New Testament history; e.g. Matt. xxii. 28, and its parallel passages. Paul in his defence before the Sanhedrim (Acts xxiii. 6–9) adroitly brought the Pharisees into sympathy by placing himself with them and against the Sadducees on these great points, the existence of departed spirits, and the resurrection of the body. The "certain ruler" who asked (Luke xviii. 8) "What good thing shall I do that I may inherit eternal life"? manifestly believed in the possibility of attaining eternal life [blessedness] — a belief which carries with it the corresponding possibility of failure, and of its results — eternal death. The Pharisees (not the Sadducees) led

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and represented current Jewish thought at the Christian era. On the points above named this thought was well defined and well established. Of this the historic proof above referred to is quite decisive. But this proof is heightened by the fact that John the Baptist and our Lord speak of the future doom of the wicked in a way which itself assumes a general belief in that doctrine. They do not assert it as new, nor prove it as being doubted, but assume it as a point generally believed. The thing they solemnly affirm is, that men of a certain moral character "cannot escape the damnation of hell." That there *was* such a damnation, they had not the least occasion to prove.

We thus find ample authority in the New Testament for the existence of this belief in the leading Jewish mind. It now becomes an interesting and somewhat important inquiry, whether, outside of the New Testament, there is historical evidence which confirms this current belief. Moreover, does the testimony cover also an earlier date?

Josephus, himself a Pharisee, is a competent witness to their belief. He says: "They believe that souls have in them an immortal vigor [anti-Sadducean doctrine], and that, under the earth, there will be rewards and punishments, according as men have lived virtuously or viciously in this life. The latter are to be detained in an everlasting prison."[1] "They say that all souls are incorruptible, and that the souls of bad men are subject to eternal punishment."[2] "The souls of those whose hands have acted madly against themselves [in suicide] are received by the darkest place in Hades."[3] This last quotation is from his own address to his soldiers, exhorting them against self-destruction.

Yet another witness to current Jewish opinion in the century before the Christian era has come quite prominently to view within the present century, viz. the Book of Enoch. This book has attracted the more attention because, as is now generally admitted, Jude quotes from it his vs. 14, 15

[1] Antiq., 18. 1, 3. [2] Bell. Jud., 2. 8, 13. [3] Ibid., 3. 8, 5.

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— the prophecy of Enoch. The ablest critics differ somewhat as to the date of this book; the weight of critical authority, however, locating it between B.C. 150 and B.C. 50. Professor Stuart favors a later date, on the ground of its Messianic doctrine; but the earlier date is best supported.

The doctrine of the book on the point now in hand is unambiguous and emphatic. B. F. Westcott (in Smith's Bible Dictionary) says: "The mysteries of the spiritual world, ... the power of Satan and the legions of darkness, the doctrines of resurrection, retribution, and eternal punishment are dwelt upon with growing earnestness..... The book repeats in every form the great principle that the world, natural, moral, and spiritual, is under the immediate government of God. Hence it follows that there is terrible retribution reserved for sinners, and a glorious kingdom prepared for the righteous. The Messiah is regarded as the divine Mediator of this double issue" (xc., xci.). Professor S. Davison says: "The doctrine of a future state of retribution is implied in many passages. Thus: 'Ye have committed blasphemy and iniquity, and are destined to the day of the effusion of blood, to the day of darkness, and to the day of the great judgment. This I declare and point out to you, that he who created you will destroy you,'" etc. "The eternity of future punishment is also contained in the Book of Enoch. Thus: 'Abundant is their suffering until the time of the great judgment, the castigation and the torment of those who eternally execrate, whose souls are punished and bound there forever. A receptacle of this sort has been formed for the souls of unrighteous men and of sinners. Their souls shall not be annihilated in the day of judgment, neither shall they arise out from this place' (xxii. 12, 14); 'Never shall they obtain mercy, saith the Lord of spirits' (xxxix. 2); 'Darkness shall be their habitation, and worms shall be their bed; nor from that bed shall they hope to be again raised, because they exalted not the name of the Lord of spirits' (xlvi. 4); 'But has it not been shown to them that when to the receptacle of the dead their souls shall be

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made to descend their evil deeds shall become their greatest torment? Into darkness and into the snare and into the flame which shall burn to the great judgment shall their spirits enter; and the great judgment shall take effect forever and forever'" (ciii. 5).

Of this Book of Enoch Professor Stuart says: "Composed by a Jew unusually familiar with the Old Testament Scriptures; written by a serious man for serious purposes..... the rewards of the righteous and the punishment of the wicked are his great themes. His book will therefore give us the usual sentiments of his time..... The writer's manner is such as to show that in his view the subject is not a controverted one..... The declarations that God will punish the wicked and reward the righteous are almost without number," [1] — so many that Professor Stuart for the most part omits them, and quotes only such as indicate how much or how long the wicked are to be punished. On these points the testimonies in this book are perfectly decisive. No human words or figures could well be more so.

The reader will bear in mind that neither the Book of Enoch nor Josephus are quoted as being the inspired words of God. They come in here only as reliable human history, valuable to us because they testify to a current popular belief at and before their date. This era of popular belief may be supposed, on this historical authority, to fill some two or more centuries anterior to the birth of Christ, and to have been in force during the lifetime of Jesus and his apostles — a fact which has vital bearings upon the interpretation of their words. Our present theme applies their testimony to the interval from Malachi to Christ. From David, through Solomon and Isaiah, to Malachi (iv. 1–3), our testimonies make up a chain stretching a thousand years next preceding the Christian era, showing conclusively that during that period belief in the endless future punishment of the wicked was positive, and apparently unquestioned.

Certain *objections* and *misapprehensions* should receive notice.

[1] Bib. Sac., 1840, pp. 6–9.

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1. It is objected that the rewards and punishments of the Mosaic law are temporal only; therefore it must be inferred that Moses and his people neither believed in, or even knew of, future rewards and punishments. This objection has been often made; yet it rests on gross misapprehension. For (1) The Mosaic law was framed to be administered largely by human hands — not by the Almighty alone, or through his angels, but by civil rulers — judges, priests, kings. Therefore, like all human governments, its rewards and penalties must be such as human hands can administer. If its threatened penalties had lain in the future world, how could these mortal men execute them? With what hardihood and insults would presumptuous transgressors have hurled back defiance upon those Hebrew magistrates who should have threatened them with eternal damnation! How dangerous, morally, the temptation in that case to dare those magistrates to put the threats of the law in execution! God was too wise to append such penalties to laws given to his people to administer.

(2) In so far as the Lord interposed to enforce this law by providential retributions, it was done on a principle of consummate wisdom, palpable even to very dull human thought, in these two directions; viz. (*a*) That the most hardened and sceptical might see God's hand and feel its terrible severity, despite of the most stubborn unbelief in future retribution; and (*b*) That present retribution might become both illustration and proof of that which lay on beyond in the eternal future.

(3) The assumption that Moses, "learned in all the wisdom of Egypt"; Moses, familiar from earliest years with the Egyptian doctrine of future life; Moses, who "chose rather to suffer affliction with the people of God than to enjoy" all the glory of Egyptian royalty,— the assumption that this Moses knew nothing of future rewards and punishments, is of all assumptions most puerile, most baseless.

2. A second point I put in the words of Canon Farrar (as in Smith's Dictionary, "hell"): "Generally speaking, the

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Hebrews regarded the grave as the final end of all sentient and intelligent existence; the land where all things are forgotten." To sustain this statement he refers to Ps. lxxxviii. 10–12; vi. 5; Isa. xxxviii. 9–20; Eccl. ix. 10; Ecclus. xvii. 27, 28, appending only this further proof of his doctrine: "Even the righteous Hezekiah trembled lest 'when his eyes closed upon the cherubim and the mercy-seat,' he should no longer 'see the Lord, even the Lord *in the land of the living*.'"

The marvel is that Mr. Farrar's sole argument did not open his own eyes to its fallacy. Yes, verily, Hezekiah not only feared, but knew, that after death he could no longer see the Lord *in this land of the living*. That was the very point. He longed to see more of the Lord God of Israel here, in this earthly life. He could not bear to go hence, and leave so much of his purposed earthly work unfinished. He felt the vast responsibilities of his kingdom; and especially he longed to lead out the praises of Israel yet far more for all the Lord's great mercies. All these he must fail to see and enjoy (so he thought) if his life were to close then.

Let it be well kept in mind that Hezekiah, and indeed all pious Israelites, were elated, enraptured, we might say, with the grateful songs and testimonials prescribed in the temple worship as acknowledgment of mercies. We see the spirit of it in Ps. cxvi.: "I love the Lord because he hath heard my voice and my supplication. Because he hath inclined his ear unto me, therefore will I call upon him as long as I live." "What shall I render unto the Lord for all his benefits toward me? I will take the cup of salvation, and call upon the name of the Lord. I will pay my vows unto the Lord now in the presence of all his people." So felt Hezekiah: "The grave cannot praise thee; . . . but the living, the living, he shall praise thee, as I do this day; the fathers to the children shall make known thy truth. The Lord [sprang] to save me; therefore we will sing my songs with stringed instruments all the days of our life in the house of the Lord." These thanksgiving songs filled his vision in the present.

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From precisely these thanksgiving songs the dead were debarred. So of God's wonderful redeeming mercies. The living upon whom they fell might see and celebrate them; but, in their idea, the dead could not look from their other world to participate in them or to praise the Lord for them in his Jerusalem temple. What the sainted dead might see and how they might praise and love in their new life beyond, Hezekiah does not say. It was not in place here to say it. As to the experiences of that life beyond, he neither affirms nor denies. In the same line of thought the writer of Ps. lxxxviii. sung: "Wilt thou show wonders to the dead? Shall the dead arise [from their graves] and praise thee" [here in thy temple]? He does not undertake to say that the dead see no wonderful doings of God *in the new world where they are*, nor that they never praise God there for what they see. But, being there, they see not the wonders God is revealing here; and they do not rise out of their graves to join in our glorious thanksgiving songs in our earthly temple.

Thus the writer of this Ps. lxxxviii.; thus Hezekiah in his song; thus Solomon in his passage Eccl. ix. 4–6, 10, held the doctrine, not that the dead are unconscious, but that they are not cognizant of what is transpiring here; not that they know nothing of God and his works in the world where they are; but that they see not his wonders wrought in our world, and rise not to join us in our temple praises.

3. It is objected that so far from *teaching* future eternal punishment, the Old Testament teaches the annihilation of the wicked at their death.

In proof of this, appeal is made chiefly to Ps. xxxvii. and lxxiii.: "The wicked shall perish; the enemies of the Lord shall be as the fat of lambs; they shall consume; into smoke shall they consume away." "Transgressors shall be destroyed together; the end of the wicked shall be cut off." "He passed away, and lo, he was not [literally there was nothing of him] (Ps. xxxvii. 20, 38, 36). "Thou castest them down into destruction. How are they brought into desolation as

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in a moment! They are utterly consumed with terrors" (Ps. lxxiii. 18, 19).

The one sufficient and conclusive answer to this objection is that these passages affirm as to the wicked only his *sudden death*, his vanishing from the view of the living; and *not* the extinction of his being. "He passed away, and lo, he *was not;* I sought him [among the living], but he *could not be found*." No trace of him remained in the land of the living. But this by no means denies that God could find him in the world of departed souls. This strongest phrase "he *was not*" [there was nothing of him] is used of Enoch; he *was not;* for God took him." Yet this was not annihilation. Far from it. Nor is it ever.

The sudden disappearance of the wicked under God's righteous judgments was one of the great and oft-occurring facts of his ancient administration. It often appears in both scripture history and sacred song. Never can it be legitimately held to teach that sinners, thus suddenly cut down in their sins, cease therefore to exist. This is never the teaching of the Old Testament Scriptures.

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ARTICLE VII.

THE MEANING OF יהוה.

BY PROF. PAUL DE LAGARDE, D D., PH.D., OF GÖTTINGEN. TRANSLATED BY A. DUFF, JR., OF MONTREAL.

[THE following was published in Latin by Prof. Paul de Lagarde as a part of a Corollarium at the end of his edition of Jerome's Psalter (Psalterium juxta Hebraeos Hieronymi e recognitione Pauli de Lagarde, to be procured through Ch. Trübner, of Strassburg, Alsatia), in 1874. Two other valuable parts of the Corollarium may also be read there. We have sought eagerly for permission to give this interesting investigation to the American theological public. We are glad not only to make that public acquainted with men who are steadily doing thoroughly scientific work in the theological field, thus showing to those who do not know the fact, that theology is not "effete," but is a busy and an exact science, quite as much so as most other sciences; we are glad not only to present for example and encouragement to workers in this country a piece of genuine Semitic work, done by one who is really fit for his profession; but we are glad also to present a result which has such evident practical, and we may say homiletical value. For it is easy to see the point given by Prof. de Lagarde's result to the multitude of passages in which it is recorded that the Hebrew preachers declared, — God will do so and so, "that ye may know his name is יהוה;" and the like. Or, again, see what strength the verse of the poet has, "He restoreth my soul for his name's sake"; or his plea, "Hear me for thy name's sake." This translation was made for the Bibliotheca Sacra with the express sanction of the Author, and was revised by him. — ED.].

IN the Journal of the German Oriental Society (*Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*) xxii. 331,[1] for January 1868, I showed that יהוה means Creator, *τὸν τοῦ εἶναι αἴτιον*. When I wrote that demonstration I was not aware that Johannes Clericus had held the same opinion long before me, and that Wilhelm Gesenius, in his Thesaurus ii. 577 foot-note, published in 1839, had come very near

[1] Lagarde, Symmicta 104.

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commending the same view. I had listened, in 1844 and 1845, to the lectures of Hengstenberg, a most severe critic of Clericus,[1] and afterwards had read the letters of R. Bentley; and I had concluded that Clericus was not worthy of much esteem,[2] especially as I noticed that he had a very limited knowledge of Greek, and yet had a proud opinion of himself. I owe it to a mere chance that I now think better of him. For I saw in a note on Petavius' Theological Dogmas viii. 9, 7, in the Antwerp ed. of 1700, i. 342, written by Theophilus Alethinus, the *nom de plume* of Clericus, as follows: "De nomine tetragrammato egit nuperus pentateuchi interpres ... ostenditque eo significari eum qui facit ut res sint, γενεσιουργὸν seu creatorem et effectorem rerum" (i.e. a recent interpreter of the Pentateuch discusses the tetragram, the Divine name יהוה ... and shows that it signifies "He who causeth things to be, Creator or efficient cause of all things"). Upon reading this, I at once turned to Clericus' Commentary on Exodus at this passage (vi. 3), and to my great joy found that there Clericus had advanced much concerning יַחְוֶה (for so he pronounced it) which I had long taught in my lectures as something of which I had been the first discoverer. Let me ask those to read this to whom truth is dear, and who desire that every man receive the praise due to his own merits. But since I have learned that my opinion, as it was briefly published in 1868, has been disseminated as public property, and that my name has been suppressed, I purpose to set forth here those arguments for my view which I have been wont to give in my lectures. I shall omit several things which Clericus made known before me.

In the first place, then, it is very certain that יהוה was pronounced Jahwe. Clement of Alexandria gives Ἰαουέ in his Stromata v. 6, 34 [240, 34 Sylburg ed.]. Compare what I published in the *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen* for 1870, p. 807 [= Lagarde, Symmicta, p. 14]. Epiphanius gives

[1] Consult concerning Clericus Abraham des Amorie van der Hoeven de Joanne Clerico et Philippo a Limborch Dissertationes. Amsterdam, 1843.

[2] See Lagarde's edition of the Clementine's, p. 23, towards the end.

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Ἰαβέ in his Panarium, 40, 5 [132, 12, 15, Basle ed.]; where the Venetian MS. gives *ἰάνε*, and the Basle MSS. vary and give both *ἰάβε* and *ἰαβέ*. Theodoret, in his Epitome, on Ex. xv., Roman ed. 116 [78 in Paris ed. of 1558] ascribes *ἰαβέ* to the Samaritans. Everybody can see that it is יַחְוֶה, and not יְהוָה. Nor can I imagine it possible that while the Hebrews were accustomed to distinguish between the first and fourth forms of the verb, and while they knew, for example, that יִפְקֹד differed in meaning from יַפְקִיד, they would regard Jahwe, a derivative of the fourth (= חפעיל) form as identical with Jihwe.

Again, derivatives of the fourth form were used for proper names. That this was customary is seen in the well-known word יָאִיר (see Num. xxxii. 41; Judges x. 3; and in Mark v. 22 the equivalent is Ἰάειρος), which name was used at a later period in the form מָאִיר, now often heard in Jewish families in Germany (written Meyer). Whether يالیل, the name of a deity, which has been preserved in عبد يالیل (Pococke, specimen 78), may be adduced here in illustration, I am not sure. But we may compare the following appellative nouns: يعضيد (See Lagarde's Abhandlungen 52, 29), يعقيد meaning *mel igne concretum*, from اعقد (See Butrus Bustânî 1438 a, at the end); يقطين (see Butrus Bustânî 1736[2], 5; Abdallathif 129) which means *planta erecto caule carens*, and = יַקְטִין (Cf. Amos viii. 5; and cf. also the notes which H. L. Fleischer has written on S. de Sacy i. 129, 13). In Syriac יְצַמֵּץ (See Bar Ali 4480) belongs to the root צמץ, II. = IV.; cf. Isa. xxxiii. 15; Matt. xiii. 15 (from this the Arabs have taken يعميص). For יצמץ is ريباس (rheum ribes, the sharp, acid juice of which was used for healing eye diseases (Avicenna Arab. i. 254 = Lat. [Venetian ed. of 1582] ii. 581), and it is very natural that the eyes should be made to shut by the juice لة قوة خماص الاترج والحصرم. possessing the sourness of the lemon and the unripe grape. It is, therefore, clear that in calling יַחְוֶה a derivative of the fourth form we are following correct analogy.

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It is very natural to remark here that the notion of "Being" or "essential existence" could not have been employed in early times to express the nature of the Deity. I pointed this out publicly six years ago. I said that this notion was too abstract to be thought of as occurring to the minds of simple men who were utter strangers to scholastic teaching. If any insist on thinking differently they may possibly please this fickle and ignorant age by their persistence in boasting, and even by their very ignorance; but they will certainly be always a laughing stock among prudent people.

Further, חוה = חוח = هوى which means *cecidit*. In illustration, note that in Syriac חוחא may bear the meaning *accidit ei* (cf. Bar Ali 3283); and חַוְא among the Syrians (cf. Ps. lxix. 2, 15; Luke xvi. 26; Bar Ali 3284) is the same as the Arabic هُوَّة = *βόθρος*, Prov. xxii. 14, and = *χάσμα*, Luke xvi. 26. Therefore the notion of "being" or "existence" is not what lies originally in חוה; so that those who explain יהוה as meaning *The Existing One*, or *He who is*, and assert that this is an ancient name, are not up to the mark. Since קָן takes the place of חוה among the Arabs and Phoenicians, one sees at once that יָחְוָה is the same as יָכִין 1 Kings vii. 21), or, according to later usage, יָכוֹן.

But now, thirdly, there exists a trace of this interpretation which I have given in the sacred book itself. For the author of Exod. vi. 3 certainly could not have meant to say, that the name of Jahwe was unknown to the first founders of the Jewish people. For then he would have removed all mention of Jahwe from Genesis, which he himself edited (cf. *Goetting. gelehrte Anz.*, 1870, 1558 [= Lagarde, Sym. 55]). But we know that he left the name standing there in a great many instances. If, however, we may suppose that the name which the ancients used as meaning Creator, *καλῶν τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα*, Rom. iv. 17, was used by this editor and writer in one particular application, viz. to mean *ὁ στήσας τὰς ἐπαγγελίας*, then all is plain and harmonious. I am confident that the correct meaning of Exod. vi. 2–6 is given by the following paraphrase; I am called Jahwe; and I am the same who

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gave to your fathers tokens great enough and many enough of my power; but I could not prove myself to be the *fulfiller of promises*, because, of course, in the very nature of things, it is impossible to make a promise and to fulfil it both at the same time. But I remember the covenant which I made (Gen. xv.), and I will show that I am rightly called Jahwe; for I am he who causeth things to be which are not.

Fourthly, it seems to me that with this interpretation of Jahwe, we can explain how the name came to be no longer used in speech. This took place, I think, in times of disturbance, when it seemed almost sacrilege in the eyes of devout men to call God a performer of promises, while they saw him turning away his face in anger from his own people. He who withheld from his servants the promised rewards of piety and virtue was not יהוה. So it began to be considered impious to use the name. I rather think, too, that the author of the Jobeid, who uses the name יהוה in his exordium and in his conclusion, shows that he was one of the downcast, the doubting hearts of his time, by his use of אֱלֹהַּ alone in the dialogue of the disputants. He had lost faith in God as one who peculiarly favored the Jewish race; he had lost faith in him as יְהוָה, as one who loved them in times long gone by, and established among them his own congregation. Weighed down with sorrow, they paid no attention to the various manifestations of divinity which shine forth throughout the whole earth (אֱלֹהִים). But they did not deny that there was some sort of a Deity (אֱלֹהַּ), and yet they did not perceive any benefit arising from his worship. We know that in the latter years of the Jewish commonwealth the high-priest used to pronounce the name Jahwe at the feast of the atonement only, and this in the holy of holies. On this one day they felt it possible to thank God for remembering his promise: *τἆλλα πάντα φροῦδα.*

Having given this exposition, I have then usually turned to Exod. iii. 14. For there the words אהיה אשר אהיה [1] do not

[1] Concerning which passage, see E. W. Lane's Arabic-English Lexicon, II. 1544, midd.

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show that the name Jahwe signifies τὸν ὄντα, but they are an exhortation to Moses to be reverent in his inquiry concerning the name (i.e. the nature) of God. It is as if the speaker said, 'It is nothing to thee who I am; thou knowest (note that two answers to Moses' question are given) that I am he who promised thy fathers that at a certain time I would come to the help of their children, and thou knowest that my whole nature is summed up in this name which men give me, and by which they express their belief that I am a faithful performer of both threats and promises. אהיה אשר אהיה is to be explained by similar passages, e.g. the following: Gen. xliii. 14, כאשר שכלתי שכלתי; 1 Sam. i. 24, ותנער נער; 1 Sam. xxiii. 13, ויתהלכו באשר יתהלכו; 2 Sam. xv. 20, אני הולך על אשר אני הולך; Zech. x. 8, רבו כמו רבו; Ezek. xii. 25, אדבר את אשר אדבר; Raschi on Gen. xx. 13, אונקלוס תרגם מה שתרגם; John xix. 22, ὃ γέγραφα γέγραφα; Acts of the Council of Ephesus 13 חו דחזק נחזוק, i.e. let him depart who will, we hinder no one (as may be seen in the German translation of my friend George Hoffmann, 9, 37); Bar Ali 614, אינא דהו كاين ما كان; Bar Bahlûl אינא דהו كاينا ما كان, to which he adds (see the تعريفات of Gurgâni, 17, 20, for explanation) the following, ويكون ايما علي سبيل الاستفهام (comp. Yâqût iii. 38. 4, and كاينا من كان in Ahlwardt's Fakhrî 312, 11; Kosegarten's Arabic Chrestomathy 33, 3 انى قلت لك ما قلت, also 8 صنع بنا ما صنع; Thousand and One Nights, second Bulâq edition, i. 393, 13 لكان ما كان, i.e. 'it was what it was,' meaning 'never mind'; i. 454, 10 فاصنع ما انت صانع, i.e. 'do what thou doest,' meaning, 'I do not care what thou art going to do, I give thee full liberty to do as thou wilt'; in the same work i. 482, 7, 8 كنت السبب فى هذا الذى جرى بينى وبين ولدى كله حيث اشرت على بما اشرت i.e. 'you have been the cause of all these (ill-feelings) which have arisen between me and my son, and you did it, too, by advising me as you did advise me,' meaning,

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'you did it by giving me worse counsels than I am willing now to talk about.' In the same work iii. 10, 9, طلع من طلع, i.e. 'there rose from the waves those who rose,' meaning, 'it is no use to tell who and how many rose'; in the same work, iii. 167, 2, ان اسلموا اسلموا وان ابوا فحرقهم بالنار, i.e. 'if they turn to our faith, let them turn to our faith (then we will say nothing), but if they refuse we will burn them with fire'; in the same work, iv. 411, 5 فالذى يجرى يجرى, i.e. 'what will happen will happen,' meaning 'for my part I will throw away all care, for the affairs of men are so controlled by fate, that to be cautious and provident does not benefit one, and to be incautious and improvident does one no harm.' Again, i. 494, 11, 12; iii. 156, 3; 159, 1; 160, 9, جرى ما جرى, 'what happens happens'; Knös History of the Ten Viziers, 50, 7, عملت معه ما عملت, i.e. 'she did with him what she did,' meaning 'things which I will not narrate, for they are obscene'; Maqqarî, i. 88, 22, 23 (Leyden edition), قد قدر ذلك فيك من قدر, i.e. 'he made the decree, who made the decree on your behalf,' meaning, 'do not trouble yourself, the thing will have its accomplishment,' (compare concerning the same affair Bayân, ii. 3, 17 يقدر ذلك من قدر ما قدر); in the same work, i. 89, 1 وكان منه ما كان ثم اتى عليه ما اتى, i.e. 'there proceeded from him what proceeded from him, and there came upon him what came upon him,' meaning, 'seeing that both are known publicly there is no need of repeating them. Again, i. 133, 7, اال الامر الى ما يوول اليه, the thing came whither it came. Compare Ibn Arabshâh Tîmûr, 4, 14, 15, ed. of Golius, الى ان اال امره الى ما اال, and 7, 14 الى ان كان من امره ما كان; Ibn Arabsâh, in the book mentioned, 35, 8, 9 لما اثار سجستان ما اثار قصد بعساكره مدينة سبزوار, i.e. 'after avenging the damage inflicted by the Sacae, in the manner in which he did avenge it, he departed to Sabzawâr (Yâqût, i. 804, 13, Ibn Bathûtha, iii. 65, 5) with his army;

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in the same work, 304, 10, 11, وفعل مع مباشر ذلك ما فعل, i.e. 'he did things already related'; Yâqût, iv. 191, 10, وفد على كسرى ابرويز فيما كان يفد عليه, i.e. 'he departed to Parwêz king of the Persians, with the design with which he departed,' meaning, 'it is not of importance to explain what was the cause and reason of his journey; Henzi's Arabic Fragments 26, end (they are the words of Fakhraddîn of Rhagae), ثم كان من الامر ما كان; Harîrî Durra 180 end, Thorbeck's ed., حتى دهاها الذى دهاها, i.e. '(Baghdâd was the seat of the kings) until that happened which happened to it,' meaning 'until something happened sadder than I can bear to speak of plainly. Again, Hariri in his Maqâmât 209, 1/2 Reinaud's ed., حتى انتشر عن حمالة الحطب ما انتشر, i.e. '(even in early times quarrels harrassed that most excellent man Muchammad) so that that was declared concerning the wife of Abu Lahab which (Qurân 111) was declared,' meaning 'it is so ominous that I will not say much about it'; Ibn Hishâm 152, 13, حتى اذا كان الشهر الذى اراد الله به فيه ما اراد من كرامته, i.e. '(Muchammad was wont to do thus) until the very month in which God had decreed to confer that boon upon mankind which he did confer,' meaning, 'until the well-known message of Gabriel to Muchammad.'

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ARTICLE VIII.

ILLUSTRATED SERMONS, OR TRUTH ADDRESSED TO THE EYE.

BY REV. W. B. BROWN, D.D., NEWARK, N.J.

WHILE conceding that the Lockean philosophy, which claims that knowledge is communicated to the mind only through the senses, is unfounded in fact, we must yet concede that very much of what impresses our mental faculties comes to us from sensation. And we must further concede that the eye and the ear are the most important of all the avenues to the soul. Through these gateways a vast proportion of what we learn and feel, of what moves and moulds us, finds entrance. It is not necessary that we should put the eye and ear into comparison for the purpose of deciding their relative importance; for both are well nigh indispensable. Take either from society, and civilization could not survive. Yet if one or the other must be dispensed with, it were better that we should be deprived of hearing than of sight.

I have felt for years, and more and more as the years have passed on, that it was not only possible, but most desirable, that the eye should be addressed more directly and extensively than it has been in the preaching of the gospel. We have contented ourselves with speaking to the ear alone, when we should have addressed the eye as well. We know how much of interest is imparted to a discourse from seeing the speaker and noting his attitude and gesture. Half the effect, sometimes more, comes of this. If, now, the very truth that is spoken to the ears of men could, at the same time, be represented with equal or greater clearness to their natural vision, an impression of double intensity would be produced. The attention would be riveted, and the truth, seen with a twofold vividness, would be impressed on the

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mind with a twofold power. Two reflectors, having a common focus, intensify the light.

Almost any subject suitable for popular pulpit discourse is susceptible of definite and forcible pictorial illustration; so that the field, instead of being narrowed to a few special topics, is as broad as the world. Even the abstract problems of mathematics and of astronomy are made clear to the mind by means of linear drawing. No professor would undertake to teach these sciences without his diagrams and charts. Indeed, without these he could not comprehend the subject himself, much less teach others. In geography maps are indispensable, and in all the natural sciences pictures of various sorts are of great advantage. Indeed, printing itself and all written language are no more than visible symbols addressed to the eye. If, now, in physical and mathematical science, and in the science of language, pictorial representation is of such conceded value, we should reasonably infer that in the department of moral truth it should hold an equally conspicuous place; especially, when we reflect that of the two fields moral truth is the more susceptible of elaborate and impressive illustration.

To make preaching to the eye effective, it is, of course, necessary that the views presented shall be large enough to be distinctly seen by the audience, and sufficiently artistic to be attractive to the eye. But most of all, they must have such clearness and boldness of outline and such detail that the common observer shall be as able to read and realize their meaning as he is to understand the accompanying discourse. A picture, like a sermon or a book, is of no value except for what it teaches or impresses. If a discourse is confused, showing confusedness in the mind of the speaker, it is nearly or quite worthless. So of a picture; its creator must be able to see the end from the beginning. His work of art must tell plainly its own story, or it is not worth looking at. A picture that requires a written explanation, or that when the subject is known does not explain itself, or which cannot be read as we read the printed page, is a failure.

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The subjects that are most easily represented to the eye, and that require to produce them less of artistic skill than do others, are those that have a distinct geographical or topographical or historic basis. For example, illustrated sermons on such topics as Christ at the Sea of Galilee, Christ weeping over Jerusalem, Paul's shipwreck, Abraham and Lot separating, Gideon and the Midianites at Esdraelon, Elijah on Carmel, and hundreds more of their class, are so easily represented on canvas, and furnish such ready material for impressive discourse, that they had probably best be selected at first by those who have had little or no experience in this method of preaching. Afterwards it will be found easy to take up ideal topics for the presentation of more abstract themes; such, for example, as on the rock and on the sand, the two paths, Sinai and Calvary, the parables of our Lord, the underlying ideas of our popular pictorial hymns, or the various pen-pictures of the Bible.

But the purpose of this paper is not so much to explain how the pictorial presentation of truth is to be accomplished as it is to unfold the underlying basis on which it rests, and which commends it as an important and impressive method of preaching the gospel.

1. There is a foundation and demand, and so a philosophic basis, in the constitution of the human soul, for pictorial representation. And this statement is applicable to art generally, whether it be in the department of sculpture, architecture, or painting. These all are addressed to the eye, and they all speak a universal language that is understood and enjoyed by universal man. The architect who built, and the artist who adorned, St. Peter's Church address and impress alike, through the eye, every beholder. Sculpture is not less instructive and impressive than painting. I would as soon use for the preaching of a sermon Thorwaldsen's group of Christ and the apostles as I would Raphael's Transfiguration or his Judgment Scene. But for obvious reasons, and chiefly those of convenience and cost, if preaching to the eye is to become general, pictures, rather than sculpture

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or architecture, must be used. Let us see how these fit into the constitutional needs of the soul.

Take the little child, before he is able to read, or, except in small part, understand ordinary discourse, and he loves his picture-book and appreciates its meaning. He sees and enjoys the idea of a dog, cow, pig, or horse long before he is able to read the letterpress description. And this liking for pictures is never outgrown. With adults the well-drawn likeness of some strange animal, or of some striking scene in nature, or the portrait of some unknown person often gives in one moment a truer and better conception of the original than could be obtained by any amount of thought or reading. Illustrated books, if the illustrations are good and numerous, are sought after and prized, almost regardless of what else they contain. And the demand for this sort of literature has come to be so great that not only our daily, weekly, and monthly periodicals, but standard works have to be profusely illustrated in order to assure circulation. Dictionaries, even, are made picture-books to meet the popular demand. Appleton's Picturesque America, Bryant's New History of the United States, books of foreign travel, and literary works in general seem to be more prized for their illustrations than for the letterpress. Who that takes a new book in his hand does not first of all turn to the pictures as if they were the chief attraction, thus revealing that between them and the mind there is a natural affinity?

If, now, we turn from books to the art galleries of the world, and observe their attractiveness, we have another phase of the power of pictures to instruct and impress the human mind. One chief charm of foreign travel is to see and enjoy what the art galleries of the old world have to offer. Many a one has journeyed hundreds of miles to look only for a few moments upon a single picture, — Rubens' Descent from the Cross, for example; but that one look was a recompense and enjoyment forever. What would Rome or Florence or Vienna, or Paris even, be without their works of art. Travel would lose all its charm but for the objects

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of interest that flash on the vision to instruct the mind and move the heart.

Just now this nation has celebrated its centennial anniversary. All the land has rushed to Philadelphia; and the great attraction in that magnificent bewilderment of curiosities consisted in the works of art there collected. Take the art galleries and the art products from that interesting show, and the charm is broken; its interest is gone. The pictures and statues there exhibited, if their worth were measured in gold, would almost exhaust the wealth of nations. There are single paintings in Europe that could not be bought for millions. But their gold value is of little consequence, except as it shows the power they have over human heads and hearts. And this same thing is illustrated, in a small way, by the efforts that are put forth everywhere to adorn our homes with works of art — the poor with inexpensive, and the rich with costly, pictures. But whether rude or regal, they instruct, elevate, and refine those who live in their companionship.

Another indication of the mind's adaptedness for pictorial illustration is presented in the opera and theatre. These have been immensely attractive in every age and nation. Grant, if we must, that they have been largely of evil tendency; this detracts nothing from their effectiveness and suitableness to impress the human mind. And what is it that gives to these places of amusement such increasing popularity? It is not what is spoken there; for the compositions that are recited are seldom read from books. The most of what the multitudes know of Shakespeare is what they have seen and heard in theatres. It is the pictorial representation, the scenery, the costumes, the groupings, the tableaux, the acting generally, that attract and impress. Take these from the theatre and the opera, and they would be deserted at once. True, the opera has the additional attractiveness of music; but painting and music have kindred elements, and there is no more evidence of the adaptedness of one than of the other to provide for the constitutional

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needs of the soul. While I would not commend operas and theatres as they are at present conducted, yet I confidently believe that operatic and theatric performances of a moral and religious character might be inaugurated that should prove greatly useful. The highest and most effective style of popular teaching, could it be rightly conducted and controlled, is the theatric style. And it is worth while for Christian people to inquire if there be not some way of wresting this popular and powerful method of reaching and impressing men from the service of Satan, and giving it to the cause of Christ.

But my one object in all these references to the adaptedness and power of pictorial representation to impress and instruct all classes of mind is to suggest, and to emphasize the suggestion, that the basis of it is in the nature and needs of the soul itself. God has made us to be so impressed, which is but another way of saying that God has sanctioned, if not necessitated, pictorial teaching. We shall have it somewhere and of some sort, and we can have it, and ought to have it, in the Christian pulpit. The preacher should reach the mind through the eye, as well as the ear. In this way he will obtain greatly augmented power, and will help to grasp God's agencies from the enemy, and to employ them in the service of Christ. Thus much upon the point that the pictorial presentation of truth has a philosophic basis.

2. My second argument for pictorial preaching is drawn from God's method of teaching and impressing truth as it is seen in the material world. I know that God speaks to men sometimes, and powerfully, by his Spirit; but he speaks to them constantly through his works. And when the Spirit of God communicates truth to the souls of men, the figures of speech or emblems of communication employed are what nature furnishes. Without these there could be no teaching, or at most but little. Our conceptions of heaven, of angels, of God himself, and of the whole unseen world take shape and proportion from the visible objects of earth. It is only by means of things seen and temporal that we can grasp and

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compass things unseen and eternal. Nature is God's panorama, passing constantly before the eye of the universe, to impress himself upon it, and to instruct rational, and even irrational, creatures of things which they need to know as conditions of life and well-being. Nature is not the ultimate, but only the pictorial representation of the ultimate. Here lies the grave mistake of one class of naturalists. They see physical nature only, and do not realize that these visible forms are but the outward and pictorial representations of invisible things, which alone constitute the real and the final. The physical world is allegorical; it carries a meaning deeper and richer than itself. It is but the magnetic wire, stretching from sun to sun and from system to system, and touching all visible objects, along which the invisible truth of God perpetually flashes. "The true theory of the universe," says John Harris, "is, that it is a vehicle or medium constructed expressly for the circulation and diffusion of God's love." The visible universe is a type and expression of the invisible. I believe that Swedenborg's law of correspondences, though often perverted, contains a vastly important truth. The visible everywhere shadows the invisible, much as pictures convey to the mind objects which they are made to represent.

Now, my point is, that nature is intended of God to be man's great teacher, and that those who teach others should study and imitate nature's methods, and address the eye as well as the ear. The heavens above, whether viewed in the golden splendor of noonday or in the stellar brilliancy of midnight, in the purple glow of morning or in the gorgeous glow of the setting sun, are God's great painting to instruct and impress the universe. The earth beneath and around us, with its forests and vales and mountains, and infinitely diversified scenery, whether viewed amidst the buddings and rich bloom of spring, or in the warm, leafy robes of summer, or amid the fruitage and parti-colored foliage of autumn, or beneath its winter winding-sheet of snow and ice, — however and whenever viewed, it is God's landscape spread before us

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for study, enjoyment, and profit. The vast ocean with its islands and coasts, near and remote, the cloud-land, now as distant mountain ranges, and now as a canopy of light hanging over it, and winged vessels like angelic throngs drifting on its surface, — whether seen in storm or in sunshine, in calm or in tempest, — is God's sublime painting, in which he mirrors forth himself and his truth to men. A storm at sea is one of the grandest sights, and most impressive of things infinite and eternal, that mortal vision ever gazed upon.

Turning, now, from the vast to the minute, we find that nature presents everywhere the most beautiful pictures, fitted to instruct and impress every thoughtful beholder. We have only to look on some quiet pastoral scene, stretching from vale to hillside, with its flocks and herds feeding in the cool morning or seeking shade at midday; or upon some beautiful grove skirting the river-side, its branches waving in the breeze, and the sunlight peeping through them; or upon some gay harvest scene, where the ripened grain, dancing in the wind, is being garnered by swarthy husbandmen; or on some family group at the old hearth-stone, on Thanksgiving eve, "where age and childhood meet and mingle into one," — we have only to contemplate these, or other of the numberless pictorial scenes that nature everywhere presents, and we at once realize the place and worth of pictorial representation. If the preacher of the gospel would learn from God in nature how to present the truth, he will address the eyes and ears of men alike; he will preach by pictures, and not pen pictures alone.

Let no one assume that such teaching would be vague and indefinite; for, if properly done, it would be quite the opposite. A single glance over Switzerland from Mount Riga, looking northward over the undulating plain and across its flashing lakes, or east and south where in snow-clad magnificence "Alps on Alps arise"; or a single glance at the famed Yosemite valley from Inspiration Point, where the lofty rocks and broken walls, stretching ten miles

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away, presents the appearance of a vast but indescribable ruin, gives a clearer and more detailed knowledge of those wonders of nature than any written or illustrated lecture could possibly convey. A picture can never equal, but it may approach, the reality; and if well executed it may be almost as instructive as the original. Indeed, a picture has the advantage, often, of bringing distant scenes into such close proximity that the relations of one part to the other, and of each to the whole, are better seen and realized from the copy than they could be from the original; so that the sketch may be even more pleasing and impressive than the scene from which it was taken.

Thus God, on a scale of boundless extent, and with measureless power, speaks to the eyes of men; and we, in addressing each other, should adopt God's methods as we find them everywhere in nature. The obstacle to be overcome is, that most people go through the world with little or no artistic vision. Humboldt and his horse travelled together over the same mountain ranges, and looked upon the same scenery; but the effect produced by what they saw was strangely different. Many human beings who go out into the wonders of nature are, as to artistic vision, more like Humboldt's horse than like Humboldt. There is need of artistic training, both on the part of those who preach and of those who are preached to; and of this I may speak briefly at the close of this paper. My purpose here is only to illustrate that if we would adopt God's methods of imparting instruction we must, in addition to oral teaching, and in conjunction with it, address the eye by means of pictorial representation.

3. My third argument for pictorial illustration in the pulpit is drawn from the Scriptures themselves, — not so much from what they say as from what they are. If the Bible and nature are both from God, we should expect to find a correspondence between them. If one is pictorial, so should the other be. Now, from Genesis to Revelation the Bible is full of pictures, of sign-language, addressed either to the eyes of men or to

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the artistic elements of their nature. Whatever appeals to the imagination is, to that extent, a work of art. The imagination is the constructive faculty. Its office is to take disjointed and scattered elements, and construct them into a completed whole, as the architect constructs his building or the artist his picture. Every man whose imagination is well cultivated and developed is at bottom an artist. He sees with the artist's eye, he speaks or writes from the artist's stand-point. All things come up to him in the picture form, and he recalls from the past what has been pictured on his memory even when he forgets the circumstances out of which the picture was created; so that if the picture was at fault his memory will be also.

Now, when I say that the Bible is throughout very largely pictorial, of course I do not mean that the Bible is full of actually painted pictures (though many of our Bibles are); but I do mean that the Bible is the reproduction, much of it, of real pictures, which the writers saw by natural or supernatural vision. God inspired and instructed them by means of pictorial illustrations; and what they saw in pictures they give us in pictorial form. And I mean more than this — I mean that another large portion of the Bible is literally a pictorial representation addressed to the eyes — a sort of sign-language that conveys truth through the senses, chiefly the sense of sight. In the partial *résumé* that I propose, I shall not always sharply distinguish between what was clearly pictorial to the writer, and what he has made so to us literally or by figure of speech.

If the story of the creation of the world and fall of man, as given in Genesis, is rather an allegoric representation of the facts than a literally historic narrative, as many of our best biblical scholars now contend, then in this opening record we have the grandest picture ever sketched. And if it be literal history, Moses must have taken it not from the facts themselves, but from some picture of them presented to his vision. So that in any view the story of the creation involves picture-making as an element of the Bible. And clearly the whole

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system of sacrifices, commencing at the fall of man and running through the Old Testament and into the New, was, and was intended to be, an illustration of truth addressed to the eye. The altar, the slain animal, the fire, the ascending smoke, the priestly robes and attitudes are all visible representations. If they were not literally pictures, they were for my purposes the same thing; they were attempts to instruct the mind and impress the heart through the eye. And it is more than probable that the true doctrine concerning God, and sin, and purity, and forgiveness, and atonement could not have been taught in any other way. Throughout the Mosaic ritual the eye, more than the ear, was directly addressed. Indeed, in the Mosaic service no provision whatever is made for oral teaching. It is throughout scenic — addressed in solemn silence to the eye alone. The building of the ark, and the deluge itself, took on the picture form. They spoke to the eyes, not to the ears of men. True, they were somewhat more than pictures, but they contained the pictorial basis. The same remark applies to the tower of Babel, and to the confusion of tongues there witnessed. Patriarchal life in the Old Testament is filled with pictures. Abraham going at the call of God to seek the land of promise, his conversation with angels, and his offering of Isaac; Jacob's vision at Bethel, his wrestling with the angel, and the strange, sad events of his old age; and the life of Joseph from commencement to conclusion, were all the lessons of God's providence addressed to mortal vision. The story of Moses throughout is one continuous panorama, with accompanying oral explanation. His hiding and finding in the bulrushes, his smiting of the Egyptian, the burning bush on Mount Horeb, the changes of Aaron's rod into serpents, the series of mighty wonders wrought in Egypt for the deliverance of the people, the opening of the Red Sea, the daily manna, the awful scene of Mount Sinai, the cloud by day and pillar by night, the tabernacle and its whole ritualistic service, the forty years of wandering, the vision of Moses from Mt. Nebo, and the manner of his death are all

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in their nature pictorial — put before the eyes of men to impress the truth of God. The story of Joshua, of the judges, and of the kings both of Judah and of Israel presents to us not pictures wrought by human hands, but representations addressed to the eyes of men, wrought of God himself, and having the same end in view that pictures of our making, by way of imitation, strive to attain. The prophets abound in pictorial teaching. So numberless are their sketches that I cannot catalogue them. Jeremiah's almond-tree and seething-pot, and his figs good and bad; Ezekiel's wheels, high and lifted up so "that they were dreadful"; his chambers of imagery, and his man with the inkhorn; the plumb-line of Amos and his basket of summer fruit; Jonah's gourd, if not Jonah himself; the candlestick and the flying roll of Zechariah — all these are but specimens of the numberless pictorial devices addressed to the eye with which the prophets abound. The splendid prophecy of Daniel was made from pictures that God himself produced, and which the prophet, seeing, has graphically described.

And the New Testament is not less pictorial than the Old. The grandest fact in the universe — the incarnation — is God's endeavor to bring himself, his attributes, and his character, before human vision. God, who was obscured and incomprehensible, was now made manifest in the flesh. All the circumstances of Christ's coming into the world were pictorial. The manner of his birth at Bethlehem, the angels, the shepherds, and the wise men, his flight to Egypt, the scene in the temple, his baptism and the descending dove, the temptation in the wilderness, his miracles addressed to the eyes of men, his parables, themselves pictures, and founded mostly on familiar scenes in nature — all this was the pictorial preaching of the Son of God. The two ordinances of the New Testament, — baptism and the Lord's supper, — like the Mosaic ritual which they supersede, are purely a representation to the eye; one being the visible sign of inward purity, and the other, of our Lord's sacrifice for the sins of the world. His death on the cross, his burial and

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resurrection and ascension were not pictures, indeed, but they were the most powerful sort of illustrated preaching, addressed to the eye of the world, and perhaps of the universe.

The Acts of the Apostles, and the Epistles, even, abound in visible representation. The scene of the cloven tongues of fire on the Day of Pentecost, Stephen's vision at his martyrdom, the healing of the impotent man, and the death of Annanias and Sapphira, Peter's vision of the great sheet let down from heaven, Paul's conversion and much of his life, and the manner of delivering the apostles from prison — these and such like scenes owed their power largely to the fact that they were scenes which men looked upon.

The Apocalypse is one long drawn-out panorama, containing the most wonderful series of pictures ever beheld. John saw them literally, and he makes us see them by his graphic description of what he saw. The candlesticks, the seven seals opening into the seven trumpets, and these again into the vials, to be followed by the beasts and the horses and the scarlet woman, are almost to us, as they were to John, literal visions to be studied and interpreted. When, at the close of revelation, God would give us some just conceptions of heaven, he builds before us a vast city, with gates of precious stones and streets of gold, and innumerable multitudes, with harps and trumpets, singing hallelujahs to God and the Lamb.

Thus the Bible is throughout pictorial, addressed to the eyes of men, and especially of those who wrote it. Its attractiveness and abiding power are due largely to its pictorial character. Take away its sign-language of various sorts, and much of the charm would be lost. Now, if God has employed pictures and visible representations so largely in giving us the Bible, we should employ them in the interpretation and enforcement of what it contains. Could we, as the Bible does, put the pictorial element into our popular teaching, the effect, if not doubled, would be greatly increased. We can do this somewhat by word-painting; but if we add to this visible representation, our word-painting even will be

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doubly effective. And nothing cultivates so much the power of word-painting as an attempt at pictorial illustration. One who makes pictures on canvas, will be likely to make them in popular discourse, especially if his canvas contains the subject and illustration of that discourse.

4. My fourth and last argument for pictorial preaching is drawn from the place it has held in religious history, both pagan and Christian. Until within about one century art has been, as it largely is yet, and ever must be, the handmaid of religion. For ages it was the popular method of religious instruction. The Egyptians and Assyrians taught history and religion by means of pictures chiefly, as their ancient monuments reveal. The old Greek and Latin mythologies were preserved and expressed by sculpture and painting. These arts were then essentially religious, and were employed for religious teaching. Pictures and statues of Jupiter, Venus, Hercules, and other of their deities and heroes, constituted the sacred works of those remote ages, and they impressed and held the popular mind with wonderful and prolonged power.

For fifteen hundred years, in the history of the Christian churches, the pictorial presentation of truth was not less prominent and impressive than it had been in systems of Pagan worship. Especially from the fourth century to the sixteenth, the church, such as it was, was more dependent on art for its popular teaching, than upon any, if not every other appliance. An educated monk was an artist; and in this his education chiefly consisted. Many of this class could not read or write; and those who could, spent years in illuminating and illustrating the Bible, where they spent days in directly teaching the people by word of mouth. The result was that every church and convent and town was filled with pictures, all of them intended to teach and impress religion. Madonna and Christ scenes, with other Bible illustrations, were found everywhere, and were everywhere looked upon with reverence, if not worship. Of course religion with only such teaching became sentimental and

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imaginative. It was even found an easy and not incongruous thing to introduce heathen works of art into Christian companionship; so that Jupiter was baptized as Jehovah, and the Greek Venus became the holy Virgin. So exclusively was art the religious teacher of those generations that churches and cathedrals were built and decorated, not as places where the truth of God was to be taught orally, but that the edifices themselves might teach and impress the people. It is scarcely a hundred years since art began to be divorced from its exclusively religious wedlock. It is probable that prior to that date such a worldly and wicked thing as a landscape painting, executed according to the true laws of perspective, was never made, if it was ever attempted even. In figure and group scenes these laws were understood and applied perfectly; but their application to landscape painting is wholly a modern invention, I might almost say discovery; and it is one that should be turned to moral and religious uses.

These illustrations of the place and power of pictorial presentation in past ages, and in religious history, indicate the place that art should still have in the department of religious teaching. I would not go back to the old methods, neither would I exclude them. They were not chosen and continued through all those centuries arbitrarily. There is a call, a fitness, a need for them, in the nature of things. Old methods must now be modified, but they cannot be rejected without great loss to the cause of religion.

It was a weakness in the old Puritan and Roundhead reformers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, that in their opposition to popery they fell into the opposite extreme, and became iconoclasts. John Knox and the reformers of Scotland pulled down the popish cathedrals, and burned their images and pictures. Their motto was, "Tear down the nests and the rooks will fly away." The cathedral at Glasgow was splendidly painted; and, because its utter demolition was opposed, a compromise was made, and its decorated walls were white-washed. In this way many splendid fres-

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coes were thought to be destroyed. But the present generation, at great labor and cost, has removed the lime, and in part restored the old pictures; a fact that shows the drift of interest in Christian art now, as compared with then. The time will doubtless come when our Protestant churches, striking the happy medium, will be decorated, more or less, with paintings of real merit, and of a high moral and religious character, that will greatly impress, educate, and refine the people.

If it be objected that a resort to the pictorial presentation of truth in the pulpit tends to a ritualistic service, as practiced in the Mohammedan, Greek, Roman Catholic, and some Protestant churches, my reply is, that even such ritualisms have, in the past, served some good purpose, and my objection to them as now practised lies mainly against their puerile character. They are fitted for the infancy and not the manhood of society. The priest's robes, the burning lamps, the censors, the altars and bloody sacrifices, were all needed by a nation of slaves who were to be educated into the knowledge and worship of the true God; but when that was reached they had served their end. Hence Jesus and the apostles discarded them. The people who now resort to such puerile devices as wearing a white robe to suggest the idea of purity, or of bowing before an image to suggest the idea of worship, or of having a trail of white-robed boys to suggest the idea of angels, or of burning candles to suggest the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit, ought to be children; or if they are grown-up people they should have been born four thousand years ago.

The pictorial illustrations that I would gladly see introduced into the churches should mean something. The arbitrary, and often ludicrous, blackboard sketches that are prepared for Sunday-schools have very little to commend them, except that they are a feeling after something higher and better. What is needed is the bringing to our churches of artistic and powerful representations of divine truth, addressed to the eyes of the people, and accompanied by

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manly and graphic descriptions; thus by a double agency enforcing the leading thought contained in the picture. When this is done attention never lags, and the truth that was both seen and spoken makes an impression on head and heart that can never be effaced. To do this is to make place in protestant Christianity, but in a new form, for that old and powerful system of art teaching that has prevailed in the Romish church.

Thus from four sources of argumentation — from man's mental constitution, from the methods of nature, from Bible precedent, and from the history of religion — I argue the desirability and practicability of preaching to the eye as well as ear, and I claim for it an improved method of instruction.

I realize that there are difficulties to be overcome in employing it. The great obstacle is the want of artistic skill on the part of public teachers. Clergymen now, unlike the old monks, are not generally artists. It is desirable that each preacher should be the author of his own picture, as he should be of his own sermon, and for substantially the same reasons. To accomplish this some instruction in perspective drawing and in water-coloring, either in the theological seminary or at an earlier period in one's course of study, would seem to be both desirable and practicable. And the same reasons that call for teaching in oratory would justify instruction in the rudiments of art. Only rudimental knowledge is absolutely requisite. One must have a clear conception of what he wishes his drawing to express; he must give to it unity of plan and simplicity of arrangement, not overcrowding and confusing it with needless and irrelevant detail. In a word, the very qualities of a good sermon that is to impress truth through the ear, are the qualities of a good picture that is to impress the same truth through the eye. The painting and the sermon must be a unit, proclaiming together the same thought.

Let no one be discouraged until he has made faithful and persevering endeavor as to his ability to do this. Success is the child of endeavor. At first one may need some help,

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and may succeed but poorly, whether as to his drawing or as to its exposition. But after a few attempts he will gain confidence, and find himself making bold and impressive outlines, on heavy paper background, say four by eight feet in extent, and so richly tinted in water colors that, to persons not close at hand, they will seem to be genuine works of art; and in drawing and perspective they will be. And such a picture-sermon he will, to his own astonishment, be able to produce by the work of a single day, or even less. And when his picture is completed his sermon will be made with it. His imagination will be set aglow, and his discourse, sustained by the illustration, will be in demonstration of the Spirit and with power. Let no one, I repeat, be discouraged who has not made the attempt. Success will be worth more than its cost. Where there is a will there is a way. In the words of an old Latin proverb, "They can, because they think they can." "Before the close of this century," said President Hitchcock, in one of his illustrated geological lectures, "pictures will be as much used in the preaching of sermons as are manuscripts."

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ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A. GERMAN AND FRENCH WORKS.

THE PHILOSOPHICO-CRITICAL PRINCIPLES OF SELF-COMPLETION, OR PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.[1] — The work whose title is given below may be regarded as the completion of the author's system — a system expounded chiefly in three previous productions to which we will for a moment refer. The first, originally published in 1844, was entitled "Outlines of Speculative Criticism" (Grundzüge der speculativen Kritik), and is a kind of metaphysic of pure thought. It is divided into three great sections, designated respectively, (1) Hypothetik, (2) Antithetik, (3) Synthetik; the first embraces the main features of formal logic; the second may, in a general way, be said to treat of the subject ordinarily embraced by applied logic; the third, to quote the writer's own words, is "that part of speculative criticism (or critique) in which it issues forth as the desired unity of thought or as truth — that which has been variously described as faith, intellectual vision, and so forth." Hereupon followed, in 1857, "The Philosophico-critical Principles of Self-Knowledge, or the Doctrine of the Soul," divided into three parts, treating, respectively, of (1) The Soul developing, or Self-Development, (2) The Thinking Soul, or Self-Determination, (3) The Plastic Soul, or Self-Expression. In 1864 appeared "The Philosophico-Critical Principles of Self-Presupposition, or Philosophy of Religion," a work which we noticed at the time in the Bibliotheca Sacra. These works are presupposed by the one now under consideration; the main ideas here carried out had been previously hinted at in various connections, especially in the discussions entitled "Speculative Critique." In an Introduction the author expounds his view of the Philosophy of history, and briefly glances at some other German works on the same subject; for example, Herder, Lessing, and Hegel. His review lays no claim to the completeness which characterizes the recent work of Professor Flint of Edinburgh on the "History of the Philosophy of History." Then followed two great divisions, the first discussing the Idea of History, the second, the Realization of the Idea. History is the process of personality, the process by which the idea of personality is developed and realized. We have not space to attempt to give any notion of the

[1] Die philosophisch-kritischen Grundsätze der Selbst-Vollendung oder die Geschichts-Philosophie. Ein Versuch von G. Mehring. Stuttgart: Cotta. 1877.

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rich variety of suggestive thought which the work contains. It is no hasty production; and whilst no one will suppose — least of all the author — that it offers a satisfactory rationale of the history of the human race, even up to the present time, no one will be able to read it without an increase of light and hopefulness. Prelate Mehring has no doubt been greatly indebted to his predecessors in the field; but he has had an idea of his own to work out, and conscientiously endeavored to work it out. It were well if more attention could be now given to the philosophy, or, if it were preferred, the science of history; we should then, perhaps, hear less than we do of the application of mechanical or necessarian principles to human nature and life.

THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEIR SOLUTIONS, HISTORICO-CRITICALLY EXHIBITED.[1] — The idea of this work is good; its execution leaves much to be desired. We have long felt that the common mode of writing the history of philosophy needed to be supplemented by another — the one hinted at in the title of Herr Flügel's work. Students get but a confused impression of the progress of philosophical thought from most histories, notwithstanding the efforts made to distinguish between various schools and tendencies. We should prefer some such plan as the following: In an introduction we would give a view, first, of the problems which the human mind has formulated; and, secondly, of the possible alternative answers; and then proceed to show, after the manner of the history of Christian doctrine, what problems each philosopher has treated, and how far he advanced towards their solution. Herr Flügel has made a contribution towards this desideratum. His work is divided into two parts; the first devoted to the Problems of Theoretical Philosophy and their Solutions, the second to the Problems of Practical Philosophy and their Solutions. In order that our readers may have a clear idea of the scope of the work we will give the chief headings of the first division: the first beginnings of metaphysical speculation; the conception of absolute Becoming; the chief systems of absolute becoming; restrictions of absolute Becoming; conception of being; the Beënt; connection of the Beënt and the Given (des Gegebenen); systems of pluralism (Is there a finite or infinite number of real beings? Does every movement of the real beings need a cause? Are matter and force separable or inseparable? Are the real beings (atoms) penetrable or impenetrable to each other? Are they all of the same or of different quality?); fundamental problems of theoretical philosophy; problem of inherence; problem of change; problem of matter; problem of the Ego; attempts to return from idealism to realism; the teleological problem. Considering that the entire work has only two hundred and sixty-six large-type pages, of which one hundred are devoted

[1] Die Probleme der Philosophie und ihre Lösungen historisch-kritisch dargestellt von O. Flügel. Cöthen: Schulze. 1876.

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to the ethical problems, it may well be imagined that the treatment of the subjects just enumerated cannot be very thorough. Nor do we like the method. The author's point of view is that of the Herbartian school — which is no recommendation; for to our mind it is hard, pretentious, and dogmatic. Still, until something better appears, the work may be of use.

PHILOSOPHY IN ITS HISTORY. I. PSYCHOLOGY.[1] — Dr. Harms is one of the few able teachers of philosophy in Germany who are in hearty sympathy with Theism and Christianity. The volume before us is the first of a larger work, and seems to indicate an intention on the part of the author of carrying out some such plan as we suggested in the notice of Flügel's *Probleme*. At all events, he has here given us a history of the theories of the nature of the soul — one of the fundamental problems of philosophy. The subject has of course been treated before, especially in works on psychology proper; as, for example, by Fortlage, Volkmann, Noah Porter, and others; but by none with the degree of fulness that the subject warranted and demanded. The author divides the history of philosophy into three great periods, opened respectively by Augustine, Descartes, and Kant. Special attention is, of course, given to German psychological inquiry.

PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS OF THE TIME.[2] — The second edition of a series of essays on the following subjects: Philosophy and our Time; Force and Matter; End and Cause; The Origin of Species (Darwinism); The Rank of Organic Beings; Animal and Man; Soul and Body; The Temperaments; The Will and its Freedom; Conscience and the Moral Order of the World; The Future of the Soul; Religion and Philosophy in our Time; The Philosophical Systems and the Future of Philosophy. It will be seen that the ground covered is extensive. The questions discussed are of the highest importance. The author calls his essays popular, and in the German sense they are popular; but they deal with their subjects in a careful manner, and in general in a reverential, whilst free, spirit. Most of our readers will agree with the writer in such views as the following, expressed in the essay on religion and philosophy: "We must protest against the notions that an impassable gulf necessarily lies between the need of faith of scientific thinkers and that of the people in general, and that the religious faith of the individual has the right to emancipate itself from all relation to the community at large" — two notions which are specially prevalent in Germany, and both of which are pernicious in their effects. "One thing ought not to be tolerated — untruth in faith. We find men of the most

[1] Die Philosophie in ihrer Geschichte. I. Psychologie. Von Dr. F. Harms, Prof. der Phil. an der Univ. Berlin. Berlin: Grieben. 1878.

[2] Philosophische Zeitfragen. Populäre Aufsätze von Jürgen Bona Meyer. Bonn: Marcus. 1874.

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varied opinions united in professing one faith. They condemn each other, and yet do not separate. The religious life will not be renovated, in the deeper sense, until this condition of untruthfulness becomes unbearable." It is a remarkable feature of the times that men who have long broken with the faith of the churches to which they belong, in important, if not absolutely essential points, still refuse to dissever themselves. Is it insincerity or unclearness? or is it, as Professor Meyer would perhaps say, that the difference of thought and agreement of spirit felt by such men forebode, or rather promise, the rise of a higher form of faith, which shall resolve the now conflicting views into unity? There is much in this work that Christian believers will not like; much, however, that ought to be helpful.

History of Israel (Geschichte des Volkes Israel). Pastor Leinicke's point of view is rationalistic. In this first volume he deals mainly with the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua. He is said to evince thorough learning.

Contributions to the Explanation of the Book of Job. Dr. J. Barth, the author, is a Jew. His programme is chiefly devoted to the settlement of the date of the origin of Job, which he fixes about 700 B.C.

Handbook of the Biblical History of the Old Testament. Professor Köhler's work, of which this is the second part, embracing the period of the Judges, is conservative in its character.

Christ and the Caesars. Another work by the once notorious Bruno Bauer, who for years seems to have kept silence. As the second part of the title indicates, it is an effort to show that Christianity owed its rise to the confluence of Greek and Roman elements. As a reviewer has said, his Christ is simply Seneca's ideal of the wise man, equipped with traits derived from the Roman emperors. The following details will convey some idea of the arbitrary mode in which Bruno Bauer goes to work: Augustus is styled "Prince of Peace"; Tiberius, "Servant of the Commonwealth"; Caligula, as the one who presented himself as "God-man and Judge of the World"; Nero, as "Friend of Man and Cosmopolitan." The Gospels are referred to the age of the Antonines. Credibility is denied to Tacitus, and integrity to the letter of Pliny to Trajan. By such means, clearly, it is easy to make anything out of anything in history.

History of the Relations between Natural Science and Theology. Few men are more competent to deal with this subject than Dr. Zoeckler, the author of this work. The present volume is the first part, and extends from the beginnings of the Christian church down to Newton and Leibnitz. He refers especially to the account of creation, as given in Genesis and viewed by science. The subject is one of ever increasing importance; and we trust not only that the author may soon be able to complete his task, but that a competent translator into English may present himself.

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History of Religious Illuminism in the Middle Ages. The first volume of this important work by Hermann Reuter we noticed in the Bibliotheca Sacra soon after its appearance. This second and concluding volume embraces the period from Abelard to Frederick II., and covers, therefore, the classical century of the church and science of the Middle Ages. As Reuter shows, it was then, especially, that both heretical and illuministic opposition was raised against the church. It is becoming clearer and clearer, from works like the present, that the stagnation long supposed to characterize the Middle Ages was the invention of ignorance.

The Rise of Monachism. Dr. Weingarten has investigated the historical documents on which the traditional view of the rise of monachism rests, and has arrived at the conclusion that anachorets began to show themselves in Egypt towards the end of the era of Constantine; the idea having been suggested by the pre-Christian Serapis-monachism; and that monasteries originated after A.D. 350; and that the proper founder of Greek monachism was Basilius of Caesarea. He shows that Paul of Thebes is a mythical person, and that Athanasius was not the biographer of Saint Antony.

History of German Literature. There are already many excellent histories of German literature, none, in their way, better than Vilmar's; but there would seem to be room for another. Few men could be more competent to supply the need, if need there be, than Dr. König, the editor of the *Daheim* — the Christian rival of the anti-Christian *Gartenlaube*, whose proprietor and editor has recently died. As Dr. König is an earnest Christian, a careful student, a man of fine literary taste and wide reading, and as the book he is publishing will be thoroughly well got up, we feel sure that it will be well fitted to introduce to a knowledge of German literature.

German Hymnology. The great authority on this subject, Philipp Wackernagel, died in June, 1877. He has left his work incomplete; for, though it comprises five large octavo volumes, it extends merely to the end of the sixteenth century. Those who are interested in the study of this subject should use his work, and also the *Bibliographie zur Geschichte des evangelischen Kirchenlieds*, published in 1855. There must surely be a wonderful susceptibility to religious emotion in a nation that could produce so many hymns, among which, as is well known, a large number are of a high type.

Herzog's Real-Encyclopaedie, which is now appearing in a second revised, enlarged, improved, and partly rewritten edition, deserves to be recommended to all theologians. It is the most comprehensive work of the kind that we know. It has its defects. One is a lack of perspective. The editor does not exercise sufficient control over his contributors, but allows them to ride their hobbies too vigorously. Another is that, as is too much the wont of our German cousins, the ecclesiastical and religious ideas and experiences of Germany occupy a somewhat too large space. It were a benefit to German readers to know more about British and American Christianity, whether of thought or practice.

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ESSAI DE PSYCHOLOGIE: La Bête et l'Homme. Par le Dr. Eduoard Fournié. Paris: Didier et Cie. 1877.

M. Fournié is one of the physicians of the French National Institution for the Deaf and Dumb. His professional occupations having led him to devote unusual attention to the function played by language in the constitution and development of the human intellect, he became convinced that new light might be thrown from this source on old and hitherto unsolved problems. The results of his earlier investigations he embodied in two works on the "Physiology of the Voice and Word" and the "Physiology of the Nervous System"; and in the work before us he has followed up his inquiries further into the domain of psychology. The reasons which have induced him, though a physiologist, to meddle with psychology are, (1) that a physiology of the brain, even from the purely experimental point of view, will be an impossibility until psychology has determined the psychical elements by which physiologists ought to be guided; and (2) even in the view of candid psychologists, psychology will never be securely established until it shall plant its feet firmly in the positive facts of our cerebral life. To some extent, M. Fournié's general position is indicated in the passage just quoted; but we may refer also, for the same purpose, to words used elsewhere, as, e.g. "Psychology will be definitively constituted when all the facts with which it is occupied shall have been reduced back to physiological facts." As will be seen further on, however, when we come to his view of the soul, he is not a materialist, i.e. he does not regard psychical phenomena as the simple products of the sensuous organism, like bile or saliva or any other secretion. Against such positions as those of M. Robin,—"Thought is that mode of neurosis which is peculiar to the anatomical elements of the brain, and which has for result the production of instinctive and intellectual ideas, which may be expressed or not" (*Anatomie et physiologie cellulaire*),—he protests, saying, "The materialistic idea is not only anti-scientific, but also anti-progressive; for it replaces by words which mean nothing the scientific notions which it dispenses itself from seeking under the pretence of shunning metaphysics."

We shall best consult the interests of the author and of our readers by giving now a brief view of the general contents of the work, referring, as we proceed, to one or two peculiarities which deserve special attention.

It consists of an introductory section and four great parts, respectively entitled: Fundamental elements of the soul, or Psychical elements; psychical activities; notions and sentiments which represent the higher modes of psychical activity; the soul considered in the *ensemble* of its elements.

In the Introduction, he deals in particular with the question of the reality of a specific vital force, concerning which he says: "Life is not explained by the properties of matter. Chemistry can analyze the products of life; but there is something which it cannot analyze, namely,

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the living cellule. This cell is no doubt a compound — a compound of matter and life. The chemist can show us some of its components, as e.g. oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and nitrogen; but, as he is unable to reconstitute life by means of these elements, something must clearly have escaped his analysis. That something is the principle of life. Let a chemist produce for us out of these elements a living cellule, — only one, — and we will surrender." "Materialists do not hesitate to attribute special forces to brute matter when they are dealing with special physical and chemical phenomena; yet strangely enough they object to the intervention of a special force in the marvellous instrument in the midst of which thought is developed and moves."

The First Part treats, in four chapters, of the phenomenon perception, its precise meaning and anatomical seat; the perceptions which proceed from the organic life; the perceptions which accompany or result from the activity of the functional life; and the acquired perceptions.

Employing the term "perception," in place of "sensation," to designate the phenomena of sensibility, whatever their origin and cause, he describes it as a vital phenomenon analogous to other vital phenomena. From the point of view of biological classifications, to transform blood into bile and to transform impressions into a thing perceived are two facts of the same order; for both are the work of life. And we are as unable to explain the one as the other. The seat of perception is placed by him, after the example of other physiologists, in the optic *thalami*.

As to the perceptions proceeding from the organic life, he agrees in the main with Mr. Bain, classifying them as the needs and passions of the organs of nutrition, of the organs of generation, and of the organs of the life of relation; but omitting pleasures and pains, which are treated in the succeeding chapter. He objects, however, to the idea of specific muscular sensations adopted by Mr. Bain from French writers. Fournié's conception of *besoin* or need is peculiar. It is commonly regarded as an uneasiness resulting from lack of the nutriment appropriate to the system. He defines it as follows: "Besoin is a peculiar mode of feeling, the cause of which resides in each of the organs of life. All the organs, without exception, supply a product of their life destined to co-operate in some one of the three forms of the destiny of the living being — self-maintenance, the establishment of relations, reproduction. When delay occurs in the utilization of these products, the organs become overfilled; from this there results a functional tension; and thence passes an impression to the optic thalami, which calls forth in them the sense of need. It may therefore be more precisely defined as an appeal made by an organ to the psychical activity, with a view to exciting the general co-operation of the life toward the realization of its specific physiological destiny." There are, no doubt, some facts which favor this view; but we question whether it is in harmony with all. It is true of the excretory and communicative needs, but

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not of what may be termed the assimilative needs — hunger, thirst, sleep, repose. Bain describes the excretory needs in much the same terms as those which M. Fournié applies to them all.

Among the needs of the organs of the life of relation he includes the needs of movement, perceiving, expression, knowledge, and language. By the need of expression is meant the impulse experienced by the centre of perception to show by particular movements how it has been affected, whether agreeably or disagreeably. By the "perceptions" or sensations which accompany the activity of the functional life is meant the feelings common to all the functions — as of pleasure and pain, — and those special feelings which result from the activity of the functions of relation, from the activity which is due conjointly to the brain and to the senses, and from the activity which arises conjointly from the brain and the organs of movement.

To one point discussed in this chapter M. Fournié attaches special importance — to what he terms the *sensation-signe*. He describes it as not merely the first, the most legitimate, and the most important of the perceptions, but as the "hominal" sensation par excellence. "The *sensation-signe* is analogous, as far as its mechanism is concerned, to all the sensations which result from the activity of our organs; but it contains something more. When we simply provoke a movement in the organ of the voice, the sound which results represents one of the special perceptions already spoken of — a *perception expressive*. But if, whilst provoking the sound, it is our will to represent thereby a distinct notion, we establish a special *rapport* between the sound and the notion, one which we designate *rapport significatif*." "Words, names are the sensible form by means of which we perceive this *rapport*, when they express the two terms thereof, namely, the movement of our organs and the determinate perception"; otherwise expressed, when the words are really names. This point is connected with M. Fournié's special views on language, to which we shall refer presently.

The "psychical activities" (Part II.) are discussed under the heads: the psychical activity in general; the first fundamental activity of the soul; the second fundamental activity, movements and acts; the third, memory; the fourth, language.

The first fundamental activity of the soul is directed to the formation of what the author terms the *notion sensible* and the *notion intelligente*. And as he attaches great importance to this point, we must notice it more particularly. "The *notion sensible* is a perception or sensation with something besides, which something is a certain mode of activity of the soul which transforms the sensation into a *notion sensible*. This transformation is effected when the sensation in question is distinguished from all sensations already known by means of characteristics exclusively sensible — as, for example, by color or hardness. The *notion intelligente*,

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on the contrary, is a perception distinguished from all others by characteristics derived from the intelligence — as, for example, when a comparison is instituted as to size, number, and so forth; for such characteristics are derived from the intellect, not from sense." Thus, what some might call a distinct perception, whether sensuous or intellectual, our author terms *notion sensible* and *intelligente*. The intermediate link between perception simple and notion is memory — the remembrance of having had other and different perceptions. In fact, the notion is the result of a judgment between divers modes of perceiving. Animals are capable of having *notions sensibles;* men alone of *notions intelligentes*. The distinction has an important bearing on the general question of animal instinct and human intelligence. M. Fournié denies altogether to animals the power of establishing *rapports intelligents* between sensations, that is, relations of number, and the like. Some facts, however, seem opposed to his theory.

Passing over the chapter on movements and acts, we must briefly refer to his view of memory, which has its peculiarities. In every act of memory — the term "faculty" is discarded — two elements may be distinguished, namely, the reproduction of a notion already acquired and the remembrance thereof. They are inseparable, it is true, though notions may reappear in the centre of perception without being remembered. The element which invariably accompanies the reproduction of notions, and stamps thereon the character of memory, is, says our author, the *feeling of our past activity*, which feeling is rooted in the very constitution of the *notion sensible* and *intelligente*. The mind does not remember the objects; it only remembers itself, and to remember itself is to recognize itself in its own acts by the special marks which it has impressed on the causes which gave rise to its activity. When a man recognizes an object again, it is because he perceives that the effort necessary to distinguish it (whether as *notion sensible* or *intelligente*) from every other object has been already put forth by him. In a word, memory is the fundamental activity which, on occasion of the representation of any particular notion, awakens in us the feeling of our past activity.

The next point to be noticed is language, on the nature and genesis of which M. Fournié claims to have thrown new light. Man has instincts in common with other animals; but one is peculiar to him, namely, the instinct of language. He creates words by an inner impulse as necessary as that which leads the bird to build its nest or the bee to construct its comb. It is a cerebral need, represented in the encephalon by a special conformation of the third convolution of the frontal lobes, and rendered possible by the existence of a special organ — the larynx. Words are the material product of this instinct; that is, they are objects capable of impressing the centre of perception which are furnished by the movement of our organs. They comprise, however, something besides mere movement, namely, a *rapport* established between the movement and the

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object it represents, which *rapport* is significant. Expressed in other terms, words are the material vehicle of the *notion intelligente*. By means of this vehicle or body which intelligence thus gives to itself it enters into the physiological movements, and becomes accessible to the senses. The ground of this is, that though the brain, or the soul in it, perceives its modes of being and acting, it does not directly perceive itself. Hence when it perceives an object, it knows that it perceives only because it remembers that the present modification in its mode of being differs from previous modifications thereof. So, when the brain acts it knows that it acts only by giving rise to a movement which results in a phenomenon appreciable to the senses. This, then, according to M. Fournié, is the genesis and important function of language.

By the notions and sentiments representative of the higher modes of psychical activity, discussed in the Third Part, are understood consciousness, the ego, will, thought, imagination, reason, the feelings, and the passions. It will be seen that he treats them as forms of psychical activity, and not as distinct faculties. We have only space to notice the view taken of consciousness. A distinction is made between the consciousness of the merely sensuous being, i.e. the animal, and that of the intelligent being, namely, man. In both cases consciousness is the result of a perception or act which contemporaneously awakens the memory — the feeling of the possibility of having been or of actually being affected, or of having acted or of being able to act in a different manner. The difference between the two is, that whilst in the former the actual perception or act is united with the perception or act given in the memory by simple association, in the latter the link of connection is a veritable *rapport*, in other words, the *notion intelligente* of the situation. To be conscious that one is affected in a particular manner is to remember that one can be affected in a different manner; without such remembrance perception is a vital, unconscious phenomenon, and nothing more. Self-consciousness, in the strict sense, is regarded by M. Fournié as impossible. The ego does not perceive itself directly; it becomes conscious of itself solely in the indirect manner described above.

The Fourth Part discusses the following subjects: the materialistic and spiritualistic view of the soul, both ancient and modern; the constitution of the soul; the soul in its differentiating characteristics; natural deontology; the soul of brutes. With regard to the nature of the soul, M. Fournié's language is open to criticism, as lacking in clearness and consistency — a fault due, perhaps, to the double aspect of his work. At one time he speaks of the brain as though it were the soul; at another, he uses the expression "principle of life"; at another, the word "ego"; at another, the term "soul." Nor is it perfectly clear how he regards it; though his protests against materialism, as well as his own positive expositions, forbid the notion that he holds it to be a mere product of the

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human organism. In the chapter devoted to the definition of the soul he differentiates it from the body by its capability, first, of perceiving the sensuous and mental; secondly, of moving the matter of the body; and thirdly, of acquiring and conserving its knowledge. It is the form of the body with which it is substantially united; it is a sensitive, intelligent, and movent principle, essentially free and responsible, and, notwithstanding inequalities due to inheritance and circumstances, so far equal in all that, with the aid of education and effort, each may raise himself to the level of the highest. "In one word, man is the artificer of his own soul; and this must be understood in the most absolute sense. His soul is born and develops itself with the body; it begins to know and to assert its existence when the infant acquires the indispensable instrument of language; and from that moment until death every act, every thought, is one of its constitutive elements."

The account we have given of M. Fournié's exceedingly interesting work is very imperfect; but we trust it may suffice to attract to it the attention of some of our readers. With much in it we ourselves cordially sympathize; and even where we have been doubtful valuable suggestions have rewarded our perusal. S.

B. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN WORKS.

HISTORY OF OPINIONS ON THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE OF RETRIBUTION. By Edward Beecher, D.D. pp. 334. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1878.

The scope of this work is very extensive. It is nothing less than to gather up the opinions which have been held in all ages upon the Scriptural Doctrine of Retribution. Looking down from the age of the Maccabees as a mountain top of vision, it surveys the views of men from the Patriarchs to the Ecumenical Councils.

The discussion of the age of the Maccabees is full and clear. The view given is popular rather than scholarly, and there yet remains room for exhaustive investigation into the extant writings of this period for both lexical and historical purposes. Chapters IV. to VII. discuss the origin of the Jewish views of future retribution, and are decidedly the most interesting and convincing in the whole volume. It is clearly shown that neither Egypt nor Persia nor Greece gave the Jews the conception which they had, and the true origin of this conception in the underlying thought of the whole Old Testament is forcibly brought out. More might be said of the apparent reasons for the method of divine revelation pursued in the Old Testament, but what is said, is with few exceptions luminous and true. The tendency from the earliest point of Jewish history was "directly to a belief in eternal life, and endless retributions" (p. 57). Chapters VIII. to XIII. are devoted to the ages from the Maccabees to Christ including also the contemporaries of Christ and the Apostolic

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Fathers. The three forms of belief at present dividing the church are found to exist at this early period. Chapters XIV. to XIX. are principally taken up with the words αἰών and αἰώνιος. The conclusion arrived at is, that αἰών means *age*, but not *eternity*, and αἰώνιος *belonging to an age*, but not *eternal*. Chapters XX. to XXII., comprising almost half the book, consider the views of the Fathers under the title: "Age of Free Thought and Inquiry," and are intended to show early and great diversity of view, and that *the Church* has never decided authoritatively in favor of any view. The work closes with some personal remarks.

At this point is exhibited the purpose of the book. Among the body of Christians to which Dr. Beecher belongs the case has been tried in the court of the Bible, and it has been *supposed* to be decided. Dr. Beecher now wishes to appeal the case from this court to that of *the Church*. Until *the Church* decides upon it perfect freedom of thought is to be allowed. We are inclined to ask: Will not freedom be allowed *after* such a decision? Such decision, if worth anything, would be only an interpretation of Scripture. To the Scriptures we are ready to submit, for we hold to their sole authority in matters of religion. But we claim also the right of free personal interpretation, and shall venture, even when *the Church* has decided this question, — as she has thought she has many others, — to be like the more noble Beroeans and "search the Scriptures daily whether these things are so."

The argumentative value of this book lies in what is said about the true meaning of αἰών and αἰώνιος, and in the discussion of the doctrine of the Fathers. This part of the work seems to us essentially unscholarly. We do not refer to slips of the pen, as when he puts the LXX more than a century too early, but to the whole conception and execution of these pages. They are job-work, for they are based upon an idea confessedly new to the author, and suggested to him "by reading the profound essays of Prof. Tayler Lewis in Lange's Commentaries" (see p. 296), and under the influence of this idea he has unconsciously done what he has condemned in others, and written history to support previously formed opinions. He has contributed nothing to the discussion of the subject. Some of his remarks have been before the American public forty years (E. S. Goodwin in Christian Examiner, 1831–32). They are now, as they were then, essentially unscholarly.

For example, take the discussion of Aristotle, *De Caelo* 1, 9. A careful examination of this passage will uproot Dr. Beecher's whole explanation. He wishes to show that αἰών here does not mean *eternity*, because (1) Aristotle's authority in etymology is poor, (2) even if Aristotle was right, ἀεί may mean *continuously*, and (3) The context shows that αἰών here does mean *continuous existence*. (1) and (2) are immediately granted. Turn to (3). The first phrase striking our attention is where it is said that things beyond the heaven do not grow old, etc.; but, enjoying the

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best and most satisfying life, they διατελεῖ τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα. What does this phrase mean? It cannot mean as Dr. Beecher translates it: "pass their whole existence," because (a) διατελέω with an object signifies "*to bring to an end.*" Therefore (b) τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα is an adverbial expression. And (c) its meaning is settled by Aristotle's use elsewhere (Met. v. 9. Other references in Lid. and Sc. See also in other forms *De Caelo* B. 1, *De Mundo* 2, 7). Accordingly (d) the phrase means "they continue *through all eternity.*" The passage immediately following, when correctly translated (Dr. Beecher transposes unwarrantably), is as follows: "For also this name [i.e. αἰών] by a divine inspiration was bestowed by the ancients. For they called the boundary which encompasses the time of the life of each man, beyond which, according to nature, there is nothing, αἰών. But on the same principle also the boundary of the whole heaven, and the boundary which encompasses all time and infinity, is αἰών, having derived its name from its always being immortal and divine." It is evident then (a) that this passage takes up the word immediately preceding, which meant *eternity;* (b) that the ancients are commended by Aristotle for having chosen an appropriate name; (c) that the name was appropriate, because (1) αἰών is often used of the complete period of a man's life, and this is the complete period of all existence; and because, (2) it is a good word for it (as being derived from ἀεί), since it denotes that which *always is;*[1] and so (d) that the appropriateness of the name consists in the fact that it *expresses* the endlessness of that which *inherently* encompasses *all time*, or according to another form of expression is *without time;* in fine (e) that *continuous* existence is the very idea the context *shuts out.*

Another example: Dr. Beecher's treatment of Justin is lamentably unscholarly. In many instances Justin speaks in Scriptural language; and here Dr. Beecher regarding himself as having shown that αἰώνιος does not mean *eternal*, must be permitted to quote him without rebuke. But in other passages he cannot be so easily let off. In one place (Trypho, p. 223 B.), Justin says: "At the same time I affirm that souls never perish." He has been developing the principle that immortality is not a necessary attribute of the soul, but depends upon the constant volition of the Deity. His object in teaching this was to prevent the inference that if the soul was by the necessity of things immortal, it must be independent of the Deity, and so not liable to punishment (Try. p. 218 B). Now he wishes to guard against the idea that souls will sometime cease to be, and thus escape further punishment. Accordingly, he utters the sentiment above quoted. Dr. Beecher wishes to show that Justin teaches annihilation

[1] Note that the derivation of αἰών is *hinted at*, and not *stated* by Aristotle. To say that Aristotle derives it from ἀεί and ὤν is to charge Aristotle with poor scholarship, which belongs only to him who brings the charge.

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after a certain amount of punishment. He translates the passage as follows: "I do not affirm that all souls do, in fact, cease to exist at death" (p. 210). He says that he has "carefully considered what has been said in favor of a different translation." It is a pity that he did not add the Greek, for any school-boy would have been able to correct him. Justin writes: Ἀλλὰ μήν οὐδὲ ἀποθνήσκειν φημὶ πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς ἐγώ. The οὐδέ must by all the laws of Greek construction go with ἀποθνήσκειν; Dr. Beecher carries it over to φημί. Compare a parallel case: ὡς μηδὲ ἀποθνήσκοιεν, Apol. i. p. 70 A. This explanation is established by the context: "for this [viz. that the soul should die] would be, indeed, a god-send to the wicked." The wicked would rejoice to escape punishment by annihilation, but this rejoicing they are not to have, since no souls perish. Dr. Beecher evidently felt the force of this consideration, for he has endeavored to parry it by rendering ἀποθνήσκειν in a way utterly indefensible, "cease to exist at death." It means simply *die*. Here are two blunders; but they are necessary if Justin is to teach annihilation. In another place (Try. p. 359 D.) occurs a passage which shows how clearly Justin teaches endless punishment: "The limbs, therefore, shall be devoured by the worm and the fire that cannot be quenched, remaining immortal for a spectacle to all flesh" [ἀθάνατα μένοντα ὥστε καὶ εἶναι εἰς ὄρασιν πάσης σαρκός]. Dr. Beecher renders ἀθάνατα *deathless*, though he has always translated ἀθανασία, when used in reference to the righteous, *immortality*. According to him the bodies cannot die *while exposed to the fire*. This makes fine nonsense of Justin! They live while they suffer *so as to be* a spectacle! How could they be a spectacle any other way? Justin's evident meaning is that they will be an eternal spectacle to men.

In treating Augustine Dr. Beecher admits that he taught eternal punishment, but adds with charming *naïveté* (p. 256) that if he had known his mother-tongne better he would have seen that the Latin Bible did not teach eternal punishment! Augustine's intimate acquaintance with the Latin poets, and the fact that his profession before conversion was Rhetoric, pass for nothing with Dr. Beecher. Soon we shall have some of this school of writers on future punishment telling us that *we* don't know our mother-tongue, and the English Bible never was meant to teach eternal punishment. F. H. F.

THE BOOK OF JOB; WITH NOTES CRITICAL, EXPLANATORY, AND PRACTICAL. Designed for both Pastors and People. With a New Translation appended. By Henry Cowles, D.D. 12mo. pp. 298. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1877.

We are glad to see that Dr. Cowles has published a new translation of the Book of Job. We think that it were well for him, even at this late day, to append to his other commentaries new translations of the books

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which he has explained. We regret to perceive that "with this small volume on Job the author's work on the Old Testament is completed." We think that the commentaries of Dr. Cowles are eminently adapted to instruct and to animate both clerical and lay readers. To enter into the minutiae of the ancient languages is not his design; but he seizes the meaning of the words on which he comments, and explains them with much skill. In many particulars, the present volume is admirable. It indicates the good common sense of the author, his candid and truth-loving spirit, as well as the tenacity of his faith. He devotes eight pages to an explanation of Job xix. 25, 26, 27: "For I know that my Redeemer liveth," etc. In these pages he manifests much acumen, fairness of mind, freedom from extremes. We feel certain that lay readers will nowhere find a sounder and safer exposition of this difficult passage than they will find here. The great majority of pastors will be stimulated by this entire commentary. Dr. Cowles retains his simplicity and perspicuity of style, and avoids the pedantry which is fashionable among exegetes.

A Commentary on the Greek Text of the Epistle of Paul to the Thessalonians. By the late John Eadie, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Biblical Literature and Exegesis, United Presbyterian Church. Edited by the Rev. William Young, M.A., Parkhead, Glasgow. With Preface by the Rev. Professor Cairns, D.D. 8vo. pp. 373. London: MacMillan and Co. 1877.

This is a posthumous publication; still it was in great degree prepared for the press by its lamented author. We miss two essays which there are indications that he intended to add; "one on the Resurrection and the other on the Second Advent." The volume exhibits Dr. Eadie's usual thoroughness of research and firmness of opinion. It is a valuable accession to our theological literature.

The Bible for Learners. By Dr. H. Oort, Professor of Oriental Languages, etc., at Amsterdam, and Dr. J. Hoolayaas, Pastor at Rotterdam, with the assistance of Dr. A. Kuenan, Professor of Theology at Leiden. Vol. I. 12mo. pp. 546. Introduction; The Generations before Moses; from Moses to David. Prepared by Dr. H. Oort. Vol. II. 12mo. pp. 616. From David to Josiah; from Josiah to the Supremacy of the Mosaic Law. Prepared by Dr. H. Oort. Authorized Translation. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1878.

The second of these volumes contains forty-three pages of Indexes. They are well prepared. Both the volumes are translated by Philip W. Wicksteed, M.A. We presume that they are well translated, although we have not seen the original. The exposition of the New Testament by the same editors is soon to appear. Without waiting for that exposition, we remark that the two volumes already published are founded on

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the hypothesis that there have been no miraculous, or even supernatural, interpositions in the history of the world. It is not the aim of the volumes to prove the hypothesis, but to reconcile the Bible with it. The attempt at reconciliation is a failure. It shows that the hypothesis is not "a good working one." It renders it necessary to torture the words of the Hebrew text. It renders it impossible to account for the history of the Bible, for its long-continued success in gaining the esteem and love of men. It renders it impossible to account for the characters delineated in the Bible; those great and noble characters, "the inventors of which must have been greater than the heroes." On this hypothesis the character of the man Christ Jesus must have been formed by a lengthened series of mistakes and delusions. He reverenced the very books which are so expounded in these volumes that they appear ridiculous. When we read these Dutch travesties of the Bible, we exclaim again, "O Infidel, great is thy faith." Rare is the credulity of men who can believe that the pure ethics, the magnificent system of doctrine, the majesty and sublimity of style which are found in the Scriptures germinated from such crude minds as are represented in these volumes.

In our days of commercial fraud and political chicanery we need to strengthen the faith of men in the substantial accuracy of the Bible. It is the duty of a patriot not to lessen the reverence of the young for the only book which they can regard as enforcing duty by the special and express sanction of heaven. If these volumes had contained a fair discussion of the meaning of the Bible, if they had supported their hypothesis by argument, if they had exhibited the objections which the wisest men in the world have brought against the hypothesis, if they had given a scholarly exposition of the biblical text, their destructive influence would have been lessened. They assume as true what they ought to prove; they make an impression that their exegesis is admitted to be accurate by scholars *as such;* their inference is thus derived from a false impression, and must be deleterious. When this "Bible for young people" has taught the children of our Sabbath Schools that the Yahweh who is "Israel's god" is entirely different from the God of truth, the real God, then the Bible of their fathers will become to them like Aesop's Fables or the Arabian Night's Entertainment.

THE FITNESS OF CHRISTIANITY TO MAN. By F. D. Huntington, S.T.D., Bishop of Central New York. 12mo. pp. 127. New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1878.

"John Bohlen, who died, in Philadelphia, on the twenty-sixth day of April, 1874, bequeathed to trustees a fund of one hundred thousand dollars, to be distributed to religious and charitable objects in accordance with the well-known wishes of the testator.

"By a deed of trust, executed June 2, 1875, the trustees, under the

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will of Mr. Bohlen, transferred and paid over to 'the Rector, Church Wardens, and Vestrymen of the Church of the Holy Trinity, Philadelphia,' in trust, a sum of money for certain designated purposes, out of which fund the sum of ten thousand dollars was set apart for 'The John Bohlen Lectureship,' upon the following terms and conditions:

"'The money shall be invested in good, substantial, and safe securities, and held in trust for a fund to be called the John Bohlen Lectureship, and the income shall be applied annually to the payment of a qualified person, whether clergyman or layman, for the delivery and publication of at least one hundred copies of two or more lecture sermons. These lectures shall be delivered at such time and place, in the city of Philadelphia, as the persons nominated to appoint the lecturer shall from time to time determine, giving at least six months' notice to the person appointed to deliver the same, when the same may conveniently be done, and in no case selecting the same person as lecturer a second time within a period of five years. The payment shall be made to said lecturer, after the lectures have been printed and received by the trustees, of all the income for the year derived from said fund, after defraying the expense of printing the lectures and the other incidental expenses attending the same.

"'The subject of such lectures shall be such as is within the terms set forth in the will of the Rev. John Bampton for the delivery of what are known as the "Bampton Lectures" at Oxford, or any other subject distinctively connected with or relating to the Christian religion'" (pp. 1, 2). Foundations like this are eminently useful. It is singular that they are not multiplied in our principal cities, as well as at our colleges.

The first of Bishop Huntington's four lectures is the best in the volume. Its aim is to show that "the Christian faith is found to be true by its adaptation to mankind." It is well illustrated in the following passage: "The Chinese student in the study of Bishop Boone, representing intelligent humanity at its farthest modern remove from Christ, speaks the irresistible verdict of the race. He was a teacher among his Pagan countrymen, and was taken into the mission family to learn English and translate the Bible into the Celestial tongue. For a long time he remained insensible to anything in the Scriptures but their literary beauty. Abruptly, one day, he rose from his manuscripts, with the New Testament open in his hand, and, with the rapid manner of one who has been startled by a great discovery, he exclaimed, 'Whoever made this book made me. It knows all that is in my heart. It tells me what no one but a God can know about me. Whoever made me made that book.' What is true of the book is true of him who is its life. Whoever made you a man, and me, is, *in Christ*, reconciling us to himself" (pp. 11, 12).

In these days of the exaltation of Buddhism by our popular writers, it is refreshing to read such passages as the following: No claim is set up

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that Buddhism "is a system of historical realities, verified by historical tests. The shadowy accounts of Sakyamani, in some sense the founder of Buddhism, making him come into the world in the form of a white elephant, giving him twelve thousand names and several successive births, and enveloping his story in a cloud of legendary extravagance, are as utterly unlike the sweet and simple narratives of the evangelists as the doctrines of annihilation, atheism, and despair which form that dreary theology are unlike the blessed teachings of the Saviour's mercy, sacrifice, and resurrection.

"One of the conceits of the most recent rationalism has been to bring the maxims and meditations of the Vedas and Zendavesta into the rank of the spiritual instructions of the gospel. Suppose they were all that is claimed for them, close akin to the Christian ethics, or worthy to be compared with portions of the Sermon on the Mount, what have they *done*? What have they done even for the foul, cruel, lazy populations that have received them? They have had those sottish communities to themselves half a thousand years longer than Christianity has lived. Buddha and Kung-fu-tse have had no rivals till the modern missionary preached Christ, and then Hindostan was pierced with arrows of light in less than ninety years" (pp. 26, 27).

The second lecture is entitled Christ disclosed to Men of a False Religious Culture; the third, Christ in the Presence of Doubt and Disbelief; the fourth, The Religion of Christ in the Power of Action — its Appeal to the Human will. Throughout the volume, and particularly in the fourth lecture, are remarks fitted to lessen the respect of men for scientific theology. This is the gravest fault of the volume. In the Table of Contents the titles of two of the lectures are printed incorrectly. On the whole, however, the book is well printed and well written. It promises to be useful.

WAYS OF THE SPIRIT, and other Essays. By Frederic Henry Hedge, Author of "Reason in Religion," "Primeval World of Hebrew Tradition," etc. 12mo. pp. 367. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1877.

The Contents of this volume are: I. The Way of History; II. The Way of Religion; III. The Way of Historic Christianity; IV. The Way of Historic Atonement; V. The Natural History of Theism; VI. Critique of Proofs of the Being of God; VII. On the Origin of Things; VIII. The God of Religion, or the Human God; IX. Dualism and Optimism; X. Pantheism; XI. The Two Religions; XII. The Mythical Element in the New Testament; XIII. Incarnation and Transubstantiation; XIV. The Human Soul. The style of Dr. Hedge is rich, and his thoughts are often profound. His learning is extensive, and his writings deserve to be studied. In the present volume we are specially interested in his Critique of Proofs of the Being of God (pp. 144–188). We think, how-

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ever, that he unduly depreciates these proofs. His essay on the Way of Historic Atonement (pp. 95–119) is a fair specimen of his style. He is fond of attaching an unusual sense to the technical terms of theology, and of discussing one subject when his orthodox readers had been expecting another. He describes the atonement in Christ as the reconciliation of the antitheses between the natural and the supernatural; the finite and the Infinite, or God and man; the temporal and the spiritual, or the church and the world; the mortal and the immortal. In discussing this last topic Professor Hedge says: "That absolute life, that mighty solvent in which flesh and spirit are resolved, and natural and supernatural fused in one, — shall it not also fuse and resolve the last and longest contradiction of time, the contradiction of mortal and immortal, the here and the hereafter, earth and heaven, in the local sense of those terms? 'The last enemy that shall be put under is death.' The apostle who wrote thus had a vision of a state in which death should be no more. The popular belief transfers that state from this human earth to some unknown region beyond; and Christians talk of 'going to heaven' in much the same way that the ancients talked of going to the place of departed souls; with this exception, that the going in the one case is a going up, in the other, it was a going down; but with this advantage on the side of the ancients — that they had a distinct conception of the whereabouts of their imaginary world, and the route by which it was reached. I see no reason for this translocation; no reason for supposing that the sphere of planetary attraction ceases with the dissolution of the animal frame; no reason for supposing that the planet's hold of its own is bounded by the animal life. On the contrary, it accords with reason to believe that the soul — which makes the individual, and which must not be confused with the accompanying spirit, which is not individual — is a part of the planetary life, and can never, while that life endures, be divorced from the system to which it belongs.

"It may be that the human body, without the intervention of death, will one day become so etherealized as to be impervious to death — will become death-proof; that in this way mortal will put on immortality. However this may be, I am persuaded that dying is not migration, that this earth is man's future and eternal abode, and that in the course of human development the time will come when death shall no longer occupy the place it now does in the human economy; but, if in any sense it continues to be, will be practically, as an enemy, put under. In the final and consummate atonement, this last antagonism of mortal and immortal, earth and heaven, will be atoned. There will be no talk then of 'going to heaven,' as in the gospel there is no such word. We do not go to heaven, but heaven comes to us. They whose inner eye is opened see heaven, and they who see it are in it, and the air to them is thick with angels, like the background of Raphael's 'mother in glory'" (pp. 112, 113).

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Thus we often find ourselves engaged in a philosophical discussion when we might have been expecting an essay on the interpretation of the Bible. The discussion awakens a surprise, and the surprise heightens our interest in the discussion. The rhetoric is successful when the theology is deficient.

LIFE AND TIMES OF THOMAS BECKET. By James Anthony Froude, M.A. 12mo. pp. 150. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Company. 1878.

Any work by Mr. Froude will command readers, especially when the subject is so interesting as Thomas Becket, the Becket of veritable history, and the Becket of Catholic tradition. His character will be understood hereafter more thoroughly than it is at present.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE REV. WILLIAM ARNOT, Minister of Free St. Peter's Church, Glasgow, and afterwards of the Free High Church, Edinburgh; and Memoir by his Daughter, Mrs. A. Fleming. 12mo. pp. 511. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1878.

This volume is not so interesting as the Memoir of Dr. Guthrie, or of Norman McLeod. Still it will abundantly repay perusal. It contains many exquisite passages. When Mr. Arnot visited our country in 1870 and 1873 he did not come as a stranger, for his writings had introduced him to our churches. His impressions of America were highly favorable to us. Still he saw our faults, and notices them pleasantly.

The following extracts may not be unacceptable or useless. Describing the meetings of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in 1870, he writes: "I forget whether I mentioned that I get D.D. here universally. It comes in a rush, and there is no resisting it. I get quite used to it, and never take the least notice. Even those who know the fact are carried down in the flood. Here there is no such thing as a man approaching my age and position that is not D.D., and so the good people cannot call me anything else than Doctor; only the striplings here are simply 'misters.' I must own, however, that the reading of the lists of committees, etc., by the clerk, becomes very ludicrous, for every man named on any committee is D.D., and the clerk laboriously pronounces the two sacred letters after each name. I think from the preponderance of the title here it will, within a generation, come to be given to every minister at ordination, which would be a good solution" (p. 442).

Again, describing his ride through Union Park, New York, at the time of the meeting of the Christian Alliance in 1873, he writes: A "considerable menagerie in the corner of the park. Plenty of noble bears — a sea lion, who kept up a constant melancholy cry in his pond, where he had hardly room to turn his huge bulk — lions, as usual, wonderfully quiet and dignified. How sublimely indifferent the brute is to all the hubbub

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of monkies and elephants and women and children below. Several of them lay with their backs to us, slumberously looking with half closed eyes on the setting sun through windows in the back of their cage. Another menagerie I visited with less profit in the evening — a reception of all foreign men at Dr. Schaff's. A mob, as usual, in the midst of which I stood and bawled till I was out of breath, and then sought a seat in a corner. The government schools should endow a lion's den in every village, and make it incumbent on Young America to stand half an hour every day in front of the royal brute to learn repose and dignity. How grand and solid the mien of the beast — how like a mountain; how small and frisky the men — how like a potash bottle, always going off! (p. 462).

Mr. Arnot's suggestive style of writing is well illustrated in a passage taken from his Life of Hamilton, and appended as the closing passage to the present Memoir: "All is not lost to the world when a good man dies: his character remains behind to enrich the community, as certainly as the rich man's wealth remains behind to increase the estate of his heir. We watch with expectant interest the swelling of a rosebud in spring; we luxuriate in the possession of the full-blown flower while it lasts, and we sigh in sadness when its glory departs. But, moved by a prophetic instinct, we gravely gather the shed leaves from the ground, and deposit them in a place of safety; and soon we make the glad discovery that in these leaves, even when withered, we retain for enjoyment the fragrance of the rose in the dull winter days that follow, when we can no longer look upon the living flower, fresh and dewy on its living stem." (pp. 494, 495).

THE UNITED STATES AS A NATION. Lectures on the Centennial of American Independence, given at Berlin, Dresden, Florence, Paris, and London. By Joseph P. Thompson, D.D., LL.D. 12mo. pp. 323. Boston: James R. Osgood and Company. 1877.

These Lectures have been favorably noticed by the German, French, Italian, and English Press. We have been compelled to omit from two late Numbers of the Bibliotheca Sacra a highly commendatory review of the volume. The same reason — want of space — compels us to omit the review from the present Number. We cannot refrain, however, from noticing the fact that Dr. Thompson has not only been a voluminous writer, but still continues to publish pamphlets and books with uncommon rapidity. He is a model of industry and perseverance. Our clerical readers may be interested in reading the titles of his published volumes and essays. When we remember that, before he left the country, he was pastor of a large and important church, and since he took up his abode in Germany he has been a confirmed invalid, we cannot fail to be surprised not only at the amount, but also the variety of his publications. Some of

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these publications have attracted much attention in Germany, and are but little known in this country. Some of his published papers were originally read before important Literary and Scientific Societies in Europe. The following are the titles of the books and pamphlets which he published before he removed to Germany:

Books: Memoir of Timothy Dwight; of David Hale; of David T. Stoddard; of Samuel Pitts; of Bryant Gray. — The Sergeant's Memorial; Lectures to Young Men; The Believer's Refuge; The Holy Comforter; Egypt Past and Present; The Christian Graces; Love and Penalty; The Theology of Christ; Man in Genesis and Geology; Home Worship. (The last four volumes were published in England).

Pamphlets: Christianity and Emancipation; How to Build a Nation; Revolution against Free Government a Crime; The Theocratic Principle; The Moral Unity of the Race; Our Common Schools; Capital Punishment; Paganized Ecclesiasticism; The Christian Citizen; Man's Completeness in Christ; Abraham Lincoln. — In addition to these pamphlets Dr. Thompson wrote a score of Sermons and Addresses during the war, which were published by the Loyal Publication Society, Union League Club, etc.; also scores of Articles in the New Englander, Bibliotheca Sacra, and especially in the Independent newspaper, of which he was an editor for thirteen years.

Since his removal to Germany in 1872, he has published the following Books: Church and State in the United States; Jesus of Nazareth; (both of these works are published in both German and English). The United States as a Nation (published in English; to be published in German). He has also published the following Speeches, Addresses, Scientific Papers, etc.: America as seen from Europe; The Heroic Age of America; Lucretius or Paul, or Materialism and Theism; A Talk with the Telephone; Contest with Ultramontanism; Papalism; Vaticanism; Ultramontanism; Paparchy and Nationality. Peace the Nursery of Chivalry; The Armament of Germany; Intercourse of Christian and non-Christian Peoples; Treaties as Matter of International Laws; International Copyright, — printed also in French and German. Book Worship; Our Free Theology; Tribute to Copernicus; Tribute to Agassiz; The Age of Stone; The Question of Races; Egypt and the Exodus; Letter on Russia to the Peace Society; Letter to Prof. Weber on the Creed.

FIVE PROBLEMS OF STATE AND RELIGION. By Will C. Wood, A.M., Late Pastor at Wenham, Mass. 12mo. pp. 379. Boston: Henry Hoyt. 1877.

The five problems are: The State and the Sabbath; the State and Temples (taxing God's house); the State and the Church; the State Schools and Religion; the State Institutions and Religion (chaplaincies, etc.). The discussion of these five topics is the fruit of various reading,

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and proves, what we have known before, that Mr. Wood possesses an active, sprightly, and energetic mind, which he disciplines by earnest and diligent labor.

LAW FOR THE CLERGY. A Compilation of the Statutes of the States of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin, relating to the Duties of the Clergymen in the Solemnization of Marriage, the Organization of Churches and Religious Societies, and the Protection of Religious Meetings and Assemblies; with Notes and Practical Forms, embracing a Collation of the Common Law of Marriage. By Sanford A. Hudson, Counsellor-at-Law. 16mo. pp. 192. Chicago: S. C. Griggs and Company. 1877.

This is a valuable book not only for the clergymen in the States to which it is expressly adapted, but also for all clergymen who need to learn the principles of the common law. It contains an excellent index of ten pages.

ASPIRATIONS OF THE WORLD. A Chain of Opals. Collected with an Introduction, by L. Maria Child, Author of "Progress of Religious Ideas," etc. 16mo. pp. 276. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1878.

The books to which Mrs. Child is most indebted for her extracts from Asiatic writings are Conway's "Sacred Anthology"; Johnson's "Oriental Religions"; Mills's "Life of Buddha"; Longfellow's "Unity and Universality of the Religious Ideas"; Higginson's "Sympathy of Religion"; Max Müller's "Translation of the Dhammapada." Some of the Extracts are from "David, Hebrew King, 1055 B.C."; "Hebrew [Writing] ascribed to Moses, date ancient, but uncertain"; "Euripides, Grecian, 470 B.C." Jesus Christ, Israelite, New Testament;" "James Thomson, Scotch, 1730 A.C."; "Mohammed, Arabian, Koran, 609 A.C."; "Loo-tze, Chinese, 604 B.C.," and other writings and authors. Many of the extracts are striking. An interesting Introduction (49 pages) is prefixed to the volume.

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THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

ISOCRATES.

BY PROFESSOR R. D. C. ROBBINS, NEWTON HIGHLANDS, MASS.

(Continued from p. 424.)

OBJECTIONS TO ISOCRATES AS WRITER AND TEACHER, IN HIS OWN AGE.

The defamers of Isocrates in his own age were of such a character that he did not feel called upon to reply to them until he was quite advanced in life (eighty-two years old), and then only because he saw that the multitude did not understand the nature of his studies and instruction and the manner of his life; so that he would be placed in a false position not only among his contemporaries, but also in the estimation of succeeding ages. He says: "Although I have known that my manner of life is the subject of calumny with some of the sophists, who accuse me of drawing up petty pleas for the courts, just as one might dare to call Phidias who made the statue of Minerva a mere puppet-maker, or Zeuxis and Parrhasius as painters of sign-boards, — still, I have not defended myself against their petty slanders, because I supposed their prating was without influence, and that I had made it evident to all that I had taken upon myself not to speak and write upon petty private contracts, but upon subjects of such magnitude and importance that no one else except my pupils and their imitators have ventured to handle them. On account of this my choice of labor, and my study

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to consult for things that make for peace, I supposed, even until quite an old man, that I had the good will of all those in private life." "But now, unexpectedly, when near the end of life, ... I have found out that some of these are not so well disposed toward me as I had hoped. A part of them because they are quite ignorant of my course of life, and disposed to listen to those who have anything to say prejudicial to me; and others who, although they know well how I pass my time, are envious, and are of like mind with the sophists, and rejoice that others have an erroneous opinion concerning me." "I therefore cast about me to see how I could best make posterity acquainted with the character I have established, the life I lead, and the instructions I give to others, and not allow myself to be misunderstood in reference to these things, and remain at the mercy of my detractors; ..... and I concluded to write a discourse as a picture of my thoughts and actions, which should remain as a memorial more honorable than any statue of brass." [1]

That he did not consider his course a failure, or unworthy of the approbation of his contemporaries, notwithstanding the opposition that he met, and his inability to attain to his aspirations or control adverse circumstances, a passage in a letter written in his old age shows: "Although," he says, "I have kept aloof from civil employment and from the orator's stand, in default of self-confidence and voice, still, I have not been entirely useless, or without honor and influence, but have been an undoubted counsellor and aid to those who have taken upon themselves the advocacy of your best interests and those of the allies, and have had more influence by my writings in favor of the freedom and independence of the Greeks than all those who have harangued before popular assemblies. For this you would justly give me your most hearty thanks." [2]

It is noticeable that the main point of objection to him was the same that was brought against Socrates. He says: "According to the indictment, my accuser seeks to bring

[1] Antid., §§ 3. 4. 5. [2] Letter 8th, to the Magistrates of Mitylene.

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upon me the suspicion of *having corrupted the youth*, by teaching them to speak and to carry their point in judicial contests contrary to justice."[1] But instead of making the effort to prove this accusation, the detractor attempts to bring envy and odium upon him by an exaggerated account of his popularity and influence. "He makes me so great," Isocrates says, "as no one either of those employed in the courts or in the study of rhetoric has ever been, and my pupils more in number than those of all the teachers of rhetoric.[2] For he says that not only private citizens, but orators and generals and kings and other rulers have been my disciples,[3] and that I have received, and am now receiving, immense treasures from them. In this style he brings his action, since he supposes that by such exaggerated statements concerning me and my wealth and the number of my disciples he will excite a feeling of envy in all who hear him, and by the action before the court rouse your anger and hatred, which feelings make the judges harsh in their decisions."[4] His most prominent argument in defence, in addition to the general course of his life in private, was, that no one whom he had injured had appeared to testify against him, as he would be sure to do, in this hour of his peril, if any such there were.[5]

Whilst, too, his writings and his whole influence had been to urge his own state to such conduct as should conduce to to her best good and free the other states from present evils, and such as to show that his desire was to induce all the citizens to aspire to the highest excellence, how could he corrupt his disciples?[6] The reputation obtained by his

[1] Πειρᾶταί με διαβάλλειν ὁ κατήγορος ὡς διαφθείρω τοὺς νεωτέρους λέγειν διδάσκων, κ.τ.λ. — Antid., § 30.

[2] Ἐγὼ πλείους (μαθήτας), ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν διατρίβοντες. — Antid., § 16.

[3] Οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἰδιώτας φησί μου γεγενῆσθαι μαθητὰς ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ βασιλέας καὶ τυράννους.—Antid, § 30.

[4] Τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον πεποίηται τὴν κατηγορίαν, ἡγούμενος ἐκ μὲν ὧν καταλαζονεύεται περί μου καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καὶ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν μαθητῶν φθόνον ἅπασι τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐμποιήσειν, κ.τ.λ.

[5] See Antid., § 33 sq.

[6] See Antid., § 86 sq.

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writings also brought him many pupils, none of whom would have remained if they had not found him what they expected. "But now," he adds, "although they were so many, and had remained with me, some three, some four years, still no one of them was ever known to find fault with me; but at last, when about to return to parents and friends, they were so well satisfied with my training that they took their leave with sorrow and tears."[1]

He also triumphantly refers to those by name who have been life-long disciples, in proof that his influence upon his pupils is good rather than bad. "I will bring forward those who have been my disciples from my youth even until old age, and will name those among you who are my contemporaries, as witnesses of the truth of what I say. Among the earliest of my pupils were Eunomus and Lysithides and Callippus, and after these were Onetor, Anticles, Philonides, Philomelus, and Charmantides. These were all honored by the state with golden crowns, not because they aspired to renown abroad, but because they were good men and did great good to the state. Place me in whatever relation to these men that you please; for as far as the present question is concerned it will in any case be honorable to me. For if you consider me as their adviser and teacher you will justly have more regard for me than for those who, on account of their virtues, are entertained in the Prytaneum at public cost. For each one of these has made *himself only* a good man and citizen, but I *as many*, as I have before indicated to you."[2]

The only other objection made to him as teacher of oratory was that he himself was not an orator, and his reply was, according to Plutarch, that "the whetstones are not themselves sharp, but yet are able to sharpen iron."[3] He, too, was

[1] Νῦν δὲ τοσούτων γεγενημένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἔτη τρία τῶν δὲ τέτταρα συνδιατηθέντων, οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν φανήσεται τῶν παρ' ἐμοὶ μεμψάμενος, ἀλλ' . . . . . οὕτως ἠγάπων τὴν διατριβὴν ὥστε μετὰ πόθου καὶ δακρύων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀπαλλαγήν.—Antid., §§ 87, 88.

[2] Antid., §§ 94, 95.

[3] Αἱ ἀκόναι αὐταὶ μὲν τεμεῖν οὐ δύνανται, τὸν δὲ σίδηρον τιμητικὸν ποιοῦσιν. Plutarch's Vita, p. xxx; Horace, too says: Ergo fungar vice cotis, acutum reddere quae ferrum valet exsors ipsa secandi.

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accustomed to say to his friends that he taught for a thousand minae, but would gladly give ten thousand to any one who would teach him confidence and strength of voice.[1]

Isocrates' Love of Country.

A genuine love of country is conspicuous throughout the writings of Isocrates. The whole of Greece with her Asiatic colonies are the object of his regard and affection when their interests conflict with those of foreign nations, and especially with those of the Persians. His hatred to the latter, as the oppressors of the Greeks, appears in nearly all his writings, and is the basis of the Panegyricus and Philippus. He appeals to the example of the earlier Greeks, who, he says, would not return a favor for a benefit received from the Persians, so enduring is their anger toward them. "Our ancestors condemned many to death on suspicion of favor to the Medes, and even now, before business is entered upon, in our convocations, curses are imprecated upon any who may be guilty of such treachery. The Eumolpidae, on account of their hatred of the Persians, made known by criers that all foreigners should be excluded from the celebration of the mysteries as murderers. Our dislike to them is so ingrained that the myths in which the calamities of the Trojans and Persians appear are most of all pleasing to us. We recite in our festal assemblies triumphal songs relating to our wars with the barbarians, but elegies over our conflicts with the Greeks, in our days of sadness. I suppose that one great charm of the poetry of Homer arises from his eulogies of those who fought against the barbarians. It is, too, on this account that our ancestors gave his art so prominent a place in musical contests, and in the training of the young; so that often listening to those poems enmity, to the barbarians would be kept active, and admiration for those who fought against them may and would enkindle our emulation for such exploits."[2]

He feels above all things the indignities offered to Greece

[1] Τόλμαν καὶ εὐφωνίαν.

[2] Paneg., § 157 sq.

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by the peace of Antalcidas, and the abuses that followed it, and tries to rouse his countrymen to throw off the degradation of the yoke that they had allowed to be cast upon them. It is now this hated king of those Persians who have so often shown their inferiority to the Greeks, "who manages our affairs, and prescribes what each must do; and except that he has not established governors in our towns, what has he left undone? For is he not the arbiter of war and peace, and has he not taken upon himself the guidance of our affairs? Do we not make suit to him as commander in our difficulties with one another? Do we not call him *the great king*, as if we were captives?[1]

Such were his feelings in reference to the whole of Greece when her interests came into conflict with foreign nations. But when, as was often the case, the Grecian states were at variance with each other, Athens called forth his warmest and heartiest commendations. "Our state," he says, "is acknowledged to be the most ancient, the greatest, and the most renowned among men. Upon this as a basis, still greater honors have accrued. The land that we inhabit we have neither seized upon by violence nor acquired by occupation. Neither are we a heterogeneous mass collected from various nations, but so noble and pure is our origin that we may ever, through all time, have her from whom we are born; since we are natives of our own soil, and can call our country by the names of our most endeared objects; for we alone of all the Greeks can call the same our nurse and native country and mother."[2]

The benefactions of Athens to the rest of Greece is dwelt upon in the Panegyricus, and elsewhere in his writings, lovingly and with the greatest assurance.[3] "These, he says, we shall best understand if we examine in order from the beginning the acts of our state. For we shall find that she has been in the front rank in the perils of war, and has been

[1] Paneg., §§ 120, 121.

[2] Paneg. §§ 23, 24. Lysias has this same declaration.

[3] See Paneg., § 26 sq.

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the originator of that civil code by which we have, instead of nomads, become the inhabitants of fixed abodes, and collected together in towns, and enjoyed the privileges of cultivated life."[1] "Through her we have the advantages of agriculture, the mysteries,[2] and festive assemblies. She has acquired territory, founded colonies, invented the useful and ornamental arts, cultivated philosophy, taught proficiency in the use of language,[3] and inculcated piety towards the gods; and, in fine, it is useless to attempt to teach the honor that belongs to her, such benefits has she bestowed upon the Greeks. No one, indeed, could invent a recompense which would be a fit return for her benefactions.[4]

His patriotism is conspicuous in his influence as teacher. It was for his country that he labored to form the minds and character of his fellow-citizens. Of them he demanded no pay. Pecuniary reward he received from those who came from abroad, but he was satisfied if his home pupils became good and influential citizens.

Isocrates' invitation to Philip to make himself the head of united Greece in order to enable them to throw off the dominion of Persia, has sometimes been alleged as suggesting a suspicion of treason. But I can find nothing but a loving regard for Greece in it, although his confidence in Philip proved to be too implicit. He felt doubtless, that the aid of the Macedonian was the last resource left to his country, and hoped that he was appealing to a nature as generous and honor-loving as his own. Thus Gillies says: "Even Demosthenes, the inveterate enemy of Philip, though at first he exclaimed against the peace with this prince, yet afterwards published a discourse to persuade the Athenians to observe it, though he continued to inveigh against Philip in the public assembly he was sensible that his countrymen were unable to resist him in the field. But Isocrates, more cautious, instead of irritating that powerful monarch, endeavored to appease him. He attempts by insinuation and address to deceive the man who had so long deceived the

[1] Paneg., § 26. [2] Ibid., § 28 sq. [3] Ibid., § 47 sq. [4] Ibid., § 33.

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Greeks. As ambition was the predominant passion in the breast of Philip, Isocrates offers to him the idea of an enterprise more glorious and splendid than even the conquest of Greece. It becomes a prince like you, he says, to despise little interests and inglorious victories. You ought to attempt an enterprise which, if succesful, will raise your renown above that of all former monarchs, and which, though unfortunate, will ensure you the love and esteem of your countrymen."[1]

It seems strange that Demosthenes judged so differently from Isocrates of the character of Philip, as is shown by his Philippics, which Isocrates probably refers to as slanderous to his Philip. But, as Rauchenstein[2] says, Isocrates, born five years before the Peloponnesian war, had as a boy and young man seen Athens at the height of its prosperity, and been familiar with the improvements which had resulted to Athens from the age of Pericles. This early impression often burst forth in his praises of that age and of the earlier democracy. But the Decelean war, which began B.C. 413, in his twenty-third year, he considered as the turning point, after which the glory of Athens waned, and internal corruption increased.[3] From that time he saw the wild rule of demagogues, the deep humiliation of Athens, the reign of terror of the Thirty and its results, the citizen's war; and soon after the end of that, relaxation of discipline, idleness, poverty, deterioration, and all the evils of democracy for nearly seventy years. How could the grey-haired old man with all these experiences have the same faith and hope as young and strong Demosthenes, with his fewer years of struggle? Isocrates felt the insufficiency of the old worn-out systems of Greece, but he was full of faith that his people were destined to a better fate if only the right man should come, as he certainly must, who would unite all the states against their old enemy.

In the Panegyricus he had labored to bring about a reconciliation among the Greeks, so that they, by a united effort, might free the Grecian colonies in Asia, and give indepen-

[1] Life of Isoc., p. 133. [2] Einl., S. 12. [3] On the Peace, §§ 37, 84

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dence and prosperity to the whole of Greece. But this could not be accomplished without discarding the Peace of Antalcidas, and that had been brought about so much by Spartan influence, and in favor of Spartan supremacy among the Greeks, that they were hard to be persuaded.[1] Although his feeling of the superiority of Athens so pervades this oration, still he contrives wisely to make all the circumstances contribute to rouse resentment against the barbarians, that it should seem that it could not fail of its design. But, as is well known, it did; and the Greeks continued in their intestine broils, and wrought out their own destruction."[2]

He next (366 B.C.) turned to Archidamus of Sparta, a descendant of the Heraclidae. But the dissensions of the Greeks still continued. Four years after (362 B.C.) the fourth invasion of the Peloponnesus was made by the Thebans, in which Epaminondas lost his life. Five years later still the Social war commenced between Athens and her allies, which proved exhausting to the Grecian states, and, in the same year, the still more disastrous Sacred war commenced between Thebes and Phocis, and lasted ten years. For a time, too, Isocrates placed some confidence in the aid of Dionysius of Syracuse and in that of Jason of Pherae, whose conquest of the Persian king ended in words only.[3] But when all other resources failed, and he saw his country drifting slowly, but surely into absolute subjection, he made the effort which, to one less confident in the love of the right and honor, would have seemed fool-hardy; but to him it offered a gleam of hope, which, however, the battle of Chaeronea soon obliterated.

The Political Ethics of Isocrates.

As a writer in political ethics Isocrates has perhaps few, if any, equals among the ancients; and yet he never wrote specifically on that subject. But the practical bearing of his writings in the direction of state-policy, and devotion to the best interests of his country, whether upon the side of the

[1] Paneg., § 18 sq. [2] Gillies's Introd. to Paneg., p. 12.
[3] See Rauchenstein's Einl., Reden des Isoc., S. 10, and Phil., § 119.

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ruler or the subject, — for he placed himself in both relations, — cannot be questioned. Dionysius says: "I suppose if any one wishes not a one-sided, but a comprehensive, knowledge of state government and policy, he should study Isocrates assiduously." "Who," he asks, "would not be incited to a love of the state and people, or to the nurture of civil honesty, by reading the Panegyricus? For in that whilst he commemorates the virtues of their ancestors who liberated Greece from the dominion of the barbarians, he not only depicts them as brave warriors, but as men possessed of a most noble character, not more coveting military and political renown than striving for a well-ordered life; desiring less the things of others than those impossible to obtain; judging of happiness not according to a money standard, but by a good name and honorable deeds; and feeling that they should leave to their posterity great and unenvied wealth if they bequeathed them a good reputation among the people."[1]

In respect to the nature of government he well says: "Government is the very soul of the state, having the same power as the mind in the body. For it is that which gives counsel concerning all things, devises and guards what is good, and wards off evil. It assimilates to itself laws, statesmen, and citizens, and controls their action."[2] The constitution of Athens, as devised by Solon and revised by Clisthenes (and interpreted by Isocrates), is, in its working, a model for all ages: "They did not," he says, "establish a polity which, while it claimed for itself equity and lenity, was actually oppressive in its application to those who lived under it; nor one that trained its subjects to consider democracy as license; freedom, lawlessness; and liberty of speech, the right to utter calumnious and seditious sentiments; and the permission to do all these things as the highest good. On the contrary, by frowning on and punishing all such perverters of freedom,

[1] See Dionysius, Vita, p. 57; also Panegyricus, § 76: Οὐδὲ πρὸς ἀργύριον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔκρινον, ἀλλ' οὗτος ἐδόκει πλοῦτον ἀσφαλέστατον κεκτῆσθαι καὶ κάλλιστον, ὅστις τοιαῦτα τυγχάνοι πράττων, ἐξ ὧν αὐτός τε μέλλοι μάλιστ' εὐδοκιμήσειν καὶ τοῖς παισὶ μεγίστην δόξαν καταλείψειν.

[2] Areop., § 14.

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it made all of the citizens better and wiser. It also trained all to be good citizens by teaching them to distinguish that equality which treats all alike from that which gives to all according to their deserts, rewarding and punishing all as each deserves. ..... Offices, also, were bestowed upon those alone who were best and best qualified for their respective duties, with the hope that private citizens would be assimilated to their rulers." [2]

The mutually advantageous relation of different classes in society, if accepted in theory, is not always carried out in practice and feeling in our own, as it was not in his, age. "They [our ancestors] not only agreed in reference to public matters, but in private life they respected each other's rights as right-minded fellow-citizens should do. The poorer classes were so far from envying those who had accumulated property that they cared for the greater estates as their own, because they supposed that the prosperity of these was gainful to themselves. Those who had wealth did not despise those who were less fortunate, but, with the feeling that their poverty was their own disgrace, they gladly ministered to their necessities. Some they supplied with land at a moderate rent, others they employed in trade, and still others were furnished with means for pursuing other avocations. For they did not fear either that they should lose the whole, or be obliged to resort to harsh means for recovering any part of what was loaned. They felt as secure in reference to it as if it were shut up in their coffers at home. For they saw that those who were made judges of private transactions did not use partiality, but adhered strictly to the laws, ... and felt greater indignation against the transgressor than the injured party themselves. For those who violated trusts injured the poor, rather than the rich. For the latter, if they intermitted their loans, suffered small loss; but the former, if deprived of aid, would be subject to extreme want." [2]

That civil polity is best of all, in his estimation, which

[1] Areop., § 20 sq. [2] Areop., § 31 sq.

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relieves the poor from want by furnishing the means of gaining support by labor and by the benefactions of the rich, shields the young from licentiousness by care in interesting them in business and study, saves magistrates from peculation by visiting transgression with merited punishment, and rescues the aged from despondent inaction by political honors and the due reverence of the young.[1]

His leading precept, when he was giving instruction to Demonicus,[2] the son of his friend, not only for the guidance of his youth, but of subsequent life, is: "First of all, exercise piety toward the gods not only by your offerings, but by faithfulness in abiding by your oaths. For whilst the former is an indication of your pecuniary ability, the latter is a proof of your soundness of character. Honor the deity at all times, but especially in connection with the public sacrifices. Thus you show not only your piety toward the gods, but your obedience to the laws."[3] His respect for law was to be not merely eye-service; for he enjoins not only the faithful observance of the written laws, but obedience to the wishes and imitation of the example of the ruler as the most authoritative law.[4] Neither does the form of government affect the duty of obedience. "For," he says, "as those living under a democracy must obey the will of the many, so those under a king must respect the authority of the king."[5]

Upon the king he enjoins, with even more distinctness, piety, self-culture, personal subjection, a blameless life, and a subservience of all self-interest to the best good of the governed. The limits of one Review Article allow but a meagre selection of the noble precepts with which his Nicocles is filled, and which are also scattered through his other writings. In general, he says to the king, "Manage your state as you would your own paternal household..... Worship the gods as enjoined by

[1] Areop., § 55.

[2] Προειλόμην ..... ἅμα τοῦ τε παρόντος βίου συμβουλίαν ἐξενεγκεῖν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος χρόνου παράγγελμα καταλιπεῖν, § 44.

[3] Demon., § 13.

[4] Ἰσχυρότατον μέντοι νόμον ἡγοῦ τὸν ἐκείνων [βασιλέων] τρόπον. — Dem., § 36

[5] Demon., § 36.

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your fathers, but consider that the best sacrifice and the highest service is to show yourself as the best and most righteous..... All must acknowledge that it is the office of a king to remedy defects, supply the wants of the state, and guard its prosperity, and raise it from a low to a high position..... It is plainly not so necessary for athletes to exercise the body as for kings to cultivate the mind and heart..... They should make special effort to excel as much in virtues as they do in honors,[1] and not suppose that whilst care and labor avail in other matters they have no influence in the enlargement of their own virtue and wisdom..... Have not less dominion over yourself than over others, and reckon it most kingly to be subject to no passion, but to rule your desires more authoritatively than your subjects."[2]

More particularly, he says: "If you find that any prescriptions or laws are unjust in their bearings, either annul or correct them. Strive earnestly to originate the best measures; and if you cannot do that, adopt those which others have found best. Let them be wholly just, useful, and homogeneous, and such as will make differences among citizens fewest and reconciliations easiest..... Perform the office of judge, when controversies arise, with the strictest impartiality and consistency, always giving the same decision in reference to the same things." Again, he says: "You will best rule the people if you suffer them never to do or suffer wrong, and are careful that the best receive the honor, whilst the other citizens experience no wrong. For these are the ground-principles for the best administration of the government."[3]

Isocrates' precepts for those who occupy places of trust and authority, if they may seem commonplace truisms, yet are not always more heeded in our own than in his age: "If you are appointed to office, employ no unfaithful assistant in your duties, as his delinquencies will be imputed to you..... Go not out of office richer, but more honored, than when you entered upon it; for the praise of the many is better

[1] Ad. Nicoc., §§ 11,12. [2] Ibid., § 29. [3] Ibid., § 316, and cf. Plataicus, § 34.

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than great riches..... Be not an aider or abettor of any wrong-doing; for you will have the reputation of that to which you give your influence in others..... Exert yourself to gain the ability to acquire wealth and power, but abstain from grasping more than is your due, so that you may seem to desire justice not from weakness, but from love of the right."[1]

His exhortations to the leaders in society and government are adapted to times of prosperity, as well as adversity. After enumerating the signs of wealth and power at Athens, he says: "These very things especially excite my apprehensions, because I see that those states that feel most confident in their prosperity counsel most unwisely, and that extreme self-confidence is the precursor of the greatest peril. The cause is obvious; for unmixed good or ill is not the lot of man. Folly and license are often the offspring of wealth and power; but poverty and lowliness of mind beget wisdom and moderation. So it is uncertain whether we ought to strive to leave the one or the other [wealth or power] to our posterity."[2]

The feeling of Isocrates was strong that the only firm basis of a government was the virtue and intelligence of the citizens: "Increase of virtue comes not from these things [i.e. many and accurate laws], but from the habits of daily life; for the many are assimilated in character to the education that they have received. The number and accuracy of the laws are a sign of the imperfections of those governed. ..... It is not necessary to have the piazzas covered with edicts, but to have the principles of justice in the heart. Without these, the best laws can be of no avail; for they only who are well educated are sufficiently prepared to receive them."[3]

"The whole object of the discourse upon the Peace," he says, "is to show the folly and madness of supposing that injustice can ever be advantageous, and that the retaining by violence of territory belonging to others can be otherwise

[1] Demon., § 38. [2] Areop., § 38. [3] Aerop., § 40, 41.

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than calamitous."[1] His rebuke of those who maintain a contrary sentiment is plain and pointed: "Wretched sophistry!" he says; "as if wealth, power, honor — in one word, happiness itself — were not the reward of virtue; as if the virtues of the mind were not accompanied with every other advantage; as if such as neglect them were not blind to their truest interest; and the temperate, the brave, and the just were not especially favored by gods and men. For my own part, I am persuaded that these alone obtain what is truly useful, while the unjust become the victims of gain; and like creatures which are caught with a bait, purchase an accidental pleasure at the price of absolute destruction. But the pious and just live perfectly secure, and eternal felicity lies open to their view."[2] It is, too, still more necessary for states than individuals to practice virtue and eschew vice. For a bad man may die before punishment is executed, but states, from their undying nature, are subject to certain vengeance from gods and men.[3]

The exhortations of Isocrates at the close of his honest and bold and patriotic plea with the Athenians for peace, is as good a proof of his love of country and the right, as the soundness of his political code. "I have this to add as the crowning idea of my discourse, to which the whole has been tending, and as the test principle of all political action, that if we would end the calumnies that now are put upon us, cease from needless war, and secure for our state a supremacy both high and enduring, we, mindful of the calamities that arise from them, must discard all tyrannical rule and unjust authority. . . . . A great deal might be said upon this topic, but the length of this discourse, and my advancing years, admonish to refrain. But I advise and entreat all who are in the bloom and vigor of life to speak and write such things as may, avoiding injury to the others, incite the leading states of Greece to virtue and just dealing, which with

[1] Peace, § 17.
[2] Peace, § 31, 32 (Gillies's translation); see also Isoc., Plataicus, § 25.
[3] Peace, § 120.

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the prosperity of Greece will advance the interests of liberal culture.[1]

The form of government that he preferred for his own state was, as has been before hinted, a democracy, and for an oligarchy he had no tolerance. "All my discourses," he says, "plainly show my hatred of oligarchy and every species of tyranny, and my love of equal rights, and a democracy based on justice and reason. . . . . Its superiority is shown in the history of our own ancestors when they lived under it, and thereby became the most distinguished of nations, and in that of the Lacedemonians, and other peoples that have become most renowned and prosperous. Even our present system, faulty as we all feel it to be, is divine in comparison with the rule of the Thirty."[2]

It need not be denied that the troubles and abuses of the popular government of his time not only caused in him longings for a full re-instatement of the Areopagus, but also suggested vividly the advantages of a monarchy where such a ruler as Evagoras or Nicocles occupied the throne; into the latter of whose mouth, in the address which he prepared for him to give to his people, he puts them fully and vividly."[3]

Wieland well characterizes the spirit and influence of Isocrates' writings in their political bearing. "Any one," he says, "familiar with his works cannot resist the belief that it was his true zeal, when he for half a century used to the full all the powers of his mind, and all the resources of his art, to turn back the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks to the better ways of thought and life of their ancestors, and to persuade them that the erroneous and hurtful notions that we are able to build up our own interests by the oppression of others, unmistakably will accelerate our own ruin; that justice in word and deed, without which the most powerful states cannot long maintain their power, is indispensable to the bare existence of the smaller states, and that nothing

[1] Ἐν ταῖς τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐυπραγίαις συμβαίνει καὶ τὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων πράγματα πολὺ βελτίω γίγνεσθαι.

[2] Areop., § 60 sq.

[3] Nicocles, § 14 sq.

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else than a public spirit which would animate all the Greek states and towns, and unite them, as it were, into one great family, could make this state-bond (which exists only by its concord and brotherly feeling, without which it would be powerless and fall to pieces of itself, but with which it is vigorous, terrible, and every way powerful) secure from the disgrace of subjection to an Asiatic despotism, or from the danger of an unlooked-for bondage to an ever-growing European neighbor. All his writings breathe forth these only true principles of state policy, which consists merely in the application of the principles of morals to the intercourse of common life, and to the carrying on of existence in communities; and in this regard he seems to me to have acted worthily of his name, Isocrates,[1] and to have been among the rhetoricians of his age what Socrates was to the sophists of his. But his labors had also in reference to the great object for which he labored no better result."[2]

In what Sense did Isocrates claim to be a Philosopher?

The question naturally suggests itself what right Isocrates had to designate his teachings as philosophy[3] (*φιλοσοφία*), and his pupils as students in philosophy (*οἱ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ὄντες*). Although he shows some acquaintance with the philosophical terms[4] of Socrates and Plato, yet he plainly had no taste for, or familiarity with, their minute speculations and dialectic niceties. He had probably been a hearer of Socrates in company with Plato, and they had, as has been seen, the highest appreciation of Isocrates' talents; but the only ground of sympathy between them must have been the high-toned moral bearing and intellectual culture,

[1] That is according to the explanation of H. Wolf.: *κρατοῦντα τὸ ἴσον*, or aequabiliter temperatum boni et aequi observantem. Still the other explanation: aequalium victorem is preferable."

[2] Benseler's Einl., to the Paneg.

[3] See Paneg., § 13, and Rauchenstein's Einl. to Paneg., and Areop., p. 6.

[4] Rauchenstein cites the contrast between *δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη*, 13. § 8, the use of *ἰδέαι* 3. § 20, *φύσεις μετεχούσας τούτων τῶν ἰδεῶν*, i.e. *τῆς σωφροσύνης* and *τῆς δικαιοσύνης*.

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so prominent in them all. Some passages in both Isocrates and Plato would seem to indicate opposition in sentiment[1] upon some points between them, but not of a nature to produce any acrimony or even want of mutual regard.[2]

Isocrates' own words are the best explanation of what he means by philosophy. "It is that which has trained us to right action, and humanized our intercourse with one another, and taught us to distinguish between the evils that arise from imprudence and necessity, and to ward off the one and bear nobly the other."[3] In Antidosis, too, he defines it: "Since men have not by nature that knowledge which enables them to determine what in all cases is best to be done or said, I suppose those are wise who by their intelligent judgment are able best to attain to the highest good; and philosophers are those who occupy themselves with those things which will most easily and quickly give them this ability of right discrimination."[4] Philosophy in Isocrates' view is all that culture of the mental and moral powers that enables men to think out and carry into practice, and especially to express in words, whatever is best fitted to the relations of speaker and hearer.[5] Thus Dyonysius advises all of those of his own age who wish to cultivate true philosophy, and who are not satisfied with the contemplation of virtue merely, but desirous of its practice, and who are not so solicitous to pass a quiet life as one that will be most useful to the greatest number, to imitate the plan of life that Isocrates laid down."[6]

The study of philosophy is with him the study of literature in its best and most extended sense, and philosophers are students of literature. His ideal philosopher would be a man of the highest culture in morality and intellect. And as his aim was to give this culture, he properly called his school a school of philosophy, himself a teacher of philosophy, and his pupils students in philosophy. The best phi-

[1] See Note on p. 6, of Rauchenstein.
[2] See p. 423.
[3] Paneg., § 47.
[4] Antid., § 270, 271.
[5] See Antid., § 180 sq.
[6] Vita, p. 57.

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losophy is that which enables a man to exercise the best moral influence. In a more restricted sense, philosophy is the careful study of any subject. And the true orator receives by him the name of philosopher, because he considers that careful and thorough training and study are prime requisites for the orator. Hence, he says: "Those who turn the minds of the youth simply to exert themselves to become eloquent, perform a good work, but those who labor to form in them good and intelligent characters accomplish a far higher end, in as much as to *live* well is a far better attainment than to speak well." [1]

It is well known that Isocrates, as well as Socrates and Plato, was often ranked as a sophist, and made responsible for their sentiments, and thus was not only subject to calumny from others, but was also envied and hated by them. But he was careful to make known how far he was from the pretension and arrogance of many of them whom he called *ἀγελαίους σοφιστάς*.[2] He characterizes them, as does also Plato, as professing to know all things, and as ready at the smallest expense to teach others all things, and yet (which Isocrates considers as the most damning sin) not feeling confidence that their teaching will turn out their pupils as honest men, but requiring pledges of their honor and honesty to be deposited with others.[3] This same arrogance which they exhibit they impute also to Isocrates, which he triumphantly discards by appealing to the character and testimony of his life-long pupils.

Isocrates' Moral and Practical Teachings.

The works of Isocrates abound in precepts of morality, and rules for the successful guidance to an honorable and

[1] See Demon., §§ 3, 4. *Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν φίλους τοὺς προτρεπτικοὺς λόγους συγγράφουσι, καλὸν μὲν ἔργον ἐπιχειροῦσιν, οὐ μὴν περί γε τὸ κράτιστον τῆς φιλοσοφίας διατρίβουσιν ὅσοι δὲ τοῖς νεωτέροις εἰσηγοῦνται, μὴ δι' ὃν τὴν δεινότητα τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀσκήσουσιν, ἀλλ' ὅπως τὰ τῶν τρόπον ἤθη σπουδαῖοι πεφυκέναι δόξουσι, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἐκείνων τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὠφελοῦσιν, ὅσον οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ λόγον μόνον παρακαλοῦσιν οἱ δὲ τὸν τρόπον αὐτῶν ἐπανορθοῦσι.*

[2] See his Discourse against the Sophists, Panath., § 14. [3] Sophists, § 2 sq.

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useful life, some of which have been already quoted.[1] His picture of the habits of the young men of former ages, to which he exhorts those of his own time to return, is worthy of notice. "The youth did not then frequent the gaming-houses or the music-shops, or other places of frivolous amusement and dissipation, such as those in which they now pass their time, but engaged in those studies and pursuits which were appointed them, with admiration emulating those who excelled in them. They had such an aversion to the forum that if they were ever compelled to pass through it, they showed their modesty and reserve by their demeanor in it. Want of respect for the aged they considered worse than the young men now-a-days do disobedience to parents. No slave, even, of good character, would venture to eat or drink in a low tavern, for they were desirous of maintaining a reputable demeanor, and of avoiding that of a buffoon. The ability to say sharp things and to scoff, which we consider a mark of genius, they supposed to be a misfortune."[2]

In a discourse written when he was eighty-two he quotes from his different discourses to prove that all his writings inculcate virtue and justice, whether they are in disconnected moral precepts, as in Demonicus and Nicocles, or in more connected piece, such as the Panegyricus, Panathenaicus. But our limits do not allow extended quotations, and indeed one would hardly know where to begin, so full are his writings of precepts and indirect lessons, which inculcate a high-toned morality, such as are seldom found in authors who precede the Christian dispensation. Even the much vaunted precepts of the Buddhists can scarcely be said to equal, and certainly not excel them.

He inculcates not only upon subjects, but rulers, to worship the gods by the prescribed rites, but especially by a strict regard to the truth and the literal observance of oaths, which are to be taken only when religion and honor are at stake, and never for pecuniary gain.[3] Always show yourself such a

[1] See p. 435 sq.

[2] Areop., § 48, 49.

[3] See Demon., § 13; Ad. Nicoc.; also Demon., § 23: *Ὅρκον ἐπακτὸν προσδέχου διὰ δύο προφάσεις, ἢ σεαυτὸν αἰτίας αἰσχρᾶς ἀπολύων, ἢ φίλους ἐκ μεγάλων κινδύνων διασώζων. ἕνεκα δὲ χρημάτων μηδένα θεῶν ὀμόσῃς, μηδ' ἂν εὑρεῖν μέλλῃς.*

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lover of truthfulness that your words may be more relied on than the oaths of others.[1] Truthfulness in all relations and in all places he inculcates with such plainness and frequency as to show that it was not only the basis of his own character, but of the character he would form in others. He recognizes conscience, too, as a ground for right action. "If you conceal a wrong act for the present it will come to light at some future time; but even if you succeed in keeping it secret from others, *you yourself will be conscious of it.*"[2]

He enjoins upon his hearers, whether in the relation of kindred or friends or fellow-citizens, to judge of the treatment to be extended to others by the substantially Scripture rule: "Whatsoever ye would that others do to you, do ye the same to them"; or, in other words, put yourselves in their places, and decide by what you would then wish.

Practical precepts for the ordinary life, day by day, are found abundantly in Isocrates' writings: "Decide slowly, but act promptly when you have decided."[3] "Seek prosperous issues from the gods, but wise counsel from yourself." "Be content with the present, but seek better things in the future."[4] "Do not so much desire a great accumulation of good things of this life as a moderate enjoyment of them in the present time." "He who labors zealously to accumulate wealth, when he knows not how to enjoy what he already has, is like a purchaser of a spirited horse which he cannot ride."[5] "Seek that pleasure which is free from the taint of dishonor as a great good, but count that which is without honor as most evil."[6] "See to it that you control all those things by which it is base that the mind should be overcome, such as love of gain, anger, pleasure, grief. This you will do if you consider that to be *gain* by which you procure a better name, and not wealth merely; and if you indulge in such *anger* towards offenders as you would wish others to exhibit towards you when you offend; and if you count it base while you rule your servants to be slaves to *pleasure;* and in *grief*, if you

[1] Nicoc., § 22. [2] Demon., §§ 16, 17. [3] Ibid., § 17 sq.
[4] Demon., § 29. [5] Ibid., § 27. [6] Ibid., § 16.

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observe the calamities of others and recollect that you are mortal."[1]

Next to truthfulness Isocrates would seem to value good learning. "Consider it, he says, far better to have laid up much useful knowledge than great wealth; for the latter may quickly pass away, whilst the former is a possession for all time. Wisdom alone of all our acquistions is immortal. ..... Do not hesitate to make a long journey to those who promise to teach you anything valuable. When merchants make long sea voyages to increase their estates, is it not base that the young should shrink from a land journey for the improvement of their minds?"[2]

The Domestic and Private Life of Isocrates, and his Death and Burial.

Of the domestic character of Isocrates little is known. The insinuations of Plutarch that he was guilty of some sensual indulgence in early life seems not to have much foundation, and is sufficiently contradicted, in the absence of proof, by his subsequent life and writings. His commendations of a life of purity and self-command are abundant and explicit. He did not marry until late in life, and then to a widow, by the name of Plathane, the daughter of the orator Hippias, the youngest of whose three sons, Aphareus, he adopted. This adopted son seems to have profited by the instruction of Isocrates, and, in imitation of him, wrote orations, and was also the author of tragedies, and performed the duties of a son with faithfulness and affection. When Isocrates was called upon unjustly to fit out a trireme, Aphareus was able successfully to defend him.[3]

Perhaps no circumstance of his life is more indicative of his kindly domestic character than his letter, in extreme age, to the Mytilenians, at the request of the children of Aphareus, asking permission for their music teacher and his relatives to return from exile. "The children of Aphareus, my grandchildren, who have been the pupils of Agenor in music, have

[1] Demon., § 21. [2] Ibid., § 19. [3] Antid., § 145.

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requested me to write you a letter asking you, as you have recalled certain others from banishment, that you will extend your clemency to him and his father and brothers. I replied to them that I feared I should seem out of my place and meddlesome if I asked so great a favor from those with whom I had never before had communication or acquaintance. But they were still more importunate. And when they found that I did not yield to their entreaties they showed themselves plainly displeased and grieved. Seeing this, I at last promised to write and send the letter to you."[1]

The meridian of the life of Isocrates would seem to have been almost cloudless. Possessed of a healthy mind and a body that knew little or anything of pain or disease, associated with the men of the highest character and the most elevated position, loved and honored by the most gifted young men of the age, many of whom had been or were his pupils, surrounded by every comfort which an ample fortune could give, untramelled by public or private business, nothing but the varying fortunes of his beloved Athens seemed to give him cause for anxiety or annoyance. Those who from envy and malice put a wrong construction upon what he wrote, and attempted to impugn his motives, he says, "did not move him," so certain was he that his intentions and influence were good.

But as age advanced he became more sensitive to criticism, and more solicitous that his name should descend to posterity as untarnished as he felt his life to have been pure.[3] Still he felt such confidence in his own integrity of purpose, and such assurance that the voice of posterity would sanction it, that he, if indeed he could have in any circumstances, has now no disposition to have recourse to any other than the most high-minded measures for defense. So, after quoting from several of his discourses which had been previously made public, he says: "I see that others, when on trial, at the close of their defense, supplicate and entreat you and bring forward their children and friends in order to influence your feelings.

[1] Epist. to Myt., 8. [2] Panath. [3] See above.

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But I suppose that no such thing is suited to one of my age. And besides I should blush for shame if I used any other means of defense than my previous writings, which I have just recited to you. For I am confident that I have spoken in them with such reverent regard and honesty, both with reference to our country and ancestors, but especially in reference to the gods, that if any human affairs committed to their care receive their attention, I suppose no one of these which now concern me will escape their notice. I therefore do not stand in dread of your decisions concerning me, but have the confident belief and hope that my life will come to its close, whenever it shall be best, making this proof that I have lived in past time, until this day, as those should live who reverence the gods and are loved by them."[1]

When Isocrates was in his eighty-fourth year and in the midst of an elaborate discourse in praise of Athens, the almost unbroken tenor of his laborious life was interrupted by an attack of disease with which he struggled for three years. His own account of it and its attendant circumstances can hardly fail of interest to the student of his works. "I wish," he says, "to say a word upon what befell me when I was writing this discourse, which I began at the advanced age specified in the beginning. When it was half written I was attacked by a disease which, although delicacy forbids me to name it,[2] frequently ends the life not only of the old, but also of those in the vigor of life, in three or four days. With this I struggled continually for three years, suffering daily so much, that not only those who were with me, but those who heard about it from them, admired me for my powers of endurance more than for those things which had called forth their praise in former days."[3]

In the following quotation from the same discourse we have the outlines of a picture of the closing labors of the

[1] Antid., § 321, 322.

[2] Coray says: Meint er etwa den Durchfall (Diarrhoë) eine bei den Alten sehr gefährlich Krankheit.

[3] Panath., § 266 sq.

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veteran scholar, surrounded by admiring friends, such as Cicero praised in his treatise on old age. Isocrates says: "When I was thus exhausted by disease and worn with age, some of those who frequented my house, and had often read that part of my discourse that was written, urged and entreated me that I would not leave it half written, nor even incomplete, but that I would devote myself at short intervals [i.e. as my strength would allow] to its completion. They did this not as a mere ceremonious attention to me, but with the highest encomiums of what was written, and saying things which if they had been heard by those who were not familiar with or attached to me, must have seemed to have been the most arrant flattery; and, if I had listened to them, I should have shown myself in the last stages of senile folly. I thus yielded to them; incurring, perhaps, this reproach from some, when I wanted but three years of being an hundred, ... and was so enfeebled that anybody else would not only not apply himself to writing, but would not feel able to listen to a discourse written and read by another." [1]

The battle which crushed the liberties of Greece and made it little more than a dependency upon the king of Macedon, was fought at Chaeronea in Boeotia, and the news was not long in reaching Athens. The consternation that shone in every face and filled every heart, was too much for the patriot of almost a hundred years to endure. He had labored long with his fellow-citizens, admonished, entreated, advised them, with the hope that something of the vigor and honesty of the age of Solon and his successors might again return. He had endeavored to kindle in the breast of Philip a glow of the nobility that he hoped was latent in his blood that had flowed down to him from a Greek fountain, and sentiments of a noble and generous ambition to be, by the aid of the united Greeks, the conqueror of the Persian despot. But all had failed. His life-work was blurred; he might almost, at the moment, feel that it was obliterated, and the page on which it was inscribed a blot. From this time he took no

[1] Panath., § 268 sq.

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food, and in three or four days was gathered to his fathers, repeating the first line of three of the dramas of Euripides:

Δαναὸς ὁ πεντήκοντα θυγατέρων πατήρ —
Πέλοψ ὁ Ταντάλειος εἰς Πίσαν μολών —
Σιδώνιον ποτ' ἄστυ Κάδμος ἐκλιπών.[1]

Isocrates was buried, in the midst of his kindred, near the Cynosarges, on a mound to the left, in the suburbs of Athens, where the school of the Cynics was held, and where were temples of Hercules, and other worthies. Not only his father and mother and aunt, and brother Theodorus, and a cousin of Isocrates, but his wife, his adopted son Aphareus, with his children, were clustered about him. Six mural tablets marked their graves. Over that of Isocrates was a column thirty cubits high, surmounted by a syren of the stature of seven feet, symbolical of the charms of his eloquence. Not far off stood a tablet on which were delineated poets and his teachers, among whom was Gorgias, with Isocrates standing near, looking upon an astronomical globe.

In the vestibule of the temple at Eleusis, too, there is a brazen statue erected to him by Timotheus the son of Conon, and pupil and life-long friend of Isocrates.[2] His step-son Aphareus, also, could not leave him whom he had so loved and honored in life, without a public token of his regard. He placed upon a column in the temple of Jupiter Olympus a brazen statue in his honor.[3]

[1] Plutarch's Vita, p. xxvii. and Note (Auger's edition). By these lines Wolf says: "Isocrates wished to indicate that Greece was now subjected to its fourth enslavement to a barbarian dominion. The Macedonians, as appears from Demosthenes, were included among barbarians, although Philip was considered as an Aegean and descendant of Hercules."

[2] The inscription was as follows:

Τιμόθεος φιλίας τε χάριν ξενίην τε προτιμῶν,
Ἰσοκράτους εἰκὼ τήν δε ἀνέθηκε θεαῖς.
Λεοχάρους ἔργον. — Plutarch's Isoc., p. xxx.

[3] The following was the inscription upon it:

Ἰσοκράτους Ἀφαρεὺς πατρὸς εἰκόνα τήνδε ἀνέθηκε
Ξηνὶ, θεούς τε σέβων καὶ γονέων ἀρετήν.

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ARTICLE II.

THE CONCEPT OF GOD AS THE GROUND OF PROGRESS.

BY REV. GEORGE T. LADD, MILWAUKEE, WIS.

ANY wise man, when about to take a journey through remote and obscure regions, will be inclined diligently to consider his preparations, his proposed route, and his desired end in making such a journey. To inquire as to the ground of the world's progress, is to attempt a journey through remote and obscure regions of thought. But the views and reflections already given to the readers of the Bibliotheca Sacra will help us to answer the questions, With what preparation, by what route, and with what final purpose the journey is undertaken.

The discussion in the number for January 1877 led us to this conclusion regarding the Origin of the Concept of God: It is the resultant of God's revelation of himself along many lines of his self-revealing force, and within that organon of the self-revelation which is the entire human soul. The reception of truth in general does not depend upon the quality and activities of the intellect alone; its reception is dependent upon symmetrically cultured manhood, rightly correlated action and balanced capabilities of man's different powers. But in the case of this peculiar and comprehensive concept that is pre-eminently true which Dr. Carpenter avers of certain departments of science: "Our conclusions rest not on any one set of experiences, but upon our unconscious co-ordination of the whole aggregate of our experience; not on the conclusiveness of any one train of reasoning, but on the convergence of all our lines of thought toward one centre." In proof of this view of the origin of the concept of God, the concept and the soul regarded as its organ of reception were compared. Analysis was made to show how

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the various elements of the concept arise in various activities of our complex manhood, and, under the pressure of strong constitutional instinct, desire, and bias, coalesce in the incomparable whole. Thus the whole soul, in all its activities of thought, feeling, and volition, when these activities are rightly correlated and symmetrically cultured, stands pledged to the idea of a self-revealing God.

In a subsequent Article the attempt was made to classify, set forth, and in some slight degree soften, the stern difficulties which attach themselves, as to every concept worthy of the name idea, so also pre-eminently to this pre-eminently great idea of God. Among these were considered the ontological difficulties, which are such as concern the objective validity of the idea. The view was maintained that the prime and indestructible postulates of all human thought — viz. the universe is thinkable, and my thought corresponds to the reality of the thinkable universe — guarantee the objective validity of the idea of God. The claim was set up, that with "the fullest strength of conviction do we reach the objective validity of the concept of God as the conclusion of an indirect proof, when we consider God as the postulate of the world's evolution." "The real being of God is required by thought to serve not only as the ground of all phenomena, but as the ground for the orders of phenomena, and for all forms of human science which deal with the various orders. The being of God is the one rational explanation of nature, history, art, and politics; of the unfolding ethical and religious life of man; and of the relations which maintain themselves amongst all these complex interests and forms of growth." How we do find this idea of God underlying all forms of progress, it was promised should perhaps occupy our thought at another time. To the attempt at redemption of this promise we are come in the present Article.

And now this brief review of thoughts already dwelt upon enables us to answer the three inquiries just proposed. We are setting out upon a brief journey by thought around the rational universe. We wish to consider the phenomena

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with a view to discover not what they are of themselves, but what they teach as to the being of their common ground. We start equipped with certain knowledge, fairly won, as to the idea of God and the reality corresponding to the idea. We are ready to inquire whether it be not true, as Trendelenburg declares, that "this unconditioned which supports the verity of the whole, philosophical abstraction calls the Absolute, but faith, more lively, calls it God."

And as to what shall be the route of our journey in thought we can now easily determine. The concept of God is a concept worthy to be called an idea. It is fitted to take up into itself, harmonize, and explain a vast aggregate of otherwise disparate and conflicting phenomena. The modern conception of progress is also one of sufficiently large proportions and promising construction. Our course of thought will lead us to inquire whether the latter must not find in the former its only possible ground and guarantee. The idea of progress must be analyzed, in order that it may be seen whether it do not necessarily break up into elements, every one of which requires for its rational explanation some corresponding element in the idea of a self-revealing God. The facts of progress must be examined, to see whether they do not imperatively demand, as their sole ground in reality, that real One whose reality is postulated in this same idea of God. Moreover, the idea and facts of progress are given to us under several different, but correlated types. We shall do well to see whether we are not warranted in saying that each form of science and life shows its own special progress as somehow grounded in the same idea and reality of God.

But what ends are to be served in following such a course of thought? We strive to serve at least two. We hope to understand the idea and facts of progress better after attempting to understand them as resting upon their ground. We expect, also, to obtain proof, additional to that already offered, for the validity and comprehensiveness of the true idea of God. We start upon our journey already persuaded that God is the ground of the world's progress. We expect

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to reach its end with a clearer view of progress. We expect, also, to derive a stronger proof of the being and attributes of God from our consideration of him as the sole rational ground of this progress. Nor is this a vicious circle, in either definition or argument.

That profoundest of all historians of the church, the beloved Neander, begins his great work by placing in its candlestick the idea in the light of which he will read the history. "Our knowledge here," says he, "falls into a necessary circle. To understand history it is supposed that we have some understanding of that which constitutes its working principle; but it is also history which furnishes us the proper test by which to ascertain whether its principle has been rightly apprehended." So when "we read the great world-poem in the idea of God," our knowledge falls into this necessary, but legitimate circle. For, as says Trendelenburg, "Experience and idea demand each the other; and the greatness of the cognition lies in this, that both are mutually interpenetrating."[1] The effort to ground the idea and facts of progress in the idea and reality of God brings us new proof of the truth of the old impression — what a focus for all converging beams of light, what a hearth of all diverging rays of heat, is this same concept of a self-revealing God! We claim the right to use this "necessary circle," over whose whole circumference "experience and idea demand each other." One other right we claim as legitimate and necessary to our argument. This is the right to approach the subject with that "good faith" which, as says a writer on logic, "is the parent of the grand truth of the reason that the world is a systematic whole, — nay, that the universe is such a whole."

Suppose that we analyze this comprehensive idea called progress, and find that its elements are all grounded in the idea of God; it is still possible for scepticism to inquire, What then? and to say, You have resolved one idea into another without showing that either corresponds to any

[1] Untersuchungen, ii. p. 494.

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reality. To scepticism the reply must be, that idea corresponds to reality in the case of the present argument, is one of the grandest and most conclusive applications of those same postulates of all observation and reasoning, to which attention has already so frequently been called. We postulate that the universe is thinkable, and that our thought corresponds to the reality of things, — in this, as in every argument. We start out with "good faith" when we go forth to read the great poem of the universe in the idea of God. He who is unsound in his philosophy, and at the same time logical in his deductions from that philosophy, cannot be otherwise than hopelessly sceptical concerning the proofs, cosmological and teleological, which theology has to educe. He only who is enough of a philosopher to avoid the gross credulity of relying upon his intellect for the rejection of intuitions and postulates which lie at the foundation of all its work, is able in appropriate good faith to start upon our journey.

As truly as the idea of progress is grounded in the idea of God, so truly are the facts of progress grounded in the reality of God. For, the orderly movement of the universe forward toward a goal is not merely the subjective scheme or framework in which we, through being deluded, set all the varied phenomena of history and present life; it is a great objective reality as well. The self-revelation of God in the universe involves both subjective process and objective fact. It is not made once for all; it is being made through all time; it is not, and cannot be conceived as being, statical; it is dynamical. So man conceives it; so it really is. That is indeed true of this all-embracing divine institution of the cosmos, which Schmidt has declared true of the believer's holy supper; "divine institutions are not to be conceived as somewhat once for all time made ready." Legitimate "good faith" in the postulates of all thinking and being enables our observation of phenomena to reach the conclusions that the universe is really moving forward toward a lofty goal, and that God is the one who gives the force, thought, and final

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purpose of its movement. The good faith of the sound philosopher, if not the religious faith of the theist, is needed to reach these conclusions.

The progress of the universe is grounded in God. This statement appears true whether we consider the idea and facts in general of progress, or consider the separate special forms into which the universal movement divides itself. The idea of all progress is grounded in the concept of God. The sciences are grounded in the same concept. So that not only is the modern conception of evolution, so far as it has proved itself true, to be considered as a partial expression to the perfected idea of God, but also all the sciences, which are being so diligently cultivated and evolved, are to be looked upon as fragmentary, but correlated, forms of expression to the thought and will of God.

We shall consider, then, first, the idea and fact of progress in general as grounded in the idea and reality of God; and afterward illustrate and enforce what shall have been said, by considering, second, the sciences as grounded in the same idea.

There is no conceivable idea of progress which is not grounded in the idea of God, and there is no reality of progress which is not grounded in the reality of God. For what is this so much discussed idea of progress?

Profound logicians and students of the history of thought lay down the law that all progress in thought consists in a continuous process of synthesis, opposition, and new synthesis. This is the Hegelian process of absolute negativity; somewhat similar is Dr. Newman's principle of the survival of the stronger; both, as Mr. C. E. Appleton assures us are "worthy of attentive and respectful consideration."[1] Men think and affirm; they think farther and deny their first affirmation; they think still farther and, discovering the "soul of truth" in both the former affirmation and its denial, they deny the denial in its first form, and make a new and still higher affirmation.

At this point we might press the inquiry, what one force,

[1] Contemporary Review for Nov. 1876, p. 946.

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containing and realizing the guarantee of progress, pushes forward this movement of human thought, this process of reciprocal induction and deduction, this constant synthesis and negation and higher synthesis? But for the present we drop the inquiry, and pass on to ask, what is that special form of affirmation which best sums up the present status of human thought? As nearly all agree, it is the doctrine of evolution. Indeed, this law of progress in thought is itself a fragment of the general doctrine of evolution. In the light of this idea of evolution, the scientists and the thinkers of the world generally are trying to read all the phenomena before them. Even fiction and poetry are illuminated with rays from this great synthesis of the present age. But do the idea of the scientists and the idea of the theists contradict each other? Or must not rather the idea of the former receive its rational explanation and guarantee in the idea of the latter?

Now it is plain to theists that if, in trying to read the world-poem in the idea of evolution, we must, with Mr. Tyndall, discern in atoms, "self-moved" and "self-posited," "the promise and potency of all terrestrial life," or, with Mr. Spencer, must declare, in despair, "the Power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable," or, with Mr. Arnold, must see in the "not-ourselves which makes for righteousness" only a blind, unconscious drift or tendency; then we cannot make the idea of evolution coalesce in any way with the idea of a self-revealing God. In none of these forms, however, is the doctrine of evolution proved true. It is only in so far as it is not proved true, that the notion of evolution contradicts the concept of God. In so far as it is proved true, it not only illustrates and proves, but is also grounded in, the concept.

Nor have we to inquire whether that very special and restricted form of the general doctrine of evolution, which Mr. Darwin advocates, is compatible with theism or not. For it is not proved true.[1] We have, indeed, the declaration,

[1] We wish to propose with becoming modesty a question concerning Darwin-

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approaching very near to the fraud of enthusiasm, from Mr. Huxley, that evolution — meaning, I suppose, Darwinism — which was once "a matter of speculation and argument," has now "become a matter of fact and history." But on the other hand we have the declaration of Mr. Mivart, that this form of evolution is "a puerile hypothesis," and also the conclusion which Dr. Elam reaches, that it "has no scientific basis." We have the confident assertion of some scientists; we have the cautious dissent or open denial of others. While Darwinism is winning or losing its way, theology is not bound to show its consistency with her tenet of a personal God. But theology is encouraged to find that the very things, known to be true in the general doctrine of evolution, are well adapted to prove God as the ground of all evolution.

In all the universe, so far as it comes under human research, there are abundant evidences of certain lines and kinds of progress. All the phenomena of the physical universe, the higher and yet higher collocation of atoms and forces, the ascending types, genera, and species of animals, the advancing history of the race at large, and the growing kingdom of God on earth, tell us the same wonderful story. They do not tell of evolution without God, but of that progress which has its explanation and ground in God.

And now laying one side the unessentials, and as well all the unproved elements, of this great synthesis of modern

ism which we have seen nowhere satisfactorily handled. Some one of high authority as both physicist and mathematician should attempt the complete treatment of this question. We wish to see the doctrine of chances thoroughly applied to the phenomena of "missing links" and intermediate forms. Darwinism professes to give laws which apply to and explain all the phenomena of life, in the past and in the present. The record of the phenomena is broken. Perhaps in some rough way the proportion which the remaining fragments bear to the whole can be estimated. What is the probability, antecedent to research, that these remaining fragments would show no more of the intermediate forms, which at some time of course existed, than they actually do? The lack of such forms is one which Darwinism sorely feels. What are the chances that the theory can be true and yet feel this lack without some other law or laws needed to account for the very lack itself? In other words, can it be even roughly stated, *what is the antecedent probability that there would be so many missing links?*

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thought, let us examine it under the title, Progress of the Universe.

What are the real elements of this idea and its corresponding reality, called Progress of the Universe?

One element of the idea and fact of progress is the cognition of motion. This is the most patent and superficial element. In the world of material things there must be movement of matter, in masses or in atoms, through space; there must be new collocations of material substances, in order to any progress. Even the shallowest, rankest materialism, even the thinnest, flimsiest doctrine of evolution, must assume not only "self-posited," but "self-moved" atoms. To inquire what proof for any being beyond and underneath itself would be given in the mere existence, without change, of matter, is to go outside the present inquiry. The cosmological argument which denies the possibility of "self-posited atoms," and asserts the necessity of God as a ground for atoms themselves, is surely not more barren without union with the teleological, than the doctrine of evolution when it postulates matter without also the motion of matter. Nor can we speak of progress in culture, politics, or religion without implying some change in quality of those beings in whose varying culture, politics, and religion the progress consists. The appearance of new qualities and activities, or of new forms to old qualities and activities, we also, by a figure of speech, call motion.

Now, were the mind of man constituted differently, it is conceivable that it should receive without further inquiry the fact of these manifold motions. But thus constituted it could have no sense of the fact or doctrine of progress, could in truth scarcely be called *mind* at all. In contemplating all changes, whether of matter in space or of the manifestations of mind in time, the very nature of thought compels us at once to assert there *is* some cause, at once to inquire, *What* is the cause? "*Self-moved*" atoms and a "*self-moved*" universe are an absurdity to all human thought. For motion and change of every kind, says thought, must have a cause;

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some cause atheistic evolution and theistic philosophy must alike assume or prove. What we reach, however, claims Strauss,[1] is not the conception of a cause of which the cosmos is the effect, but of a substance of which individual cosmical phenomena are but the accidents. We reach, not a deity, but a "self-centred cosmos, unchangeable amidst the eternal change." What is all this but to say that the substance is the cause of the individual phenomena, the self-centred cosmos the cause of all eternal change? But the idea of substance, like that of cause, is an ideal element of evolution. When once an ideal element of whatever sort is introduced to account for the phenomena of change, it is legitimate for us, with Strauss, to inquire, what and of what sort it is. This inquiry cannot be pushed aside by speaking of "self-moved atoms" and a "self-centred cosmos." We still have the two conceptions on our hands: there are the phenomena of motion, and there is the ideal element of their cause. To divide the universe into two parts, one of which is the self-centred cosmos and the other the series of phenomena which constitutes all eternal change, and then posit the former as the cause of the latter under the new relation of substance and accidents, is to make a more rash and illegitimate use of the cosmological argument than theology has been wont to attempt. "Self-moved atoms" are an audacious assumption; so also is a "self-centred cosmos." For even if the universe could be considered at all thus statically, so to speak, in adopting Strauss' view and all similar views, we should only be in reality admitting the same underlying cause in which the universe is grounded, while apparently denying our own admission by an unphilosophical substitution of the word "substance" for the word "cause." And we are sure that the cause of the universe, if by universe we mean the aggregate of all finite substances and all phenomena, cannot be the universe itself, unless in the universe we include something more than finite substance, and all phenomena. For as Ulrici has said,[2] "a universe abiding in its uniformity

[1] The Old Faith and the New, p. 132. [2] Review of Strauss, p. 89.

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amid the eternal shifting of phenomena is a contradiction in the adjective, because that which changes does not remain uniform"; unless, we will add, it is a contradiction in the noun, because the same word universe cannot properly be made to stand both for all the varied effects and for the one cause of them all. To talk of "self-moved atoms" is also but thinly to paste together the two separate conceptions of phenomena of motion and underlying ground or cause of those phenomena.

With the cognition of motion and changes of phenomena there necessarily arises, then, the idea of a ground of the changes of phenomena. This idea of the unchanging cause of all changes, of the abiding ground of shifting phenomena, is one necessary element in the rational conception of God. This idea of "the conditioning, in and of itself, purely as conditioning" (Ulrici), of the "one ultimate cause," of the ground of phenomena, is that which "philosophical abstraction calls the absolute, but faith, more lively, calls it God." Neither philosophy nor faith can escape the necessary idea of the absolute.

We advance, now, another step. The universe, it has already been said, cannot be considered merely as a problem in statics: the universe is a problem in dynamics. The cause which we see manifested in the movements of matter, and in the appearance of new qualities and activities of living and rational beings, must be force. It is not cosmical substance expressing itself in cosmical accidents, but force expressing itself in results.

That force is one element in the idea of evolution need not be proved. It is force alone that evolves, force that causes the motions from inspection of which we reason back to itself. But what shall we say of this new element which the complex idea of modern evolution holds so prominently before us? Is it, or is it not, like the element of cause, one element of the same concept of God? We must certainly say of it that it is an ideal element. It therefore flatly rebukes that "downright repudiation of all the ideal ele-

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ments" which atheism and materialism seem so anxious to bring about. Force, as an ideal element, is not to be got out of any mere inspection of material atoms, whether in motion or at rest. Force is got out of the self-conscious and free personality of the inspectors themselves, and is put not *into*, but *behind*, these atoms by the instinctive philosophy of the human soul. Instead of saying, My personality has no freedom, because atoms have force, we say, rather, There is force behind the atoms, because my free personality posits it there. The admission, both intelligent and unintentional, that this element of the idea of evolution is derived from man's own self-conscious use of force is not infrequent, even among the advocates of modern evolution. The admissions in this direction of Du Bois Reymond are quoted by Ulrici against Strauss, by Martineau and Dr. Elam against Tyndall. The latter himself quotes with approbation the same admissions.

It seems that "it is absolutely and forever inconceivable" — even for the fertile brain of the modern scientist — that a number of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen atoms should be otherwise than indifferent as to their own position and motion, past, present, or future." The force, then, which determines the position of these indifferent atoms cannot be in any case other "self-moved atoms," but must be something unlike atoms. To determine the origin and nature of this idea of a force behind the atoms, we have to go to self-consciousness. We might watch the silent swing of the celestial bodies or the minute and mysterious changes of protoplasmic matter, to all eternity, and never get beyond motion to force, were it not for the self-consciousness of a soul which is itself forced to believe in causation, and which itself exercises, and so demonstrates the existence of, force. While, then, the physicist can only define force superficially, as that something which produces or tends to produce motion, the psychologist looks within himself, and discovers straightway what this something is. It is I who produce or tend to produce the motions of my physical organism; and while

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the atoms are utterly indifferent themselves to their position, I, who move them, am not indifferent. I find force in me. I find it nowhere else, except so far as I carry it over from the sphere of my self-conscious being, and place it behind those phenomena which I know I do not produce, those motions for which I know my willing is not the cause.

It is this truth which gives Schopenhauer his ground for affirming will to be the reality of all things. For since we find an unconditioned, in the form of our own free-will, lying underneath, and, in a real, though limited way, giving conditions to the phenomena of the self-conscious life, therefore do we infer that the Unconditioned, in the form of Absolute Will, underlies and gives conditions to all the phenomena of the universe. The man of low culture places a will behind each one or each separate order of the phenomena. He sees proof of gods many and lords many in the experiences of life which he has so loosely concatenated, so little harmonized. The superior culture of science goes forward to the theory of correlated forces. It thinks all the various causes of motion as various forms of that one force which utters itself through them all. Having measured the relations amongst certain of the forces called physical, and having found them constant, it rises upon the wings of faith to the conclusion that they are all so. It lays down, as its great law of forces, the law of conservation and correlation of forces; although, as says Lange, the historian of materialism, in its "strictest and most consequent meaning, it is anything but proved; it is only an ideal of the reason; perhaps, however, indispensable as a goal for all empirical research." But this "ideal of the reason," required by the modern scientific doctrine of evolution, is the very ideal hailed by rational theology in all the ages. We are quite ready to agree with Mr. Spencer in thinking that the force which the universe manifests to us is one. We are also ready to spell it with a capital. And whereas he, under the influence of the modern doctrine of science, writes these many forces into one word,—"Power," — we, under the influence of the old doctrine of theology,

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and in accordance not only with the same doctrine of science, but also with the true philosophy of mind, write the same forces into one word — Will. We thus ground another element of the idea of evolution in the idea of God.

At this point many of those who do not believe in a Personal Absolute begin to draw backward. To speak of Will, instead of Power, is quite too much for them. Spencer and Tyndall and Huxley remain, we conclude, somewhat behind even this point. They occupy themselves with an "inscrutable Power," or with "self-moved and self-posited atoms," or with "subtile influences," or with "that mysterious thing by which all this has been accomplished." We may be certain, then, that they will go no farther on. The German pessimist comes fairly up to this point, but refuses to take the next step. Strauss, however, after reproaching Schopenhauer for his inconsistency, joins hands with Plato and Hegel, and pushes boldly forward. This power, which these other advocates of evolution are willing to leave inscrutable, Strauss declares "is by no means merely a rude power to which we bow in mute resignation, but is at the same time both order and law, reason and goodness, to which we surrender ourselves in loving trust." [1] There is, then, also thought manifested in evolution, according to Strauss's view of the universe. But the admissions of Strauss are by no means such as the advocates of scientific evolution wish to abide by. For who does not see that the strong ethical nature and crude materialism and shallow philosophy of this author make his attempt to account for the universe but an unmixed mess of pottage, alike bitter for all palates. Yet we should be glad to be informed by those who best understand the modern doctrine of scientific evolution, how they are going to eliminate the element of thought from the idea and facts of progress. For surely the movements of these atoms and living souls which make up the universe are such as to involve very complicated relations. Evolution implies not force alone, but force rationally used; with what amazing rationality we understand all the better, the better we understand the doctrine of evolution.

[1] The Old Faith and the New, p. 164.

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Place a thinking being like man in the midst of the homogeneous cosmic vapor with which evolution begins; and on the first appearance of change in his surroundings, that thinking being would postulate a cause. But let appearances of changes continue, and so correlate themselves before him as to become orderly changes, and then the thinking being would postulate thought beside his former postulate of a cause. Neither extension of the time nor of the space occupied by the universe will relieve the mind from the pressure of this problem of universal thought.

But, not to go back to cosmic gas and inquire how an original or acquired difference in the qualities of the sixty-three simples of chemistry could exist without thought, we may begin much nearer ourselves. For, if we examine that restricted form of evolution known as Darwinism, — which surely has a minimum of rationality admitted into itself, — how, nevertheless, without implying thought as an element, shall we analyze even it? The laws of heredity and specific variation and survival of the fittest — all imply thought. They imply an orderly interaction of forces, a concatenation of causes, which speaks to our reason, and speaks of a reason not ourselves.

Indeed, we start with thought, we use thought in research, we find thought, we come back to thought, everywhere. Were not the universe cast, as to every lineament of it, in the mould of thought, we could not speak of a universe at all. It is the reason stamped everywhere which makes men reason back to the universal Thinker. It is the cosmos which is to blame, if blame there be, for these so numerous arguments of natural theology. To refuse to ride upon them as "poor old dead horses" is altogether to refuse to go toward the solution of the problem of the universe. Upon what shall we ride out into the universe, if not upon the wings of the rational absolute? The conception of an orderly whole (*raisonée*) underlies all rational knowledge, and especially, therefore, that great conclusion upon which all the modern forms of knowledge are supposed to bring to a

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focus their special rays of light. Atoms "self-moved and self-posited" require to be supplemented with a something else which moves them and marshals them into rational shapes and along rational lines of direction.

Shall we, however, place this something else, as the materialist places all original position and subsequent motion of atoms, in the atom itself? This will only be to attribute co-operative thought to each atom. In consideration of that love of unity which dominates the modern idea of evolution, it would seem scientifically preferable to have one Thinking Absolute, rather than countless co-ordinate thinking atoms. We need not, however, fall back upon the absurdity of thinking atoms. Science assures us that it is forever inconceivable that these atoms should be otherwise than indifferent to their own motions. That something else, then, which is of the nature of thought, must be placed elsewhere than in the atoms. Where shall we place it?

When man builds his temple or theatre or ship, we place the thought which we see rendered objective in temple, theatre, or ship within the thinking man. When the bee builds the cell, we are perhaps doubtful whether we shall place the thought which becomes objective in the cell within the bee or not; whether, also, we shall call the bee gifted with thought or instinct. When we see the crystal shaping itself mathematically, and so putting thought into objective expression, within what or whom shall we place the thought thus expressed? And when we press on to inquire whose thought correlates bee to cell, and both to the human mind, man to his edifice, and both to the thought of his fellow-man; and correlates all men and all animals and all crystals into one grand progressive scheme of materials, forces, and laws — what answer shall philosophy bring back? Shall she remain dumb? Shall she be ashamed at being deemed overmuch pious? Can she bring back a better answer than to place this thought in one thinking being, and so join thought to will as another element of the idea of evolution, found by analysis to have its ground in the idea of God?

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Thought is as surely a necessary element of progress as is force; for progress implies not mere motion, but co-ordinated and rational motion. In the progress of the universe we are compelled to see thought giving conditions to the process of evolution. Thought as an element of the idea of progress is therefore grounded in thought as an element of the idea of God; for it is just such thought as gives conditions to all this process which we call evolution, that theology and philosophy know under the name of the Thinking Absolute, who is God. He, then, who talks of evolution, and recognizes in it no Universal Reason does but overlook the very source "from which he derives the spark of reason which he misuses."

And to thought let us add final purpose, as another element in regard to which the idea of progress grounds itself in the idea of God. At this point even the accommodating Strauss begs leave to separate from us. And Matthew Arnold, although he makes his contribution to the great modern idea of evolution under the term of a "not-ourselves which makes for righteousness," shrinks back from the personality of final purpose. The German would have us think of a universe which is planned "not by a Supreme Reason, but planned [by whom?] on supreme reason"; the Englishman would have us think of a blind drift or tendency, which, nevertheless, makes for the noble goal of righteousness. But is not this only to talk of the reality under other and misleading terms? After all explanations as to how the universe can be "planned on reason" without a rational final purpose, and how a Power can be said to "make for righteousness," without the assumption of a self-consciously followed goal — we are still in the dark. We still cannot see how there can be any evolution, either in idea or in fact, without the idea and the fact of a goal and a final purpose. Should this our inability be charged to weakness or ignorance, we are desirous of good company. We, therefore, return the charge in words partly borrowed from Ulrici.[1] The fact that

[1] Review of Strauss, p. 101 f.

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such thinkers do not see their self-contradiction in imposing on blind, unconscious, unthinking necessity, the adjustment of a development of a higher something out of a lower, is due to the superficiality and lack of thought which seem to cleave inevitably to every form of materialism. But how shall we apply such language to Mr. Arnold who has so nobly espoused the cause of that Zeit-Geist which plays so important a part in Literature and Dogma? Only because he will not allow his Geist to remain spirit; only because he will try to do with blind unconscious necessity the work which must be attributed to the Spirit of all times, to the Personal Absolute.

But Strauss and Matthew Arnold are not scientists. Will not, then, some one of the clearest and most learned writers on scientific evolution tell us how even the idea of evolution can be entertained without implying a final purpose and a goal? To make merry over special mistakes of theologians in inferring this or that special purpose, is the easy, but quite unsatisfactory reply. Teleological instinct and work may go awry, as every other instinct and work, with scientists as well as theologians. But what sort of development is that which expresses no idea of final purpose and moves forward toward no goal? Evolution, as we have already seen, necessarily implies not only motion, but orderly motion, not only force and cause, but correlated forces and co-ordinated causes. It implies, however, more than this. It implies movement forward from that which is comparatively crude to that which is comparatively perfect, from the inferior to that which is regarded as better. For even if we hold the view that each stage of the process is equally good in its place, and try to confine our thought to the nature of the process itself, we have not escaped the ideas of a goal and a final purpose. The words higher and lower, progress and retrogradation, fit and unfit, will inevitably creep into any discussion of the doctrine of evolution. These words all imply a goal to be reached, a final purpose to be attained.

Let us consider that questions after the final purpose of the whole, and of each part of the whole, are questions which

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the mind must keep asking until it receives an answer. The philosophic instinct and habit of man requires him to ask for what, as surely and persistently as he asks whence and how. No amount of mistaking and of rebuffs for mistaking can repress this inquiry.

Let us consider, also, that the existence of final purpose in the universe is a fact than which no other is more patent and convincing. It is the fact implied in all forms of research. For whatever new views of efficient causes may be given us by the discoveries of modern science, they only open manifold new and more remarkable relations of the same ancient question: To what final purpose do the efficient causes thus combine? If the continuous adjustment of organism and environment tells us how the preservation of life is secured, we have still to ask, For what end is the preservation of life thus secured? If the theory of the survival of the fittest proves itself true, we still inquire, Fittest for what? And if the reply be made, Fittest to survive, of course; we inquire again, Is it meant simply to affirm that what survives does survive, or rather that what is adapted to survive does survive? If the former, the great theory furnishes no information; if the latter, the questions still presses upon us, What is meant by adapted? For what end is the existing adaptation? For what end the survival of some rather than others?

When, however, these efficient causes of modern science are regarded not simply as combining in certain proportions to fashion certain fragments of being, but as combining all of them in all their scope to produce that total scheme of a progressive universe which evolution teaches, then the inquiry into final cause reaches its grandest possible proportions. The doctrine of evolution introduces us in each of its minutest problems to the doctrine of final causes; but in its total compass it brings before us that final cause which dominates all the others, and which furnishes no less than the goal of the universe itself. "The teleological proof," says Trendelenburg," shows the harmony of the conditioned through the purpose which rules the world." This purpose which

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rules the world, and which is admitted, though often so tardily, by all theories of evolution, is another element in which the great modern synthesis grounds itself in the concept of God.

And having once admitted the idea of a final purpose which rules the world, we are helped in the effort to read all the steps of the progress in the light of their goal. The various instances of final cause which we find in these steps we must account for by placing them in some being who is capable of acting as final cause. With much of the development of man we seem to have no difficulty. It is man's final purpose which makes him serve to furnish, not only the efficient, but also the final, cause of so much of his own development. But when Galvani discovers galvanism, and Columbus discovers America, each without having the end attained in view, we question further as to whose final purpose is served in such discoveries. And when we see what we are pleased to call instinct, working such wonders, so as to spin the spider's web and build the cell of the bee and paint the shell of the mollusk, we are invited to put the final cause of all these activities in the same place of rest where we find the goal of the universe. Indeed the only satisfying answer to teleological inquiry in the case of these fragments of the whole comes from considering them as accounted for in their relations as fragments to the whole. The greatest uncertainty attaches itself to the most special of the final causes when we attempt to interpret them away from the light of the plan of the whole.

We find, then, that final causes ground themselves where efficient causes do, and that the point of union for both is in the thought and will of God.

And we are warranted in going beyond the bare assertion of the fact of all-prevalent final cause amidst efficient causes. Says a writer on logic, "Wherever it exists the final cause is the real cause. In nature, in life, and in history, this is the working power; this sums up all parts of the process in itself, and the beginning finds its real existence in the end

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or in the process which leads to the end." It is the idea of the goal which dominates the entire view of the journey. If the end of progress, judged by ethical and spiritual standards, is a lofty one, then ethical and spiritual forces will be paramount in the account rendered of the process. There is no element, then, in the idea of development, upon which theism seizes with more eagerness, and which it grounds with more confidence in the idea of God, than this element which is contributed by viewing the world as a whole moving forward to a grand and lofty goal.

After we have once seen how the idea of the progress of the universe discloses itself as grounded in the idea of a will guided by thought and final purpose, it is in vain for the advocates of evolution to try to draw us back into uncertain talk about "drifts" and "tendencies" and "unconscious" or "subtile influences" and "inscrutable power" and the "mysterious something by which all this has been accomplished." We have found the something by which all this has been and is accomplished, in the will and thought and final purpose of an absolute being not ourselves.

It remains only to ask whether the accepted idea of evolution has any element in it which can answer the question, What is this dominating final purpose which the thought and will found in the universe are carrying out? To this question scientific evolution is nearly dumb, — nearly, but not quite; for materialistic scientists, like Christians, walk largely by faith, rather than by sight. They, too, feel "urged to cross the boundary," and lay down postulates as to the remote past and the remote future. For after thinking man has done the utmost that lies in him to put out of sight the ideal elements of his being, he will still of necessity look both before and behind. Looking both ways, the disciple of evolution without God discerns that there has been movement from what is worse to what is better, and believes that this movement will continue in time to come. How such discernment and belief are to be justified when once the ideal elements are left out of the problem, it is vain to inquire.

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Without these, homogeneous cosmic gas must be judged to be as worthy of admiration as the perfected kingdom of God, and the movements of the protogenes of Haeckel as the holiness of Christ. Still, however illogically, the faith in a progressive conquest of the world by whatever is noblest, purest, and best, is apt to maintain its place even in the most rankly materialistic scheme of evolution. Modern evolution, then, in the most restricted and low-lived form, is not quite dumb as to the goal of the universe.

But when we take this modern synthesis, and examine by it the sciences of history, ethics, aesthetics, politics, and comparative religion, we hear voices more clear and consentaneous. They speak to a faith that is in man before the proofs of evolution come, and they bring back from all the phenomena new increments of proof to the faith. Theology uses this faith and accepts these proofs to make and to maintain its fundamental thesis, viz. that absolute goodness must be. It says to the other sciences, as you have both postulated and proved absolute will, absolute thought, absolute final purpose, so now I, with your help, and yet in no servile dependence upon you, make and prove my postulate. To be sure I have difficulties with this postulate, just as you have with yours. But without it I can neither read the universe nor satisfy the soul of man.

Ultimate cause, which is absolute will, thought, and final purpose,— absolute because conditioning all the phenomena; perfect love,—if only the word be understood loftily and comprehensively enough,— these are the ideas of a personal God; and in them we find grounded all the ideal elements of the doctrine of a progress of the universe.

Nor, to come back to the postulate of "good faith" with which we started out, does this analysis lead us only to an ideal scheme or form of thought, according to which, hedged in by illusions, man is forced to construct the phantom of a universe. We speak of things, as well as thoughts, when we speak of evolution; we argue back not to an idea simply, but also to a reality, when we ground evolution in God.

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For the validity of the argument and for the objective reality corresponding to its terms we have pledged those same postulates which accompany all human thought — the universe is thinkable, and my thought corresponds to the reality of things. All the facts and phenomena and laws of the universe are seen, the scientists claim, in their reality and true connection when seen by the synthesis of evolution; they are seen, then, in their truest connection, in their deepest reality of meaning, when seen as parts contributing to the complete idea of God.

For the phenomena of the universe some idea, some systematizing conception, is needed; such an idea is that of God. We must ground the doctrine which offers itself as the best synthesis of the phenomena in some reality; such a reality is the Divine Being. Progress, then, is not merely human and subjective; it is the objective fact of universal history, the divine law of self-revelation. "The unfought is the unfelt": God makes himself felt by revealing himself as in a struggle toward a purpose, as in a race toward a goal. These are conclusions from our consideration of the idea of progress as grounded in the idea of God.

Our plan leads us, in the second place, to enforce and illustrate what has already been said, by considering some of the sciences as grounded in the same idea. All the sciences of man are fragmentary, but correlated, forms of the self-revelation of God. In each of them, when discovering, or otherwise receiving truth, the wise man is bound to cry out, "I read thy thoughts, O God." With each one of them we do not doubt that thorough analysis is competent to show how the elements of the basis upon which each rests have to be considered as themselves resting upon the idea of a thinking, willing, loving Absolute, whom faith calls God. This work of analysis belongs to those writers who undertake to treat of the philosophy of all the sciences, and of those special forms of philosophic laws, ideas, and truths which underlie each special science. Such analysis teaches us to see in the divine One not only the "great geometer," but

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also the great chemist, botanist, biologist, statesman, poet, and inspirer of morals and religion. All human knowledge and all human life are painted into the great chiaro-oscuro, in which blend the light and shadow of that natural which is grounded in the supernatural, of that supernatural which is revealed in the natural. "My Father worketh hitherto"; "In him we live and move and have our being." All the unwitting wisdom of those who recognize not God goes to proclaim these truths, and all their attempted contradiction of these truths is patent folly.

To understand and set forth this universal interpenetration of being and thought, of natural and supernatural, no other one is so well fitted as he who takes high rank both as physicist and metaphysician. To go to those who have substituted "metempyrics" for metaphysics, or have resolved the universe into intelligible phenomena and unknowable something else, for the true meaning and scope of even their own sciences, is to go sadly astray. It is to thinkers like Trendelenburg and Lotze and Ulrici, who find the absolute in the phenomena, and read the phenomena in the light of the absolute, that we are to go for the truest views of even the so-called physical sciences. All the forms of human science — the ologies of men — exhibit themselves as correlated phases in revelation of the one Thinker whose thought expressed (λόγος) is the underlying basis of them all. All the sciences, in so far as they are themselves progressive, and give us knowledge of the various lines along which the total progress of the universe has been made, have their explanation in God, the one patron, teacher, and inspirer of human thought.

These statements are, of course, quite the opposite of the view which many scientists are wont to take of the material and mission of their special sciences. Their view, however, is what we have to expect from the attempt to get rid of metaphysics by substituting, under the term science, a bad for a trustworthy metaphysics. For it is in that basis of their special sciences with which metaphysics deals, that the truth I am advocating is clearly discernable.

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It is the philosophy of science, and it is the philosophical elements of each of the special sciences, which introduce us to the idea of God. The relation of the special sciences to each other and to their common ground is admirably, yet briefly, given by Trendelenburg in the first chapter of his Logische Untersuchungen. "The special sciences conduct beyond themselves. In their effort to attain self-sufficiency they seek to confine themselves to an independent domain, but they are compelled once more to open their barriers, because it becomes evident that they contain within themselves blind presuppositions, unexamined fundamental concepts, assumed principles, unexplained elements. . . . . The sciences include the thought of a whole of which they themselves are only a part, and they are desirous of forming themselves into a unity of thought as this whole. . . . Out of this necessary striving and counter-striving springs philosophy, which . . . may be called the science of the idea." Philosophy divides itself into metaphysics and logic, according as the universal object or the universal method is made the subject of philosophical research. But "every science has its own metaphysical problem, and it is the business of its metaphysics to exhibit the particular connection of its object (as a special science) with being as such." "The metaphysics of mathematics, the metaphysics of the sciences of nature, the metaphysics of ethics, exhibit different sides, or different ramifications of that one form of reflection which is directed to ultimate principles." So also "every science contains a special procedure through which it brings its subject, and finally, the ground of its subject, into the possession of the soul." We can speak, therefore, of the "particular methods of special sciences, of the logic of mathematics, the logic of the sciences of nature, the logic of jurisprudence."

From this view of the connection of the sciences with philosophy in its two forms of metaphysics and logic, we derive the following considerations appropriate to our theme.

We see over what ground the strife between atheistic science and theology must inevitably be waged. So long as

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the special sciences confine themselves to the phenomena which they have fenced off from the universe of phenomena, no valid conflict with theology arises; nor further, so long as they confine themselves to the inter-relations of the phenomena of the different sciences. But when they undertake to lay hands — as the philosophic impulse urges them to do — upon the problems of metaphysics and logic which underlie them all, they find that they have grasped at the same object with which theology undertakes to deal. The problem is, in some form or other, the problem of the absolute, that is, of the necessary ground which underlies the phenomena; the object is some side of that many-sided "Absolute, which faith calls God."

In some appreciation of this truth must we place the effort of Herbert Spencer in his First Principles to reconcile science and religion upon the basis of an abstract proposition. Upon that basis where being and thought meet in the necessary of both, the reconciliation of the sciences with theology must indeed be found; for in the region of that basis originates the strife to be reconciled. No proposition, however, of an "inscrutable power" can be the desired reconciliation. For theology is bound by its primal obligation of fidelity to its mission, to investigate and exhibit to thought the various forms in which, besides that of one force, the underlying ground of the universe becomes scrutable. The proposed reconciliation is an attempt to annihilate theology.

We derive proof of this truth, that the philosophical basis of the sciences is also the sphere in which theology is obliged to move, from the close relations in which philosophy and religion have always stood. The oldest philosophies are either avowedly or unwittingly religious; the thinkers on religion are never able to keep out of the sphere of philosophy. It is not without significance that Comte ushers in his age of positivism after having banished both the age theological and the age metaphysical. But science, in the sense in which positivism is fond of using the word, is about as sure to be always at war with speculative theology, as avowed philoso-

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phy is sure to be its professed friend. For, this sort of science begins by denying to both philosophy and theology a valid existence; it then proceeds to substitute for such philosophy and theology as have been tested and cultivated by minds trained to their work, a certain novel something under the name of science, which, however, is neither science, philosophy, nor theology. Genuine science, however, can never begin to seek about for her own ground of standing, her rights and significance, without becoming both philosophical and theological. With true science, true theology can have no quarrel; with science falsely so-called, and usurping jurisdiction without payment of the price of possession, she can have no truce. Were man only a scientific animal, — if, indeed, we can restrict the adjective enough to make it comport with the noun, — the case might be different. But as the case is, formal and polemical theology may accept the invitation, or insulting demand, to withdraw itself from considering the ground of necessary being and thought which underlies the sciences; theology true to her mission — NEVER. *Theology will never cease the attempt to be completely rational.* She will have more to feed her devotees upon than the few crumbs of knowledge floating about in the thin soup of sentiment, which atheistic science, with disdainful courtesy, hands over to her. She will have all that the sciences have, and also dominate and mould it all. *In all the widest possible growth of the special sciences she will be scientia scientiarum still.*

This view of the connection of the sciences with philosophy also shows us what is the legitimate ground for the scepticism of science. Each science is bound by the law of its own being to inquire not only into the phenomena and concatenations of phenomena which constitute its own facts and laws, and into its own phenomenal relations with the other sciences, but also to inquire into the special metaphysical ground and logical method which belong to itself. In making the former inquiry the scientist remains a scientist; and the inquiry remains scientific inquiry, in the restricted

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meaning of these words. In making the latter inquiry the investigator ceases to be a scientist, and becomes a would-be philosopher, and the inquiry becomes a philosophical inquiry. But when the same investigator presses on to inquire into the nature of that common ground which underlies, and of that common thought which gives method to, all the sciences, he treads at once upon the special domain of the student of philosophy and philosophical theology. He is not to be warned off or shot for poaching. He is to be reminded that he is now become a professed philosopher and philosophical theologian. Sceptical theology and shallow metaphysics from a mind untrained in theology and metaphysics is not necessarily the highest form of human knowledge, though it bear the pseudonym of science. Mr. Tyndall, this side the boundary, is, doubtless, a good scientist; let him be as sceptical as he will in regard to the subjects and method of his own science. But we almost always have trouble with Mr. Tyndall when he "crosses the boundary." Mr. Tyndall across the boundary is a very indifferent philosopher and theologian.

Philosophy, in its two forms of metaphysics and logic, seeks out the necessary in being and thought, and finds the source and explanation of this interpenetration of being and thought in the great idea of God. God is the Personal Absolute; inasmuch as he is the Absolute, he is the ground and explanation of all being, for such is the very conception introduced by philosophical theology under the term absolute; inasmuch as he is also a Person, he is the ground and explanation of all thought; inasmuch, finally, as he is the Personal Absolute, all interpenetrating thought and being find in him their common explanation and ground.

Let us consider in a more special manner how logic, looked upon as disclosing the method of universal thought, is grounded in the idea of God. Logic deals with that form in manifestation of the one Absolute which is given to us in the unity of thought. Neither a merely formal logic, — like so much of Sir William Hamilton's Lectures, — nor the best

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work of positivism — as for instance, the last edition of John Stuart Mill, — exhibits clearly the real grounds and process of thought. Thought, considered as the weaving of syllogisms, the correspondence of whose contents to the reality of the universe is a matter of indifference, or the reality of whose correspondence to the universe is merely phenomenal, does not disclose its own foundation. It would be difficult, indeed, to treat philosophically such systems of logic. But the claims of realistic logic are of remote antiquity and well sustained. It is not without significance that the six alleged systems of Hindoo logic all contain something of both metaphysics and ethics, and all have for their highest object the solution of the problem of existence. To the philosophy of Hegel the process of thought and the universe of real being are identical.

For, logic postulates a universe which is fashioned in the forms of thought, and which therefore, bears in itself the proof of thought in the absolute which is its ground. Its very existence is based upon its good faith in the universality and unity of this expression to the thought of God, which is made to us in the works of his hands. Logic does not deal with any of the phenomena merely as isolated phenomena afloat and groundless amidst countless millions of unrelated phenomena; it deals with them as really related, and so capable of being joined into concepts of individuals, genera, classes, and orders; all of which, in its good faith it assumes, correspond to the reality of things. It seeks, and finds, and contemplates, in the universe a real unity of thought; because it goes forth in the faith that this unity is there. Thus does its postulate teach us to discern

> "A motion and a spirit that impels
> All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things."

Thus is a universal reason expressing itself in the universal order brought before the soul.

This universal reason logic also reaches in its criticism of the necessary forms of all human thought. For it postulates

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not only a universe which may be thought, but also the validity of human thought. Our reason is thus seen to be, not a somewhat which we have given ourselves or hold by personal and exclusive ownership, but the image and revelation within us of this universal reason. It is not strange that Sir William Hamilton has to point out the error of supposing that Kant and Aristotle were serving the same end in their categories, when the former made "an analysis of mind in its unity" and the latter "a synthesis of things in their multiplicity." The analysis and the synthesis disclose, the one on its subjective side and the other on its objective side, the same process. A unity of absolute thought and being — in these elements of the idea of God do the twin sciences of metaphysics and logic ground themselves.

Realistic logic, however, helps us to other ideas of the reason than this one of absolute truth and absolute thought. Absolute goodness and absolute beauty are discovered to be ideals revealed in all the work of the reason. These three it unites in one source of all which is true and beautiful and good, who is the Absolute One, even our Father and God.

It will, doubtless, seem not a little fanciful to some readers, if I call attention to the fact that the categories of the understanding, the formation of the concept and the process of reasoning, have all of them something to teach us concerning their ground in absolute truth, beauty, and goodness. But human thought is no more stationary than the universe of physical substances and forces. Human thought moves forward toward a goal. There is a great world-process of ratiocination, in which mankind rises from synthesis to synthesis toward an ever fuller comprehension of absolute truth. The present theory of evolution is one synthesis in this world-process. It is the effort in thought of the present race of men to see themselves and their surroundings as they appear to absolute thought in their movement forward toward a goal. As one thinker in the use of his faculties moves forward in thought from the individual to the universal, so the race in this great process of thought.

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The proposal to account without God for the progress of the race in thought is a proposal to tear up by the roots all that is most deep-set in the past. Grander by far, and more conclusive than any evolution of material organisms into higher forms of life, is this progressive uplifting of the world of human thought. Who but the absolutely good and beautiful and true One can be its ground? Who but God weaves the various little threads of thought, spun by the workmen of the passing hour, into the strong encompassing web which encloses and holds up each advancing generation of thinking men? Surely we do need a wonderful Zeit-Geist to weave this so wondrous web. We can agree with Matthew Arnold when he writes: "Thought and science follow their own law of development, ... their ripeness and unripeness, as Dr. Newman most truly says, are not an effect of our wishing and resolving; rather do they seem brought about by a power such as Goethe figures by the Zeit-Geist or Time-Spirit, and St. Paul describes as a divine power *revealing* additions to what we possess already." Yes, surely — the process of developing human thought *is* the work of the spirit of all times, of the Eternal Spirit, revealing *his* thought to and in the world of thinking souls. But is it anything less absurd than to talk of "wooden iron" (to use the figure of Ulrici), when we affect to deprive this Eternal Spirit of all the qualities revealed in the process of thought, — yes, of all spirituality itself?

The process of thought objectified in the universe, the process of thought as it goes on in the various generations and races of thinking man, and the correspondence of the two, constitute the chief contributions which realistic logic has to make to him who, in its elements and truths, would study the self-revelation of God.

The philosophical elements — if I may so call them — of the idea of God are those in which, for the most part, philosophy, in its two divisions of metaphysics and logic, has its ground. In this part of our discussion the more practical elements and the elements of the heart remain comparatively

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in the background. Yet they are not wholly out of sight. For, as we have already seen, logic shows us the universal reason, giving conditions and law to aesthetics through the idea of absolute beauty, and to ethics through the idea of absolute goodness. Philosophical theology has always been wont to look upon God as the Thinking Absolute; it always needs to have the emotional and practical elements of his true complete idea supplied from their own most fruitful sources. Left alone it has always tended toward pantheism. Expressions are found in the writings of Paul which considered apart would be pantheistic; nor is it easy for any thinker to drive his steeds of thought near to the central glory of absolute being without incurring risk of a fall into the dark and bottomless sea of pantheism.

The philosophical study of certain other sciences tends to supplement and symmetrize this otherwise restricted idea of God. Yet all philosophical study of theology has to guard itself against the excess of the pantheistic tendency. On the other hand it is certain that the true considerations of fact and principle which pantheism has to present, must have their place in forming every true and exalted conception of God. And just what is their place it belongs to philosophical theology to investigate and determine. How the philosophy of the pure sciences leads us to the vision of the Thinking Absolute, we cannot now take time in detail to inquire. In the metaphysics and logic of mathematics the postulates of all thought reach their highest certainty of expression. This height of certainty is due largely to the fact that the objects of thought dealt with in mathematics admit of such speedy and direct inspection. He who breaks faith with these postulates will find no proofs of the thought of the Absolute Thinker in the certainties of mathematics. He will not feel himself able to trace in the theorems of geometry the thought of the "great geometer." But he who consciously keeps faith with the postulates will find in all the truths of mathematics glimpses, impressions, demonstations, which will reveal themselves as grounded in that absolute truth which is the thought of God.

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How the so-called sciences of nature have their ground in God has already been indicated. They all have to deal with that will and thought and final purpose which give the cause and explanation of the world's progress. Of will, thought, and final purpose, and so of these elements in the idea of God, they can never rid themselves. In vain do the scientists prepare their cosmic vacuum, and then proceed with extremest caution to let into it the one cosmic vapor and the one or two forces with which alone the cosmos is to be built up. Their work is no sooner supposed complete, than the rush of mighty wings is heard; and into the vacuum force their way, borne upon the backs of Mr. Arnold's Pegasi, a troop of divine entities, called "force" and "ultimate existence" and "ultimate cause" and "subtile influences" and "goal of the universe," — in brief, the whole mysterious something by which all this has been accomplished. Thus we have gods many and lords many, instead of the one Lord God, who is over all, in all, and works through all.

The sciences of history, aesthetics, and politics, have their philosophical basis in the idea and reality of God. How absurd it is to suppose possible a science of history without the work of the Eternal Spirit who weaves the web of history, how the history of religion as it is given to us through the researches of comparative theology reveals God, and how far the historic element enters into the formation of that special type of the idea of God which is held by each individual, nation, and age; we may, perhaps, in the future find courage in some measure to investigate. Considerations like these are scarcely to be introduced, as illustrative material, into the present Article.

We conclude it with a brief consideration of the general truth that the ground of all the sciences is the idea and reality of God, as this truth is illustrated in the case of the two special sciences of psychology and ethics.

Psychology has its philosophical basis in the idea and reality of God; for God is the Author and Inspirer of the human soul, and in the human soul, as his organ, he reveals himself.

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If psychology were simply one of the sciences of nature, it would still be grounded in those elements of the idea of God in which, as I have already pointed out, all the sciences have their ground. But since it is the science of the rational and free human spirit, it discloses other and more strictly personal qualities and relations of the Divine Spirit. In the case of psychology, as in that of every other science, it is by examining its philosophical basis that we discover how it has its ground in the idea of God.

That part which the logical and metaphysical faculties of man bear in determining his conception of God, has already been sufficiently treated, either by suggestion or directly, in this and the preceding Articles. Man as a philosopher has difficulties with the concept of God; as a philosopher he finds, however, all progress and being grounded in God. The process of thought leads us to the postulate of a thinking being, who is at once the ground of the process and of that thinkable universe which supplies the process with its material.

But thought is not the whole of man, and psychology is not simply the science of the human soul as rational. Man has feeling, and exercises will; psychology is also the science of the human soul as possessed of appetites, instincts, desires, and emotions, and as making choices. And if psychology include, as it should, the science of the pneuma, it deals with man as possessed, not only of ideas, but also of emotions, which go out toward and take hold upon God. The metaphysics and logic of human feeling lead us to the idea of God.

The science of human feeling can scarcely be said to show much development; perhaps both from the difficulty of making inspection in this direction, and because a sort of unworthy shamefacedness in thinkers has created the impression that human feeling is not worthy of scientific and philosophical research. Especially has the study of the religious emotions been neglected; as though their exercise without their inspection also were enough for the best growth

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of man. But we need to know what and of what sort are the so-called religious emotions more than we need to find a "legitimate satisfaction" for them; and this latter need a leading scientist has declared to furnish the "problem of problems of our day."

The constitutional forms and laws of human feeling are not self-originated; they are such as could have been bestowed only by one who has revealed himself in them. Man instinctively concludes that the movements of his finite spirit in feeling, so far as they are considered in their necessary and constitutional features, tell him of an Infinite Spirit that "rolls through all things."

In so far, then, as psychology can furnish the required harmony of principle which should exist between the human soul and its surroundings, and so can show both as answering each to the other, and together witnessing for God, it will satisfy the demands of philosophical research into its domain. That narrow mental science which gives no adequate account of the human soul, and denies the philosophy of psychology a right to existence, has of course no affinities with theology. But the fuller and richer psychology which the phenomena demand, finds in the necessary of the phenomena a proof that the soul has its ground in God.

Blind appetite, instinct, and desire are of themselves in man essentially what they are in the other animals — the push of force not ourselves toward a goal which we but dimly recognize. The disorder, the chaos, of these different impacts of outlying force through inward aptitude for its reception, distinguishes the human soul in painful way from the cosmos in which it is set. But the science of psychology introduces us to suggestions, if not to the established law, of an order amidst this seeming chaos: it gives us glimpses of a goal toward which the complex of different feelings seems to tend. It thus discloses in the construction of the soul a reason and a final purpose not our own, but belonging to him who has set us in the midst of this play of forces. And when ethics comes to the help of psychology, then both rise

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to the height of finding their common ground in that Eternal Spirit, who not only gives, but gives laws to, the human spirit.

Nor can psychology contemplate man as possesed of free-will without becoming ethical in its language and conclusions. Only when it finds in the free self-hood, purposing to do right, a power which is fitted to give conditions and law to all the rest of the soul, can psychology discover what *is* the order and final purpose of its own subject of research. Only by becoming ethical can it know what is the supreme law and idea which enables it as a science to classify its phenomena. There could be no science of psychology were not man, like God, a moral being.

Research into the phenomena of the soul shows that their law of arrangement and control is given to them in the moral faculties. Only when we touch conscience and duty, and get down in research to the philosophy of the ought, do we begin to be in a position to render a philosophical account of the human soul. As vain as to attempt to understand the solar system without gravitation and light, so vain is it to attempt the problem of the soul without recognizing the underived and dominant nature of moral faculties. Ethics gives the key to man's nature into the hands of psychology. The law of duty brings order out of confusion in the phenomena of human feeling and willing.

The science of ethics is pre-eminently fitted and obligated to show us the true idea of God. It sets up the ideal standard of the ought. With an awful voice of warning, or a plea of sweet persuasiveness, it summons every thought and feeling to rally in order around its standard. Then there breaks in upon the continuity of all lower forces — mechanical, chemical, vital, intellectual — a startling new force, asserting with firm, kind majesty, its superiority over them all. A new law of order and a new form of cosmos are opened to the view. What the will and reason and final purpose of the absolute are to the universe, that is the complex of moral activities in man to the otherwise unintelligible phenomena

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of his soul. No wonder that conscience is called the voice of God. There is a supreme authority and objectivity to its utterances which can be explained in no other way than by attributing them to the absolute reason and goodness of God.

Among the forms under which ethics reveals to man the sacred rule of duty is the obligation to love. With this form of the rule of duty, as with all its forms, it does and must evince the objective correlate to the rule of duty, which is the eternal law of right. Thus ethics shows us the face of that Holy One, over which the law of evolution leaves a vail, though it implies his presence when it discourses of a movement from the lower to the higher, from the beginning to the goal. The highest of all is holiness, and the goal of the universe must be found in this highest. Perfect love — if love mean the summing up of all burning, but rational, passion for what is highest and best — is given by ethics as the supreme law of the soul, and the supreme quality of its Author as well.

And when physics, collocating and interpreting philosophically the phenomena of the universe, has introduced us to the idea of one will, working out with absolute thought its glorious final purpose; and psychology has introduced us to a wonderful order inherent in all thought, feeling, and final purpose, viz. the order of an absolute moral law; and ethics, catching up the deliverances of psychology, has introduced us to the idea of absolute holiness, and has referred that holiness to him who is absolute love, and whose love is made the goal of the universe; then let the three join hands with one another, and with the whole sisterhood of sciences, to fall upon their faces before the throne of the Infinite God, and worship, saying: "Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honor and power, for thou hast created all things, and on account of thy will they were, and were created."

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ARTICLE III.

CHRISTIAN PERFECTION.

BY ALBRECHT RITSCHL, DR. THEOL., AND PROF. THEOL. IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN, PRUSSIA.[1]

[EDITOR'S PREFATORY NOTE — There has already appeared in a British Review a translation of this discourse. Yet we publish the following for various reasons. The importance of the Christian doctrine of perfection here set forth may be inferred from the fact that the discourse was prepared by Dr. Ritschl to embody for more popular use the substance of the final results of his work on "The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation." The doctrine of atonement must be the central one in Christianity, or the religion of reconciliation. It is not hard to see that an accurate statement of those means by which Christ sought to give a fatal blow to sin and sin's results, and an accurate statement of the results of Christ's work, must be of immense importance to a Christian preacher. The sense of the importance of this doctrine or statement will grow fast on a student as he finds that just by this doctrine Christianity is sharply distinguished from heathenism, or from its sister, modern polytheism, which believes that there can be a conflict between religion and so-called science, an essential conflict between one set of phenomena in the world and another set, and that a reconciliation is an absurdity. He will find that the line of distinction lies just here, too, from another sister of heathenism, namely, religious formalism, which declares that reconciliation exists only between God and a small group of his creatures; those namely, who perform certain mental, or even physical exercises, all being excluded whose business, as ordained for them by God, excludes the possibility of performing these exercises. For what else is the belief that the forms of religious observance and theological expression produced by any one age must be the standard for men in all circumstances? What else is this than holding that reconciliation with God can be had only by the holders of these forms? And what else is this than to say that men whose birth occurred after that standard age's philosophical apparatus had been superseded can have no reconciliation?

[1] Die christliche Vollkommenheit. Ein Vortrag von Albrecht Ritschl. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht's Verlag, 1874. Published in the Bibliotheca Sacra with special consent of Dr. Ritschl. Translated by E. Craigmile. Carefully revised, and at times explained, by Prof. Archibald Duff, Jr., Montreal.

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Again, just on the doctrine of the atonement is Christianity sharply different from the theory of the Roman Catholic clergy.[1] For while the latter hold that only the clergy can approach God, and the laity must use the clergy as mediators in their intercourse with God, the former doctrine clearly declares that there is complete reconciliation ready for every man. Every man may have, every real Christian has, constant, immediate intercourse with his Father.

Just the doctrine of the atonement it is, also, which the worldling passes by, or tosses away. He will have all pleasure. Yes; but the Christian too, has perfect pleasure. The latter believes that he, after whose plan the world moves, loves him, and enjoys having him perfectly happy; that is, the Christian knows he will be, he is provided with perfect happiness; for are not he and God and God's plan for the world reconciled. But the worldling has no confidence in this, no confidence that a due regard to the needs of all things will allow a complete exercise of a plan, whose complete exercise is sure to bring full happiness to all concerned. He does not believe in a reconciliation between his wants and the plans of the great Manager. He thinks his own happiness will only be obtained by seizing on what gratifies him, even to the utter disregard of others' needs. Their needs and his needs are irreconcilable, to his mind. He and the Creator are not reconcilable.

It is thus the doctrine of the atonement that lays bare the common essence of worldliness, of standard Roman Catholicism, of formalism in religion, of modern polytheism in the claimants that science conflicts with religion, in heathenism past and contemporary.

What the atonement effects, what are the results of it in men is, however, the question where the oppositions above described become sharp. Christian theologians have somewhat neglected this question, while they have discussed largely the other question, how was the atonement effected. We have been too much like the mediaeval scholastics; too little attentive to studies of practical points in the care of souls.[2] The following discourse is wisely aimed. It is a summary of the author's treatise on Christian atonement, for practical use. It therefore sets forth what a man is who has been reconciled to God through Jesus. If there be men on whom God now looks with full pleasure (for what else does "reconciled" mean), if there be men whom God thus regards as perfect, let us know what are the characteristics of such men. What is Christian perfection?

[1] The doctrine of many of the people, and of much of the liturgy, is very different from the standard doctrine of the clergy, viz. that of the Council of Trent.

[2] Such as this, What is the nature of a reconciled man? Just what are the peculiar characteristics which he has gained? What is a man who is right with God, sufficient in his sight, perfect before Him, so far as he *can* be in the nature of things?

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Let no one say the word "perfection" would be better reserved for a state of absolute perfection, when a soul could not in any possible way be further developed. For human souls would be human souls no longer had they got into such a position. Ritschl discusses this point well at the close of his discourse, pointing out that the desire and capability of increase are essential characteristics of the human soul. And a doctrine of Nirwana, of ultimate, complete cessation of our humanity is no part of Christianity. No; the use of "perfection" observed in this discourse is the only possible one. A soul is perfect when it is complete after its kind. Although, also, at different times that same soul may be said to have a different completeness to fulfil, yet it may be or become complete in each case. The faith of that soul that God and it are reconciled is faith that at that moment God is satisfied with its being what it is. First, then, he is satisfied with its doing what it can do, that is, with its faithful performance of the service of its vocation. It is confidence, too, that the feeling of joy, of satisfaction, which a man, honest to his various duties has as he performs them is no mere frivolous affection, but is something created by God to be the index to the soul that it is well pleasing to God. Again, confidence in reconciliation with God is confidence that the soul is a complete thing after its kind, and therefore fit to have a value set upon it. It has a value in comparison with the value of the whole complex of things and influences which are included together in one whole, and termed the world. And the confidence in reconciliation also means confidence that as a spirit the soul is of the same kind as God, and its value, when doing its own work, is far greater than that of the whole world. It is of more importance to God that that soul be preserved in its integrity than that the world, which at times seems opposed to the interests of that soul, should gain the day and overthrow the soul. And the soul believes that all things are in the control of that one great Creator Spirit, so that there is nowhere in the universe anything which can ultimately get the better of that reconciled soul. The sin which the soul had done, and for which it dreaded the Creator, has been covered up, put completely out of mind by God. He bids the soul believe in his love, in spite of the past sin.

These are a few of the points which are investigated in the following discourse. We think the treatment of the main question involved is so good, and withal of such prime importance to practical carers for souls, that it is well to republish the discourse. The previously published English translation was not enough. It was not in a periodical which would ensure for the essay a wide reading in America. Again, we feel modestly sure that the style of that previous translation was of that involved kind which prevents many translations being read. We believe that the following translation avoids that evil, and presents Ritschl's matter in a purely English dress; and more, presents it with thoroughly English features, as if it were a discourse by an English or American thinker.

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A word concerning Dr. Ritschl himself is here in place. We must decidedly condemn the hero-worship which exalts this or that German as ultimate authority. For us, Germans are not and cannot be ultimate authorities. We must base our arguments, not on their names, nor on any names, but on rigid observation and deduction. Germans or other investigators must be consulted only for their opinions. The opinions of Ritschl deserve record and study because he himself follows this method; searching deeply and widely, reasoning rigidly. More, the fact that he does this is widely recognized in his own land. Ritschl differs sharply from the high Lutheran way of thinking, widely also from that of the negative school, to use a vague yet useful word, and he differs widely, also from the so-called mediating school. And yet his method is acknowledged by men of all parties to be the right one. We may call it the strictly scientific method. And this method of Ritschl's promises to lead in theological thought, and also to command for theological thinkers the respect of thinkers in all other departments of knowledge.

It is well to add a brief notice of Dr. Ritschl's work in general. Now Ordinary Professor in the Theological Faculty at Göttingen, he was formerly at Bonn. He has published a work on "The Rise of the Old Catholic Church," second edition, thoroughly newly constructed, 1857, discussing the first three centuries; smaller works in pamphlet form, "Concerning the Relation of Confessions to the Church, a vote against the New Lutheran Doctrines," 1854; "De Ira Dei," 1859; "On Schleiermacher's Reden 'über die Religion,'" discussing the effect of these as in some respects evil, 1874; "On Instruction of Children in Christian Religion," 1875, etc., besides his recent great work. Dr. Ritschl lectures now in Göttingen, on Christian Dogmatics, Theological Ethics, Comparative Investigation of the Doctrines of the different divisions of Christendom, Exegesis of New Testament books. His lectures, along with those of Lotze on Philosophy, and such teachers as De Lagarde in Semitic Philology, and Sauppe, Benfey, and others, have made Göttingen, during the few years past, perhaps, the most important university in the world.]

In raising the question of Christian Perfection, I am quite conscious of striking a chord which will sound strangely in the ears of Protestants. In the Protestant churches we are taught to abstain, in modesty or humility, from all claim to any perfection of our performances in practical life. The public or commonly received doctrine teaches particularly that we never become so free from sinful impulses as to perform all the good works which it is our duty to do, that in this respect we always fall short of our duty, we very

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defectively fulfil the task of loving our neighbor. If we compare our actually good works with the moral law, we shall always perceive, even in the best cases, missing links in the chain and flaws in our intentions, so that we can never affirm a perfection of our moral accomplishments.

But this, adds the common doctrine, has this advantage, that we are not ensnared in any sort of self-righteousness — more especially we do not become self-righteous toward God, and, instead, we look for our salvation to God alone, whose power and grace are more distinctly apparent when we bear in mind our weakness and imperfection. The plan of redemption through faith is also commonly declared to imply that perfection belongs to God's plan, but that the faith which we build thereupon often enough lacks the strength and assurance and joy which rightly belong to such faith. Who, then, can get beyond the cry of yon needy one: "Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief."

Such is the Protestant hereditary doctrinal declaration of the imperfection of our fulfilment of the law, and the imperfection which is inherent in our saving faith. How strange, disturbing, and confusing must the title appear which I have chosen — "Christian Perfection." I cannot allow this appearance to remain, even until I show presently that it is a false appearance. In order to gain favor and attention for my proof that it is false, I ask whether we do not actually console ourselves with our confessions of imperfection, being conscious that by such confessions we are exercising a perfect humility?

The straightforward acknowledgment of these facts of our inner and outer life would amount to a declaration that we have, at all events, a *religious* perfection, which sort of perfection we must certainly include in our discussion, if we discuss Christian perfection completely.

Besides, these confessions of our imperfections are exactly what is meant by the common doctrine when that speaks of *perfect* humility and the *complete* renunciation of all self-righteousness. We not only feel, but we teach this. In no

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other sense are our teachings to be understood. Were it otherwise, there would be united with the recognition of the constant imperfection of our moral action the danger of terrifying men from attempting any duty. It is an inevitable condition of the will that its power is crippled, its exertion ceases, and its zeal is relaxed when the possibility of accomplishing an act perfect in its kind is denied beforehand, or if there is the conviction that the nearest possible approach to the goal is worth exactly as much or as little as remaining at the greatest possible distance from it. If we had to judge the effects and consequences of our moral action only as the possible degrees of imperfection, — if we could not set a value on them proportioned to our laxness or energy, indifference or zeal, laziness or diligence, our approach to the goal or our remaining at a distance from it, — then would no man set hand or purpose to work. The idea of moral perfection as possible is necessary to us in action and in the formation of character, not only in order to prove our imperfection, but the real value to us of perfection lies in our belief in our destiny to reach it.

The condition of activity of the will which we have described is not merely a general or, so to speak, a natural truth. It was recognized by the Founder and by the earliest witnesses of our religion. Jesus designates the love which he prescribes towards our enemies as the perfection which is like to the perfection of God. James says: "Let there be a perfect work united with patience in suffering." And Paul writes to Corinth that he knows such perfect Christians, in whose fellowship he speaks the words of wisdom. But he declares more significantly, in his letter to the Philippians: "I have not yet reached the mark, and am in this respect not yet perfect; but I follow after it, forgetting those things which are behind." "And indeed," says he, "all we who are perfect are thus minded, that we press toward the mark for the prize of the calling in Christ." Certainly, the task of perfection is variously viewed in these expressions. In so far as refers to loving our enemies, *perfection is required* of

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the disciples of Jesus, in opposition to the rule which prevails among other men — those who stand outside the church. But as James and Paul use the term there is a distinction made between different degrees of acquirements within the church itself. The word "perfection" is used by these two writers even of those who are striving toward the mark. Whereby we are to understand that the perfection meant is not that which is reached with the last goal of life, and the completion of redemption. Thus these witnesses confirm the position assumed above, that the perfection of moral purpose and performance must be represented as attainable, even if only an earnest and unremitting effort of the will is to be excited. But Paul's declaration comes unexpectedly upon us, that those who are engaged in the endeavor to attain to the blessed goal of divine holiness are already worthy to be called perfect. Here is a really surprising idea for us Protestants. The surprise cannot at first be counterbalanced even by our confidence in the apostle. And the reason for this is to be found in the use, or misuse, which has been made through many centuries of the distinction between perfect and imperfect Christians.

By means of this distinction it was that monasticism appeared to be justified, and rose into high estimation. But the rejection of that form of Christianity is so closely interwoven with the Reformation that abhorrence of everything connected with the monastic sort of Christian perfection, that would-be sort, runs, so to speak, in our blood. What wonder is it that we extend this aversion even to the expression which the apostle uses. Perfection and monastic life had become synonymous. But Paul certainly did not use the word in reference to the characteristics of the monastic life.

Monasticism had its root in pre-Christian religions; and the expression "Christian perfection" was not appropriated by monasticism without a change in the meaning of the term, so that it might agree with non-Christian customs. To follow this out here would be too long a digression. For the better understanding of monasticism, I shall men-

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tion just one regulation which it has appropriated from Christian ethics. James expresses this in the rule he lays down, that we should keep ourselves unspotted from the world. This might be understood to mean that we should withdraw ourselves as much as possible from intercourse with mankind, and that we should especially avoid those conditions of society which give rise to the most manifest temptations, such as the intercourse between the sexes, the struggle for riches and for personal honor. In accordance with this the three monastic duties were imposed, viz. the rules to abstain from marriage and family life, from personal possession of property, and from all that self guidance and independence which belong by nature to every man; moreover, to practise instead of this such whole-hearted obedience towards superiors as to regard any transgression of their injunctions as a deadly sin. In these duties of chastity, poverty, and obedience was held to consist that heavenly, angel-like life which was the aim of Christianity. But it had to be admitted that the whole of Christendom could not be taken into cloisters. There was no help for it but that the great majority of Christians, who had to live in a state of imperfection, should try to counterbalance the imperfection of their life in the world by means of periodical church sacraments. The whole structure of the Roman Catholic church is founded on this gradation of perfect and imperfect Christians; so that the former can be easily distinguished from the latter by dress and abode. And yet, however much monasticism may differ from worldly life in appearance, the world and its temptations cannot be shut out by cloister walls and exercises of church service. History proves that, invariably, after a short time the discipline of monastic life relaxes, and that withdrawal from regular intercourse with society and flight from its seducing influences lead to ruin of the mind and paralysis of the mental character. For, family life, the effort to obtain private property, the full enjoyment of personal honor are not merely — are not even necessarily — occasions to sin; they are

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rather the inevitable conditions of morality and the incitements to it. For the family is the school of public spirit, property and honor are the supports of independence, without which nothing can be contributed to the general good. Those men must be very peculiarly constituted who without these conditions of life, and under the restrictions of monastic discipline, remain at heart true and kindly. As a general rule, men inside monastery walls do not become more perfect than they would be in the world, but less perfect.

Now, how were the Reformers to overthrow the claims of this sort of Christian perfection? Does any one suppose that the mere assertion would suffice, that Christians can never get beyond imperfection? Such a mere denial, even if it contain the greatest truth, is never enough to annul a positive preconceived judgment. A controversy can never be carried on by a simple denial; victory over an error can only be gained by maintaining the truth which is opposed to the error. The Reformers were induced, in consideration of this, to recognize a doctrine of Christian perfection; but they had to give to the term a different signification, so that they might annul that false classification of Christians above described. They had to freight the expression "Christian perfection" with such a meaning that it could be applied to the every-day performances of all Christians. Thus it was brought back from the monastic misapplication of Paul's definition to the sense implied in our Lord's expression. Agreeably with this, we read in the Augsburg Confession: "Christian perfection consists in the fear of God, and in faith grounded on Christ that God is gracious to us, in prayer to God in the sure expectation of his help in all our undertakings in our calling, as well as in diligence in good works in the service of our calling. In these things consists true perfection and true service of God, not in celibacy, in begging, or in dirty clothes." To supplement this I shall take a sentence from Luther's work on Monastic Vows: "The condition of perfection consists herein, that a man should in strong faith despise death and life, fame, and the

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whole world, and that he should be serviceable to all in ardent love. But scarcely can men be found who cling more to life and fame, who are more devoid of faith, who shun death with greater vehemence, than those who are most monkish." Let me now ask you to group these thoughts a little more systematically in your minds, and to combine 'reverence for God' and 'trust in him' into the one idea of 'humility.' Substitute also 'faith in God and submission to his providence' for 'the expectation of God's help and the contempt of death and the world.' Add to these supplication and thanks to God in prayer; and lastly, faithfulness to the public demands of morality. Christian perfection consists in these performances, which are the duty of every man. If gradations in the amount of performance by different men be perceived, we must not for that reason form classes of men, some perfect, some imperfect. These differences only correspond to the law of growth, that one is nearer to the end than another.

But consider, now, what we may legitimately and usefully designate as perfection — legitimately, i.e. in strict accordance with Christian usage as that usage is exhibited in the evidence above cited. Certainly, in any case, it must be something which is compatible with the essential nature of man; that is to say, it must be compatible with a nature which is created, limited, continually developing or growing, which is never done working, which never comes to be equal to God. But it must be something which can be compared with that perfection in God which is manifested in goodness towards the just and the unjust. Perfection such as our Lord Jesus, the apostles Paul and James prescribe and declare to be possible means that a Christian — each Christian — be or become a complete thing, after his peculiar kind, in the sphere of religious faith and moral action. This destination of each soul to a completeness in his kind is so necessarily bound up with the fundamental peculiarity of Christianity, that Christianity cannot be fully understood and propagated if the doctrine of Christian perfection be put under a bushel. For this

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doctrine brings the answer to the question which has been put in all previous religions; it lifts from the heart the weight which is felt in all religions, solves the contradiction in which man by nature finds himself; namely, that he is but a little fragment of the world, and yet is also as a spirit an image of God, that as this latter he has a value quite different from that of all nature — with which nature, however, he shares the fate of belonging to the world. For what else do men strive after in heathen religions but to fill up what is lacking in themselves by a fellowship with the divine life, seeking to have fellowship which shall be effectual for themselves by means of the acts of divine worship? [Note, also, the Roman Catholic mass as illustration of this].

This striving after completion through God is the universal expression of the need of having in one's self such value as only a complete thing can have; and a man wants to be sure he has such value, in order to counterbalance the knowledge that naturally he occupies a pitiful place, being only a fragment of the world. The spirit of man seeks an assurance that what is wanting in him will be made up; he seeks it in his conception of God, in subjection to God, in service of God, in the feeling that God is near. In this sense religion is a law of the human spirit. But heathen religions, of whatsoever form, do not reach what is desired. For, since in all of these religions the idea of God is not clearly distinguished from that of the world and its parts; since the belief in different gods is intimately interwoven with a conception of nature as not essentially one (but rather a complex of essentially different parts, perhaps discordant parts, perhaps elements controlled and moved by entirely independent principles),—since these things are so, therefore, the heathen idea of God is itself too devoid of the character of one single whole, for humanity's yearning after a completion from above to be satisfied by that idea. But in Christianity this completion is guaranteed to us; and thus Christianity is not merely the perfect kind of religion as distinguished from some other things which are imperfect kinds of religion, and

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yet are really religions; but Christianity is itself the real religion. Ordinarily men seldom make clear to themselves the fact that their idea of what the world is, what the world as a whole is, has a solely religious origin. That the multitude of phenomena in the universe, which we can never count or completely investigate, forms one whole; forms such a unity that the law-abiding interdependence of all the parts is controlled by one purpose, — this thought we obtain neither by ordinary experience nor by scientific investigation. We *believe* that the world is a whole in this sense. And this belief is not a mere opinion adopted at arbitrary pleasure, which it is possible to change; but we have full confidence that the world is one whole, and in the most important affairs, as well as in the most insignificant things of our life we regulate everything by this belief.

This conception of the world and this belief that the world is essentially one whole has its origin always in a religious tendency and a religious need, as well when itself and its origin are to be used in scientific discussion of the subject, as at any other time. This is the case, even although we be unconscious of it, and so seek an explanation of cosmogony without the thought of God.[1] But the clear and distinct conception of the world as one is to be found only in the Christian theory of the world. This clear and distinct conception is not the result of the one factor only, viz. of the belief in a God spiritual, free as respects nature, and almighty; but along with this works, as another factor, the estimate which Jesus gave of a human being, his rule, namely, of self-estimation, that the life of a single man has a higher value than the whole world, and that this is seen to be true when we consider a life which is regulated according to the Christian standard. It profiteth a man nothing if he gain the whole world and lose his own life; for nothing, not even the whole world, is a compensation, an equivalent for it. But it is to

[1] The physicist's belief that the same laws of gravitation, of chemical combination, of the action of light, etc., hold good at all points of the universe, no matter whither he point his telescope and spectrum, is a case of this kind. How does he know they hold good? He believes it. That belief has a religious origin, strictly so-called.

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be borne carefully in mind that this assertion must be tested by a case of life within the moral kingdom of God, in the service of Jesus. The place to see that the whole world is of less value than a soul is the development of that soul in character while it fulfils the almost more than natural task of religious faith and moral dealing. It is here, too, that the saying of Jesus is seen to be true, that whosoever will preserve his life, — as a member of the world, — shall lose it; and whosoever, — in his service, — even loseth his life shall, by that very means, save it.[1]

Thus the conception of the world as one is established on two foundations. One is belief in the one divine Creator. The other is the estimate of the spiritual object of our life as something of more value than that great complex unit, the whole world; of more value than this combination of manifold natural agencies acting and reacting on one another, in the midst of which we stand, but whose extent we cannot know, and whose innumerable, yet regular, modes of interconnection we can never fully comprehend. This is the only complete view of the matter, and it is furnished by Christianity. I must add that those who think of the world as a whole, without taking God into consideration at all, do not for all that get free of Christianity. For in their case the belief in the law-abiding arrangement of the world rests on an actual valuation of their own spiritual life as something better than all the world together.[2] Those, then, who scorn

[1] Considering the mere physical possessions, for example, as of first importance he will lose his life. For these are not of more value than other physical things in the world, and so shall not by any means be preserved. Only the spirit is of more value. But the worldly man does not care for that. On the other hand, he who lives in the spirit, like Christ, may lose his body, but never loses real life.

[2] This is the case with the physicist above cited. His belief that the world is one rests partly on *belief* that there is *one* first cause, and partly on a belief that he is of more value than all nature. His reason and its judgments are not to be set aside for anything in all nature. More, he cannot believe that perhaps there is in the universe some cause altogether and essentially unlike all that he yet knows, which may run counter to all his calculations and overwhelm him forever. No, he is sure his calculations are correct, and he acts on them. This even the fanatical physiologist did, who professed that he and an oyster were alike worth-

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to sail through life on the bark of Christian philosophy and Christian self-estimation, nevertheless ride on a plank which has been borrowed from that bark. Their self-consciousness implied in their cognition, their action, their claim to any peculiar honor regulates itself, silently, and without their noticing the fact, according to the knowledge which no one used or possessed before Christ came, viz. that the whole world is no equivalent for the spiritual life of a man.

Therefore, since we who are Christians each distinguish our personal worth from that of the whole world, it is our task as Christians to become each in his own kind a complete whole. And this task is possible, because, and only because, by that belief which we have in God we are made able to comprehend the world as a whole, even while we cannot know or imagine to ourselves all its parts. Therefore it is necessary to Christianity that it lay on us the task of perfection in religious and moral life; perfection, namely, in the sense which we have justified. Without this practical culmination of the system Christianity would be incomplete.

But why does the task of Christian perfection lie just in those sorts of religious faith and moral action which have been described above (p. 665)? Let us test them. The simplest to understand is, we may say, faithfulness to the particular proper calling in which each man finds himself placed. We overlook entirely the necessary condition of a calling, if the imperfection of our good works in comparison with what seems required by the general moral law, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," is always to be reckoned as guilt, as a result of sin. And yet that *general* law, as it is often understood, does necessarily count on our being imperfect, whether we acknowledge ourselves to be sinners or not. For the *general* moral law includes, that is, it lays on us obligation to perform, good works in every one of all the possible directions in which there is good work to be performed. It

less parts of a great machine which might utterly crush out both. For he never sat down to listen to the lectures of an oyster, but he valued his own opinions so highly as to print them and deliver them, and to call himself a teacher of wisdom.

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follows that the good works binding on a man are an infinite series; and not only so, but are in each moment so numerous, rather so innumerable, that they reach beyond the bounds of space. The actual meaning of that *general* moral law is, apparently, that every man ought in every moment of life to accomplish good in every relation of life which can be counted. But in the attempt to do this a man would be torn asunder, separated into countless fragments, ruined. Therefore the imperfection with which we charge ourselves in view of this law, may have nothing in common with sin. The imperfection we fancy we have is rather to be justly charged to the faulty conception of our duty. The task is an impossible one. If this fact is not generally taken into account, the reason is that the true limits are tacitly drawn. These limits ought to be publicly set forth. The matter must be set right. We do tacitly limit the obligation laid on us by the general moral law to particular fields of action, namely, to the particular callings in which we are to perform, not good works, but a connected, harmonious life-work; and we regard that life-work as a whole, having its particular value as such, even although we do say that we ought to perform more in our calling than we ever do accomplish. That is the way in which every sensible man tacitly limits and adjusts the infinite and impractical obligation to all good works to which we have alluded. But this limitation ought to be pointed out in our public statements of Christian doctrine, so that we may also limit our confession of imperfection. Otherwise, the idea of imperfection tends to frighten men from working out, each in his special calling, a connected result, or life-work having its own peculiar worth, and from becoming a being complete after his own kind. But is this limitation at all authorized by the principles of Christianity? Has it anything in common therewith? I might point to the fact that the apostle Paul has in a sense sanctified our civil callings, by saying that we are to abide in those callings in which the Christian call has found us. Further, he says no one in the Christian community shall claim support who does

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not work. Lastly, he not only charges every man to think of himself according as he brings some work to completion, but he also judges himself, estimates himself, by the fact that by the prosecution of his calling he has accomplished a work which will stand the test of the judgment-seat of God, and which is the pledge of his salvation. Of course the apostle might have obtained these thoughts in some source outside of Christianity, and then merely have incorporated them therewith to secure an interest in them. But the fact is, that they spring directly out of the Christian view of men's moral relations to one another. All those moral arrangements, which Christianity finds already existing among men when it comes to them, viz. family, position, nationality, concern only certain parts of our spiritual relationship to one another, parts, namely, which are based on natural relationship. And so in these parts of our spiritual relationship we are connected only with portions of the human race, not with every individual. For these two reasons, moreover, the natural basis of relationship, and the limited range of the same, the most self-sacrificing devotion to one's own family, one's own rank, one's own people may be threaded through and through with egoistic motives. But the great task set for accomplishment by the kingdom of God, and the law of universal charity enjoin on us an all-comprehending union of men, something above mere natural union. And yet this does not mean that we must of necessity give up our family, our rank, and our people, in order to serve men simply as such — our neighbors, forsooth, in Asia or Africa. We have rather as Christians to serve our relations, our fellows in rank, our fellow-citizens, just as before, but not now merely because they are united to us by that particular tie, but because they are the *men* in the special mutual relationship with us; standing in the natural and particular relation to us, we prize and love them as men. We prize the whole of mankind, we prize each part of mankind for the special place in mankind which it is fitted to fill, therefore we prize these particular members, these men our relations, as the men

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who in these places help to make mankind complete. We love them as such. Then, too, when we do this, shall we overcome the danger connected with family spirit, with class interest, and with patriotism. Then shall we be able in all cases to feel an interest in every man as such, however distant, and to render him our service. The general can be realized only in the particular; every genus in nature has existence only in its species. Thus the Christian rule of morally right action is this: that we ennoble all specific relationships of natural attachment by our generic readiness to love all men as such, and that we thus elevate these relationships above nature into the rule of the spirit. Therefore as a natural consequence of the Christian law proclaimed for the kingdom of God, there arises directly the obligation to have a proper calling, and to esteem the same as the regular sphere of the efforts we are to put forth for the general good. So the obligation to work and to persevere in a regular calling which Paul preaches is explained at once by the final aim of Christianity, the all-comprehending brotherhood of men; for in the special field of his regular occupation, every man is to work not merely for his own interest, but also in the widest sense for the interest of all.

Finally, the Christian law requires that, in addition, we seek in faithful devotion to our individual proper callings, whether these seem grand or small, to make our lifework a perfect, a complete one. Now, that is a whole, which having many parts, has these parts all subordinated to one common aim, and connected together as members of that whole in a way peculiar to the particular assemblage of parts. A man's lifework may be regarded as a whole if his labor in his particular calling is directed to the common weal of the human race; and it will be proved to be a whole if he possess that perfectly justifiable feeling of self-satisfaction which, as Paul testifies, comes with the accomplishment of the life-work. It is a universal experience that whoever undertakes no vocation, not only does nothing for the general good of the community, but also suffers damage in his moral character. It

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is an equally common experience that he who does not confine himself to his own vocation, but expects he will accomplish more by dabbling also in many other sorts of work, becomes just so much the more incapable of fulfilling his own calling. Of course, in the various relations of life we are obliged, times without number, to step beyond the bounds of our own callings, but in these cases we follow the path of strict duty, judging that it is our calling to follow in these cases the principle of general willingness to serve. But public opinion condemns quite rightly a man's interference in other people's affairs when the man, judged by his performances in his own calling, has evidently not yet acquired the ability to give counsel in another province. Therefore, the Augsburg Confession states a valuable truth when it says that one part of Christian perfection is the sure expectation of God's help in all undertakings *in our own calling*.

And so our attention is turned to a consideration of the other group of manifestations of Christian perfection, namely, humility, trust in God's providence, patience under all the hinderances and sufferings of life, and finally, prayer. These things represent the possible religious perfection, as distinguished from the perfection possible in work in a calling. They are so constituted that no one can appear without the others. They are the different manifestations of religious assurance of reconciliation with God through Christ. The Augsburg Confession, as it helped us above, gives also an intimation of this connection in the words, "He who knows that the Father is gracious to him through Christ recognizes God aright, and knows that God cares for him, and he prays to God." The thought has been worked out in exhaustive detail in Luther's treatise on Christian freedom. The members of that sentence just quoted stand in such relation to one another that their order may be inverted. Thus we may say, that whosoever trusts, in all situations of life, that God cares for him, and therefore cries to God for help, gives thereby evidence that he is in a state of grace, that he is reconciled to God through Christ. Belief in God's provi-

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dence, that is, that all evil, as well as all good, is ordained with a well-arranged design for our education, is certainly not an outgrowth of observation of the world, certainly not a product of science of any kind, certainly not a fruit of the so-called natural religion. But belief in that providence is certainly produced by the religion of reconciliation. If a soul accept and cleave to that religion, then that soul will certainly believe in that providence. Whoever preaches the reconciliation will of necessity preach belief in the providence. That belief is the distinctively peculiar test of that religion. Ordinary observation shows us only that in the world and in our lot there appears at one time what has a good purpose, but at another what has no good purpose, or a bad one. Scientific knowledge of the world does not bring us any farther. The so-called natural religion is a mere fancy. There is only positive religion; and that which theologians tell us is natural religion consists always of convictions of thoroughly positive origin.[1] We have become accustomed to them, and have forgotten their source. The Reformers knew better. It is from the special promise of grace that Luther infers there will be a readiness in the believer to submit to God's will in all things, to hallow his name, and to follow God's guidance in whatever way God pleases. These are Luther's words: "Trusting in his promises we do not doubt that the true, just, and wise God will guide and care for all things in the very best way." Calvin says: "Whoever is firmly convinced that God is the gracious and kind Father expects everything from his good pleasure; and, in assurance of salvation, rises up manfully against death and the devil." And this is only the echo of

[1] For example, the doctrine that God is love is not a product of natural religion. It cannot be called a fruit of observation or of reasoning. Pray who has observed all the possible cases of God's work which would have to be observed, if observation were to be the method of proof? Were I to claim I had observed all cases would you, could you, test all my observations? No. I may propose the doctrine, and you may trust it, and be satisfied with the result so far as you go, and thus the doctrine is merely a posited one. It has only positive origin.

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the grand assurance which Paul speaks out, when he is opposing the attempts to make the community of Christians split over the question of the authority of different teachers, and when he seeks to save them from entanglement in belief in an essentially plural origin of the world. Says he, "Let no man glory in men." Let no one make men the ground of his confidence or the source of his spiritual life. "For all things are yours, whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come; all are yours, and ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's." "Even so nothing can separate us from the love of God which is manifest in Christ, neither life nor death, neither things present nor things to come, neither high nor low." The poet of the old covenant knew this also in his measure: "Whom have I in heaven but thee, and there is none upon earth that I question after besides thee. Should both my flesh and my heart fail, yet God is ever the strength of my heart and my portion. Near to God do I find my best good. I have put my trust in the Lord, that I may declare all thy deeds."

It is certain that we are as far removed as possible from independence, if we consider only our natural existence as parts of the world in the midst of the action and reaction of all the parts thereof. We are exposed to all possible restrictions of our freedom, endangered by all possible evils of nature and of human society. These evils are innumerable; and in their pressure against us is seen the pressure of the whole world against us. Where, then, shall we rest our self-assurance, that nevertheless we are not as a worm that writhes? Not on our mental gifts, for they may deteriorate; nor on our good intentions, for they may become corrupt; nor yet on knowledge that if we are crushed by the machine of the world, that cannot be helped, the crushing is absolutely necessary; for to accept that is to renounce our self-assurance itself and our nobility. There is no other way out of the difficulty for the man who feels that he is exalted above the world by his likeness to God, than to take that likeness

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to God in thorough earnest. We must give ourselves up to entire dependence on God, take refuge therein, in order to counterbalance the constant dependence of our natural existence, in order to make ourselves sure of attaining our high destiny, sure that the whole world is no equivalent for our life; that as spirits which are persons each one of us is a complete whole, and ranks in value above the world. The revelation of himself which God makes to us in his Son offers us the assurance of this herein, that that Son reconciles us his followers with God. That is, the revelation impresses us with the certainty that our weakness does not make us too contemptible, our dependence on the world, which we feel when we sin, does not make us too despicable, to trust God as our Father, to come near to him, to lean on him humbly, and so experience that to those who love God all things work together for good.

Having then this certainty, we find we have arising out of it a religious perfection; that is, each is able to lift himself up conscious that he is a complete individual; yes, complete and indestructible, and set higher than the world. The world is beneath him. We trust in God's help, protection, and education, although we do not distinctly see how and whither our life is being guided. "Unsearchable are God's judgments, and his ways past finding out." Even when men come to see how events in their lives have fitted together, as they look back on these events in the past, they can least of all boast that they know exactly what part of their way was the result of God's will, and what the consequences of other men's sin. But neither this limitation of our knowledge respecting the past, nor the narrow bounds of our knowledge of the future will lessen our confidence in God. Neither will contradict our consciousness of our own worth, which comes to us simultaneously with our confidence in God; for it is not the clear and exhaustive perceptions which exert the greatest influence on human conduct. It is rather the indefinite ideas, those which insinuate themselves into the feelings and the will, which excite the emotions, and which work

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in us alongside of our definitely calculated purposes, moving us indeed mightily, while they seem to play about the definite threads of our thought as an expression of that secret relationship of part to part in our spiritual existence which we ourselves cannot penetrate. We need not expect to alter this fact by the steady exercise of our powers of comprehension. Indeed, the scientific thinker needs above all others support from his disposition, his spiritual temper, and the state of that disposition is always nothing more nor less than the effect of these indefinite ideas on the feelings and will. The scientific thinker needs this help, and can never reach a point in his culture where he can do without it, or supply its place by something else. The spiritual temper is quite indifferent to clear perceptions; being thus indifferent it nevertheless claims a control over the feelings and the will, puts them in connection the one with the other, and manifests itself peculiarly in the emotions. The disposition, the temper of mind is thus the home where trust in God may rule, where humility may govern.

This religious virtue, humility, may be directly termed the disposition to depend on God. There are, indeed, expressed by it both a distinct purpose of submission to God and also a feeling of pleasure and bliss; but, although it thus consists in part of a purpose, yet the texture of humility is so delicate that the garment threatens to be torn if we make a stern resolve to have it, or try to prove its existence by a process of reflection. "Humility," says Christian Scriver, "is like the eye, which sees everything except itself."

Side by side with humility, and like it, stands the other religious virtue, patience. Patience is exercised towards the world, as humility is towards God. But they must go hand in hand; for every religion produces a relation to the world corresponding to the doctrine of that particular religion concerning relationship to God. Thus patience means that, in humble submission to God's guidance, we obtain freedom from the mastery of the world — of its aids, as well as its hinderances. True, this is the meaning of patience in all

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cases, even where it occurs quite unconnected with a religious cause; but its significance in the Christian religion is that in the Christian's view of the world patience is the necessary, the consistent behavior — consistent with the very central essence of Christianity, flowing out of the peculiar principle thereof. There is no reason why patience should be held to be more severely tested by the hinderances and troubles of life than by life's good fortunes. In times of happiness it is necessary to show forth our freedom by patience, so that on a change of fortune we may not be suddenly overtaken by an outbreak of our own impatience. Such patience — that bearing of the soul which stands even this severe test — proves its connection with humility hereby, that it also is not to be obtained perforce by a single decision of the will. It is a virtue that must be gradually gained, and thus, like humility, it belongs to the disposition. Do we wish to acquire patience? Then we must exercise perfection in every kind thereof, especially in the faithful fulfilling of our calling. To this end prayer, too, must be exercised. Melanchthon and Calvin define prayer as a direct consequence of reconciliation with God, consisting in the recognition of his providence, that is, that he guides in general and in particular the affairs of every man. Therefore are its contents, under all circumstances, thanks to God, praise, and acknowledgment of his favor. Prayer is simply a definite expression of these three things, spoken aloud in order that we may set its contents distinctly before our minds, and in order that we may join with others therein. The request for bestowal of good things and for fulfilment of wishes is a merely subordinate part of thanks. Were it not so, we could easily fall into the danger of making unrighteous and selfish requests. "In every prayer," says Paul, "let your request be made known before God with thanksgiving. Rejoice evermore; pray without ceasing; in everything give thanks, for that is the will of God revealed in Christ Jesus." By this means that prevailing spirit of joy is proved to be present and is maintained which we are exhorted by the men of the New

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Testament to possess in all circumstances, even amid the sufferings and distresses of life. Yes, they demand this of us. But joy is the feeling of completeness. Joy could not be commended as the steady companion of Christian life, unless the Christian religion brought men to have the value of complete spiritual beings, brought them to be each one in his spiritual existence a complete, a perfect whole, each one worth more than the whole world.

And now we can see how this truth is reconciled with that confession which comes so readily to our lips, so much more readily than does the doctrine we have traced. We do not hesitate to confess that in our work we always leave something undone; we never reach the limit of our work — the point where it would be complete in the sense that we might then fold our hands in our bosom. No, in this sense we are certainly never done, not even when we have a justifiable feeling of possessing a completeness in our soul, of having gained a character, of being able to contribute a calling and the work thereof to the service of mankind. But a thing that is complete remains complete after its kind, whether it be something large or something small. There is within us, necessarily, an impulse to go on obtaining a wider and ever wider sphere for our influence. Whoever prematurely gives up the effort to obtain this will find that he cannot remain sure of the healthiness, the value of his own peculiar influence. This impulse to an increase of sphere is necessary in us, as well as is the possibility of rendering complete service in any one sphere. With the yearning and labor for the attainment of that worth as a complete soul must be also united the impulse to make wider and greater that life-service which is our perfect work. In this respect, anxiety over the incompleteness of our fulfilment of duty is justified. But in such circumstances the anxiety affords exactly the necessary moral impulse, and does not tend to frighten us and lame our zeal. Even so shall our confidence in God, our submission to his arrangements, our patience never be complete in the sense that we

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do not need ever to quicken them, to strengthen them, to root them more deeply. And yet here, again, we are only considering difference in quantity, as it were, between weaker and stronger confidence at a particular moment, between the more or less patience with which we can meet a particular evil which is attacking us. The true quality is present; there may be more or less quantity at different times. Although these religious virtues are exercised only in a limited measure, yet they are in their kind the tokens of reconciliation with God and the expression of an endeavor to claim for one's self value as a complete spirit by rising above the merely natural and subordinate powers of the world. And then, moreover, confidence in God's help, humble submission to his government, patience towards all the hinderances of life, will include, will bring in themselves, the possibility of the increase and strengthening of these virtues and the impulse thereto. Even the weaker measure of trust in God, even the momentary wavering in the resolution to submit and be patient, does not lack the stamp of Christian perfection, if in kind it can be regarded as consistent with religious reconciliation; that is, if the soul where it exist do still live trusting for reconciliation with God according to the message of Christ, and if it be aiming to raise itself above the ends and control of the world. Constant readiness to go forward and grow richer in these signs of Christian perfection is, indeed, necessary in order that one may not go backward and grow poorer. But only a religious faith which is in itself perfect will break out in life's great need into the prayer: "Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief."

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ARTICLE IV.

DOCTRINE OF THE EPISTLE OF JAMES.

BY REV. EZRA P. GOULD, PROFESSOR IN NEWTON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THIS Epistle is practical and ethical, with only one strictly doctrinal passage, but that one of great interest and importance. But, as might be expected in a discussion of Christian ethics, the references to Christian doctrine are scattered through the Epistle, though not so thickly as would be expected from a more speculative and discursive mind. We need not be reminded at this late day that these references to assumed doctrinal belief are as important and significant as the intentional development of doctrine. And on the same principle such references and implications in a writing so exclusively ethical are specially interesting.

Neither has the Epistle any general subject. It enforces certain duties and practical aspects of the Christian life, and without any attempt to give unity to the discussion. But its teachings, disconnected as they are, all belong to the one subject of the practical Christian life. We will take this, then, as our basis, and the first question suggested is the view of the author in regard to the

ORIGIN OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.

By this is meant the source of the Christian's moral state. If the other question of the saved state, the justification of the believer, is treated, it will be incidentally. In fact the question before us, though it forms our starting-point, is only incidentally answered in the Epistle. On this moral side, then, the Christian life has its source in regeneration (i. 18). In this passage the author of regeneration is said to be God. That which determines him to the act is his own will, by which we are probably to understand, from the nature

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of the act itself, his independent will. The instrument which he employs is the word of truth. But in what way this instrument is employed is not stated here, any more than in the other New Testament passages teaching the same thing. The fact that the Christian life is regenerate is also plainly implied in those passages which speak of the law as a law of liberty (i. 25; ii. 12). For the ἐλευθερία describes the Christian state as one in which the believer obeys the law of God out of his own free will, not with the constraint which implies bondage. And James recognizes, also, the Christian philosophy underlying the necessity of regeneration, that like produces like, which of course makes a change from the old sinful state essential, and at the same time precludes its self-origination (iii. 12).

In regard to the previous moral state of the believer the Epistle teaches nothing directly, but the sinful character of that state is certainly implied in the doctrine of regeneration.

The second part of our general subject is the

Nature of the Christian Moral State.

Under this head the author teaches first that it is a mixed and not a simple state, sin and holiness being mingled in it. This is a fact really underlying the entire Epistle, the object of which is to warn the readers against certain sins to which they are subject, and which are inconsistent with the general, and especially with the normal, character of their lives. Its sinful side is taught directly in the statement, i. 14 and 15, about the origin of temptation in the Christian's own sinful desires; in the command to lay aside every uncleanness and abundance of wickedness, i. 21; in such specific charges of sin as ii. 6; iv. 1 sq., 16; and the statement, iii. 2, of the sinfulness in many respects of all believers; in the description of the tongue as an untamed evil, iii. 7 sq.; and in the command to confess sins to one another, v. 16.

But second, in spite of this admixture of sin, the predominant character of the Christian life is holy. The conflict between these opposing elements is not on equal terms.

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This is the tone of the Epistle throughout. The exhortations and warnings are evidently addressed to men whose desires and tendencies, though often thwarted, are yet toward righteousness.

If we seek more particular proof of this, we shall find it, first, in the statement that this life originates in regeneration by God through the word of truth, which of course gives its own stamp to the life originated (i. 18). And the description of the law as a law of liberty, meaning that its commands are performed by the Christian freely, and not compulsorily, implies the same (i. 25; ii. 12). Moreover the author teaches distinctly that faith which is the distinguishing trait of the Christian, has its proper fruit in works of righteousness, and is proved living and genuine by them (ii. 14 sq.). And in v. 16, after exhorting his readers to pray for each other, he enforces it by the general statement of the effectiveness of the prayer of a righteous man.

Third, this Christian life is progressive, having for its goal the perfect fulfilling of the law. This is also confirmed by the general tone of the Epistle, which has for its object to secure in the readers this more complete conformity to God's will. The author begins by exhorting them to rejoice in temptations, or trials, because they contribute to this result, the right use of them tending to perfection and completeness. And a striking statement of the earnestness with which this result is desired by God is found in iv. 5, where he is said to desire the spirit which he caused to dwell in us to the extent that he is jealous of conflicting claims, and the writer therefore exhorts Christians to repentance and humility, but above all to the expulsion of opposing forces. That is to say, God has gained partial possession of the believer's soul, but with this he is not satisfied, and longs for complete possession.

In this unfolding of the twofold aspect of the Christian life we find, third, the author's

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Doctrine of Sin.

That is, a general doctrine of sin is implied and developed in connection with the teaching of the Epistle as to the sin of believers. We have, first, the statement (i. 14 sq.) that sin has its root in the evil desires of the man, corresponding exactly to our Lord's teaching that it comes from the heart. As to external influence the Epistle teaches in reference to a particular class of sins, which may, however, be taken as representing all, that these evil desires are inflamed by hell (γέεννα) (iii. 6). And in accordance with the same the readers are warned to resist the devil (iv. 7). The objects on which these desires fasten, and which therefore furnish the occasion to sin, are found in the world, the love of which is enmity to God (iv. 4 sq.). And in this statement we find, too, the author's idea of the nature of sin, that its essence is in love of the world and in hatred to God. For this love of the world is in reality love of evil, according to the New Testament idea of the world. In regard to the relation between sin and knowledge James states, in a single passage, but very distinctly, the principle so essential to a right understanding of the New Testament doctrine of sin that it is sin to him who knows what is right, but does not do it (iv. 17).

Coming now to the other and predominant side of the Christian life, we find, fourth, the doctrine of the Epistle as to the

Nature of Christian Holiness.

We have seen that it originates in regeneration, effected by God through his word. The same agent and instrument are shown to be active in its maintenance and growth (i. 16, 21). In vs. 16 God is represented as the author not of temptation, but of every good and perfect gift; in which would be included specially the helps, as opposed to the hinderances, to holiness. And in vs. 21 the implanted word is said to be able to save their souls, i.e. as the passage goes on to state, through obedience. The agent in implanting the

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word is evidently, as in vs. 18, God. In iii. 15 the wisdom that is pure, peaceable, full of good fruits, is from above. And in i. 5 the relation of wisdom to perfection is shown, and also our dependence on God for this wisdom. And finally, in the passage on justification (ii. 14 sq.; see especially vs. 18, 20, 22, 26), the underlying principle is evidently that genuine faith manifests itself in works — that it is a vital principle producing fruits of righteousness. But manifestly faith has no such power in itself, only as the medium through which is conveyed to the soul the divine grace.

In regard to the nature of this righteousness, the Epistle lays down the important principle of the necessity of consistency between the inward and the outward in Christian character. This is one of the central thoughts of the Epistle. Already, in the opening verses, the δίψυχος, the double-minded man, turned now this way and now that by conflicting desires, is represented as a specially repugnant type of character. And at the close of the first chapter we find the well-known and beautiful description of the true nature of religious worship or service as consisting in deeds of charity and in personal purity of character. This is contrasted with the semblance of worship, the ordinary outward form of religious service. That is, if we search for the underlying thought, the vital principle of worship is reverence toward God, which finds outward expression generally in what men call worship. This may exist, however, without the reverence; in which case it is a mere pretence; and thus the reality of the reverence which constitutes the true θρησκεία has to be tested by other things — by love to men and purity of personal character. The passage is, therefore, a protest against the outward unaccompanied by the inward, and, at the same time, a statement of the outward conduct which does form a test of the inward principle. The passage on the relation of faith and works (ii. 14 sq.) has the same key-note. Works are evidently, in the mind of James, the legitimate results of faith, and the only valid test of its existence. And the

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reason that faith without works does not justify is the absence of this proof of the genuineness of the faith, which shows it to be a mere profession (see vs. 14, 18). Just so in iii. 13 sq., works are the manifestation of true wisdom and the test of its heavenly origin and character. In fact, the assumption of the Christian character of the readers runs through the entire Epistle; and they are therefore called on to show its proper fruit in their lives.

Taking, then, this twofold aspect of the Christian state, we find in regard to the inward side that it is represented as residing in the affections, and primarily in love to God. There is implied throughout the Epistle the reference to God in all Christian action, and the grounding of that action on our relations to him. It is his law that we are to obey, his righteousness that we are to fulfil, a religious service pure in his eyes that we are to perform, his example in our treatment of the poor that we are to follow, his friendship that we are to seek, his will in regard to the events of life to which we are to submit. But when the author wishes to express that comprehensive and fundamental quality which makes men heirs of God's kingdom, we find that he selects love to God (ii. 5). And in iv. 4 sq. he contrasts friendship with the world and love to God as the fundamental traits of sin and holiness. In the relations of the Christian to his fellow-men the author lays down the same great law of love, which he terms the royal law, *νόμον βασιλικόν*: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (ii. 8).

Besides this love of God and man, the two most prominent inner traits of the Christian character in the Epistle are meekness, or humility, and penitence. The recognition of man's dependence and of man's sinfulness, of his position as a creature and as a sinner, the rebuke of pride and self-exaltation, and the inculcation of all the humbler and gentler virtues, form one of the most distinctive, and certainly one of the finest, traits of Christianity; being fundamental alike in its morality and its doctrine. And their enforcement in this ethical book of the New Testament is a striking illustra-

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tion of the unity and coherence of the Christian system, and of the subtile, deep harmony that pervades its writings. Among other passages under this head, see i. 5, enjoining prayer for needed wisdom; iv. 6, in which God is represented as resisting the proud, but giving grace to the humble; iv. 13, showing the necessity of recognizing our dependence on God in making our plans; iv. 9, 10; v. 16, enjoining penitence and confession of sins.

When we come, now, to examine the outward side of the Christian life, we find the author's idea comprehensively stated as obedience to a perfect law (i. 22 sq.). All the law must be comprehended; for it is a unit (ii. 10 sq.). The various duties included need not be mentioned particularly. It should be noticed, however, that the morality enjoined is that of the Sermon on the Mount, in both its spirituality and completeness; in its commendation of humility and meekness; in its insistence on obeying as opposed to hearing; in its statement of the incompatibility of loving and serving both God and the world; and in its injunction against swearing. And further, that the perfect law is moral, not ceremonial. To be sure, there is nothing said about this. But this silence is a presumption not for, but against, the inclusion of the ceremonial law in the *νόμος τέλειος* of James. For its enforcement would make this Epistle isolated among the New Testament writings. We leave out of this discussion altogether the question of inspiration and of the unity of doctrine among inspired men, and urge merely the natural improbability of such disagreement as this on other grounds. The author would have been in manifest opposition, for instance, to Peter, the apostle of the circumcision. For in Gal. ii. 11 sq. the charge of Paul against Peter was not that he did not hold the same opinion as himself in regard to circumcision and the other works of the law, but that he dissembled these opinions, and that he himself followed Jewish customs not from conviction, but from fear of the Jews. And the argument against him is based on the assumption that he himself lived *ἐθνικῶς*, Gentile-wise, but was compelling the

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Gentiles, by his present hypocritical conduct, to Judaize. And Paul includes Peter with himself as believing that he was to be saved through faith alone, aside from all works of law.

Furthermore, there is good proof that James believed essentially the same. For he was associated with Peter and John in giving the hand of fellowship to Paul and Barnabas. This does not imply that Paul was teaching among the Gentiles, as applicable to their particular case, a gospel of liberty, which, however, would not apply to the case of the Jews, and that these representatives of the Jewish church allowed him to go his way, while they went theirs, each preaching a gospel suited to his own field. For the basis of their fellowship is evidently the essential unity of their teaching. Paul does not claim that he is teaching a gospel for the Gentiles, applicable to them because they are Gentiles, nor would he have allowed any such claim; but he claimed to preach a universal gospel, the same for both Jews and Gentiles. And when he afterwards yielded to the urgency of James and the rest at Jerusalem, and conformed publicly to Jewish customs, he certainly did not understand that such things were regarded by them as in any way essential. If he had, he would have refused compliance with their request, as he did in the case of Titus. Evidently, the only ground on which Paul complied at all with the ceremonial commands of the Jewish law, as in the circumcision of Titus, was that of national custom, not of religious requirement. And in this I see nothing at all to indicate that he did not occupy common ground with the other leaders, including certainly Peter and John, and probably James. Evidently, then, there is here a strong presumption to overcome in order to establish the inclusion of the ceremonial part of the law under the *νόμος τέλειος* of James. The silence of the Epistle on this point, in connection with the wide range of its moral specifications under the law, greatly strengthen this assumption.

The strongest objection to any such inclusion of the ceremonial commands under the term law in the Epistle how-

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ever, remains yet to be noticed. Obedience to this law, as a whole, whatever is included in it, is to James of the utmost importance. On obedience to it in all its parts depends the Christian's final salvation. I do not mean by this perfect obedience, but obedience to a perfect law. We are certainly here at a very great remove from the spiritual religion of the New Testament, if a law on which so much depends is partly ritual. For it must be remembered that this makes the author occupy the ground, not of the Jewish, but of the Judaizing Christians. It is, as we have seen, not common to him with Peter, the apostle of the circumcision, and yet he is associated with Peter and John in their relations to Paul, implying substantial doctrinal accord. It is not meant, however, that James did not himself observe the ceremonial of the Jewish religion, and encourage such observance on the part of Jewish Christians; but that he considered this essential as a part of the perfect law by which men were to be judged, or of the works by which man is justified, there seems no reason to believe. And yet, this is the aspect in which the law is presented to us in the Epistle, and it is as a part of this law that, if at all, the ceremonial of the Jewish law finds place in it.

The Motives of the Christian Life.

The Christian life has been considered as represented in the Epistle, with reference to its origin and nature. The only other aspect of it presented is that of its motives. There are two great classes of these used in the New Testament; one which seeks to influence the Christian by the consideration of what has been done for him, by gratitude and love, is not developed in the Epistle, except in the general exhortation to love God. In fact, the absence of all direct reference to the work of Christ in this or any other connection is very noticeable. But at the same time it is true that the Epistle presupposes this work, though its general subject does not strictly call for any mention of it. The other great class of motives drawn from the relation of the

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Christian's character and conduct to his future state is the one constantly applied in the Epistle.

The two contrasted states of the future world are termed here, as elsewhere in the New Testament, life and death (i. 12; v. 20). The state of the righteous is also represented as inheritance in the kingdom prepared by God for them that love him (ii. 5). It is evident from the passage itself that the poverty mentioned is not the condition of membership in that kingdom, that being the love which characterizes those for whom it is prepared. But the statement is only that God selects its members out of the poor rather than the rich class, which is substantially the teaching of Christ on the same point. This state is also represented as a state of salvation (i. 21). These are familiar New Testament terms, used evidently in their ordinary sense, and do not need to be dwelt on here. But the use of the rewards and punishments of the future state to influence Christian conduct, making the former dependent on the latter instead of on the pure grace of God, does require careful examination. The author says that it is the man who is tested and approved by the endurance of temptation who will receive the crown of life (i. 12). The relation of this endurance to the love which is made the condition of the promise in the last part of the verse, is evidently that of the test. The endurance tests the genuineness of the love, for he that loves God keeps his commandments. In the last analysis it is obedience to this comprehensive and fundamental law of love which entitles the recipient to eternal life. See also ii. 5; i. 21, 22, where the doing of the word is said to be essential to salvation; and ii. 12, in which the judgment is said to be by the law of liberty. Thus the Epistle teaches certainly and prominently a doctrine of salvation by works.

But we should make a great mistake if we supposed that this is the only view presented. There is indeed a gracious side to this. For in the first place, as we have seen under another head, the new nature which is necessary to the performance of good works is the work of God, and that

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too a work of begetting out of his own will. And even after this new creation the works are made dependent on his gracious help, so that humility is represented as one of the most characteristic traits of the Christian life. Moreover, the judgment which is to decide the future state is represented as a merciful judgment. Evidently, then, we are here on different ground from that of strict law. For here, on one side, representing man's need, we are confronted with a state of sin from which the man must be converted, and a multitude of sins needing to be covered; and, on the other side, representing God's action in this state of things, with regeneration and a judgment of mercy.

But not even now have we exhausted the statement of the doctrine of salvation in the Epistle. For in the passage on justification (ii. 14 sq.), while the author insists that faith alone does not save the man, it is equally clear that in his view neither do works alone save him. It is faith and works which, in any view of their connection, is a very different thing from salvation by works. In the beginning of the chapter this faith — the connection of the argument is such as to show that it is the same faith represented in vs. 14 sq. as saving — is denominated the faith of (as an objective genitive) our Lord Jesus Christ. Here, then, we have very important additions to the doctrine of salvation by works with which we started. Regeneration, the forgiveness of sins, a judgment of mercy, and faith in Jesus Christ as one of the factors in justification, take us a long way towards a distinctively Christian doctrine of salvation. But the question still remains, whether the doctrine of James is in harmony with the general New Testament doctrine. The clue that will lead us out of our difficulty as regards all the passages in question, except the one on justification, is to be found in the fact that James, except in that passage, is talking of final salvation, not of present justification. The motive to which he appeals is the judgment and its decisions. And when he represents that as a judgment of works, and bases salvation there on the deeds done in the body, he is simply stating the uni-

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versal doctrine of the New Testament. The doctrine of Christ in the synoptic Gospels, see especially Matt. xxv.; and in John (see v. 29; and of Paul even, see Rom. ii. 6 sq.; 2 Cor. v. 10) is that of James, that the final judgment is of the deeds done in the body, whether they are good or evil. And this is the uniform description of the judgment. There is nothing to conflict with these statements. Absolutely, then, the only peculiarity of this Epistle in its treatment of this subject is the prominence given to the doctrine, which is itself the general New Testament view.

But when we consider its teaching, not in regard to final salvation, but to present justification, there is apparent discrepancy between this and New Testament, and especially Pauline, doctrine. For James says, faith without works does not justify. Paul says, faith, not works; faith without works does justify. Now if we take these two statements by themselves, apart from their connection, they are capable of this explanation: Paul may be confining his attention to that act of the man which justifies, which he affirms to be faith alone; while James may be speaking of the inseparable accompaniments, or fruits, of this faith, without which it could not exist, and of course could not justify. Out of these inseparable things Paul selects faith as that which justifies the man, while James asserts their inseparability. The key to the whole difficulty, on this supposition, is that there is no faith without works, on the one side, and of the two it is the faith that justifies, on the other. So that faith without works justifies, and faith without works does not justify. Paul, affirming the one, protests against legalism, and James, affirming the other, protests against antinomianism. They may, therefore, as far as these two statements go, occupy common ground. But do they thus agree?

One thing is very certain: Paul sees and states both sides He does not believe that faith can be found alone without works. The sixth and eighth chapters of Romans are as strong a protest against antinomianism as anything in the New Testament. His doctrine there is that faith joins us to not only a justifying, but also a sanctifying Saviour. And

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the two offices being united in the same person, who is appropriated as a whole in the one act of faith, there can be, in Paul's view, no justification without sanctification, and so no faith without works. The only question is, whether James takes this broad ground, or whether his view is that there is a justifying power in works themselves, which would certainly put him in conflict with Paul, and, in fact, with the New Testament generally. Before proceeding to consider this, however, we must premise one thing: that what James says elsewhere about the bearing of works on our final salvation must not prejudice this matter. For the subject there treated is a distinct one, and his view of it is the general New Testament view; so that it cannot be made part of the argument to show his disagreement with the New Testament doctrine on this subject. For that it could do only if it was peculiar.

In considering the bearing of this passage on justification it is to be noticed, first, that the author does not consider faith to be genuine without works. His statement is guarded at this point. The supposition with which he starts is, that a man say that he has faith, but have not works. The question is not whether faith unaccompanied by works can save, but whether a professed faith without this accompaniment can save. He illustrates this by a profession of good will that does not manifest itself in deeds; and says that faith without works is equally dead, which is the same as to say that it is unreal; for life is the distinctive quality of a spiritual act or state like faith. And he proceeds further to state that the true proof of faith is works.

Second, this is the reason that faith does not justify without works, that the faith is unreal in such case. Works are not shown to us as an independent factor in the work of justification. The only influence which they are shown to have on the result is not in themselves, but through their bearing on the faith. The reason that faith alone does not justify is not that here is one of the things necessary to justification, but not the other, but that the absence of works invalidates the faith, and there is thus not the one thing necessary. The faith by itself is a mere profession, a dead thing. It is

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thus the faith itself, one thing, which is perfected by the works, not the sum of two things, which is incomplete without either one or the other. For in Abraham's offering of Isaac, the Scripture that is said to be fulfilled is, that "Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness." In itself, then, the absence of works is not represented as affecting the result, only as it makes the faith dead, and therefore inoperative.

Third, it is evident, then, that in this discussion faith and works are not co-ordinate things, but that the works are subordinate to the faith. Indeed it is not maintained by those who hold that there is here a real difference between Paul and James, that these are co-ordinate, a proposition that it would be difficult to maintain, but that the faith is subordinate, the works being the real condition of justification. They hold that faith is regarded by James as necessary to produce the really justifying works, which is of course exactly the reverse of Paul's position. According to this one teaches that faith justifies, but must be accompanied by its necessary result, works; while the other teaches that works justify, but must be accompanied by their only sufficient cause, faith. Whereas it seems evident that in the passage from James faith occupies no such subordinate position, but is required as, after all the principal thing, only needing the works to complete it and give to it life and genuineness.

If these positions can be maintained, and they certainly seem tenable, then James holds the ordinary New Testament doctrine of justification by faith, only emphasizing more and differently the necessity of the accompanying works.

There are only two other things remaining to be noticed in this statement of the doctrine of this Epistle, its theology proper, and its allusion to the second advent.

Theology.

Under this head there are only a few things worthy of special remark. First, that only the Father and Son are mentioned. The Holy Spirit is not once alluded to in the Epistle, which is the more remarkable in a discussion of the

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practical Christian life. Furthermore, there is no statement of the relations between the Father and the Son, nor of the redemptive work of Christ; neither of which, however, is at all demanded by the subject. But the doctrine of Christ, as far as it is developed, is the same as in the other books of the New Testament. He is uniformly termed the Lord (see i. 1; ii. 1; v. 7, 9, 14 sq.) — a term also applied to God (see iii. 9; iv. 10, 15; v. 10, 11). Christ is also represented as the Judge (v. 9); and the healing of the sick and the forgiveness of sins are probably ascribed to him (v. 15). God is also frequently termed the Father; and the allusions to him are chiefly noticeable for the union of justice and mercy in the description of his character.

THE παρουσία.

As regards the coming of the Lord, it is used to comfort the Christians in their persecutions (v. 7–12). It is a time when the Lord will show his pity and tender mercy to his own (vs. 10, 11); when he will judge their enemies, but also themselves (vs. 9). As regards the time of this event, in whatever way we explain the παρουσία itself, that certainly seems to be represented as near. ἤγγικε is the verb used, meaning "has come near"; and in accordance with this is its use as a means of personal comfort and encouragement to the readers. A quite common explanation of the references to the παρουσία in the New Testament — that they announce its time as uncertain, so that it may be expected at any time — is certainly inadequate to explain the definite statement of its nearness in this passage.

But is it certain that the παρουσία uniformly denotes the final, second coming of the Lord? It certainly seems as if the defenders of such a view of inspiration as would exclude such a mistake as this expectation of the nearness of the παρουσία must extend the meaning of the term so as to include other typical comings of the Lord. But the whole subject is involved in the gravest complications, and is probably the most difficult problem in the whole range of biblical study to those who hold strict views of inspiration.

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ARTICLE V.

ON ASSYRIOLOGY, — A CRITICISM.

[WITH EDITORIAL NOTE AND REPLY.]

In the Bibliotheca Sacra for July 1877 there appears an Article "On Assyriology," which is translated from the German of Professor de Lagarde, and published in this country at his own suggestion. The author, we are told, is "one of the leading Semitic scholars of the world, one whose knowledge of Syriac especially, and whose work in applying to the Semitic family of languages the same principles as Grimm and others have successfully followed in Indo-European comparative philology, has already given rich promise and rich fruit." With such ample qualifications for Assyrian studies, it is to be regretted that we have not his active co-operation, instead of his discouragement, in constructing the foundations of cuneiform science; but the tendency of the Article referred to, if not also its intent, is to discredit the results of cuneiform research, and to create doubts respecting their reliability. Already in Germany, as it appears, these attempts to discredit Assyriology are receiving the notice of Dr. E. Schrader; and we can safely trust the defence to his hands, so far as Germany is concerned. But why should Professor de Lagarde seek to forestall public opinion in America, where cuneiform studies have so few defenders, and need most of all encouragement, instead of detraction? Whatever might be the reply to such an inquiry, there are certain points in the "review" to which allusion is made that merit a particular notice; and it is proposed to submit a few remarks upon them.

1st. Upon the necessary qualifications for a successful study of the cuneiform texts. This is not the first time it has been claimed, or at least strongly implied, that a thorough ac-

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quaintance with the entire circle of Semitic tongues is indispensable to success in the treatment of these texts, doubt being thus thrown by implication upon the results of those investigators who have not such knowledge. The simple facts in relation to this point may be briefly stated. For the ordinary study of the inscriptions, with a view to obtain the essential facts, or to translate correctly the great mass of texts, such extensive preparations are not required, although they would afford the student some advantage, and would be, of course, quite convenient. But for the higher purposes of linguistic criticism, and for dealing with many difficult passages, the qualifications before stated would be necessary. It would be very much the same with Hebrew, Syriac, or Arabic texts, with the exception that the Assyrian has not been so thoroughly studied, and thus the difficulties would oftener occur. I might illustrate here by the legend of the "Descent of Ishtar into Hades." This was at first a more difficult text to handle than is usual to find; and the earlier efforts at rendering it were crude, and fully realized as such. But to-day the general sense is well understood, and the recent versions agree substantially, except in regard to certain very dark passages. In so far, the results are fully reliable; and where they are not no pretence is made that they are. But this text is exceptional, as compared with the majority, which require no such labor to translate them, and no extensive knowledge of the cognate tongues.

2d. Upon the reading of names of persons, places, etc. It is to be admitted that here are many difficulties and many liabilities to error. But it is difficult to see that the general Semitic scholar, in reading these names, would have much advantage over another student. The difficulties are not so much linguistic, properly speaking, as paleographic. They are mostly due to ideography and polyphony. The author of the "review" alluded to offers a good illustration, except that he has fallen into more or less errors, thus: If the names "*Tigris*, *Babylon*, *Nabuchodnosar* are expressed by groups of signs which at other times are read *Bartikgar*, *Sintirki*, *Anapasa-*

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dusis, then this arrangement must have had a cause somewhere, although it seems to us, at first sight, like the work of insane persons."[1] It is evident the writer of the foregoing is not a specialist in cuneiform studies; for the mistakes he makes no one familiar with the texts would be likely to do. In the first place, *Sintirki* should be *Din-tir-ki*.[2] Then, again, the writer is under the impression that *Din-tir-ki* is only another reading of the signs whose Assyrian value is *Bab-il-ki*, or "Babylon"; but such is not the case. *Din-tir-ki* is an old mystical name of Babylon, is quite a different word from *Bab-il-ki*, and written with wholly different signs. The Accadian reading of the signs *Bab-il-ki* would be *Kâ-an-ra-ki*; but they are never read *Dintirki*, between which and *Bab-il-ki*, therefore, there exists no polyphony. The writer has cited a wrong example. But there does exist a polyphony between the Assyrian *Bab-il-ki* [Babylon] and the Accadian *Kâ-an-ra-ki*; since these are two readings of the same group of characters. That the Accadian is here the primitive reading appears from the fact, that the sign *ra* is not involved in the Semitic *Bab-il-ki*.

These examples afford a curious instance of ideography, as well as of the utility of cuneiform studies to the biblical scholar. The element *ki* is the determinative of place, city, etc., in each instance. Then *Bab-il* means "gate of Il," Hebrew El; and *Kâ-an-ra* means "gate of the god of the deluge"; while *Din-tir-ki* is "city of the root of languages," — as before remarked, an old and mystical name of Babylon, evidently referring to the supposed primitive unity of languages, which was broken up at the Tower of Babel (*Bab-il*), the building of which had been undertaken by those who had migrated directly from the diluvian mount in the East. The significance of changing the name from the "gate of the god of the deluge" to the "gate of Il," or El, is found in the fact that, according to Berosus, the god of the deluge was

[1] Bibliotheca Sacra, p. 567.

[2] *Sintirki* is a mistake in our printing. Prof. De Lagarde's own publication reads *Dintirki*. — Ed.

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thought to be El. The reference of these names to the events recorded by Moses cannot be doubted.

The author of the "review" labors under an erroneous impression, likewise, as regards the name *Tigris*, of which he assumes *Bar-tig-gar* as a polyphone, which is not the case. The signs *Bar-tik-gar* never have the phonetic value of *Tigris;* but the river whose cuneiform name is often written *Bar-tig-gar*, is known to be the *Tigris*, and is thus so called in rendering the texts. Thus, in this instance, also, a wrong example is cited.

In the case of the name *Nabuchodnosar*, the author of the "review" has hit upon a proper illustration of polyphony, except that no cuneiform student would ever mistake *Anapasadusis* for the true reading of this name. It is written quite diversely in the texts, but the true reading is never a matter of difficulty. In any event, the general Semitic scholar would have here no advantage over another less accomplished student. What is above all necessary is a careful study of the texts themselves, which afford abundant guidance. In this name, the element *Nabu* is the Assyrian title of the god Mercury, usually preceded by the determinative of divinity, the Accadian *An*. This element is often written phonetically with the two signs *na* and *bu;* but as frequently with one or the other of the two Accadian monograms for Mercury, which are the signs *ak* and *pa*. Under such circumstances the phonetics *na* and *bu* direct what the reading of *ak* or *pa* should be, when employed in writing this name. The same principles would guide us, in the absence of other knowledge, to the true reading of the name *Bab-il-ki*, or Babylon, which is often written phonetically with the signs *ba-bi-lu*.

From the foregoing remarks and practical illustrations, it will be seen that what is most essential to reliability of results is a patient study of the texts themselves, which afford sufficient guidance in the majority of instances. Even a critical knowledge of the various Semitic tongues would not give one any marked advantage; for the difficulties are not so much linguistic as paleographic. Nevertheless, it cannot

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be denied, nor has it ever been questioned, that such a knowledge is absolutely essential in dealing with the Assyrian language itself, and with many difficult texts. That to which objection is here made, is the tendency to magnify the difficulties and uncertainties in cuneiform researches, and to over-estimate the value and necessity of general Semitic scholarship in such studies; especially to detract from the labors of those devoted to these studies. O. D. MILLER.

EDITORIAL NOTE AND REPLY.

[We are glad that Prof. de Lagarde's Article gained so much attention. We are glad, too, that the critic thoroughly agrees with him in insisting that for scientific study of Assyriology full Semitic philological equipment is indispensable. Of course, such careful scientific study is the only study that can be of any service to the careful scientific investigators in other fields. Especially is it such accurate study only which is of any use to theology. The fitness that a plea for such care should appear in the Bibliotheca Sacra is evident. On Prof. de Lagarde's informing us that the following confirmatory Article by Prof. Nöldeke of Strasburg, and another Article by Nöldeke on the subject, which we hope to publish, are all the reply he deems necessary to the critic, we publish this Article. Perhaps it is not necessary to inform any Semitic scholar in America who Prof. Nöldeke is.

The importance of "study of texts" emphasized by the critic is not only great, but becomes a serious additional cause of doubt as to the value of decipherings, so long as Smith's opinion holds good, that the texts must be studied on the slabs themselves, day after day, year after year.

The following Article by Prof. Nöldeke appeared in the Leipziger Literarisches Centralblatt for Aug. 12, 1876, No. 33, Art. 1. It was a review of Prof. Alfr. v. Gutschmid's "New Contributions to the History of the Ancient Orient. Assyriology in Germany."[1]]

IN a discussion of the latest edition of Duncker's Ancient History, Gutschmid had complained that the book made too extensive use of the supposed results of attempts to decipher the cuneiform inscriptions. He had shown that Assyriologists displayed far greater assurance than they could rightly lay claim to; and he had given a number of instances in

[1] Prof. Alfr. v. Gutschmid, Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte des alten Orients. Die Assyriologie in Deutschland. Leipzig, 1876. Teubner, pp. 158. l. 8vo. 4 Mk.

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which their assertions were flatly contradicted, either by known facts, or at least by very probable propositions; or where they contained decided nonsense. He had, therefore, recommended historians to be extremely cautious in the meanwhile in regard to these results. This censure on Assyriologists was expressed at times rather keenly; and of course was not aimed altogether at Schrader, Duncker's chief authority, but certainly, in the main, at him. Schrader was the first to claim for Assyriology in Germany the rank of a science. It was much to be desired that Schrader should restrain his sensitiveness, and take a lesson from the earnest counsel which this criticism contained. Especially should he have seen what a mistake it is to seize on temporary expedients for overcoming objections and other difficulties, instead of acknowledging that for a time, at least, numberless riddles must remain unsolved. Instead of this he published an explanation replying to Gutschmid, whose strength in his own particular subject he must have known; and in it — rather condescendingly, as at times he can write — he tried to refute Gutschmid's objections. This explanation would have helped him little in the eyes of calm judges, even if he had proved Gutschmid wrong in one or another proposition; for in the main point he could not succeed; that is to say, he could not answer the charge of undue haste and unmethodical procedure in the historical valuation of the inscriptions.

Gutschmid now felt himself obliged to substantiate his objections fully in a separate pamphlet. It is this pamphlet which now lies before us. For the sake of perfect clearness Gutschmid has reprinted in full the part in question of his criticism of Duncker's book, as well as Schrader's reply. Of this reply there then remains not one stone upon another. The few points respecting which Schrader justifies himself, are those on which he was not at all attacked. Gutschmid's review is cutting, and often bitingly ironical, but with the exception of one unfortunate expression on page fifty-six, it keeps within the limits of parliamentary language. In respect

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of the facts at issue, however, the opponents are crushed. It is shown, for instance, among other things, how for the sake of their interpretations, they ignore distinct facts of history, of historical and physical geography, and zoölogical geography, too, as well as technical chronology; how they set little value on important testimony of Greek writers and of the Old Testament; and how they overrate for purposes of historical evidence the character of such Assyrian writings as they themselves know to contain many errors.

The difficulty of deciphering the Assyrian cuneiform character is very great, as Gutschmid here once more shows. Present reviewer knows no other kind of writing which can even be likened to it for confusion. Compared with it, Arabic texts without the diacritic points, or Pehlevi books are easy to read; for we know the languages themselves. Even the riddles of the hieroglyphics are nothing when compared with Assyrian; and by interpretation of these hieroglyphics the way has been opened up for reading the more difficult sorts of Egyptian writing. But in Assyrian perhaps every character can be read in more than one way. According to Smith,[1] one character may have thirteen, fifteen, even twenty-seven different meanings. Here is a language, in one respect quite Semitic, yet showing so many peculiarities, even at times seeming so utterly lawless, that the thought rises again and again, such a language can never have been actually spoken. In Assyrian there is certainly more darkness than the acuteness and knowledge of a few investigators can throw light upon in a short time. And the syllabaries, even incomplete as they are, surely show us clearly how many meanings everything may have, how improbable it is that texts of any considerable length can be fully read, and that with certainty of correctness. Compared with these Assyrian syllabaries how modest is the old Uzwaresh glossary, made for initiating the disciples of the magi into the secrets of their writing, just as the former were probably made for the Assyrian priests' disciples. Generations to

[1] The Phonetic Values of the Cuneiform Characters. London, 1871.

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come will value very highly the work of those who have made the first successful efforts in this field. The faults and mistakes of these investigators will then be willingly pardoned; but now we cannot so easily overlook them, while we see their direct consequences before us. Joy over what is already known has made men forget too soon how to estimate what is not yet understood. Some dark points did become clear, and then there was an inclination to assume that all had been dark where in fact all had been tolerably clear, and to call everything clear, where all still lay in darkness. An unfortunate mania for hypothesis became infectious. Witness the nonsense talked about the Cushites and Turanians. What strange views even the gifted Oppert is now again bringing forward about a certain Phoenician inscription, and about the nationality of the Medes, on subjects, too, which those who are no Assyriologists can easily examine for themselves. It needs a strong effort to refrain from injustice, and to acknowledge gratefully the lasting service which that decipherer has rendered. Sober criticism by themselves of their own work, recognition of the uncertainty, yes, of the great improbability, of many of these results, is to be found among Assyriologists too seldom. It is impossible that all the qualities and knowledge theoretically necessary for deciphering can be united in any *one* man. But it may be fairly demanded that all Assyriologists should have, e.g. a rather more accurate idea of the history, the geography, and the condition of Western Asia than they commonly do have, and that their ideas of these things should be gained from the study of the real sources of information. It is a fact that Assyriology has often blinded her disciples to things which they must have known before. For example, Schrader strays into a very unhistorical view as to the greatness of the power which the kingdom of Judah had at the time of Uzziah; and he does this in order to explain the meaning of an inscription whose historical explanation is unquestionably a riddle at the best. Again, he makes the king of the great empire of Assyria call the little land of Judah an extensive

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territory (K. A. T. 90); and this moreover, although it is easy to see from the Persian text of Behistûn that Sanherib merely called Judah a "distant" land, and did so quite correctly. If one who has been a sober investigator learns to distort thus relations with which he is accurately acquainted, how can we be sure that he will measure correctly things which are wholly in the dark, or at least are so to him.

The reviewer may here be allowed to touch on a point on which Gutschmid is purposely silent. Two years ago, in this periodical,[1] the reviewer expressed in a very mild form his doubts as to the value of the *dilettante* philological treatment of these texts, which have been correctly read, perhaps, so far as the sound is concerned. Schrader soon answered[2] in an Article which showed that he had not clearly understood the exact aim of the reviewer's Article, and that he had misunderstood several details of it, in some cases in an extraordinary way. A superficial reader might have really thought that all the reviewer's objections were refuted, that some of them had been shown to be purely crotchety. Men who really know Semitic languages think otherwise. It would be easy to point out in Schrader's books dozens of impossible etymologies, and meanings which must appear extremely forced, at least to one who is somewhat at home in the Arabic or Aramaic idioms. Reviewer finds in Schrader a constant effort to translate as if there were a complete connection in sense, where for the present no connected translation is possible. As in historical relations, so in language, there is a desire to know the language, just as there is a desire to know the historical facts more exactly than they can be known; and in order to hide from themselves the fact that some things are unknown, some people do not shrink from the most questionable etymological tricks, and from the use, in a hurried, careless way, of untrustworthy dictionaries. The philologist, like the historian, may use the decipherings of Assyriologists only with the utmost caution. The claim

[1] Leip. Lit. Cent. blatt. 1874, No. 26. [2] Jena Lit. Ztg. 1874, No. 27.

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which appeared lately in this paper [1] — viz. that the results of Oppert, Sayce, and Schrader should be used as quite good material in the scientific comparative study of the Semitic languages, — must be, we think, rejected.

Although Gutschmid's pamphlet is essentially polemic and negative, it contains also much careful, positive investigation and many valuable results. We may point, e.g. to the discussion of the origin of the Median empire, which is well elucidated by the analogous rise of the Parthian empire. We may point also to the Excursus on the Assyrian Eponyms, and to many other parts of the work. How rich are the treasures of knowledge which are at the command of our author, how correctly he handles the historical method, and how interestingly he can write, are well known from his former writings. Even historians and philologists who have little or nothing to do with the ancient Orient will find the book very instructive on account of the facts which it communicates, and especially on account of its method, and will find it also for the most part highly attractive reading.

A few more details: We hold decidedly, on the strength of varied and quite independent testimonies, that Phul was an Assyrian king, who ruled for a time in Babylon. Gutschmid's conclusion that he was king over a portion only of the country along the Euphrates above Babylon has not yet fully convinced us. The cultivable land on both sides of the Euphrates above Hît is so narrow that it affords no territory such as we must ascribe to a ruler who interfered so largely as Phul did in the affairs of distant Palestine. However, in any case, the condition of the Assyrian-Babylonian states was at that time very complicated. Some very skilful hypothesis is necessary, if we are to get rid of all difficulty. But we must nevertheless keep in mind that the condition of these countries at the time, e.g. of the Bouides and Hamadanites (10th Cent. A.D.) was at least equally confused.

The view that בן חדד is a translation of the Aramaic בר חדד is sustained by the fact that the LXX, Targum, and Peshito

[1] In 1876, No. 30, p. 988.

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do translate the Hebrew בן in this name by "son" without any hesitation, and thus both of the latter get back to בר חדד. Moreover, the *υἱὸς Ἀδέρ* of the LXX depends on the reading with *r* in Hebrew, not on a corruption of the Greek text. The name of the Syrian bishop (of whom no one will believe that he was named after the old heathen king) was actually written with *d*. This is proved by the Greek orthography *Βαράδοτος*.[1] There are thus quite decisive grounds for holding that בן חדד (with *d*) is the right name, and that its bearer was different from Binidri, or as it is to be read, the king of Imirisu (Is it really "Ass's Tower" [see ABK 325]? That would be a most singular name).

A better geographer than the Assyriologists, namely, Jâqût, confounded two places which they confound; but he made the mistake exactly the converse of theirs. For he confounds *Kamch*, the place from which the country *Κομμαγηνή* likely got its name (see Ibn Chord. 83; Belâdh. 184; and cf. Sprenger's "Post and Travel Routes" 106 f.) with *Kamàch* (Byz. *Κάμαχος*, *Κάμαχα*, *Κάμαχη*).

For philological reasons we cannot believe that we have Iranian forms in the names of the princes Kundaspi and Kustaspi (= Vindâspa and Vîstaspa), as Gutschmid thinks we have. Besides, it is very improbable that here in Western Upper Armenia there should have lived pure Iranians, in the strict sense of the term.

In connection with the interesting legends of Moses, we may remark that the same occurs in the Persian heroic legend (see the Dârâ). Firdausî locates it on the Euphrates, and even the smearing with pitch is not wanting. Another form of the story, in Ibn Athîr (i. 196), i.e. Tabari, locates it on the Persian Kur, and at Persepolis. Did the story originate in Egypt or in Babylon?

From Arpâd to Samaria is *not* "very much farther" than from Arpâd to Nineve (see p. 118). As the crow flies the distances must be about equal; and the actual journey must have required in each case about the same length of time.

[1] Procop. Pers. ii. 13.

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We (reviewer) reckon, according to Arabic geographers, that to Mosul from Haleb, which was about three German miles from Arpâd, was sixteen to seventeen days journey; and it was sixteen days journey from Haleb to Samaria. Any shortened route through Mesopotamia which is not noticed by Arabic itineraries cannot have been suitable for the Assyrian armies. Of course Gutschmid is decidedly right in saying that an expedition from Arpâd to Samaria cannot have been considered a mere insignificant side excursion.

It is not only probable, but it is certain, that *magupati* is the prototype of *môbadh*. The Pehlevi still writes the expression thus, מגופת. As early as the fourth century it must have been pronounced *môpat*, Syriac ܡܘܦܬ.

Respecting the very correct opinion that the Assyrians were in truth an unspeakably abominable people, we may note that Assyriologists have really thought so too. See, e.g. Maspero's "Hist. anc. des peuples de l'orient," p. 283. By passages like this quoted one he makes up, in some measure, for the many serious faults of his book.

May Gutschmid's book have the effect of making Assyriologists more methodical, less at their ease, and more self-denying; but may it also inspire those who are not Assyriologists with a wholesome distrust of these decipherings. Gutschmid justly considers it a questionable proceeding that the results of these men should be given to the public, and this by authority, too, as if the investigations were completed and closed. The wish to check this authoritative publication, as far as lay in his power, has led him to enter into controversy which must of necessity be aimed chiefly against Schrader. If Gutschmid attacks this Assyriologist more zealously than he attacks others, if he occasionally praises this other man or that for a more correct judgment on some question of detail, still, of course, he by no means considers Schrader to be the weakest of them all. There are several other decipherers who would have afforded Gutschmid far more abundant material for criticism. Th. N.

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ARTICLE VI.

SYMMETRY AND RHYTHM.

BY REV. THOMAS HILL, D.D., LL.D., FORMERLY PRESIDENT OF HARVARD COLLEGE.

It is a fault, or else an excellence, of human language that no word long remains perfectly unambiguous. We at first coin a word to express an idea, and presently either expand its meaning to cover kindred ideas, or contract it, and restrict it to a part of its original signification. Even in the mathematics, where, if anywhere, we should find words absolutely unambiguous, every symbol, every term, conveys more than one meaning, according to the connection of thought. The words "symmetry" and "rhythm" are, of course, no exception to this general law. Symmetry primarily, according to its etymological derivation, refers simply to equality of measure. But no man can consider seriously his own conception of symmetry, without discovering that he usually perceives in an object which he calls symmetrical something deeper and of more importance than a mere equality of dimensions. Hence we come to recognize two principal significations in the word. The first is a regularity of form which can be determined by compass and rule, consisting merely in the equidistance of points from some point, line, or plane of reference. The second meaning demands, in addition to this equidistance, — nay, even sometimes finds, in spite of failure to conform to the standard of rule and compass, — a higher quality, akin to beauty. This second meaning of symmetry contains an implicit recognition of geometric law. In like manner, rhythm refers primarily to a mere equal division of similarly recurring divisions of time; but in a higher sense asks that this regularly recurring division of time should be such as will produce agreeable

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sensations in him who perceives it. Before we can deal intelligently with our subject, we must therefore define clearly our ideas in relation to the laws of space and time. Symmetry does not refer, in its best sense, simply to material things, but to the space which they occupy. The Grecian architects discovered that a perfect conformity of material things to symmetrical forms did not suggest those symmetrical forms to the beholder so distinctly as they were suggested when the marble was made to deviate slightly, according to perspective laws, from the form which it was intended should be embodied in imagination by the beholder. The attempts of civilized governments to secure uniform weights and measures, in conformity to a single standard, show us how difficult, how impossible, to make a material substance exactly in conformity with an ideal measure. The objects which we call symmetrical we call so only because they suggest to our imagination symmetrical forms. Yet those forms exist not only in our imaginations, but in space also, and, out of our imagination and thought, in space only. And by space I mean that which the ordinary, common sense view of mankind understands by the term; not that which modern philosophers, or would-be philosophers, mean, but that which Plato meant — an incorruptible, eternal entity, having no other properties than its three dimensions, of boundless extent, and incapable of division or separation except through an act of intuition or imagination. The dimensions of a material thing arise from the property in matter of occupying space. The idea of space in the mind is not innate, but arises from the instantaneous perception of space by the intellect, on the occasion of the first perception by the senses of a body occupying space.

Space, being infinite in extent, and indivisible except in imagination, is handled by the human reason only through the means of negations; that is to say, the boundaries of its divisions themselves occupy no space; they are positive to thought, but negative, or rather zero, in regard to space. The first of these zeros is a surface; the second is a line; the third

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and most complete zero is a point. A point is an absolute negation of dimensions, but is located, or has position, in space. It is one of those contradictions in which the human mind finds itself involved, whenever it attempts to fathom the depths of its own thought, that we should thus speak of the position in space of that which does not occupy space. An equal inability is felt by the mind in attempting to locate a single point in space without referring to another point, or, indeed, to locate any body in space without referring to other bodies. We pass from points to lines in one of two methods, both inconceivable, and yet both necessary, in geometrical reasoning. We may define a line to be a series of points infinitely near together, but in which each is contiguous only to two others, and they on its opposite sides. The inconceivability of this conception lies in the point's having no dimensions; so that however nearly contiguous two points may be there is room for an infinity of points between them, and however infinite the number of points may be, since they have no dimensions, they cannot make length to a line.

The other mode of obtaining a line from a point is Newton's. It defines a line to be the path of a point moving in space; and its inconceivability lies in the fact that a point has been defined to be a mere position in space, which cannot be moved, although the attention may be transferred to other points.

We obtain the idea of a surface, in like manner, from a point, in two distinct ways. A surface may be defined as a series of points contiguous to each other, arranged in such a manner that they shall occupy no space, and yet, at each point, a series of points shall extend in every direction which is at right angles to a certain line passing through the chosen point. Or a surface may be defined as the path of a moving line, when the points in that line are not, by the motion of the line, moving in the direction of the contiguous points in the line. These modes of generating a surface have in them the same elements of inconceivability as the modes of gene-

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rating a line. A solid is simply a portion of space inclosed by a surface; and inasmuch as space is homogeneous, the geometrical properties of a solid are discussed in the discussion of the surface which incloses it.

The human mind has no interest in the discussion of points, lines, and surfaces, unless they conform to law, — unless they are obedient, as it were, to the mind. This figurative expression, obedience to law, may be best explained, perhaps, by Newton's conception of a line being generated by the motion of a point; although it may be justified, also, in the other way of looking at the composition of lines and surfaces. When a line, for example, consists of a series of mutually contiguous points so arranged that the position of each and every one may be defined by defining the position of any one, then we evidently may say that all these points are subject to one and the same condition of position. It is not a harsh figure to speak of them as obedient to that act of thought which defines the conditions of their position. If, now, we conceive, in Newton's fashion, a point as running through such a line, we may say that the point everywhere moves in obedience to one law — the law which defines what its position shall be at each part of its path. When we remember that a line extends only in one direction, and is absolutely without dimensions in the other directions, we see that this law which governs the motion of a point is exceedingly strict; it permits motion in the line with perfect freedom, but absolutely forbids any motion whatever out of the line. Both of these methods of explaining or justifying the figurative expression "obedience to law" may be applied to surfaces, as well as lines. A surface is a series of contiguous points, so arranged that we may, through any one of them, draw a straight line which shall be at right angles to all lines joining that point to contiguous points of the surface. That surface may be said to conform to law when each point in it is subject to one and the same condition of position; so that a point or a line moving in that surface may be considered as obeying in its motion always one and

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the same law, namely, the law or expression of thought which defines its conditions of position. And the law of surfaces is equally strict with the law of lines; the moving point is perfectly free to move in the surface, and absolutely forbidden to leave it.

It will readily be seen that these conditions of position must of necessity be intellectual conditions, since the parts of space have no property by which they can be distinguished from each other in any other way than by a mental act. We may express these conditions by language of a greater or less degree of accuracy and strictness, or we may represent them by diagrams, drawings, or models. Thus the circumference of a circle is a familiar term, sufficiently understood by every educated person; and its law may be expressed in various forms of ordinary language, or by geometric definition, or by equations of analytical geometry, or by a drawing or figure sufficiently accurate to suggest the exact idea. It will readily be seen that no circle made by human art of a material substance can be absolutely accurate, although in the best mathematical instruments an exceedingly close approximation is obtained. But the conception of a perfect circle is very readily awakened in the mind of the beholder by a diagram or drawing very far from exact accuracy. Many other figures which have been investigated, and expressed in the technical language of geometry and algebra, are also familiar to the minds of all educated persons; and a very precise idea of them is readily conveyed either by the forms of ordinary language, or by drawings which give only an approximate expression of their laws. There are also many beautiful figures, familiar to our eyes, which have not been analyzed, described, or defined in technical language, but which we instinctively feel must be capable of such expression under some future, or at least conceivable, increase of mathematical skill. Thus the varying forms of crystals distinctly suggested to every student the faith that they were subject to law, for a long period before the law was actually discovered and expressed in the modern systems of crystallography.

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Thus, also, the botanists had perceived that the leaves of plants are arranged in a kind of symmetry around the stem long before Peirce showed that they obeyed the simple law of division in extreme and mean ratio.

Symmetry in its higher meaning implies this obedience to law. The symmetical form is that which not only has equal dimensions in sundry directions, but that which is inclosed in lines, or surfaces obedient to law. This distinction between the better idea of symmetry and the inferior, has not been clearly made by many writers; but its reality has been felt, I suspect, by every student of nature or of art. A waving line made by equal arcs of circles, turning alternately to one side or the other, and having common tangents at their points of junction, is symmetrical in the lower sense; but it suggests, to every eye keenly appreciating beauty, a more beautiful line, the elastic curve, which obeys everywhere a single law, and does not, like the alternating arcs of circles, change its law when it changes its direction of curvature.

The sense of beauty is awakened by the embodiment of a simple law giving rise to a varied outline; and the degree of beauty felt by a cultivated beholder is in direct proportion to the simplicity of the law, and also to the variety, or complexity, of its manifestations. Another element enters into the formation of beauty, an element which makes a transition to the idea of rhythm. When in the consideration of symmetry we take Newton's notion of fluents and fluxions, and consider surfaces and lines generated by motion, we leave the consideration of pure space, and introduce the idea of time also. The motion of a point, at a uniform rate of speed, through a line obedient to law, must, must of necessity, be governed by rhythm, as well as by symmetry. In this conception of rhythm, the idea of number is much more prominent than in the conception of symmetry alone. By the definition of beauty which we have just given, both rhythm and symmetry should be more beautiful in proportion to the simplicity of the numerical ratios entering into

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them, and to the multiplicity of their combinations. Thus the law of phyllotaxis to which I have just alluded, embodies only the three smallest prime numbers, two, three, and five, but embodies them in such a way as to admit of unnumbered forms of manifestation.

The beauty of proportion has been conceded by architects and by painters, although it has not been clearly defined by them. In Hay's analysis of Grecian architecture he shows that beauty of proportion probably consists in the numerical ratio of angles to a right angle. The angles whose proportion constitutes the beauty need not be distinctly marked by lines, but must be strongly suggested to the imagination. Thus to take the simplest case, a rectangle is of fine proportion, when a diagonal would divide the right angle in the proportion of prime numbers smaller than ten. I have myself subjected this supposed law of Hay to independent experiment. Making a rectangle variable in its proportions, I have asked persons of good taste, ignorant of my design, and never having heard of Hay's law, to arrest my alteration of proportions in the rectangle at the instant when they deemed them most beautiful, and I have found that, in an overwhelming majority of cases, they stopped the movement of my hand at precisely the point where an imagined diagonal divided the right angle in the proportion of one to two, else in that of two to three. Such experiments tried upon a great variety of persons, both adult friends and pupils in high schools and colleges, have demonstrated to me the fact that the eye of persons having a taste for drawing and architecture, recognizes unconsciously, if I may use so paradoxical an expression, the existence of numerical harmony in the magnitude of suggested angles. A similar and still more extensive series of experiments which I have made in public schools, and in private circles, has convinced me that the child of civilized parents, to say the least, recognizes in music not only that numerical harmony which is found in the rhythmical movement of a composition, but also that hidden numerical harmony and proportion of ratios which lies concealed in

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the nature of musical tones, melodies, and progressions. Arrangements having been made by which the members of a large school should write down independently of each other, their impressions of the aesthetic meaning of a piece of music, heard by them for the first time, I have found that three quarters of the pupils were in substantial agreement concerning the precise shade of feeling which the music conveyed, and which I knew it was intended by the composer to convey.

Scientific men no less than artists have an implicit recognition of the existence of law and harmony in the external world. The history of progress in every science bears witness to this fact. Observers of nature have never been content with the mere observance of the facts of nature, but have always sought to group those facts together, and link them to each other, by intellectual bonds. Moreover from the earliest period there has been manifested, in the history of scientific progress, an invincible faith among scientific men that the facts of nature are capable of being arranged in conformity with intellectual laws; laws of geometry and algebra. Nor has this faith proved deceptive. In many cases centuries of observation and of patient study have been requisite in order to discover those relations in external things themselves, which correspond with or conform to symmetrical laws in space, or rhythmical movements in time; but whenever science has risen above empirical formulae to rational, scientific formulae, the victory has been accomplished. The origin of this conformity of external nature to the intellectual laws of space and time has not always been inquired into by the scientific mind; that is not a scientific problem. The scientific instinct prompts man to seek the law, and may lead him to a successful search, without even suggesting to him the question of the origin of the law. This latter question is suggested by a different, a metaphysical or religious instinct; and may be wisely and successfully pursued by one whose acquaintance with the results of scientific inquiry is but slight. No possible extension of the results of the investi-

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gation of external phenomena can affect the question of the origin of those phenomena; it may affect the question in what manner, in what order, the phenomena have arisen, but it cannot go back to the origin itself.

As a matter of fact no man confines himself exclusively to his speciality; whatever a man may devote himself to, as a profession, he has also some general culture, and is interested in the general questions which interest mankind. Indeed the interdependence of all branches of human knowledge makes it usually true that a man cannot become a successful student of a special department unless he lays a broad foundation, in a general knowledge of matters of human interest. The structure of scientific attainment is most secure, and can be raised to its loftiest height, only when its foundations are as wide and as deep as the individual character of the student's mind will permit. From this fact, that no man can be, even if he try, a pure specialist; and from the fact that a general culture is requisite in order to give the highest success in special pursuits; it follows that scientific men must speculate to a greater or less extent upon theological subjects; that men devoted to the natural sciences must have some knowledge of pure mathematics; and that theologians and mathematicians must peer into the laboratories of the physicist and the biologist, with liveliest interest. Men are not to be reproved for thus going "beyond their last"; they are not to be discouraged from thinking, and even speaking, upon subjects which lie out of their special sphere; only provided, that they retain a proper humility, and do not attempt to decide dogmatically upon questions, to which other men have given much more attention; with perhaps an equal or superior native ability to understand. But let it be recollected that the man of physical science is just as liable to misconceive and misunderstand a theological question, as a theologian to misconceive facts of natural science. The psychologist, mathematician, and theologian require no laboratory, they are unable in general to put their hypotheses to physical tests; but it does not follow that the

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investigations of the geometer and the metaphysician, and of the divine, require no intellect and no special training. W. R. Hamilton's Quaternions, and W. Hamilton's posthumous lectures, make as real a demand upon the reader, for intellectual power and intellectual training, as can be made by any writing of Helmholtz or Darwin. The effect of true culture ever must be to remove self-conceit, as well as to give confidence in the results of learning. The effect of a liberal education ought certainly to be a cultivation of the spirit of respect for all intellectual workers in whatever field.

In regard to the question of the origin of natural law, there have been mistakes by both great parties for whom these questions have most interest. The metaphysician and the theologian have frequently shrunk from the acknowledgment of the supremacy and universality of law, as though such a view would destroy human freedom, and make the world, as they express it, a mechanical, brazen universe. In the Duke of Argyll's "Reign of Law" he shows the fallacy of this judgment, and illustrates, in a varied and beautiful manner, how the presence of intellect may be made even more manifest in a universe governed by law. On the other hand, many scientific students have misconceived the theological position that all the universe is dependent upon the will of God, thinking that position inconsistent with the universality and invariability of law in the universe. The theologian admits no such incompatibility; since he regards the will of God as a power guided by absolutely infinite wisdom — a wisdom which foresees from eternity the best possible mode of action in all the absolutely infinite variety of cases which can arise. Indeed, the theologian claims that it is from his science that the idea of law in the universe can alone be legitimately deduced. Historically, it is, I believe, true that the earliest statements of the universality of law are found in connection with religious thought. To one whose mind has grasped the conception of the existence of an infinite Deity, of infinite wisdom and power, the whole universe is but the expression of a single thought, producing an infinite

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variety of detail, but also possessing a perfect unity. In this theological form the doctrine of the correlation of forces and of the consequent inter-dependence of all sciences, was familiar to metaphysical and theological writers long before its tardy confirmation, or partial confirmation, by the induction of physicists. And it appears to me that the popular modern school of Darwinians are in reality wandering far from this faith in the universality and invariability of law, to which they will be brought back, if brought at all, only by a closer metaphysical analysis of the postulates of science.

The natural sciences have, like the mathematics, their postulates; and among them is that of the invariability of law. It seems to me that they also require the postulate of the universality of law. In the introduction to his "Leben Jesu," Strauss endeavors to demonstrate both postulates by an appeal to a still higher axiom — the infinity of God. God being infinite, he says, can act only simultaneously throughout all space, and synchronously throughout the past and future eternities; that is to say, he can act only by universal and invariable law. The objection to this demonstration of Strauss lies in the form of necessity which he gives to his conclusion. By thus denying the ability of the Divine Being to act in any other than certain ways, he limits and destroys the very infinity from which he professes to draw his conclusion. But when we assign to the infinite Being the attributes of infinite knowledge and wisdom which even by Spinoza's pantheism we are compelled to do, we are ready to admit the conclusion of Strauss, with a limitation; the Divine Being will act by universal and invariable laws in every instance in which it is possible for such laws to accomplish the best ends. We cannot retain our intellectual clearness and unity of thought, if we admit that even infinite power can make finite contradictories both true. This is not putting a limitation upon infinite power, but simply asserting, although in a negative form, that God's wisdom also is infinite.

Before proceeding to show in what manner the philosophy

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of Erasmus and Charles Darwin denies the universality and invariability of law, it may be better to expand a little more fully our definitions of law. I have already said that a geometric law expresses the position of each one of an infinite number of points by defining the position of one point; in other words, that a series of points is said to be obedient to law when each one of the points is subject to one and the same mental condition of position. These mental conditions of position are always capable of algebraic or geometrical statement. In these statements of the condition of position two kinds of quantity are introduced — constants and variables. The variables express the relation of the position of a point to some fixed point, line, or plane; the constants express the manner in which the variables are connected in the law. It will thus be perceived that changes in the variables produce no change in the law, but simply take us from one point to another of a line, or surface, which obeys the law; while, on the other hand, changes in the constants make a change in the law itself. The magnitude of a change made by this change of the constants depends very much upon the nature of the law; for example, to change the constants in an ellipse changes the figure from a circle to a longer oval, or even to a parabola or hyperbola; while if we take a new form of the law of a parabola, we can no longer make it revert into an ellipse, but may, by the change of a single constant in it, alter it into a catenary, or into an elastic curve. The mathematicians have devised means of tracing all the possible variations of a law which cannot ordinarily be made by changes in the constants. If the number of constants is small, the number of changes is confined to a small number of cycles which may be thoroughly investigated. If, on the other hand, the number of constants is more than three, the number of variations in the law becomes much greater, and may be practically unlimited. For example, in the Ptolemaic system of the universe each planet was supposed to be carried upon the end of an arm rotating about the end of a second arm, which in its turn rotated about the

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end of a third, and so on. By varying the length of these arms and the velocity of their rotations, the planet can be carried in any orbit in which observation shows that it is moving. This Hipparchian device of successive deferents had been anticipated, by many thousand years, in the formation of the human arm, in which the humerus is a deferent rotating about the shoulder, the ulna rotates at the end of the humerus, and the metacarpal and phalangeal bones give, finally, to the fingers' end, the ability to move in any curve whatever. Thus to the human fingers is given absolute liberty of motion, yet in obedience to this epicyclic law, which ties them to the socket of the shoulder. But the instinctive faith of the scientific man always leads him to expect in the laws of nature, by which the movements of the physical universe are governed, a much greater simplicity. The expectation has sometimes been, as I have already said, long cherished before it was fulfilled. The careful observations of Chaldean astronomy were not satisfied by the discovery of the law, until Kepler, more than thirty centuries afterward, justified the labors and faith of those ancient astronomers. In this case, not only were the observations made many centuries beforehand, but the law itself, of the ellipse, had been prepared by the labors of the Greek geometers more than fifteen hundred years before it was discovered that it governed the motions of the heavenly bodies; and thus a law involving two constants was substituted for the epicycles involving twelve or fifteen. The history of science does not contain many so striking illustrations of the long interval which may elapse between the physical observations and the interpretation of them by the mathematician; but it contains innumerable examples of cases in which observers had almost despaired of the discovery of the law, or had thought that the law if discovered must be exceedingly complex, and then were surprised and rewarded for their patience by suddenly finding an exceedingly simple law governing all the intricate phenomena. We have, therefore, not only in the simple, ineradicable

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scientific instinct, which looks for law and order in the succession of physical phenomena, but also in an induction from the history of numerous scientific discoveries, a basis for our belief that in every series of phenomena a patient investigation will finally reveal a simple law. If in our day we repeat the Hipparchian and Ptolemaic experiment, making a complicated hypothesis, involving numerous constants, to explain a group of phenomena, — if we do this for any other purpose than a mere convenient mnemonic by which to bind the facts together, we are not only disregarding the scientific instinct, but also the warnings of the history of science.

But the scheme of evolution proposed by Erasmus Darwin, and made popular by the immense learning and agreeable style of Charles Darwin, seems to me to be precisely of this character; it is a virtual denial of the existence of law in a department in which the whole intellectual history of science would lead us most surely to expect the presence of law. The doctrine of the evolution of one organic form out of another has in itself an antecedent probability, It is, as Erasmus Darwin has said, more consonant with our ideas of the infinite wisdom and power of the Creator to suppose that he has made a universe capable of self-evolution. It evidently requires a higher power to create a plant or an animal capable of continuing its kind by reproduction, than to build the most ingenious machine incapable of multiplying itself. In like manner, it would seem to us a higher product of divine skill to find an animal capable not only of reproducing its kind, but of giving birth to new kinds, capable, again, of increasing and improving the nature of their descendants. Dr. Darwin expresses this probability by saying that it requires a higher infinity to create a cause of causes than to create a cause of effects. But we are not to build our theory of the universe upon *a priori* conceptions alone; we are carefully to observe the facts of nature. When we do reason from first principles, and from our conceptions of the attributes of God, we are carefully to test all our processes not only by the laws of logic, but by a comparison of their

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results with the facts of the external world. I have heard one of the finest living mathematicians argue with faultless logic for half an hour to arrive at the conclusion that the solar tides are greater than the lunar. Nothing but the inconsistence of this result with the notorious facts of observation led him to review his mathematical calculations, and to discover its error, singularly enough, in the very first axiom which he assumed in the beginning. The doctrine of evolution assumes the possibility of evolution; and certainly this assumption cannot be considered as axiomatic. Nevertheless, it is not the doctrine of evolution which I regard as being in conflict with the universality of law; it is only the form of that doctrine adopted by the Darwins. The offensiveness of the form does not appear so distinctly in the writings of the grandfather; it is the grandson who sets forth its marked opposition both to teleology and morphology. The doctrine of teleology I have defended in this journal, and do not propose to touch upon it at the present time; it is from the morphological side alone that I wish to show the improbability, if evolution has taken place in the organic life of the globe, of its having taken place through the variations of species and the "survival of the fittest."

The form of the ultimate atoms of matter, if it consist of atoms, as is now usually assumed, may be wholly unknown. But the molecules of almost all substances known to us are evidently of regular form. The chemist and physicist suppose that even those elements which seem in our present knowledge amorphous in their molecular constitution, may, under some future torture of experiment, reveal themselves in crystalline form. The minute molecular motions which produce what we call the secondary qualities of matter are all rhythmical in their character; the molecules, therefore, obey law in time and in space; hence they probably obey law in their dimensions. The atomic weights of elements are not manifestly governed by law; and yet Professor Pliny E. Chase has shown from spectroscopic analysis, the probability that they are arranged in laws of harmonic proportion.

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Certainly, the combinations of molecule with molecule are governed by simple numerical ratios. The cosmic masses of matter, it is well known, are obedient, in their larger motions, to law; and even the form of the apparently irregular upheavals of the crust of our earth is shown, by Peirce's acute observation on the direction of long coast lines and long mountain ranges, to have been controlled by the crystalline formation of rocks. When we come to examine organic matter the same symmetry and rhythm become even more apparent. The organic world is a system of time-keepers; each creature has periodic functions; it responds to the revolution and rotation of the earth and of the planets. And this periodicity is even more marked in the higher than in the lower organizations. The movements of organic bodies are rhythmical; their forms also are symmetrical. The form of a plant or of an animal is governed by geometric law, as really as is the form of a crystal; the force which regulates the growth even exhibits strong symptoms of polarity such as is manifested in the molecular movements of unorganized matter. But there is a much higher symmetry in the plant and animal than in the crystal; new constants seem to be introduced into the law of its formation, which also by their variation give a still greater freedom of arrangement to the expression of law. In the highest plants and animals this symmetry of form and rhythm of movement give us our most perfect realization of the idea of beauty. The human imagination has never been able to exceed in its ideals of beauty the forms which are suggested and almost perfectly realized in the bodies of men and of the highest plants and animals.

The laws of symmetry and rhythm which govern the inorganic world were not revealed to the human intellect until after many centuries of patient observation and laborious comparison. Nor have they yet been fully laid open to the gaze of science. Physical investigations are pushed with more fervor to-day than ever before, and are yielding daily richer returns to the explorer. The laws which govern the

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form of organic beings will probably require even more assiduous observation and more laborious comparison; but they must finally be revealed to the patient student. But the complete expression of law requires algebraical and geometrical language; and the students of organic being can never attain complete success, until they have called in the assistance of the mathematician. Thus the botanists had given a very imperfect representation of the law of phyllotaxis until, less than thirty years ago, Peirce showed that it was the law of extreme and mean ratio; then Chauncey Wright proved that this ratio gave the most equal distribution of leaves about the stem; and Dr. Hilgard ingeniously connected it with a law of development of cells. Zoölogy had made many attempts at the classification of animals, and Agassiz had shown that the most varying schools in that science attained substantially similar results; but Peirce, in his lectures on analytical morphology, has alone given a foundation of mathematical certainty to any part of their scheme, by showing that the physical condition of the earliest embryo requires it by mechanical principles to take substantially one of four forms, by a mechanical necessity as imperious as the true form of an arch to enable it to sustain its own weight.

Since law thus pervades the world, from the molecule up to the highest organized being, it is an induction of the highest probability that law governs the classification of plants and animals — that Peirce's reduction of Cuvier's four branches to mechanical conditions of equilibrium is but the precursor of geometrical and algebraical generalizations which shall hereafter give to classes, orders, families, and genera the like clear, sharp definition. This, evidently, has been the strong, though vaguely defined, faith of most of the zealous students of the classificatory sciences in all ages of the world. They have with one voice condemned those who laid out an *a priori* system, and endeavored to arrange the facts of nature under it. They have evidently believed that in their classification of plants and animals they were de-

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scribing external facts. Whewell, in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, supposes ideal types of species to be described, and the individuals to be assigned to the type which they most nearly resemble. Of course, this is practically the mode in which plants and animals are classified; but in the mind of the botanist and zoölogist there had generally been a hidden feeling that the creatures themselves are as distinct as the ideal types; indeed, the idea of the type is but derived from the creature.

But under Charles Darwin's teaching all this is rapidly being changed. The naturalist begins to doubt whether there are any lines of demarcation in nature other than have been produced by the dropping out, by the annihilation, of a part of a series. He says that if we give him specimens enough of two or three closely allied species he can so arrange them that it shall be impossible for us to decide where one species ends and another begins. The like ambiguity is affirmed with regard to genera and higher divisions. I grant the fact; but I deny the conclusion that there is no distinction between the groups in nature. Much more emphatically would I deny that the fact points to a gradual evolution of one form from the other. I grant the fact only for the sake of argument; for I believe that it is not strictly a fact. I I think that an eye quick to detect botanical and zoölogical characteristics needs only a little more patient training to enable it to distinguish between specimens most closely resembling each other. There are many differences distinguishable to our senses which we nevertheless cannot describe with any sharp definition by words. Thus the difference between the apple and the pear, between the plum and the cherry, between the acorn and the chestnut is apparent to our senses, but is almost, if not quite, inexpressible in any terms of botanical science.

The complementary truth also holds, that the intellect can sometimes very clearly distinguish things indistinguishable by sense. Thus the elastic curve has, at the extremities of its series of variations, a straight line and a circle; and

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these straight lines and circles are indistinguishable to the eye, and even to the imagination, from the straight line and circle which we can produce by varying the eccentricity of an ellipse. Yet reason, which in the hands of the geometer transcends even imagination, shows that the two circles are entirely different, and also the two straight lines — that they cannot be considered alike, except by a process which would confound all intellectual distinctions, and destroy the possibility of science. The ellipse and the elastic curve belong to genera very far removed from each other — much farther than the oak from the chestnut; yet each in its variations may reach the form of a circle.

The observer unacquainted with mathematics might think that the ellipse could pass through the form of a circle into an elastic curve, and *vice versa;* but he cannot induce the geometer to consider it possible. When the forms of the oak and of the chestnut are as thoroughly understood by the botanist as two thousand years of labor have rendered the forms of the ellipse and the elastic curve understood by the geometer, the botanist will probably be able to make a clear statement of the difference between them, and will wonder that they were ever thought indistinguishable.

I look upon both questions as problems in geometry. The classification of plants and animals proceeds fundamentally upon differences of form or shape, and takes questions of magnitude, color, longevity, temperament, chemical nature, physiological peculiarities, only into secondary consideration. But every question of classification of forms is a geometrical question, and is to be decided by geometrical canons. The botanist and zoölogist may rebel, but they will rebel in vain. The numbers of Pythagoras and the axioms of Euclid are inexorable. The fates themselves cannot violate the laws of arithmetic and geometry; much less can fluttering theorists, however large their balloon, break through those adamantine bars. The erratic genius of DeMaillet and of the Darwins has built a plausible and ingenious theory, which, if I understand them, proposes to give up the problem of

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classification as unreal and impossible. According to this theory, when carried out to its fullest extent, there is but one kind of matter, which remains tolerably stable in its properties, but is subject to a very gradual change. When some portion of it has changed into a condition in which it chances to be stable and useful, the change is partially arrested. Thus out of the one element, some sixty have been formed. As these encounter and mix they form passive compounds, indefinitely various. Those which chance to have a more stable constitution remain, and we get minerals. But, in the muddy turmoil of the elements, a very peculiar compound, curiously unstable, was once formed, which has proved marvellously stable in its instability. This was a living germ. It multiplied; it took various forms; it became a plant; it became an animal; it developed the senses, perfectly in the animal, imperfectly in the plant; it developed sex, perfectly in the animal, imperfectly in the plant; it finally developed consciousness, intellect, conscience in man. All this was done by insensible gradations, so that if we could only have the complete line of generations, from Caucasian man back to the minute microscopic germ which first appeared on the planet there would be no break anywhere. Englishmen a thousand years ago were very much what they now are; ten thousand years ago they were not sensibly inferior to their present condition; a hundred thousand years there might possibly have been a slight inferiority in their physical powers; a million years ago they were still men, much higher than any present existing ape. Thus the change is very slow, and the time when the present species of animals began must be millions of years ago. The time since life began on the planet must at this rate be uncounted myriads of millions of ages. But, said I to an earnest Darwinian, the physicists are not inclined to allow more than one hundred millions of years since the earth was red hot over its whole surface. "So much the worse for the physicists," replied he. Such is the confidence of this school that their non-solution is the only solution of the problem of classification.

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I call it a non-solution, because it denies the existence of any order or plan in the variations of organic structure. Evolution says that the development of the plan of the organic kingdoms was accomplished under the pressure and stimulus of the inorganic surroundings of the creatures. But Darwinism, affirming the development to have been by insensible gradations, denies, in effect, the existence of a plan. The appearance of a plan arises in their view simply from the gaps making apparent divisions between species where there are none. Classification is in their eyes merely a matter of human convenience; it is applied to the organic kingdoms in the same way in which the modern physicist applies the epicycloidal curves of Hipparchus to the curves of temperature, or barometric pressure. Whatever be our judgment concerning the reality of evolution, it seems to me in every way improbable that evolution has taken place, or is taking place, in any lawless or haphazard fashion; making all the labors of classification as empty of intellectual meaning as though they had been expended upon the forms of flying clouds, or the disposition of the settlings in cups of tea. The tone of the whole Darwinian literature is that of a retreat; it virtually calls upon the botanist and zoölogist to give up any further attempt upon the problem of classification; declaring the fortress in which the secret is intrenched to be invulnerable.

Agassiz's Essay on Classification, and his Methods of Study are, on the contrary, trumpet-calls to a forward movement, and awaken enthusiastic hope and firm resolve in the heroes who lead them. They call on the naturalists to press forward in the same direction in which the army has been moving since the days of Aristotle. Agassiz shows that, from the earliest Greek to the latest French and German efforts, there has been a virtual agreement among all students concerning the main divisions of the animal kingdom; this agreement has, in regard to a large portion of the kingdom, extended even to the details of species and genera. This substantial agreement in the boundaries between the divis-

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ions, he thinks, argues the possibility of a future agreement as to the intellectual grounds for placing the boundaries as they are; and he proceeds to indicate the character of those grounds as they appear to him. Agassiz was peculiarly fitted for this work; not only by his marvellous knowledge of details, in which he was the peer of Darwin, but by his breadth of philosophical views, in which he was far superior, as it seems to me, to any of his noted contemporaries. In the university he had passed, with honor, a searching examination on the philosophy of Plato, learned from Plato's untranslated writings; and this had qualified him for these higher walks of his own specialty. Deficient in sharpness of self-conscious psychological observation, he was pre-eminent in quickness and accuracy of external sense; and pre-eminent in the rapidity, breadth, and soundness of his generalizations from external observation.

His principles, in the form laid down in the Essay on Classification, may not stand the test of a careful comparison with facts, but they will, at some day, be slightly modified and reannounced by some grateful student; and will then stand the test. For their final vindication they will require a mathematical enunciation. This has been the destiny of other physical sciences; and the analogy of the physical sciences leads us to suppose that it must be the goal of biology also. The vagueness of arbitrary variation and survival of the fittest is a poetical dream; it must give way to the intellectual, scientific sternness of invariable law bounded by invariable conditions. As the four primitive forms of the embryo flow from necessary mechanical conditions, inflexible as the law of equilibrium in arches, so the classes, the orders, families, and genera are doubtless formed by the operation of sharply defined conditions, — sharply defined in nature, although not yet defined in human thought.

Such seems to me to be the teaching of the history of the inductive sciences; and such the instinctive faith of the most truly scientific and courageous naturalists and mathematicians. The geometer will not willingly relinquish the

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hope of great triumphs in the future; when the new methods of the nineteenth century shall be as faithfully applied to the problems of organic form, as the methods of the seventeenth have been to those of inorganic matter. If the naturalists retreat at the sound of the Darwinian bugle, and the trumpet of Agassiz fails to rally them, the mathematicians will press forward and win the field.

It is scarcely necessary to say to readers of the Bibliotheca Sacra that, with faith in the wisdom and truth of the Creator, to re-enforce geometric and scientific instinct, it becomes still more evident that the rhythm and symmetry of the organic kingdoms is not the result of accidental arrests and erasures in the remains of an insensibly slow variation. I have heard a deluded girl drum upon the piano, infatuated with the belief that she was possessed by the spirit of the mighty Beethoven; but in that monotonous succession of the simplest chords there was no rhythm in the higher sense; nothing to indicate the presence of any but the feeblest intellect, and the most uncultivated taste. I have, on the other hand, heard an indifferently trained orchestra play, I knew not what, except as the sounds themselves told me, and I instantly recognized the work as the work of a great mind and a noble heart. The rhythm and harmony of the organic world reveal the power, the wisdom, the love, of an infinite God. Even the system of Darwin, if it can be called a system, admits, by its doctrine of the survival of the fittest, the fact that each creature is, in general, fittest for the place it occupies; and only endeavors, with strange inconsistence, to show here and there a maladaptation. It is in poor taste, and less wisdom; it is worse than it would be for some sciolist in music to attempt to show that Bach's music did not come from a master mind, because here and there a passing note is introduced in a melody without connection with the fundamental harmony. It is better for the young student in music to assume in all his studies that Bach was a profound master, and that his works are the best models for harmonic effects. And so long as man is less than the universe in which he

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dwells he may safely assume that all is well and wisely put; and that it is his wisest and best course of study to seek everywhere, in every department of nature, not for discords and maladaptions, but for harmonies, correlations, adaptations. The universe is the sum of all symmetries, and contains all geometries, architectures, sculptures, and pictorial arts. It is the sum of all rhythms, melodic or harmonic, and contains all algebra, poetry, music, and dance. The divine Word which created it is wisdom and love, and manifests wisdom and love in every syllable and tone in which it utters itself; not least in the wondrous series of the forms of plants and animals, swaying in the responsive rhythm of growth and decay, sleep and activity, generation and succession, to the periodic march of the planets, the moon, and the sun.

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ARTICLE VII.

THE CONTROVERSY AMONG THE PROTESTANT MISSIONARIES ON THE PROPER TRANSLATION OF THE WORDS GOD AND SPIRIT INTO CHINESE.

BY S. WELLS WILLIAMS, LL.D., PROFESSOR OF THE CHINESE LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE IN YALE COLLEGE.

The following list enumerates the principal pamphlets and articles on this discussion which have been written by Protestants:

An Essay on the proper rendering of the words *Elohim* and *Theos* into the Chinese Language. By William J. Boone, D.D. pp. 69. Canton. 1848.

Defense of an Essay on the proper rendering, etc. By William J. Boone, D.D., Missionary Bishop. pp. 169. Canton. 1850.

Remarks on the best Term for God in Chinese; also on the proper Basis of Compromise on this subject. By Rev. L. B. Peet of Fuhchau. pp. 31. Canton. 1852.

Shin *vs.* Shangti. A review of the Controversy and Statement of the Evidence, etc. By a Life Member of the Bible Society [Rev. Jacob Tomlin, of the L. M. S. Mission at Malacca]. pp. 20. London. 1854.

Letter from the Bishop of Victoria on the Chinese Version of the Holy Scriptures, to T. W. Meller, Secretary of the British and Foreign Bible Society. pp. 26. Hongkong. 1851.

Report on the Chinese Version, presented to and adopted by the Directors of the American Bible Society. Signed by S. H. Turner and R. S. Storrs, Jr. pp. 4. New York. 1850.

The Term Question; an Inquiry as to the Term in Chinese which most nearly represents *Elohim* and *Theos*, etc. By W. A. Russell, D.D., Missionary Bishop. pp. 47. Shanghai. 1877.

The Chinese Term for God. A letter to the Protestant Missionaries of China. By J. S. Burdon, Bishop of Victoria. pp. 17. Hongkong. 1877. — Another was addressed to the Archbishop of Canterbury.

The above are the leading pamphlets in favor of *Shin* as the translation of *Elohim*. Besides them, the Chinese Repository, Missionary Recorder, and China Review, periodicals printed at Canton, Shanghai, and Hongkong during the last thirty years, contain other articles on both sides.

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The following list contains the leading pamphlets in favor of *Shangti* as the proper word for God in Chinese.

An Inquiry into the proper Mode of rendering the word God into the Chinese Language. By W. H. Medhurst. pp. 170. Shanghai. 1848.

Letter to the Protestant Missionaries laboring in China (proposing the transfer of Aloah as a rendering of *Elohim* and *Theos*). By W. H. Medhurst, and five others. pp. 22. Shanghai. 1850.

On the true Meaning of the word *Shin* as exhibited in the Imperial Thesaurus. By W. H. Medhurst. pp. 88. 1850.

Inquiry into the proper Mode of translating *Ruach* and *Pneuma* into Chinese. By W. H. Medhurst. pp. 75. 1851.

Dissertation on the Theology of the Chinese, etc. By W. H. Medhurst. pp. 280. Shanghai. 1847.

An Inquiry as to the proper Mode of rendering the word God into Chinese, etc. By Sir George T. Staunton, Bart. pp. 67. London. 1849.

Argument for Shangti as the proper Rendering of *Elohim* and *Theos* into the Chinese Language. By J. Legge, D.D. pp. 73. Hongkong. 1850.

Letters on the Rendering of the name God in Chinese. By James Legge, D.D. Hongkong. 1850.

Notions of the Chinese concerning God and Spirits, etc. By James Legge, D.D. pp. 166. Hongkong. 1852.

Thoughts on the Term proper for Translating *Elohim* and *Theos* in Chinese. By a Missionary [E. Doty]. Chinese Repository, Vol. xix. 1850.

The Question of Terms simplified, etc. By Rev. John Chalmers. pp. 128. Canton. 1876.

Teachings of Experience in the use of Terms for God at Foochow. By Rev. C. Hartwell. pp. 11. 1877.

Who is God in China, Shin or Shangti? By Rev. S. C. Malan of Baliol College, Oxford. pp. 310. London. 1855.

THE discussion which has been going on among the Protestant missionaries in China, respecting the most suitable words in the Chinese language to translate the Scriptural terms for *God*, *god*, and *spirit*, has probably attracted the notice of those persons in this country who are interested in the progress of missions among that people. It is in many respects a most important discussion, and well deserves careful inquiry by those who like to know the details and results of the mission work in that empire. I do not know that any full account has been published for the information of such persons in this country, and a summary of the leading

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arguments used by the advocates of the various terms proposed may interest them. It will not be supposed, by any one conversant with the objects and character of the pious and learned men now engaged in proselyting efforts among the Chinese, that they would adopt any terms to express such fundamental ideas as *God* and *spirit* without most careful examination of their meanings; and the fact that China is the only country where a controversy on the choice has ever arisen, indicates some peculiarly difficult features in that language or people.

It has now been going on for thirty years, during which time it has grown more marked and divisive in its results, instead of drawing the parties together to agree upon those terms which might be deemed suitable. The matter has also been referred to the consideration of the two great Bible Societies in Great Britain and the United States, and their Directors have indirectly been drawn into the discussion by being asked to furnish the funds to print and circulate versions with different terms. Bibles and Testaments, with religious books in vast numbers and variety, have been disseminated in which the words *elohim* and *ruach*, *theos* and *pneuma* (*god* and *spirit*), are rendered by the same word in Chinese, which must therefore be understood in different senses by their readers to get at the meaning of the writers. Some confusion in the minds of native readers, who compare these books, must arise as to the Being or Beings who are really meant by their several authors. It is not easy to see how this untoward result could have been avoided, nor what consequences may yet flow from it, for there is no present prospect of any change in the usage of the two parties.

The discussion has its origin partly in the nature of the language of the Chinese, but really more in their pantheistic cosmogony. This is of course very vague, but their most acute philosophers suppose the existence of two necessary or eternal principles called *li* and *ki* (fate and substance), which by their intro-action evolved the material universe in accordance with the operation of the indwelling *shin* in the *li*. They

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invest these causes with life, or make life flow from them, and then use the powers, beings, and laws thus set in motion to explain whatever exists and acts. The examination of this cosmogony in connection with this discussion has already brought out much knowledge respecting the religious notions of the Chinese, which is most valuable to every student interested in the searches mankind have made to find out God.

When Ricci and other Roman Catholic missionaries began to teach Christianity, they soon perceived the difficulty of finding fit terms in the Chinese language for their new ideas. Their disputes were carried on for nearly a century, with no prospect of even then reaching an amicable solution, when the main points were settled by a Bull of Pope Clement XI. in 1715, which was the sixth that had emanated from the holy see. This ordered all the missionaries in China to avoid the use of *Shangti*, and designate the word God (*theos*) by the phrase *Tien-chu*, or Lord of Heaven, and Spirit (*pneuma*) by the word *shin*. The controversy thus closed has not been re-opened, and that usage has since obtained a great currency by their books and teachings. Abbé Huc has given a summary of the whole matter in his History of Christianity in China, and the numerous records of their leading arguments can be profitably consulted by those who are desirous of seeing what those erudite men, Ricci, Longobardi, Visdelou, Navarette, Moralés, etc., said in behalf of their opinions, and comparing them with recent utterances. It should be mentioned that the party of Ricci, which argued for *Shangti* as being the best word for *God*, also advocated, or would allow, the worship of ancestors and of Confucius, which was condemned in the same Bull.

Their discussions were peremptorily closed by an authority that Protestants cannot acknowledge for their guidance. This mode of settlement tends to weaken the weight which might otherwise be given to arguments brought forward on both sides, if those arguments had settled it. No reasons were given by the Pope as having influenced his decision. Du Halde says, "That the dispute between the two orders

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of missionaries (Jesuits and Dominicans) was rather personal than religious; all Europe was soon overflowed with a deluge of writings, which let the world see that it was not so much the Chinese ceremonies as the persons of those Fathers that were struck at." But Du Halde himself was a Jesuit. Their controversy toward the last assumed a little different phase from the present one; for, while one side advocated *Shangti*, the other urged *Tien* or *Tien-chu* as the most suitable term for the true God; but neither of them doubted as to *shin* being a suitable word for *spirit*, or proposed it as a translation of *elohim* and *theos*. Most of them seem never to have perceived the necessity of using two generic native words to denote *god* and *spirit* in order to render those two ideas as clear and distinct in the Chinese language as they were in the Scriptures and all European languages. It cannot be too carefully remembered, that in our search through Chinese literature for two words to express these ideas, it is idle to expect to find them already in it, since no pagan nation can have the knowledge of what Revelation alone teaches on these points, and learn that the real beings designated *God* and *spirits* are entirely distinct. When translating from the Chinese language we can interchange the words *god* and *spirit* to express our own notions of what they mean, without doing any violence to their conceptions. We can say, for instance, the *God of fire*, and the *spirit of a dead man*, in doing which we are partly transferring our own distinctions to their writings, by rendering one word in Chinese with two in English. This is necessary, perhaps, to convey the clearest expression of the native idea in its foreign dress; but the liability to imbibe the impression that the same distinction exists in the native language must be apparent to every one. This, of course, more or less inheres in all words brought from one language to another, and those in the poor and inaccurate tongue will always get a new growth and strength by the definite ideas transferred into them from the other; but we need much care in estimating their original value, when the opinions and conduct of those who use them are to be discussed.

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Before stating the leading arguments adduced in the present discussion, it is proper to indicate the peculiar difficulties presented by the Chinese language in defining the terms in question, and solving some of their applications as demanded by the Scriptures. One is the fixedness of the characters. No word in Chinese undergoes any change to represent its use as a verb, noun, or adjective; to indicate its position in the nominative, genitive, or accusative cases; or to show its number, gender, or tense. They are all, like our ten digits, unalterable. The difficulties arising in common life from the want of a singular and plural are partly obviated in many ways, such as stating the actual number, involving it in the context, or if not very important, letting the hearer or reader guess it. When the object is to express visible things, number can be easily denoted if necessary; but when spiritual, unseen, metaphysical, or imaginative terms are wanted, or are to be defined, this vagueness presents a real difficulty in the way of ascertaining or conveying accurate ideas. The Chinese themselves do not, of course, perceive it in its full extent, until they learn other languages; but its existence illustrates how loose their modes of thought are in comparison with those who use Greek or German.

One result of this feature is that the people think and speak loosely. Unless limited in some way, their common appellative and generic nouns, as *man*, *house*, *ship*, convey to most minds rather a plural idea; and this is even more the case with invisible things like *god*, *demon*, *fairy*. All this increases our difficulty in ascertaining exactly what they mean, and also in conveying the precise idea which we wish to teach to them. Bishop Boone remarked, when speaking of a version of the New Testament, and the diffuse style desirable to be adopted to render its teachings easily understood, "I have known instances, in my own efforts to make translations with the aid of Chinese teachers, of their insisting on the non-necessity of inserting words, which they declared no one could fail to supply; when the very parties themselves having forgotten, after the lapse of some time,

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what word was to be supplied, have made blundering work in the attempt to explain what they themselves had written."

The disregard of gender is indicated more by the want of separate terms to distinguish sex than by the impossibility of modifying the characters to show it. Particular words to denote *mare*, *cow*, *hen*, *doe*, and a few other similar terms exist; but the common usage is to add *kung* or *mu*, *nan* or *nü*, *mau* or *pin*, to the generic noun in order to describe the sex. Thus, *pin yang* means *ewe*; *ki kung*, a cock; and even *nü jin*, a *female man* is the most usual phrase for a woman. There are many deities in China whose sex cannot be certainly decided from anything attributed to them.

This vagueness in number and gender has had much to do with the definition and discussion of the proper words for *god* and *spirit*. It is remarkable, too, how the constant rendering by one party of *shin* as *god*, and by the other as *spirit*, has gradually led each to forget, in some measure, the native uses for both those foreign words. They seem to have overlooked their loose application by the Chinese, from having given them their own more definite and accurate ideas of *god* or *spirit*, according as they have translated them.

The Protestant literature of the Term Question, as this discussion is commonly called in China, has already attained considerable dimensions. The debate has turned chiefly on the points whether *Shangti*, *Tien-chu*, or *Shin* shall be used to denote the true God. One party maintains that God should be denoted by one of the first two, and the third term be solely applied to spirit. A second party proposes to denote *Elohim* or God by *shin*, and express *ruach* or spirit by the word *ling*. A third party wishes to use one or other of the first two terms for God, *shin* for gods (false gods), and *ling* for spirit. Other terms have been less used and advocated to designate God. Among these, *Ti*, a Ruler; *Tien-ti*, Heavenly Ruler; *Tien-shin*, Heavenly God; *Shang-chu*, Supreme Lord; and *Ta-ti*, Great Ruler, are the most common. Other phrases and combinations, like *Tien-fu*, Heavenly Father; *Chin-shin*, True God; *Shin-chu*, Divine Lord; *Tien-*

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hwang, Heavenly Autocrat, all more or less indicating their foreign origin, have come into partial use among missionaries according to their peculiar views. They are all, however, intended as the special designation for the true God, and not applicable, like the words *elohim* and *theos*, to all objects of worship, true as well as false. They are all, in fact, descriptive or proper names, not generic nor common terms such as is needed, and are like Jehovah, Aloha, Jesus, Messiah, Paraclete, etc., in their application. In vindication of these differing views many writers have come forward to explain and uphold the use of their chosen terms. On the side of *Shangti* and *shin*, the Rev. W. H. Medhurst, Rev. James Legge, D.D., Rev. John Chalmers, Rev. Charles Gutzlaff, and Rev. Elihu Doty in China, with Sir George T. Staunton, and Rev. S. C. Malan in England, have apparently exhausted the topic by their researches and arguments. On the side of *shin* and *ling*, Bishop Boone, Rev. Thomas McClatchie, Bishop Russell, Rev. L. B. Peet, Rev. A. P. Happer, D.D., and Rev. M. S. Culbertson, D.D., have written. Their two standpoints have been nearly diametrical. In general, it may be said that those on the first side have endeavored to find the name or deity which will come nearest in the Chinese conception to the true God, and through that name lead them up to him as the only object of worship; while their opponents have sought for the word for gods (*theoi*) in Chinese which includes them all, and can be made most effectual in teaching Chinese idolaters that there is only one God demanding their worship and obedience, and thus overthrowing their polytheism.

I shall endeavor to state succinctly the main arguments used for each word, and the objections urged against each, in such a way that the conditions of the controversy may be clearly understood. When it began in 1846, the advocates for *Shangti* and *shin* were mostly from among the British and German missionaries, and those in favor of *shin* and *ling* were nearly all of them Americans, and somewhat in the majority. In the interval of thirty years the usage of

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Shangti and *shin* has extended, and the proportion of British and German missionaries has greatly increased over the Americans. This, however, has not materially influenced the views of individuals; though a few instances are known where persons have found it so uncomfortable to preach *shin* and *ling*, where their brethren used *Shangti* and *shin*, that they have left the station or mission. At every leading missionary station in China both sets of words have been in constant use at the various chapels opened by men of different societies; and the converts have usually followed the teachings of their pastors.

In support of his argument in favor of *Shangti* Dr. Medhurst[1] quotes from the Imperial Dictionary of Kanghi, respecting *ti*, as follows, which I condense a little: "*Ti* means a judge, and is the designation of one who rules over the empire; he who in virtue is united to heaven; a sovereign; formerly *ti Yao* [the sovereign *Yao*] was intelligent, perspicacious, accomplished, and thoughtful, while his glory covered the empire. *Ti* is one of the names of Heaven, and the reason why Heaven is called *Ti* is because *ti* means to judge. This application of the word signifies that Heaven is widely extended over all, without any private feeling, forgetting the difference between self and others; his justice and equity pervade to the utmost distance, in everything judging and discriminating accurately. Therefore Heaven is called *Ti*. The five *ti* (early rulers of China) in their right principles assimilated to this standard, being able also to judge and discern, and therefore this name could be applied to them." The lexicon then says, *Shangti* means Heaven, or the Divinity, which Dr. Medhurst explains as being the Supreme Being in the estimation of the Chinese. Kanghi further tells us, "The five *ti* are the names of *shin*, or certain spiritual beings distinct from the Supreme."

Dr. Medhurst opens his argument for *ti* with the following remarks, with which, I think, most of those on his side of the question agree as expressing their own views on the place held by the term *Shangti* in Chinese writings:

[1] Inquiry, pp. 5, 6.

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"Here it may be premised that after the most studious research we have not been able to find any one term that fully answers to the words *elohim* and *theos* as used in the sacred Scriptures. In one important particular the Chinese ideas respecting God fall short of the truth; for they do not appear to ascribe the creation of heaven and earth to any one being. The Supreme in their estimation is variously designated as *Tien*, *Ti*, or *Shangti*, to whom they attribute the production and superintendence of all things. We do not find that they predicate of himself existence; nor do we remember that anywhere they expressly describe him as existing from eternity. At the same time, however, we nowhere meet with a single passage which speaks of the origin of *Ti*, nor of his deriving his existence from any other. On the other hand, all things are said to come from him, as children are said to spring from their parents. . . . . There can be no doubt that the Chinese use the word *ti* in the same way in which Western writers use the word "God" — that they ascribe to *Ti* such attributes as were usually ascribed to the Divine Being by the pagans of Greece and Rome. We therefore conclude that by *Ti* the Chinese mean the Supreme God, as far as they are acquainted with him. They also use this word when speaking of inferior spiritual beings who have some superintendence over different parts of the universe, and who, in the estimation of the Confucianists, were entitled to religious worship; while it is applied by both Taoist and Budhist writers to beings whom they consider as gods. The inference, therefore, is, that *ti* is descriptive of a class of beings, beginning with the highest and passing down to inferior divinities, and is therefore generic for *god* in Chinese."[1]

Dr. Medhurst then proceeds, by quotations from the ancient books and their commentators to show, under several heads,—I. That to *Ti* are ascribed the production and formation of all things, and the conferring of a virtuous nature on mankind; II. That *Ti* or *Shangti* is synonymous with *Tien*

[1] Inquiry, pp. 4–6.

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or Heaven; III. That he is called the Lord or Governor of heaven; IV. That divine decrees (*tien ming*) are ascribed to him; V. That a superintending providence is ascribed to him; VI. That divine acts and attributes are ascribed to him; VII. That sacrifices and worship of the highest kind are paid to him, as well as other beings called *ti*; VIII. That *shin* is viewed as an adjunct of, or something belonging to, *Ti* or *Shangti*, when the principal sacrifice is offered; and IX. That these terms are used for others beside the Supreme. Under this head he explains the description given "by the Taoists of the five *Ti*, and a variety of others, great and small, who must all be considered in the light of Gods, according to their creed"; and also of the views entertained by the Budhists, "who use *ti* in the sense of a divine, spiritual being."

Dr. Medhurst has given, with each head, many extracts from native authors in proof of these theses, most valuable in themselves as illustrating their religious notions, but beyond our space to quote. They are concluded by a list of twenty-six *Ti* and *Shangti* who are worshipped by Confucianists and Taoists, of whom there are only six specially designated as *Shangti*, the rest being termed *Ti* (Rulers), *Ta Ti* (Great Rulers), or *Shing Ti* (Holy Rulers), all indicating their high position in the Chinese pantheon. These six are called the *Shangti* of the Expansive Heavens, of the Imperial Heavens, of the Original Heavens, and of the Sombre Heavens, the Perfect Imperial *Shangti*, and *Shangti* without any epithet. The first two are regarded as synonymous with the last, and are worshipped in the state religion.

From this application of both these terms to a variety of gods, Dr. Medhurst proceeds to argue that *ti* is necessarily a generic term for *god*, and though it also means *ruler* and *heaven*, and should be so translated in general, its meaning as a relative noun, limiting its application to ruler as the converse of ruled, does not prevent it being used as the generic term to translate *elohim*. He shows, from the attributes ascribed to *ti* under the above nine heads, that the relation of ruler is too limited to answer the requirements of his powers and

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position. These involve moulding and forming things, producing and completing things, leading and influencing men's minds, conferring a virtuous nature on mankind which results in sincere and reverential thoughts, and lastly, knowing all things, controlling the heart, and seeing its feelings more clearly than in the brightest mirror, — all of which prove him to be God. Further, the fact that *ti* is applied to other beings of a lower grade who are worshipped by the Chinese, like the *shin* and the *sien* (spirits and immortals) strengthens its use as a generic word for *god* and *gods*, like *theos* and *theoi*.

He also disposes of the objections against using *Ti* for God drawn from its modern use in the term *hwangti* for emperor, first adopted B.C. 225 by Tsin Chi Hwangti; and if the previous uses and meanings of the word are admissible in Christian books, this arrogant use by human sovereigns is no serious drawback to higher and divine ascriptions in Christian worship. The same thing was known in Egypt, Persia, and Rome, and their monarchs were more arrogant than the emperors of China.

On this resemblance he very well observes, "That it prevailed in both nations, and as the practice and all the superstitions connected with it gave way in Rome before the influence of Christianity in the days of Constantine, may we not hope that the same results will follow the propagation of the gospel in China in these latter days? The apostles, when they began to preach, found human rulers deified and regularly sacrificed to after their death, and the divine name frequently prefixed to that of human beings before and after their decease; but they did not object to use the word *theos* as generic for God, notwithstanding it was prostituted to such purposes." In time, as the truth was accepted, all this blasphemous use of *theos* among the Romans ceased; and so Dr. Medhurst concludes that the blasphemous use of *ti* for gods and men will cease in China, if it be used in the sacred Scriptures to denote all gods, both true and false. He goes on to show how its historical use by Chinese writers during

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two thousand years to designate deceased emperors will practically prove no impediment to its more accurate and elevated designation of the true God, any more than it has in Roman literature. If his premise has been proven, these deductions can easily be accepted; and there will be no confusion between *ti* when applied to God and when applied to deceased emperors; nor would inquiring readers make any mistake as to the intent of the first commandment, excluding worship of, or allowing divinity to, other beings than the true *Ti* or true God.

Dr. Medhurst then takes up the objections to *ti* on account of *dominion* being the leading idea involved in the word, and endeavors to prove that *divinity* and *virtue* are also necessary ingredients in the Chinese conceptions of *Shangti*, and *a fortiori* are not found at all in *shin* — a word that does not express the nature or attributes of God in any way. He devotes nearly one half of his essay to the examination of this much disputed word, to prove that it means *spirit* alone, and can never be made to mean anything higher than that among the Chinese, and that the attempt to force it to mean *God* will only result in confusion and failure. In conclusion, he compares *ti* and *shin* as follows:

"We have thus seen that *shin* means spirit; that as such it corresponds to the human mind and soul, and is applied to the various invisible intelligences who are supposed to have charge over different parts of the universe, in which sense of a spiritual intelligence the Supreme Being in the estimation of the Chinese is called a *shin*. It is, therefore, no more adapted to represent our word "God" than is the term "spirit" in any language; while the argument for employing the generic term for divinities does not apply here, inasmuch as *shin* is not generic for *gods* but *spirits*. To use it for *God*, therefore, would be subversive of the genius and structure of the language, and render the books written for the religious instruction of the Chinese vague and unintelligible; while, on the other hand, *ti* has been shown by many examples, to have moulded the frame of nature and

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conferred the virtuous principle on mankind. *Ti* is synonymous with Heaven in the sense of the Divinity, and at the same time the Lord and Governor of Heaven; *Ti* acts according to his will, and disposes of monarchs at his pleasure; the highest act of worship is paid to *Ti*. The word is also used in the plural, as referring to a variety of invisible beings honored with religious worship; and the divinities of the Taoists and Budhists are frequently called *Ti*. We conclude, therefore, that we are warranted by the Chinese lexicographers and the *usus loquendi* of the classical writers, in proposing *ti* and not *shin* to be used generically for *god* in the translation of the sacred Scriptures."[1]

In the desire, if possible, to secure unanimity among Protestant missionaries in regard to a term fit to be selected for *God*, Dr. Medhurst devotes the rest of his inquiry to advocating the adoption of the synonyme *Tien-ti* instead of *Shangti*. He says, "We are willing to suggest a cognate, but still more definite term [than *ti*], and to recommend the use of *tien-ti* generically for *god*." This proposal is fortified by several quotations from Chinese writers, all tending to show its identity with *Shangti*. Its general use by Taoists in the sense of the Supreme God, and for a class of beings who are treated by them with divine honors, ranging from the gods of the thirty-two heavens down to inferior *tien-ti* who rank with genii and immortals, is adduced and regarded as proof enough that this compound term, meaning *heavenly-ruler*, can be and is used as a generic term. He also brings forward some quotations from Dr. Morrison's writings where it had been used for the true God, to show its fitness to designate the three Persons in the Trinity. For instance, in one place Dr. Morrison describes them as *Tien-ti shin Fu*, *Tien-ti shin Tsz'*, and *Tien-ti shin Fung*; literally, Heavenly Ruler divine Father, Heavenly Ruler divine Son, and Heavenly Ruler divine Wind. This term is regarded by Dr. Medhurst as one which "no Chinese, by any possibility would misunderstand," when used generically for God; but it never

[1] Inquiry, p. 163.

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seems to have occurred to him how this proposal to invest a word of his own selection with all the attributes of a generic word for a new idea completely neutralized all he had written for the other, and left this one unsupported by his arguments for that. The two cannot be interchanged in all positions in this manner; and the fact still remains that objects of worship are never called *ti*, *Tien-ti*, or *Shangti*, but are called *shin*.

It may be observed, in this place, that no response ever followed this proposal of Dr. Medhurst to adopt *Tien-ti* as the generic word for *God*, or even *Ti* alone. In fact it is not always easy to decide from the Inquiry whether he intended *Shangti* or *Tien-ti* as the best word for God, and *ti* alone to designate all, both true and false gods; or whether he regarded the latter as the best word for *elohim* and *theos*, and the others as most proper to denote the name Jehovah or God. However, neither of them was ever adopted; being relative terms, they were too much like *fu* and *chu* (*father* and *lord*) to meet the wants of the case.

Rev. E. Doty upheld Dr. Medhurst's view in an article written soon after, in which he compares the uses of *shin* and *ti* as generic terms for *god* and *gods*, and shows their similarity to *daimon* and *theos* among the Greeks. He also illustrates how easy it is to misunderstand, in such discussions, the meaning of the terms used, when he remarks at the close, "It is extremely doubtful whether any being worshipped by the Chinese is by them regarded as a divine being." To the general reader of many of these essays, it is apparent that there was much confusion on both sides as to the precise meaning of terms, and discrepancy as to the objects in view.

Two years after (Jan. 1850), finding that the two terms did not meet with acceptance as a compromise, Dr. Medhurst and his five colleagues at Shanghai proposed to transfer the word *Aloha* as the name for *God*, in imitation of the usage of the Nestorians of early times. The chief arguments in support of this course were, that *Aloah* is sanctioned by Scriptural usage; that it freed both parties from all mixture with Chinese superstition; that no philological difficulties

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lay in the way; and that soon they would create for themselves a *usus loquendi* with the explanation of the new term given by all missionaries using it. This proposal met with no favor from any one. It really introduced a new foreign God by the name of *Aloah*, which could not be successfully used to counteract polytheism, and even the Mohammedans had been obliged to drop the word in their books; Allah has never obtained general circulation. It needed as much explanation to exhibit the truths of monotheism by it as the native terms *ti*, *shin*, *Tien-ti*, and *Shangti*. Its advocates soon dropped it, and no books were ever published in Chinese wherein it was used. Perhaps more weight would have attended their arguments if the language itself was not so inapt in assimilating all foreign words; but there really was no need of a foreign term, as the language had words to choose from. If a foreign term could have found currency, too, it is almost certain that the Roman Catholics would have suggested some such mode of settling their disputes, — a mode which has been attempted by the Russian missionaries in their versions by transliterating the word *theos* as *té-wu-sz'*. But this solution presents the same difficulty, and is inferior to *Aloha* from its novelty.

The "Inquiry" of Dr. Medhurst was published soon after the essay of Dr. Boone, but was probably written before its appearance. Both of these authors aimed at the same thing in the same way, viz., to find a word in Chinese corresponding to *elohim* and *theos*, which could be used as a generic appellation, as God, god, and gods are in English. Dr. Medhurst proposed *ti* as the common noun, and *Shangti* or *Tien-ti* as the peculiar term to denote the true God alone. Dr. Boone wrote in behalf of the word *shin* for god, and argued that it would gradually, in spite of its present vague and pantheistic uses among the Chinese, come to stand for the true God, whom they would come to know through revelation, just as the words *god* and *deus* had been elevated in English and Latin as Christianity had been gradually accepted by those who spoke them

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Following generally the same line of argument that Dr. Medhurst had done, but taking up the points of Bishop Boone's essay seriatim, Dr. Legge of Hongkong, in 1850, issued his "Argument" for *Shangti* as the only proper rendering of *elohim* and *theos* in the Chinese language. In this he went much farther than Dr. Medhurst. He "rejoiced to acknowledge in the Shangti of the Chinese classics and the Shangti of the Chinese people him who is God over all, blessed for ever..... There is at least one Protestant missionary who does not admit that the Chinese do not know the true God." In this argument he logically maintained, therefore, that *elohim* is not interchangeable with Jehovah, and "God cannot be rendered in Chinese by giving the characters used to represent [the sound] Jehovah." He also argued that it is not necessary that Jehovah should be known with all his attributes in order to the existence of a term in Chinese which may mean the same as the word *god* means in English. This main proposition was ably discussed in the Argument, and further advocated and illustrated in two subsequent pamphlets, called "Letters on rendering the Name God in the Chinese Language," and "Notions of the Chinese concerning Gods and Spirits." These three essays contain about all that can be said in favor of his postulate that *Shangti* is the name by which the Chinese know God; and all that Christian missionaries have to do, therefore, is to divest the name of its idolatrous associations by leading its worshippers to the revelation wherein God makes himself known. If anybody could prove that this was the truth, and the right way to make it known in all its fulness, certainly Dr. Legge has done it; and his writings have been the refuge and armory of those who have been called on to defend their use of *Shangti* for *elohim*.

Just about the time that the previous essays were published, the celebrated John Bowring, then British Consul at Canton, made a short review of the points at issue between their writers, showing that they were searching in the Chinese language for what had never been there, and would never

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be found, and therefore must be supplied. As a solution, he proposed to adopt the Greek letter Θ as the symbol for *Theos* or God, by which his nature was to be taught the Chinese. He refers to the universal use of *Allah* in all Mohammedan countries in support of his proposal; and it is somewhat strange that he did not advocate the use of it in Chinese, instead of an arbitrary symbol, having no sound. It found no advocates, and would, in fact, never have been made if its author had had a practical knowledge of the Chinese language and of mission work among the people. Dr. Boone shows that he had confused an idea (viz. the true God) which was not in the language with a being (viz. a god) which was there; and then asks the question, "Could Dr. Bowring kneel down, and pray to Θ, 'O Θ, have mercy upon me!' I surely could not." Moreover, Dr. Bowring forgot to ask himself, "How can I best teach the Chinese the name and attributes of Θ, so that they shall learn who God is?" The proposal of course fell to the ground; for it was both absurd and impracticable.

Far otherwise was the drift and results of a discussion on the subject by Sir G. T. Staunton, who wrote his "Inquiry" at the request of the directors of the British and Foreign Bible Society. He agreed with Dr. Medhurst in advocating *Shangti*, "because it had been employed in Chinese from time immemorial in a sense more nearly approaching to that which we attach to the word "God" than any other which at present exists in the language of the country." His search after the right term ended in approving *Shangti*, and the directors henceforth adopted the conclusions of so good a Chinese scholar and candid polemic; though they did not withhold aid from those missionaries who preferred other terms.

Another suggestion may be here mentioned. It was proposed by T. W. Meller, Editorial Secretary of the British and Foreign Bible Society, as a solution of the difficulty arising from the want of any indication of number in the word *shin;* for one of the most serious obstacles to its reception in a monotheistic sense was how to limit it to one being in

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common usage. This was to use *shin* for gods, and *Pi-shin* or *Shang-shin* for God, the God, or Supreme God, who alone ought to be worshipped by man. The philological difficulties to the adoption of either of these phrases were, however, so apparent and so numerous that both sides were obliged to decline them as a solution of their controversy.

Dr. Smith, Bishop of Victoria, about the same time proposed the term *Tien-shin* as a compromise, urging that as *Shangti* had been called the *shin* of heaven by Chinese writers, it could be made an acceptable term to all after a full trial, and had already obtained some currency in Morrison's writings. But though it had no idolatrous associations, it was felt to be less fitted for denoting God than *Tien-chu*, and the proposal met no response.

It will suffice, now, to indicate briefly the main points of Dr. Legge's argument to prove that *Shangti* is the name of the true God among the Chinese, and therefore that it is the only term proper to translate *god*, *elohim*, and *theos* in all their uses. In the two hundred and eighty-five closely printed pages of his three pamphlets, there is much research and learning. It is mostly extraneous to his main thesis, however, and I need only mention the leading proofs of that as he gives them. His first premise is that *god* is a relative, and not a generic, term, and everywhere and essentially signifies a ruler, a lord; its correlate is creature, and he quotes the high authority of Newton to prove "that it is the dominion of a spiritual being that constitutes God." The second is, that the application of *Elohim* or God to what we call false gods or idols, or to any other being or thing than the Supreme Being, is a misuse of it. Taking *Shangti* as the relative term in Chinese for *god*, he would join it to Jehovah when necessary to designate the God of the Bible; for, he adds, "as God is not a generic term, and *shin* is a generic term, therefore *shin* is not a proper translation of God." This naturally leads to an examination of the many meanings of the word *shin*, of which he mentions the six quoted from Dr. Medhurst, classing them as he would the

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species of a genus in natural history: 1st, a Supreme Being or beings, who must be considered divine; 2d, invisible intelligences supposed to be in charge of various departments of nature; 3d, souls of men, both living and dead; 4th, mischievous sprites, elves, and apparitions; 5th, temper, disposition, vigor of intellect; 6th, certain energies of nature, which contract and expand to produce its phenomena. From these various significations, Dr. Legge argues that it is mere play to contend for any other translation but *spirit;* for if it really mean *god* in any case, then it always means *god.*" Many paragraphs are devoted to this point, in which one of the initial difficulties of the whole subject is well illustrated by the transfusion of our own ideas about god, spirits, intelligences, energies, etc., into the Chinese language, for Dr. Legge translates the word *shin* by all of them. Our ideas are definite, but theirs are so vague that this word melts away into meaning everything and nothing, as soon as we bring it to our more accurate tests. He then goes on to argue that *ti* is an appellative term, and quotes its accepted definition in Chinese dictionaries to support his position. It is, "*Ti* is the appellation of one who judges the world or rules over the nations, an epithet of honor applied to one who rules as a lord." He then fairly asks: "Is not Jehovah the governor among the nations? He is indeed King of kings; his is the kingdom, the power, and the glory; to him, therefore, may *Ti* be applied with the utmost propriety as an appellative name." Taking the two together as conclusive of the application in this sense to God, he adds: "We want now a term in Chinese which shall express the relation of supreme authority inhering in a Supreme Being. We have it in their oldest and latest books, in their every-day language. It is the term *Shangti.* Separate its constituent characters, and we shall translate them Supreme Ruler; but they carry home through the eye and ear one complex idea to the mind, the same with that in the Greek word *pantocrator*, the same with that in The Supreme, the same with that in God."

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In the quotations given from the Chinese classical and other books, he translates this word by God, as if there were no doubt that their writers knew him who made the heavens and the earth. Objections are brought against the use of *ti* or *tien-ti* as its proper rendering, the principal of which are that *ti* is too vague; "it denotes a ruler, perhaps the Supreme Ruler, perhaps some other; while *tien-ti* denotes heavenly ruler, and this is not the idea conveyed by God. We know that he has his throne in the heavens; but it is not that fact of which the term awakens recognition, but that his kingdom ruleth over all. It is only as *tien-ti* is understood to be another name for *Shangti* that it comes to have the signification of God." If this postulate has been proved by Dr. Legge, certainly it ought to be used by everybody teaching the Bible among the Chinese.

He then brings his argument to a close by denying that *Shangti* is a proper name, as had been again and again asserted. The sentence *Shangti tien chi shin yé* is therefore translated "Shangti is the spirit of heaven, i.e. the spirit that possesses this supreme power. Heaven does not mean the chief God of the Chinese, but the supreme ruling Power, known and acknowledged in China and everywhere else; the word being also used in every nation by metonymy for God." To translate the sentence "Shangti is the God of Heaven" as Dr. Boone does, is therefore described as "wonderful and erroneous." In support of this, he challenges any one who asserts that *Shangti* is a proper name, like Jupiter, to write a treatise on the birth, life, kingdom, name, and death of *Shangti;* but the "first sentence has yet to be discovered in Chinese writings which speaks of the birth, life, or death of *Shangti.* Of his name and reign we read, but to the effect that his name signifies the character of his dominion that ruleth over all."

Confident in his premises, proofs, and deductions, Dr. Legge concludes: "Let us translate *elohim* and *theos* in the sacred Scriptures by *Shangti;* if it should seem to lead us to strange results, we may not, on that account, presume

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to reject it. We may trust truth; it can never lead us wrong." In elucidation of this application, he goes on to say that the "sacred writers had no option of their own when they gave the name *theos* to false gods as well as the true. They found the name so applied by men; it was not they who deified the objects of heathen worship; and the design of all the instructions of the Holy Spirit is to rebuke and abolish the practice. ..... Nothing can be plainer to my mind than that the apostle (1 Cor. viii. 5, 6) dealt with *theos* as a relative term, having its proper signification, and expressing a relation of which one party could only be the Supreme Being, from whom, therefore, it could never be diverted, excepting by the depravity of man, and a falsehood imposed by them upon themselves. Jehovah says: 'There is no God [i.e. no Supreme Ruler] beside me.'"

The reason why good and wise men have shrunk from following their course, and calling other beings than Jehovah as *elohim* and *theoi*, is, he thinks, found in the fact "that the Chinese have not called the numerous objects of their worship by the term they have for *God*. They have not *deified* them." They have only done it in the three Taoist idols and the five *Ti*, which are among those previously enumerated by Dr. Medhurst. "The crowd of beings worshipped by the Chinese are not gods, neither are they called *gods* ..... Who says that they *are* gods? The time is coming when the Chinese will fulfil the prophecy in Jer. xvi. 19, 20, 'O Lord, the Gentiles shall come unto thee from the ends of the earth, and shall say, Surely our fathers have inherited lies, vanity, and things wherein there is no profit. Shall a man make gods unto himself, and they are no gods?' Again, Who says they are *called* gods? They are called *shin*, and *shin* only signifies *spirit* or *spirits*. It cannot be permitted that in any document pretending to accuracy it can ever be translated in any other way..... It is an inadmissible definition of *god* to say that the term means *an object of religious worship;* the ideas of god and worship are so closely associated in the mind that men, looking merely at the outside of things, can

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hardly help speaking of the beings worshipped by a heathen people as the gods of that people, and such an application of the term is generally assented to without difficulty." In saying this, Dr. Legge evidently forgot Johnson's definition, which he quotes approvingly at the outset: "God, the Supreme Being; a false god, an idol; any person or thing deified, or too much honored." Those who use the English language will still adhere to this definition of the word *God*, and no doubt call idolaters polytheists, and not polypneumatists, and will include the Chinese among them.

Speaking of the application of the first commandment to this use, Dr. Legge defines it as forbidding polytheism properly so called, i.e. the worship of *many gods;* and so far as the Chinese have worshipped many Shangti, so far do they come within the direct sweep of this commandment. The second commandment forbids what he would call polytheism improperly so-called — bowing down to or serving beings who may not be called by the name of *gods*. "So far as the Chinese have been guilty of worshipping any other beings than *Shangti*, whom henceforth they will know as *Jehovah Shangti*, so far do they come within the sweep of this commandment." He concludes his proofs and arguments in the "Notions," by bringing forward six objections against *Tien-chu*, two of which are founded on its use by the Roman Catholics, and "thinks it is a good thing for Protestants to be able by the use of a different name for God, to discriminate their teaching of Christianity from that of Popery. If the Roman Catholics had kept by the proper word for God, it would be absurd in us to use an improper word, that we might avoid being confounded with them. They have given up the *natural* word, and adopted a word which is only a synonyme." It seems to me that Dr. Legge had almost forgotten that Christian nations worship the same God when he wrote this.

Dr. Boone expanded his Essay in favor of *shin* into a "Defence," published the same year as the above "Argument," and of Dr. Legge's Six Letters in further explanation of the question. The latter entered the arena again two

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years after by the publication of the "Notions of the Chinese concerning God and Spirits," in which he developed and illustrated the former thesis, and replied fully to Bishop Boone's "Defense;" he also offered new quotations to prove that the early Chinese were monotheists, and by inference not idolaters, seeing that they worshipped the true God under the name of *Shangti*. He admitted that in the course of ages this worship had fallen away from its purity, and the atheistical philosophers of the Sung dynasty in the eleventh century had "endeavored to explain the creation and operations of the universe without the intervention of a personal, independent, spiritual being, the Creator and Governor, — in other words, without the intervention of God." It is no doubt true that this is the case to a great degree, and that their acute speculations, and subtile conclusions upon subjects beyond their knowledge, have had a disastrous effect upon the Chinese mind. These atheistical teachers are, however, looked upon by Dr. Legge as were the false teachers in Christianity, like heresiarchs in the Greek and Roman churches, who overlaid and perverted the simple ordinances and truths of revelation without destroying their vitality or origin. The present state religion practised at Peking follows in many, perhaps most, of its features the ancient ritual, and the emperors sacrifice to heaven, to the earth, to ancestors, etc., as in the Chau dynasty. Several extracts are given from the statutes of the Ming dynasty (A.D. 1530), quoting the prayers and songs used in the solstitial worship, which are remarkably pure and elevated in sentiment. Dr. Legge reviews and extols them, and claims in conclusion that the denunciation in Jeremiah, "The gods that have not made the heavens and the earth shall perish from the earth, and from under these heavens," can have no application in China, for *Shangti* cannot be among them. "The Christian world will agree with me in saying, This God is our God."

I do not find any new arguments in support of what is maintained in these extracts, which can sensibly strengthen Dr. Legge's postulate, that *Shangti* is simply a Chinese desig-

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nation of the true God, and as such ought to be developed to that people from the Bible into his full character and attributes. Since the "Argument" and "Notions" were written, twenty-five years ago, he has worked at his careful translations of the ancient classical books, of which seven out of the nine are published. In them he renders *Ti* and *Shangti* by the word *God*, as if there could be no doubt of their identity, and gives his readers the impression that Yao and Shun, Ching Tang, Wăn-wang and Wu-wang, with all those early monarchs and their subjects, were as cognizant of him as were their contemporaries, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, Samuel and David, though not taught as clearly, nor knowing as much of his character.

As a last utterance on this head, it may not be amiss to refer to a recent letter from him on "Confucianism in Relation to Christianity," dated March 1877, read at the late missionary conference. In it he expresses his conclusions even more strongly as to the theism of the classics. Speaking of the high position given to *Ti* in those books, he says to his brethren, "In order to bring our Chinese readers and hearers to think as we do about God, missionaries must supplement largely the statements in the Confucian books about him, — more largely, indeed, than in dealing with the Jews we have to supplement the testimony concerning him in the Old Testament. .... It is matter for rejoicing that we have not to clear away from the Chinese books a multitude of passages that would present *Ti* to the mind as a Being other than powerful and supreme, righteous, holy, and loving. If there be any such passages they have eluded my observation; whereas the passages that sustain what I have said are so numerous and striking that I may well be excused from adducing any of them to the members of this conference."

In this paper he admits that these writings do not take us back to a time when the religion of China was pure monotheism; but their notices indicate sacrifices and worship to the six honored ones, the hills and rivers, and the host of spirits, at the very first mention of *Shangti*, when a corrupt

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admixture of other beings went along with his worship. Such is probably the truth about the matter; but when was that time? What grounds are there for concluding that it was after the beginning of the Chinese race? Before asking us to take such a novel thing for truth, as that a great nation knew and worshipped God three thousand years ago, and yet no one ever recognized it in its fulness of meaning until the present day, we may well ask for far clearer proof than these deductions carry with them, much as some would like to believe them.

I agree with Dr. Legge in the sense he quotes it, when he says, referring to the remark in Mencius: "That Heaven also made for the people instructors, who, as well as the rulers, should be assisting to God." I fully accept this saying, and "believe that Confucius, not to specify others, was raised up by God for the instruction of the Chinese people. That Confucius's system of teaching was not complete is only in harmony with the divine plan in the communication of truth to mankind, ... and need not interfere with our admitting that those men were specially helped by God, that he might keep up some knowledge of himself and of the way of duty among the millions of our race."

These summaries of the arguments of Dr. Medhurst and Dr. Legge in behalf of *Shangti*, *Ti*, and *Tienti*, as the proper words to render *elohim* and *theos*, show all their important points. I turn now to exhibit the other side of the question, and bring forward the reasons which have induced so many Protestant missionaries in China to reject the notion that *Shangti* is the ancient Chinese name for Jehovah, and is not a suitable word to render *elohim* and *theos*. If it never did denote the true God, however near this highest deity of the Chinese came to him, the distance between them was and is infinite, and the character of Jehovah must be taught alone from the Bible, without supplementing from that book the deficiencies of their classics. I myself, used the name *Shangti* for ten years, and then reluctantly dropped it altogether, chiefly because of its identification with the idols and

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gods around me, daily worshipped by the people of Canton. Every year, too, the street placards calling them to remember *Shangti pao-tan*, i.e. the precious birthday of *Shangti*, and celebrate it by plays, led many to infer that that was the *Shangti* whom I meant as the Father of Jesus. It mattered little to them what the classics said of the *Shangti* of Yao and Shun.

Many persons had begun to inquire into the merits of this question in 1844, and a few articles had appeared in the "Chinese Repository;" but it was not till the Committee of Delegates met at Shanghai in June 1847, and its members found themselves differing in views on these vital points that they resorted to the press. The two essays of Bishop Boone written in support of *shin* as the rendering of *elohim* and *theos*, contain nearly all the reasons that have ever been adduced for that view.

He states at the outset that the main object of the Christian missionary is to teach monotheism to the Chinese polytheists. "They do not know the true God, or any being who may truly and properly be called God; therefore, the highest being known to them is to be regarded only as the chief god of a pantheon, and not as the being whom we call God. Under these circumstances, we can only choose between the name of the chief God of the Chinese, and the name by which the whole class of gods is known in their language. It is derogatory to Jehovah to call him by the proper name or distinctive title of any false god; we cannot, therefore, use the name of the chief God of the Chinese to render *elohim* and *theos*, and must, according to this alternative, use the generic name of the Chinese gods; ..... its use is absolutely necessary to forbid the reigning polytheism. This generic name is *shin;* therefore, we must use this word, malgrè all objections, to render *elohim* and *theos* into Chinese."

Bishop Boone goes on to show that he agrees with Dr. Medhurst in believing that the Chinese have no knowledge of the true God, but that they differ in the object of their search for the properest word to express it — one by the

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general term for gods or all objects of worship; the other, "by a name which will convey to the mind of the Chinese the *same idea* which was conveyed to a Greek by the word *theos;* if the same be likewise that by which the whole class of worshipped beings is known in the language, so much the better." In this also agree other writers, who are shown to have missed the end in view by not seeking for the name of the Being who can, from the attributes ascribed to him, be regarded as the true God, but have sought for a name which came nearest to the biblical account of him. It is necessary, absolutely, to have him invested with some attributes peculiar to God before we can admit that *Shangti*, *Ti*, *Tienti*, or *Tien* designate him. If one of these terms does so, they all do, or can be made to do; for they are used interchangeably by Chinese writers. These attributes are given by Knapp as follows: "God is the most perfect Being, and is the cause of all other being." Cudworth says: "The true and genuine idea of God in general is this — a perfect, conscious, understanding Being (or mind), existing of itself from eternity, and the cause of all other things." Anything short of this requirement prevents all acceptance of the Being spoken of as being the true God, or having ever been worshipped as such by men ignorant of this attribute.

Bishop Boone then proceeds to show that *Shangti* cannot be deemed to answer to God over all, blessed for ever, for the following reasons: 1. No Chinese writer has been found who distinctly states his self-existence from eternity. Dr. Medhurst admits that he has never found such a passage, but adds that we nowhere meet with a single passage which speaks of his origin. Yet self-existence from eternity being an essential attribute of God, the inference that *Shangti* is self-existent cannot be deduced from the silence of native authors, while he is not mentioned by their philosophers among eternally-existing principles. 2. The Chinese do not regard heaven and earth as eternal, but made in time, and *Shangti* had nothing to do with making them. The eternally existing principles are *li* and *kĭ*. "The first is without form

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or trace; it cannot make or do anything; the second can settle and collect together, make and do." The Book of Changes is the most ancient book in Chinese literature, and its teachings, as expounded by Chu Hi (A.D. 1150), are re-regarded as giving their true meaning.

It is a just inference, therefore, against *Shangti* being God (*propriè*) that these principles, with the *Tai-kih* or Great Extreme, and the dual Powers *yin* and *yang*, were all evolved into and by each other, until all things were made. Meanwhile he stood quietly by, and let them grind on until heaven and earth, the universe, was made, or else he did not exist. Either is fatal to his claim to be regarded as truly God. He then concludes,—after remarking that this omission to connect *Shangti* with the evolution of the *kosmos* is best accounted for by supposing that these writers so identified him with heaven and earth that it would be like making a being the cause of itself to ascribe their creation to him,—by asking the question, "If *Shangti* is neither self-existent nor eternal, nor the maker of the heavens and the earth, what then is asserted of him on which his claim to be considered as truly and properly God is founded? I cannot believe in the existence of a traditional knowledge of God among a people who had forgotten the fundamental fact that God was their Creator — at least, their Maker and that of the world they live in." The clearest proof is necessary, at least on this prime point; for a mistake is most fatal. "If there is a single doubt that the *Shangti* of the Chinese people is Jehovah, — not merely the most like Jehovah of any of the Chinese gods, — and we proceed to worship him, we are guilty of spiritual adultery."

Bishop Boone objects to the phrase *Shangti* as the rendering for *elohim* and *theos*, because they are not, and God is not, relative, but absolute terms. Bishop Russell, in his Term Question, designates them, quoting Whately's Elements of Logic, as absolute terms — "terms which denote an object considered as a whole, and without reference to anything of which it is a part, or to any other part distinguished from it.

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..... As regards *elohim* and *theos*, properly speaking, they are simply absolute terms, as there is but one God; but in view of polytheism and their *usus loquendi* in the Bible, they are also absolute-generic terms." It is impossible to substitute for them a relative or relative-common term, one "which denotes an object considered as a part of a whole, viewed in reference to the whole, or to another part of a more complex object of thought. Man is not only an absolute term, it is also a generic one, including the human race; and *father*, *son*, *ruler*, etc., are not only relative terms, they are also common ones, embracing all who stand in these relationships."

Bishop Boone completely answers the postulate that God is a relative term, although Dr. Legge adhered to his opinion in the Notions. That opinion, however, was necessary to uphold the argument in favor of the relative terms *ti* or *Shangti* as a translation of God; and one must infer that his zeal for his favorite terms blinded him to its weakness. Bishop Boone satisfactorily proves the nature of this word as an absolute term, which consequently neutralizes the propriety of the relative terms *ti* and *Shangti* to translate the absolute-generic terms *elohim* and *theos*. The same logic, consequently, applies, *à fortiori*, that *Shangti* on that ground has designated the true God, from the earliest notices, when Shun worshipped him in connection with the five *ti*, hills, rivers, and ancestors, down to the present time.

Dr. Legge admits that the expression *Shangti tien chi shin*, which Bishop Boone renders "*Shangti* is the God of Heaven," offers some difficulty as to its meaning. "He explains it, "That by *tien* is not meant the chief God of the Chinese, but the Supreme Ruling Power, known and acknowledged in China and everywhere else; the word being also used in every nation by metonymy for God. *Shangti* is the spirit of Heaven thus understood, i.e. the spirit that possesses this supreme power. The terms *Shangti* declare that possession, and express the meaning of God, unadulterated, without diminution, and without increase."

The bishop thus answers this singular explanation: "It

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is only when we come to those explanations in which *shin* is used that the divinity of *Tien* becomes possible, and in these explanations *Shangti* is neither more nor less than this *shin*. If he be a separate, independent being ruling over heaven, a god, *Shangti* is this god; if he be the soul of the compound being *tien*, *Shangti*, according to one explanation, is this soul; if he be merely the divine or spiritual energies of *Tien*, *Shangti* is the title by which it pleases pantheists to designate these energies. As long as *Shangti* is defined to be the *shin* of Heaven, the phrase Supreme Ruler must stand or fall with the meaning we attach to *shin*."

It is an inevitable conclusion, too, that *Shangti* is a proper name, and cannot be made a generic one, although there are many gods so named. They are like Jupiter tonans, Jupiter pluvius, Jupiter Stygius, all of which are regarded as so many proper names. The names Jehovah-jireh, Jehovah-tsidkenu, Jehovah-tsabaoth, etc., are similar in this respect; and similar analogies can be drawn from the Budhist, Brahminical, and Syrian systems of mythology. The proofs brought from the classics and other books in Chinese literature in support of the statement that *Shangti* is the name of an individual being are so definite, so numerous, and so pertinent that one is surprised that any other view was ever taken by anybody who has read them; or that Dr. Medhurst should think that to quote the titles of seven or eight forms or impersonations of *Shangti* helps to diminish the personal character of the name. He only proves that it is the title common to the chief gods of the two native sects. On the other hand, *shin* is the only word in the language by which all gods or idols are called; and when a native writes the characters *king shin* on the lantern hung at night before his door, it matters nothing to the real nature of his feelings whether we translate them "Reverence the gods," or, "Reverence the spirits." But it does materially affect our ideas of his feelings which of the two renderings we take.

The common people in China never venture to worship *Shangti* under that name alone; for that is the prerogative

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of the emperor. They are limited to the two or three chief gods of the Taoists, which have for ages been called *Shangti* alone in common usage. The state religion is regarded with awe and fear by them as a peculiar institution and ritual belonging to the Son of Heaven, the vicegerent of Heaven and Earth among men, who alone is qualified to offer sacrifices on the altar of Heaven at Peking. For a subject to offer prayer and sacrifice to *Shangti* at the winter solstice is tantamount to raising the standard of rebellion by invading the functions of the One Man who sits on the dragon throne. It is highly probable that the worship of God by the Taiping rebels under the name *Shangti*, which they adopted from Christian books, caused them to be suspected from the first, as aiming at the throne.

The people have therefore worshipped the *Hüen-tien Shangti*, that is, the Supreme Ruler of the Sombre Heavens, and the *Yuh-hwang Shangti*, or Perfect Imperial *Shangti;* and these two deities are found all over the land in innumerable temples. The advocates of the *Shangti* of the classics being the true God, of course maintain that this perversion of that ancient name by dumb idols is like the perversion or appropriation of the worship of Jehovah by the Israelites when Jeroboam set up the calves, and called his subjects to adore "the *elohim* which brought them up out of the land of Egypt"; or like the ceremonies and superstitions which in the Roman and Greek churches overlay the simple worship required in the Testament. It is their part to furnish some kind of proof from the Chinese classics or philosophers, like that which those who denounce the worship of the calves, or the adoration of the Virgin, find in the Scriptures for the God of heaven and earth, before they can expect that *Shangti* will be accepted as such.

That the common people understand wrongly when asked to worship *Shangti*, and believe that *Yuh-hwang Shangti* is meant by missionaries who preach from the Bible, has been often asserted and denied in China by advocates of the several terms. My own belief is that the people do confound

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the two, and I am sure that even the risk of such confusion is a strong reason for avoiding the term. A very intelligent scholar in Peking, who assisted Mr. Burns in translating the Psalms, and was familiar with the whole discussion among foreigners, said that literary men in the country would always gather that *Shangti* meant *Yuh-hwang Shangti*, for he was the only one they could worship. A British consul, T. T. Meadows, who was acquainted with it, was once walking with me in Canton, and looking up to the sign-board over a little hovel of a shrine which read *Shangti ku Miao* (the old Temple of Shangti), said: "It is a marvel to me how any missionary can use that word to preach the name of God." Bishop Boone mentions instances where the misunderstanding led to sad results; and there can be no doubt that it constantly occurs among the most intelligent Chinese, as well as the uneducated.

Another objection to *Shangti* is that it is a compound, as well as a relative term, and therefore unsuitable to designate a single idea such as *God* is. Bishop Boone urges this with great force, and justly concludes that neither the relative *ti* nor the double title *Supreme Ruler* meets the requirements of the case. The application of the word *shin* to denote objects of worship is proven to include even the four or five *Shangti* which Dr. Legge acknowledges are false gods; and therefore, he proves rather too much when he tries to show that the Chinese do not worship gods but spirits. It does not seem to be necessary to pursue this argument into its details, and adduce the examples which are quoted in illustration of the use of this word for everything that is worshipped, or the explanation which Bishop Boone gives of the application of *shin* to the manes of the dead and the human soul. It is this pantheistic use which has proved a stumbling-block to many missionaries. They say, we need a more definite word than one which includes the heavens and earth, gods, spirits, ancestral manes, demons, and souls in its comprehensive application; and by using *Shangti* we will lead the people up higher to the true God.

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On this point Bishop Boone may be quoted: "That the manes of a deceased ancestor, when regarded as an object of worship should be ranked in the same class with the Chinese Olympian deities, so far as this is done by their all being called *shin*, should not surprise us when we remember the hero-gods of Greece, and the *dii lares et penates* of the Romans. That heroism was the idol of ancient Greece accounts for the fact that Hercules was ranked among the *theoi* after death. If we remember that the whole ethical system of the Chinese turns, not on the duty of obedience to *Tien* (Heaven), *Ti* (Earth), or any other god, but on filial piety; we shall have as little cause to wonder at the Chinese deification of a deceased ancestor as at the Greek deification of a hero; find as little cause for surprise in the fact that *Hau-tsih* (the ancestor of the house of Chau) is classed with *Shangti*, among the *shin* sacrificed to on the occasion of the great drought, as that the Greeks called Zeus and Hercules each a *theos*. *Elohim* being a name alike common to the true and false gods, one of the most important uses of this word in the Sacred Scriptures is to forbid polytheism. It is, indeed, by its appellative character, and the use that can be made of it to forbid polytheism, that it is chiefly distinguished from the word *Jehovah*, and this is a point of the utmost importance to keep in mind. It is an unquestionable fact that the false worship to which the Chinese are most attached is that of their deceased ancestors. Should we not then rejoice rather than otherwise, that the word by which we must render *elohim*, although it specially designates the Olympian gods, yet by Chinese usage ready to our hand, has had its meaning so extended as to make the blow aimed at objects of false worship equally fatal to deceased ancestors and the terrestrial *ki*, as to the celestial gods themselves."[1]

Another objection exists to this use of *Shangti*, which is hardly touched on by Bishop Boone, and for some reason not even referred to by Dr. Legge. It is the decided character

[1] See for further remarks in this sense, Dean Stanley's Jewish Church, Sect. I., latter part.

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he bears as the male principle of nature. If this be not so clearly stated in the ancient classics as it was worked out by Chu Hi and his school, that silence cannot be adduced as a proof that it did not obtain then, for the germ of it exists in the Book of Changes. The Bishop says, when comparing *Jupiter* and *Shangti*, "*Tien* is a perfect puzzle; impassible, impersonal, guilty of no gallantries, and always faithful to *Ti*, with whom he begat all things. In the Chinese cosmogony, to denote this matrimonial relation, *Tien* (heaven) is called *yang* (male), and *Ti* (earth) *yin* (female)."

At Peking, where the state worship is conducted with great solemnity at the solstices and equinoxes on the four sides of the city, to *Tien*, *Ti*, *Jih*, and *Yueh* (Heaven, Earth, Sun, Moon), this parity of respect is fully understood. There is abundant proof that Heaven and Earth (*Shangti* or High Heaven, and *Hau-ti* or Empress Earth), are regarded as the generators of all things, among which are *Hao-tsih*, the ancestors of the emperors, as well as *wan-wuh* or the myriads of things. The *Hwang-ti* or imperial rulers of China, though inferior to *Shangti* the Supreme Ruler, and *Hau-ti* the Empress Earth, are yet alone honorable enough to worship them. The action of the dual powers *yin* and *yang*, light and darkness, is made the consequence of the soul of the *yang*, which is *shin* or *god*, acting on the *yin*, which is the demon, and this double soul becomes the great Father and Mother of all things. This system of cosmogony has been worked out by Canon McClatchie of Shanghai in a full manner, and very strikingly resembles that set forth by the Greek philosophers, and goes far to destroy all sense of the first cause as a personal being in the minds of the Chinese literati. It is hard to suppose, however, that if the true God had been known to King Wăn and Duke Chau, B.C. 1000, that all traces of his being the Creator and Governor of the universe and self-existent God would have perished from among the Chinese. This seems more improbable than that he is to be recognized in the *Shangti* of those ancient days, mixed up as his worship was even then with ancestors, hills, and rivers.

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In Peking, where the *Tien tan* and *Ti tan*, the altars to Heaven and Earth, are laid out in all their magnitude on the south and on the north of the imperial palace, they are fully understood to be of equal divine powers, complementary to each other as much as Zeus and Hera were among the Greeks, or Baal and Astarte among the Syrians. If Dr. Legge felt called upon when he ascended the altar of Heaven in Peking to take off his shoes because God was worshipped there by the emperor, it seems as if he ought also to have ascended the altar to Earth in the same sense. Great cause of gratitude have the Chinese that they have been preserved by God from the depths of pollution and murder which came upon those western Asiatics through their worship of the powers of nature, and their consequent destruction by the righteous Judge of man, for the reasons which he has given us in Lev. xviii. 24–30.

In dealing with the polytheism of the Chinese, it is not altogether so much the ancient notions contained in their classics that are to be combatted and supplanted, however, as the thoughts and practices of the people now waiting for the gospel. To send them back to Yao and Shun for a God whom they are prevented by law and habit from worshipping, and who has been already explained by their own ancient philosophers as the active exhibition of the soul of the universe, requires on the one hand the clearest proofs that their God is in truth the eternal God, and on the other hand that the present *Shangti* will be understood in any other sense than as he now is. Dr. Legge himself allows, when referring to a comparison instituted between Jupiter and Shangti, "If we had nothing in Greek about Jupiter but what is to be found in the Hymn of Cleanthes, and in the writings of the Stoics generally, we should acknowledge that Jupiter was the name of the Supreme God," i.e. (as I infer from the context) Jehovah. Yet Jupiter and Zeus were never regarded by the Jews, or the Apostles, or the Christians, as having been at any time used by anybody as names applied to or designating the true God. When Paul was at Lystra he had the

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opportunity to preach the being and attributes of God through Jupiter, whose temple and priest were before him, but he called him a *vanity*. And so is *Shangti*.

Another objection to using this name for the true God is the example of those who have taught his existence. The Nestorians lived among the Chinese for about eight centuries, but hitherto nothing has been discovered of their writings, except the tablet nearly eleven centuries old, now at Si-ngan, in which God is called *Aloho*, and described by the phrase *yuen chin Chu*, or eternal true Lord. His attributes are well epitomized in that inscription, and they were thus made known to the literati of China, and sanctioned by imperial assent, more than two centuries before Chu Hi and his school developed their notions of cosmogony and the *Shangti* of the classics. Yet the "atheistic philosophers," as they are sometimes called, never saw any connection between *Aloho* and the beings they described, nor did the Nestorians venture to call on *Shangti* as their *Aloho*. It certainly could not have been from ignorance of the question which we are now discussing.

Not long after came the Moslems, in the strength of their iconoclastic theism, and they rejected both *Shangti* and *Ti*, as terms for *Allah*, but adopted *chu* or lord, often making it *chin Chu*, or true Lord. It may be that they took both expressions from the Nestorians. In a compend of their tenets, published in this century, we have failed to find a sentence which intimates that they regarded the Lord whom they worshipped as having ever been known to the Chinese as *Shangti*, nor did its author seem to doubt but that the term *chu* would be understood to denote God alone. *Shin* is applied only to spirits and angels, for the Moslems could have no discussion like the one now before us.

The colony of Jews in Honan also knew the true God. The date of their entry into China is given by themselves about the Christian era, but cannot be determined with certainty. They made known their tenets, and practised their ritual among themselves, and probably kept up a knowledge of He-

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brew for many generations. No digest of their doctrines has been found larger than the inscriptions on two tablets copied in 1850 in their synagogue at Kaifung. One is dated in 1489, and commemorates the rebuilding of the Temple of Truth and Purity; the other records the rebuilding of the Synagogue in 1511. In both God is referred to and described as *Tao* or Reason, and invested with many of the attributes of Jehovah; but both show a grievous ignorance of his character, and a falling away from the truth of the Old Testament teachings. In some of their inscriptions the term *Hao Tien*, or Expansive Heaven, is used for God, and *Tien* alone in the same sense; but nowhere have they, by any phrase, intimated that they regarded *Shangti* as the Chinese term for the God of their fathers. If they were cognizant of all the literature now referred to by its advocates to prove that such is the case, it is strange that none of them ever maintained this fundamental truth. To argue, as Dr. Legge does, from the use of *Hao Tien* being a synonyme of *Shangti* in the classics, that the Jews were in favor of it, or of *ti*, as the best rendering of *elohim*, if they ever translated the Bible, is to beg the whole question on very weak and small proof.

The results of the long discussions in the Roman Catholic church on this point ended in entirely rejecting *Shangti* as the rendering for *elohim* and *theos*, and taking the phrase *Tien-chu* in preference to *Ti* and *Tienti*. If the missionaries of the Greek church at Peking ever had any controversy on the matter, it ended in their fully agreeing with the Roman Catholics; and no one who knows them can doubt their full ability to decide the question on its own merits. The weight of the evidence from all these sources as to its impropriety is surely entitled to consideration by the small body of Protestant missionaries who advocate it, — both those who agree with Dr. Legge, and those who use it as expressing the highest conception known to the Chinese of the divine Being.

There is another view which is also worth their notice. If *Baal*, which only meant *Lord*, and *Zeus*, which was another form of *Theos*, had been upheld by the prophets and apostles

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as admissible synonymes of Jehovah among the early and later Jews, would not the double use have worked much confusion in the literatures coming down to us from antiquity? To thus use both the absolute-generic and the proper names of the true God in connection with those false ones, would have almost neutralized all those declarations which speak of Jehovah's jealousy lest his glory should by any means be given to another. If, for instance; the pagan and Christian literature in the Greek tongue, before Justinian's time, had come down to us with Zeus as one name for the chief God in both, how would it have been possible for the theism of revelation to have ever been distinctly taught? The names as well as the teachings of polytheism must be discarded, because those names were polluted in the sight of the jealous God. So I think must be the result wherever *Shangti* in Chinese Christian and profane literature denotes the chief God in both. The recondite connection of the worship of *Shangti* with that of the imperial ancestors on the altar of Heaven as guardian gods of the dynasty, would also tend to strengthen the domestic idolatry now seen in the adoration paid in the family to departed ancestors; for if the emperor adored the true God and his deified predecessors as *Shangti*, why might not every Christian adore his own private lares too? The logic would be inevitable.[1]

[1] In relation to this blending of personages in the imperial worship, — a point on which it is not easy to reach a definite conclusion, — I quote a paragraph from Visdelou, one of the eminent Catholic missionaries whose researches into Chinese religion were extensive, which may throw some light on it: "Besides the common honors rendered to the five Shangti, former dynasties have honored by a peculiar superstition that one of the five from whom the reigning dynasty believes itself to have proceeded. For the Chinese think that the vicissitudes of empires depend on the fixed revolution of the five elements successively from one another. They call this period a *calendar*, because the changes of empires depend as much on this period as the conjunctions and oppositions of planets depend on their proper movement. They say that when the rule of a new element approaches, the Shangti which presides over it begets a man worthy of the empire, and helps him to attain it. This is why all the dynasty founded by this man gives, as recognition, to this Shangti the name of *Kan-shăng Ti*, meaning the Shangti who, by a secret sympathy, had begotten the founder of the dynasty; and under this designation as long as the dynasty endures, this Shangti enjoys certain peculiar honors, until he gives place to another."

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But even if the ancient *Shangti* could be proved to denote the true God, its use among the people is so completely that of the proper name of one Being, that an absolute term is still just as much needed as *god* is in English to combat polytheism. It is freely admitted by those who can find no other term for this purpose, and are quite ready to admit its indefiniteness, that *shin* is a word of far wider application in Chinese than *elohim*, *theos*, *deus*, or *god* are in their respective languages; that the want of a singular and plural form increases the difficulty of distinguishing the true from a false god; that its pantheistic senses are more common than its religious uses, and this vagueness makes the native mind slow to perceive the central truth of the Scriptures that there can in fact be but one *shin;* that *ling* has less personality than *shin;* that it is liable frequently to be misunderstood for other words of the same sound; that it means a *spirit* just as much and oftener than it does a *god*, that is, its properest English translation is oftener *spirit* than *god;* and lastly, that no Budha is ever called a *shin*, but always a *Fuh*, and looked upon as belonging to an entirely distinct order of beings. All these points and difficulties are freely admitted, for if they were not real difficulties, there never would have been any discussion about this Term Question. Still, it is maintained that in order to teach the Bible distinction between *God* and *spirits* as real invisible beings, two generic terms are indispensable. If polytheism had never existed, God would have reigned alone in the mind of man as the I AM, who was to be worshipped by all his rational creatures; but gods many and lords many have invaded his throne, and must be cast down by the truth. One mode of enforcing this truth is by using the same word which is used for himself. This is the usual rule in translating the sacred Scriptures, in which one word means all of them. Even in our own English Christian tongue there seems to have been once a similar difficulty; for instead of searching in the native language for two words, the first missionaries introduced the Latin *spiritus* for the new idea they were teaching,

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and soon naturalized it. In Chinese Christian literature, the word *shin* must gradually become limited in its application, as the people learn how the Bible describes the infinite distance between the one true and all other gods adored among mankind. As the word *god* has gradually risen with the acceptance of revelation by the English-speaking nations to stand for God, so will *shin* come to be restricted to its proper use among the Chinese.

Those who advocate the use of *shin* for *spirit* in the biblical sense, as against its use for *god*, seem to expect that that signification is going to make it more definite to the Chinese, and restrict its application to real spirits. Our distinctions will only come gradually into their minds. We may define *Shing Shin* as Holy Spirit, but the native more probably takes it to mean Holy Gods, as he does *Chin Shin* for True Spirits instead of True God, until he learns the new senses. But *shin* has essentially a religious idea, and will naturally still be applied to all objects of worship, i.e. *gods;* while another word is wanted for spirits which has not so peculiarly the sense of fear in it. The word *shin* would be most proper for *spirit*, if the language furnished another one suitable for *god*, so that the Scriptural distinction between the two could be taught, — a distinction already remarked, utterly unknown to this or any heathen people.

One lamentable result during the last thirty years has been the confusion introduced into the Christian literature by the use of *shin* in these two senses by the two parties. The terms *Shing Shin* and *Shing Ling* do probably indicate the name for the Holy Ghost with a certain degree of clearness; but in the hundreds of cases where no adjective is used the confusion remains. It is not surprising that the Latin and Greek churches, which allow reverence to saints and canonized men whose images and pictures garnish their churches, maintain that *shin* should stand for *spirit;* for then they can allow the converts to pay homage to them. But will these converts ever be taught the sin of idolatry, and that God is "not to be worshipped with men's hands, as though he

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needeth anything," when the second commandment is omitted from their ten, and they are allowed to worship ancestors and saints together? In Macao, Chinese carvers sell images of the Virgin, the Crucifix, St. Antonio, etc., on one side of their shops; and images of Kwanyin, Ma-tsu-pu, etc., on the other side, according as their Portuguese or Chinese customers ask for them. All are called by the same term, and every detail of worship goes by the same name, and has done so in that city for the last two centuries. It seems, in fact, to be well-nigh impossible to elevate the Chinese ideas about invisible beings until their generic name for all of them is confined to the only living and true God as the *only* proper object of worship. Even the term *shin fu* (spiritual father), by which the Roman Catholic priests are called by their converts, has the effect to keep the word at its heathen level.

It also has a tendency to blink the personality and divinity of the Holy Spirit to apply *shin*, the appellative of all gods and spirits to him, and call God by a descriptive name like *Shangti*, *Tienti*, or *Tienchu*, without having another word for gods which will include him in it, and can be used to teach that he is the only one in reality. It is affirmed that *shin* is too low, too wide a term to apply to Jehovah, and therefore *Shangti* should be used; because, as Mr. Chalmers says, "it is the word we find in the language for the Highest. It is not, indeed, the Jehovah of the Jews, nor the *Theos* of the Greeks, nor the God of English Christians; and it is not, either, the Jove of the Romans, the Baal of the Canaanites, or the Great Spirit of the red Indians; but it is the word corresponding to God in Chinese as near as we could wish or expect. Take it, and be thankful; or if not, find another." However, in saying this, Mr. Chalmers seems to forget that if *Shangti* be not really and truly God, the Jehovah of the Jews, he is teaching adversely to the command given to those Jews by Jehovah, through Joshua before he died (Josh. xxiii. 7), to "make no mention of the name of their gods, nor cause to swear by them, neither serve them, nor bow yourselves unto them." Is not this command surely as obliga-

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tory on the Protestant missionary in China as it was on Joshua?

Are we to infer that *shin* is good enough for spirit, and *Shing Shin* for Holy Spirit, but it will not do for Holy God? This very point was brought out so prominently in a conversation I had with an educated man, who had been taught enough to be employed as an expounder of the word, that I made other inquiries, and found that he had accepted the conclusion that *Shing Shin* was a synonyme for *Shangti;* though I do not wish it to be inferred that such confusion remains long in the minds of converts. He was not unlike those converts whom Paul met at Ephesus, who told him that they "had not so much as heard that there was a Holy Ghost." As the term *shin* includes Dr. Legge's *Shangti*, and Mr. Chalmer's Highest, and Dr. Medhurst's *Tienti*, will not a native naturally conclude that by *Shing Shin* is meant this God without compare, and confound god and spirit just as much as he does now?

That the words *shin* and *ling* can gradually come to be accepted in the distinct senses which are taught by many missionaries, is now exhibited in so many native churches in China, that no arguments or examples are needed beyond them to prove that it is possible and feasible. *Shangti* is never mentioned among them as the name for God, and thousands of them regard that term as the name of a false god. I have no doubt, too, that thousands of converts regard *Shangti* as the God of the Bible; for the study of that book wonderfully enlightens the mind, and the Spirit comes with power to set forth his truth, and quicken the conscience dead in trespasses and sins. Great care needs to be taken, however, that such are not baptized into the name of their own *Shangti*.

If more evidence be needed that the word *shin* will fully teach monotheism, the usages of both it and *ling* in Japan confirm this view. The Japanese also have their Highest, called *Ama-terasu oho-mikami*, or the Heaven-illuminating Goddess, who, like every god below her in their mythology

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is called a *kami* or *shin*, just as they are in China. The Japanese have no *Shangti*, nor such reverential ideas about his worship and patronage of the empire, nor is state worship confined to their emperor; and therefore no argument can be adduced from their ritual and literature to uphold the views advanced in China. They know perfectly the meaning of Chinese characters; for they have used them since they had any books, and they can have made no mistake in using these two in the Christian senses of *god* and *spirit*. Happily, the growing church in Japan has been spared this unhappy controversy now struggling to a settlement in China.

While the discussion has continued now since 1846, the number of converts in that empire has gone on increasing to the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches. Those attached to the latter, I am confident, have the vaguest ideas respecting the Trinity. They worship God (*Tienchu*), the Lord of heaven, and are allowed to pay homage to the *shin;* but without more knowledge of the Bible, which is little taught or distributed by Catholics anywhere in China, how is it possible for these uneducated neophytes to feel their need of a holy, sanctifying, eternal *Shin*, different from *Tienchu*, to come into their hearts to change them? The offices of the Holy Ghost in conversion are not much taught in the Roman Catholic church anywhere in the world; but in China it is harder for its members to understand them, and pray for his aid and power in leading them into all truth.

The assertion that *Shangti* denotes the true God, as maintained by Dr. Legge, is not now held by all who use it for God; but that assumption is really the only safe argument to urge in its behalf, when proving or defending its use in that manner. There can be no alternative in this view, according to Paul in 1 Cor. x. 20; for he there asserts that "the things which the Gentiles sacrifice they sacrifice to devils, and not to God." It is the safest way, surely, not to use a term which has been rejected by so many independent parties, and to which so many doubts and dangers attach;

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while even if there were no doubts, its use as a proper name makes it just as necessary in Chinese to have an absolute term for gods, and another for spirits, to teach their distinctions. Because *Shangti* himself is called *Tienchu* in a few cases, no one would try to prove that they are ever confounded by the people, or that the emperor is ever said to worship *Tienchu*, although these terms were employed long before the Catholics entered China. It is surely no objection to the last term that they use it for God; but, on the contrary, it has already attained so wide a use for the name of him whom we all adore, that it has this well-known definition among the people as a good argument in its favor. It is conceded by some that *Shangti* would not be an improper appellation for the Almighty Ruler of the universe, if it was a new term, and not already imbedded in idolatry, error, and falsehood in the minds of the people. However, there would even then be some fear of its conflicting with the term *Hwangti* used to denote the emperor. If *shin* and *ling* be accepted by all parties, not only will Jehovah be gradually known as the proper name of *Shin* as God, but other descriptive terms, as *Tien-fu* (Heavenly Father), *Shang-chu* (Supreme Lord), *Tien-ti chu-tsai* (Lord of Heaven and Earth), *Chin Shin* (True God) will also come into use as descriptive names. The first is already widely used by all parties.

It must not be inferred, from the character of this discussion, that it has given rise to any serious alienation among the advocates of the various terms. It has been confined to the Protestants, and they have carried on their work of evangelizing without coming into contact very pointedly on these topics. They have used different versions of the Scriptures with their own terms in them, and their church members have, in most cases, as might be expected, adopted their teachings. Few of these neophytes are able to understand the points of difference among the missionaries on subjects involving so much acquaintance with other languages and times. And over and above all, the name and work of *Yésu kiu-shi Chu* (Jesus, the world's saving Lord) joins all in a common hope and faith.

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While it is melancholy to estimate the weakness which the controversy has brought upon the united efforts of missionaries in China, no one doubts that the Holy Spirit has blessed his word to the salvation of many using whatever terms have been taught them. Yet every worker in the field, every contributor in the church abroad, must desire that the question be settled; and this desire increases as infant churches rapidly spring up in various parts of the empire. Yet it will never be settled until it is settled aright. It is not easy to see how the opinions now maintained are to be harmonized by any compromise, while between their extremes are to be found many diversities of views and practice. Though the recent Missionary Conference at Shanghai brought together men of all shades, and they felt that a public discussion might more likely estrange than harmonize them, their private interchange of experience was free, and can hardly fail to have had a good effect. The results during the last thirty years were before them, and the desire must have arisen to seek for unanimity on the questions involved.

Bishop Russell at Ningpo epitomizes the importance of the matter in these few sentences: "The term which represents *elohim* and *theos* in any language is that term upon which must be based, and around which must be grouped, all correct ideas, all systematic teaching, and all scriptural truth touching the nature and attributes of him 'in whom we live and move and have our being.' Hence the unspeakable importance of having the right term, and of not making a mistake in a matter which might involve in error, on the gravest of all subjects, the present and future generations of our fellow-creatures in China. It appears, too, from the undeniable fact that no other question connected with the mission work has been, and still is, the cause of so much division and estrangement amongst its members; and unless it is settled in some satisfactory way there is reason to apprehend that this unhappy condition of things will be perpetuated, and probably even aggravated, as time goes on. Moreover, as far as one can see, this question, if left unsettled, will make it impossible to have either

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a common version of the Holy Scriptures, or a common Christian literature of any kind, and thus preclude all practical, hearty co-operation on the part of those who differ. And more serious still, it is to be feared that this lamentable state of affairs will sooner or later be imported into the native churches and their members, and produce there consequences yet more disastrous."

It has been my careful endeavor, in this paper, to state all the objections and arguments for each term in the clearest manner, and as often as I could in the words of their writers. The literature of the subject has now grown very large, and includes a great amount of illustrations and facts not essential to understanding its real nature. In condensing the writings I have examined, I may have omitted some things their authors deemed important; but I am confident that no material argument has been neglected. Though my own convictions are strong in favor of *shin* and *ling* as the most fit words for *god* and *spirit*, I do not now write for persons in China, but chiefly for the intelligent readers of the Bibliotheca Sacra, and for others in this country, who may wish to know the merits of this discussion.

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ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

ETERNAL HOPE. Five Sermons preached in Westminster Abbey, November and December, 1877. By the Rev. Frederic W. Farrar, D.D., F.R.S., Canon of Westminster, etc. pp. 225. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co. 1878.

The existence of this volume is the result of literary insolence. It is in may respects an unsatisfactory book, but to no one more so than to its author. He would have withheld it from publication had he not been compelled to issue it in self-defence against a style of literary persecution too common in these days, and regarded as indicative of "enterprise," but really the height of injustice. A sensitive man cannot better be dragooned into premature publication than by meagerly or incorrectly reporting his words, and then holding him responsible for opinions he never expressed. The book must be read with these thoughts in mind.

The sermons, judged as sermons, differ widely from the standard of New England pulpit oratory, but are written in Dr. Farrar's eloquent style, and display wide reading and strong conviction. The second sermon on: Is Life worth Living? seems to us to have committed the fault of having set forth the wrong view more fully and more forcibly than the right. The preacher thus becomes unintentionally and unconsciously an advocate of error. More distinct divisions and more complete separation of the arguments in the third sermon would increase its clearness without impairing its popular character. The course of the argument is somewhat tangled, and so the impression left is general rather than definite, and the effect is to confound rather than convince. The fifth seems to us by far the best of the series, as an eloquent and extremely impressive appeal to men to better their ways.

Dr. Farrar's doctrinal position is not that of Universalism, i.e. the opinion that all men will ultimately be saved; nor that of Annihilationism; nor does he believe in the Romish doctrine of purgatory. Of what he calls the common view he rejects (p. xxiii), (1) the material torments; (2) the supposition that it is necessarily of endless duration to all who incur it; (3) the opinion that it is incurred by the vast majority of mankind; (4) that it is a doom passed irreversibly at the moment of death upon all who die in a state of sin. His own view may be stated thus: he acknowledges that the saints, whose immediate salvation is sure, are few (p. 101); he acknowledges the future punishment of all others, even of

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those who have apparently lived upright before the world (pp. 109, 112); and cannot positively declare that all will be finally saved; as, for example, some of those who are properly called reprobates upon earth (p. 102); but he believes in eternal hope, — that it will always be possible for man to return to God and be forgiven; that the ministrations of the Spirit will always be directed to that end; and he hopes that they will all actually return at last.

In many of these views we sympathize with Dr. Farrar, though we do not coincide with him in them. In regard to the method of punishment it seems to us that the inward action of remorse, and the outward tokens of God's displeasure with us, and abhorrence of us as sinners, will constitute its chief elements. Yet it seems like dogmatism to say that there will be nothing corresponding to fire. The language of Scripture means something, though we may not know exactly what. And we are prepared to say that there are some arguments in favor of the practice of those preachers, who thinking that the biblical language was more likely than their own to make a correct impression, have employed it in their sermons. Jonathan Edwards (of whom Dr. Farrar's knowledge is not sufficiently extensive) used such language, and yet in his "Nature of Virtue," and other works, he makes it evident that his view of punishment in hell was not the gross view. We reject also with Dr. Farrar the notion that the vast majority of mankind are to be lost. We do not believe that the vast majority of men (for among men we include infants) to-day are lost, and we look forward to a millennium of the triumph of the gospel, when the overwhelming majority, if not the complete number, of men will be Christians. Other opinions may be the "common" view, but they do not form such a constituent part of the doctrine that without them it must be given up.

The great original fault of Dr. Farrar seems to lie in his misunderstanding and consequent rejection of the doctrine of probation. With him there is no such thing as probation, i.e. a period when man is upon trial, and at the close of which his state is fixed. But how can he escape the impression of the Scriptures upon this point? We do not refer to specific texts, but to the repeated exhortations to immediate repentance; to the fact that this world was selected as the theatre of Christ's sufferings; to the fact that punishment of some sort certainly awaits the unrepentant at death; and to the fact that no agencies adapted to produce repentance are promised in another world. But whether the present is or is not a state of probation, certainly Dr. Farrar's idea of what is meant by that term may be criticised as being arbitrary and mechanical. Dr. Farrar does not deny that there may be such a thing as final permanence of character (p. xvi). Final permanence will have arrived at some definite point in every individual case. That point *may* come before death, and therefore a generous view of probation, such as is most consistent with the

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mercy of God, requires us to believe that it does come before death, and that God never lets a man die till it is evident that his character is permanently fixed, i.e. that he never would repent, if his probation were to be extended to all eternity. It is a strong confirmation of this view that we see in actual life many cases of men who give every evidence of having already settled their eternal destiny, and whom God is sparing longer than there is any rational ground for hope in their case. It seems arbitrary and unnecessary, therefore, to assume, as the Canon does, that if there be a probation we must acknowledge that some have not had a "fair chance." Again, the conditions of forgiveness, are not such that it is impossible for the heathen who have never heard of Christ to be accepted and forgiven through the merits of an unknown Christ. They are not mechanical conditions, and do not require confession in any particular form, or with reference to any particular person, any more than in any particular language. If it is *possible* that the heathen should be sorry for their sins and turn to God, and that they should be in such a moral attitude that their first act upon entering the unseen world would be to recognize Christ and prostrate themselves before him, it is possible for them to be saved, for they have all the elements of repentance. And so we believe that many will be saved who have never been in our churches, or heard the gospel. Dr. Farrar condemns those who "admit the validity of repentance as purely hasty and superficial" (p. xlviii), and we would no more encourage the representations of these men than he would. But repentance is turning away from sin to God, and it is therefore not inconsistent with a sound and thorough theology to say that when a man does not know much about God, if he turns to all he does know, he who looketh upon the *heart*, and is worshipped *in spirit*, will receive him, and forgive him. So even some of those who have cursed the Christ of the church, simply because they were utterly ignorant of him, — for over the eyes of many has such a mist of prejudice been drawn by other hands than their own, that in the midst of Christendom they are as ignorant of Christ as the heathen, — but who have turned towards every idea of loveliness, and towards God as they knew him, in faith and repentance, will be saved in the infinite mercy of God, and saved through the very Christ they were thought to have rejected. And though there be a probation, it may be that some will come from the slums of London and New York, as well as "from the east and west, and sit down with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob." These views seem to us not only consistent with, but involved in, the true idea of a probation upon earth.

When we look at Dr. Farrar's positive arguments in favor of his view, they seem to us exceedingly unsatisfactory. The Scriptural argument is weak and contains materials for its own refutation. Nothing new seems to have been added to the discussion of the word *αἰώνιος*, and the arguments are the same that have long been before the American public. The

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great argument from the Scriptures upon this question is derived from the impression they convey to a candid reader. This is Dr. Farrar's chief support, and forms the staple of his sermons. But does Dr. Farrar gain the same impression from the Scriptures that the great majority of pious readers in all ages have gained? It does not seem to us that he does; nor do his quotations from the Fathers convince us. The impression which the Scriptures naturally make is illustrated by the words of whose mistranslation Dr. Farrar complains. The original meaning of the English words "hell" and "damn," was precisely that of the Greek words for which they stand. Their present meaning is widely different, but from what did the change arise? It arose from the connotation imposed upon these words by the impression the Scriptures made upon the popular mind. The present meaning of these words is involved in the doctrine of Scripture, and cannot be removed by any mechanical process. Change the words, and in a few years "judge" will have in the Bible the same force as "damn" has at present. In fact the words were not mistranslated, but the connotation of which Dr. Farrar complains has come upon them since, and that through the Scriptures. This proves what the general impression of Scripture upon the mind is, and shows how far Dr. Farrar has gone astray.

The philosophical argument is equally unsatisfactory to us. It is derived principally from the love of God. This Dr. Farrar believes will lead God always to labor for the recovery of sinning creatures, and will have such a tendency to produce the final union of all things in harmony with the divine head that it may excite eternal hope. This seems to us an extremely loose argument. A similar argument would prove the non-existence of evil equally well. God's love of his creatures is so great, it might be said, that he will never suffer men to fall into sin, and its consequent misery. The futility of this argument lies in the fact that it takes into consideration no other force than simple love, and forgets that possibly there are other principles controlling God's action with which we are imperfectly acquainted. Such an argument, as well as Dr. Farrar's conception of punishment and of the attitude of God towards sinners in a future world, seems to us to contradict the idea of God's justice. All punishment is thought by Dr. Farrar to be corrective, i.e. to be chastisement, and God in his relation to sinners in another world to have no reference to any other being, or beings, than the sinners themselves. Now it seems to us that there are governmental relations of God to his creatures, and that there is such a thing as justice. New England theology does not hold to a mechanical justice, for it teaches that the impulses of God's justice are never satisfied except under the control of his love. But love sometimes calls for the exercise of retributive justice and shuts out mercy. It does on earth (p. 104), and it does in heaven. Justice calls for God's expression of his disapproval of sin, and if he does not express it, and turn

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away in abhorrence from the sinner, i.e. does not *punish* him, in distinction from *chastizing* him, it seems to us that he violates justice, shows that he has no love for the good, and therefore that he is not good, and therefore is not God.

Dr. Farrar seems to us to have failed in affording real or permanent relief from the difficulties of the subject. He leaves the possibility of the eternal punishment of some uncontradicted. But if the eternal punishment of many is inconsistent with God's love, so is the eternal punishment of one. We are dealing with a *perfect* being. Archbishop Whately well showed the futility of such efforts to relieve the difficulty as these in his remark that it is as difficult to change one atom as a whole mountain of lead to silver. It is as inconsistent with the love of a perfect being to punish eternally one sinner as one million sinners. Even Universalism gives no real relief, for the difficulty lies farther back, where one whom Dr. Farrar quotes puts it, when he says: "I see not one ray to disclose to me the reason why *sin came into the world*, why the earth *is strewed* with the dying and the dead, and why man must suffer to all eternity." The difficulty is in the *existence* of evil. Albert Barnes received and taught the New England theology. That theology feels this great difficulty, and standing with uncovered head before God confesses our inability to explain it, but leaves it to the explanation of a purer and loftier world, with a full confidence that if God's reasons are *hidden*, they are yet *wise*.

F. H. F.

THEOLOGICAL LECTURES on Subjects connected with Natural Theology, Evidences of Christianity, the Canon and Inspiration of Scripture. By the late William Cunningham, D.D., Principal and Professor of Church History, New College, Edinburgh. 8vo. pp. 625. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1878.

Dr. Cunningham was a man of strong mind and indomitable will. His style of writing, although diffuse, and redundant of emphasis, is yet vigorous. The present lectures are interesting, as they give a specimen of the theological methods which were sanctioned by the Free church of Scotland during the first year of its existence — the methods which prevailed in that church five and thirty years ago. We select only one topic, the treatment of which gives a fair view of Dr. Cunningham's general habit of reasoning.

Our readers well know that he advocated the theory of verbal inspiration. He sometimes speaks of "complete and plenary inspiration," sometimes of "plenary or verbal inspiration," and sometimes of "plenary verbal inspiration." He says: "We think that in fairness the word 'plenary' should be reserved for the view which asserts the entire verbal inspiration" (p. 345). According to this nomenclature, the divines who do not believe in the *verbal*, do not believe in the *full*, plenary inspiration of the Bible.

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This nomenclature is, of course, a wise strategic measure for Dr. Cunningham. He means by "verbal inspiration" the idea that the Holy Spirit not merely suggested the truth to the sacred writers, but also "suggested to them the words in which the matter he communicated to them was to be conveyed" (p. 346). "The verbal inspiration of the Scripture implies in general that the words of Scripture were suggested or dictated by the Holy Spirit, as well as the substance of the matter, and this not only in some portions of Scripture, but through the whole" (p. 349). These assertions, however, are somewhat modified by others, as, for example: "In one sense or respect, the Scripture is wholly the word of God; and — in another sense or respect, though just as truly and really, it is wholly the word of man" (p. 353). Statements like this are repeated in various forms: "Any doctrine short of that of verbal inspiration is inconsistent with this position, and necessarily implies that the Bible is partly the word of God and partly the word of man, but is in no sense wholly the word of either" (p. 370). "Every portion of God's word is also in some sense man's word, as it has all passed through some man's mind, and been brought in some way into contact with his faculties, and with his faculties in exercise" (p. 374).

Dr. Cunningham insists that his theory has no respect to the *mode* of inspiration; that it relates merely to the *fact* of it; still, he insists that inspiration "respects primarily and principally not the authors, but the books"; we cannot avoid certain difficulties "except by unequivocally asserting the doctrine of the plenary verbal inspiration of the books" (p. 356). Here Dr. Cunningham differs from many divines who suppose that the writers were divinely inspired, and in this sense their writings were; the inspiration affected the writers primarily, and the writings secondarily. The question whether the *writers* or the *writings* "primarily and principally" were inspired involves a question of mode, as well as of fact.

Dr. Cunningham places his main reliance on two passages, as proving that the whole Bible was inspired "plenarily and verbally." One of his proof-texts is 2 Tim. iii. 16. Notwithstanding the contrary opinion of able critics, he sees "no ground whatever for doubting," and is "firmly persuaded" that this passage is an assertion not that "every Scripture inspired by God is also profitable," etc., but that "all Scripture is inspired, and is profitable for doctrine," etc. The word θεόπνευστος means "God breathed." "It is not the authors of the books of Scripture that are here spoken of, but the books themselves." These books "were breathed or inspired by God, that is, they were produced by the agency of the Spirit, just as man's words are produced by him, through his breathing, and in the exercise of his ordinary organs of speech. The Scripture here spoken of, and referred to the inspiration of God as its cause, consists wholly of words. The words wholly make or constitute it. The Scripture in a certain sense is words, and nothing but words, and therefore every-

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thing predicated of the Scripture, naturally and obviously must be held to apply to the words which compose it" (p. 361). "It was the Scripture, and not the contents or substance of it, not the truths or sentiments conveyed by it, or the facts narrrated, but the Scripture, that was divinely inspired; and what distinct meaning can we attach to this statement, unless we admit that the Scripture as it stands, composed wholly of words, the words which make it up, is to be traced to the agency or operation of the Holy Spirit" (pp. 361, 362).

The other proof-text on which Dr. Cunningham relies for the complete verbal inspiration of the Bible is 1 Cor. ii. 13. Here Paul asserts that his "instructions were communicated not in words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth" (p. 366). Dr. Cunningham supposes that the force of this proof-text is enhanced by the fact that the writings of the New Testament are put upon a level with the writings of the Old. Both the Testaments are said to be written in the words which God teaches. In 2 Tim. iii. 14–16 Paul says: "Continue thou in the things which thou hast learned, and hast been assured of, knowing of whom thou hast learned them, and that from a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures," etc. Here Dr. Cunningham says: "There are here two grounds on which Paul requires of Timothy to adhere with unshaken confidence to the doctrines which he had been taught — the first was, that he had been taught them by Paul himself, 'knowing of whom thou hast learned them'; and the second was, that they were all based upon and confirmed by the Scriptures of the Old Testament, which had been all given by inspiration of God. And of course the only ground on which he could have been justified in thus putting the authority of his own instructions upon a level with those of the Old Testament was, that his discourses were to be traced to the same inspiring agency as they were, i.e. both as to the words and the ideas they proceeded from the Holy Spirit, as their source and author" (p. 366). Dr. Cunningham does not refer to the fact that the best manuscripts, instead of the reading εἰδὼς παρὰ τίνος ἔμαθες, give the reading εἰδὼς παρὰ τίνων ἔμαθες; the plural τίνων referring, probably, not to Paul, but to the mother Lois and grandmother Eunice, mentioned in i. 5.

Dr. Cunningham is valiant in answering various objections against his theory. Thus "Paul sometimes discovers a doubt and a change of purpose as to the time of his journeyings," etc. (Dr. Hill); but Paul was verbally inspired to express his doubt and change of purpose (pp. 380, 381). He spake as a fool when he boasted; but he was verbally inspired to state that he thus spake (pp. 382, 383). The evangelists differ from each other in repeating the same discourse or sentence of our Lord; but the Spirit accommodated himself to the faculties of the inspired men, and in this accommodation "left room for whatever diversity in their narratives was consistent with their veracity and accuracy" (p. 384). The

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verbal differences found in uninspired witnesses are deemed a sign of their truthfulness. Is it quite certain that such verbal differences "could not have been produced by the Holy Spirit, who had resolved to use the instrumentality of men's faculties in this matter, and to use them in such a way as to make the works produced contain plain internal evidences of their integrity and veracity as men?" (p. 387). The author of one Gospel may have quoted from a previously written document; in directing him to quote from it the Holy Spirit directed him to use the words of it. In 1 Cor. vii. 12, the words "I speak, not the Lord," were suggested or dictated by the Holy Spirit. It is commonly objected to the doctrine of verbal inspiration that the writers of the New Testament do not cite the Old Testament in its exact translation, but cite it in the translation of the Seventy, even when this translation is inaccurate. Dr. Cunningham, however, founds an argument for verbal inspiration on the manner in which the New Testament quotes from the Old. He refers to those passages "in which Christ and his apostles manifestly base an argument upon the precise words employed in the quotations they adduced from the Old Testament. This we find they did in many cases, and this affords a proof that they reckoned the Old Testament verbally inspired" (p. 369).

There are some objections against his theory which Dr. Cunningham does not answer in a very positive way. He admits that "Christ unquestionably promised to his apostles verbal inspiration when they should be brought before kings and rulers" (p. 365). He would of course admit that the promise made to the original disciples extended to the apostle Paul. Paul, then, had the promise of verbal inspiration when he was brought before the Jewish Sanhedrim. But Dr. Cunningham says: "There has been a difference of opinion among commentators as to the warrantableness and the innocency of Paul's conduct recorded in Acts xxiii. 6, 7; some holding that it lay within the limits of legitimate prudence and dexterity, and others that it did not, but partook somewhat of the character of an equivocal artifice. The inspiration of the Scriptures is not affected by these doubts or difficulties about some of the actions of good men recorded there, and neither is it affected by similar doubts or difficulties in regard to some of their sayings or speeches, which are also recorded without any very certain intimation being in all cases given to us as to whether the sayings and speeches were themselves suggested by the Holy Spirit, and in all respects accordant with God's will" (p. 351). See also the remarks on the speech of Stephen (pp. 351, 352).

From the same Publishing House which has sent forth the volume just noticed, are coming annually, or even monthly, various works which are of great value. Some of these, not hitherto noticed in the Bibliotheca Sacra, are BEAUTY FOR ASHES; by Alexander Dickson. 12mo. pp. 435.—HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION IN EUROPE IN THE TIME OF CALVIN. By the Rev. J. H. Merle D'Aubigne, D.D. Translated by William L. R.

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Cates. Vol. vii. pp. 576, and vol. viii. 12mo. pp. 464. This eighth volume completes the entire work, and contains a General Index of ninety-four pages. In the Appendix is a fac-simile of the Indulgence issued by Pope Leo X, the sale of which by Tetzel in 1517 was the occasion of Luther's famous ninety-five Theses affixed to the Church door of Wittenberg. — BERNARDINO OCHINO, OF SIENNA: A Contribution towards the History of the Reformation. By Karl Benrath. Translated from the German by Helen Zimmern. With an Introductory Preface by William Arthur, A.M. 8vo. pp. 304. This volume is an important addition to the history of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

ALL SAINTS' DAY, and other Sermons. By the Rev. Charles Kingsley, M.A., Late Rector of Eversley and Canon of Westminster. Edited by the Rev. W. Harrison, M. A., Rector of Brighton. 12mo. pp. 410. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1878.

Several of these sermons are remarkable specimens of extemporaneous writing. They are interesting, as they probably illustrate the habitual style of Mr. Kingsley in the pulpit. They prove that he was not a logician, nor a theologian, nor a Biblical exegete; yet that he was a man of excellent sense, wide observation, a fine command of his mother tongue; a master of terse, vigorous English; a philanthropic, benevolent Christian. His sermons are remarkable for their bold, unqualified statements. At this day we are not accustomed to hear, from the pulpit, that "God the mighty Maker died"; but we find in the Canon's sermons many expressions like the following: "God, who said 'Whoso sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed,' is the very same being, the very same God, who was born of the Virgin Mary, crucified under Pontius Pilate." "The Lord Christ who was born of the Virgin Mary, and crucified under Pontius Pilate, is the Maker, the Master, the Ruler of this world — of all worlds" (p. 61). "Thou hast not copied God, thy God, who died that thou mightest live" (p. 63). "On this day God agonized for man" (p. 90, Sermon on Good Friday).

Perhaps these sermons owed their popular influence, in some degree, to their rapid flow of thought and their freedom from prolonged explanations and intricate definitions. Their author uses an English word, sometimes in one sense, and sometimes in another, without stopping to explain which. He relies on his context for the explanation of his meaning. If he were a theological controversialist he would be accused of contradicting himself on a variety of subjects. Take, for one among several examples, his remarks on the punitive character of our earthly afflictions. In his sermon on "Sins of Parents visited" he writes: "We are tempted at times to say, 'the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge.' That is, we are punished not for what we have done wrong, but for what our fathers did wrong. One man says, my forefathers squan-

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dered their money, and I am punished by being poor" (p. 238). "But, some of you may say, is it not so after all? Is it not true? Is not God harder on some than on others? Does not God punish men every day for their father's sins? Does he not say in the second commandment that he will do so, and visit the sins of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation," etc., etc. (p. 240). In another sermon the author says: The laws of nature "punish us" (p. 177). "There are those who will hear such words with a smile, even with a sneer, and say, such wholesale judgments of God, even granting that there are such things, are, after all, very rare: it is very seldom that a whole class, a whole system of society, is punished in mass; and why, then, need we trouble ourselves about so remote a probability? Then know this: that as surely as God sometimes punishes wholesale, so surely is he always punishing in detail. By that infinite concatenation of moral causes and effects, which makes the whole world one mass of special providences, every sin of ours will punish itself, and probably punish itself in kind" (pp. 409, 340).

In other passages Mr. Kingsley denies that the pains of this life are punishments. Thus he writes: "Blessed news, that chastisement is not punishment, but the education of a Father" (p. 132). "I have seen it, thank God. How some of the purest and noblest women, some of the ablest and most right-minded men, will spring from families, will be reared in households, where everything was against them, where there was everything to make them profligate, false, reckless — in a word, bad — except the grace of God, which was trying to make them good, and succeeded in making them good — and how, though they have felt the punishment of their parents' sin upon them in many ways during their whole life, yet that has been to them not a mere punishment, but a chastisement, a purifying medicine, a cross to be borne, which only stirred them up to greater watchfulness against sin, to greater earnestness in educating their children, to greater activity and energy in doing right, and giving their children the advantages which they had not themselves" (pp. 241, 242). "Now even if you suffer somewhat in this life for your sins, that suffering is not punishment, but wholesome chastisement, as when a father chastens the son in whom he delighteth" (p. 246).

Messrs Scribner, Armstrong, and Company, the publishers of Kingsley's Sermons, are continuing to do an admirable work for our churches in continuing to issue the theological series of T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh. Among these works are the first volume of Meyer's COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS, and the first volume of his COMMENTARY ON THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. — THE SYMBOLIC PARABLES OF THE CHURCH, THE WORLD, AND THE ANTICHRIST; being the Separate Predictions of the Apocalypse, viewed in their Relation to the General Truths of Scripture. 12mo. pp. 301. — THEISM: being the Baird Lec-

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ture for 1876. By Robert Flint, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh, author of the Philosophy of History in Europe, etc. 12mo. pp. 432. — THE TRAINING OF THE TWELVE; or Passages out of the Gospels exhibiting the Twelve Disciples of Jesus under Discipline for the Apostleship. Second edition, revised and improved, by Alexander Balmain Bruce, D.D., Professsor of Theology, Free Church College, Glasgow. 8vo. pp. 539. — A CHRONOLOGICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LIFE OF CHRIST. By Ch. Ed. Caspari. From the Original German Work, revised by the author. Translated, with additional Notes, by Maurice J. Evans, B.A., with Map of the Scene of our Lord's Labors, and Plan of Jerusalem. 8vo. pp. 313.

PHILOCHRISTUS. Memoirs of a Disciple of the Lord. 12mo. pp. 412. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1878.

The design of this book indicates considerable genius; the execution of it not so much. If the details of it had equalled the main plan, the volume would have attained a wide circulation.

Philochristus writes as a contemporary, companion, disciple of our Lord, and aims to explain the narrative of our Lord's life in a rationalistic way. In this way he describes several of the works which the Evangelists represent as miraculous. Christ fed the five thousand and the four thousand with the "bread of life" (pp. 206, 207). The devils, whose name was Legion, and who possessed the "man, lank and lean, coming out from the rocks" at Gadara, "declared that they were swine, and three thousand in number" (pp. 132, 134). Not all the versions in the book are so unskilful as these. There are found in it some ingenious turns of thought, and some fine points of style. On the whole, however, the narrative lacks plausibility. There are doubtless cases of "false vision" in the world; but there is no case of so many persons uniting in the same false vision as, according to Philochristus, united in seeing the Saviour after his crucifixion. A narrative of one event may be probable, when a narrative of many events, just like that one, may be incredible. For a short time the imitation of the antique style, as it appears in this volume, enchants the reader, but after a while it cloys him. This is not a volume which can be read continuously with pleasure.

ORTHODOXY, with Preludes on Current Events. By Joseph Cook. 12mo. pp. 343. Boston: James R. Osgood and Co. 1878.

We perceive that Mr. Cook's Lectures are republished in Great Britain *with the Preludes*. These Preludes have reference, in general, to topics purely American. As some English readers have called for the Lectures without the Preludes, so some Americans have called for the Preludes without the Lectures. The plan of combining the popular style of the Preludes with the abstract style of the Lectures, is, so far as we know,

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original with Mr. Cook. We first noticed it in his "Music Hall Lectures," delivered at Lynn, Massachusetts.

It is a wise remark of Charles Kingsley that "we shall gain more instruction, though not amusement, by hunting out the good in anything than by hunting out the evil." Mr. Cook is not immaculate as a reasoner or as a writer; but his Lectures develop uncommon power of argumentation and unusual brilliancy of rhetoric. He could not have obtained his present eminence, and have commanded the attention of so many and of such eminent clergymen in so many States of our Republic and in so many parts of the Old World, if he had not exhibited rare powers of thought and expression. It is with an author as it is with a man: positive excellence is generally combined with positive faults; what is called faultlessness is often conjoined with tameness; a negative character and a negative style are less inspiriting and therefore less useful than the positive. Both in character and in style Mr. Cook belongs to the positive order. In these days the positive class of men are needed. Even the readers who feel justified in criticising him can derive much benefit from him. All those, who are in favor of a more doctrinal and intellectual style of preaching than that which now prevails, have reason to favor the efforts of Mr. Cook in making the platform and the pulpit more instructive than the popular taste has in late years demanded.

VISIONS: A Study of False Sight (Pseudopia). By Edward K. Clark, M.D. With an Introduction and Memorial Sketch, by Oliver Wendell Holmes, M D. 12mo. pp. 315. Boston: Houghton, Osgood, and Co; The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1878.

The Introduction to this work is more than interesting. It includes a valuable though short biography of Dr. Clark, who was a remarkable man, and wrote the present work under remarkable circumstances. The main design of the volume is to show that there are false visions, to explain them on scientific principles, to state the causes of them, to recite instances in which they have been experienced, etc. The celebrated visions of Spinoza, Lord Brougham, and other eminent men, of the dying, of the insane, are scientifically explained. Dr. Clark's criticism on Macbeth's vision of the dagger is quite satisfactory.

The theologian will be interested in the general theory of Dr. Clark. Some writers will perhaps apply the theory to invalidate the doctrine of miracles; particularly such miracles as those of Paul on his way to Damascus. Pastors may derive practical aid from the volume in explaining the visual experiences of the sick; the voluntary visions of children, etc.

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
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